上市公司独立董事激励约束机制的设计

我国在上市公司中引入独立董事制度,为避免其流于形式,须凭借声誉激励、报酬激励和法律责任约束来构建科学的激励约束机制来激励约束独立董事。     

独立董事的市场激励约束

独立董事制度的完善需要从多方面着手。建立完善的独立董事市场,对独立董事进行激励约束是其中的一个方面。本文就此发表一点看法。     

浅谈独立董事制度与财务管理

本文阐述了健全规范有效的独立董事制度与公司财务管理目标的顺利实现之间的密切联系。本文着重从独立董事的选拔机制,董事机构设置,责权的界定,激励和约束机制等方面提出了关于完善独立董事制度的建议。     

浅谈独立董事制度与财务管理

本文阐述了健全规范有效的独立董事制度与公司财务管理目标的顺利实现之间的密切联系.本文着重从独立董事的选拔机制,董事机构设置,责权的界定,激励和约束机制等方面提出了关于完善独立董事制度的建议.     

独立董事制度重构探析

独立董事是与上市公司及相关利益主体无重大关联关系,并对公司财务状况和业务运作进行监督和决策辅助的人员.当前,我国的独立董事制度尚不完善,远未发挥应有的作用.本文对独立董事的职能予以重新定位,对独立董事的产生机制进行了重新设计,并对独立董事的激励和约束机制进行了创新尝试,力图对独立董事的价值发挥和管理推进进行探索.     

我国民营上市公司治理对策研究——基于独立董事制度的视角

独立董事制度对完善民营上市公司治理有重大意义,但是目前我国独立董事制度仍存在一定的缺陷从而没有发挥其真正效用。本文以独立董事对民营上市公司的影响以及我国独立董事制度的缺陷为基础,就完善我国民营上市公司独立董事制度提出了完善立法,提高独立董事独立性,保障独立董事信息知情权,完善激励和约束机制等方面的建议。     

基于委托-代理关系的独立董事制度重构研究

文旨在运用委托—代理关系理论,对公司治理结构中独立董事“败德”行为的经济成因及其影响因素进行分析与研究。力图揭示我国独立董事制度存在问题的内在根源,并进行一些激励约束制度重构,为我国上市公司管理部门提供决策参考。     

我国民营上市公司治理对策研究-基于独立董事制度的视角

独立董事制度对完善民营上市公司治理有重大意义，但是目前我国独立董事制度仍存在一定的缺陷从而没有发挥其真ff-~h＇／。本文以独立董事对民营上市公司的影响以及我国独立董事制度的缺陷为基础，就完善我国民营上市公司独立董事制度提出了完善立法，提高独立董事独立性，保障独立董事信息知情权，完善激励和约束机制等方面的建议。     

我国上市公司独立董事业绩评价研究

我国上市公司独立董事指导意见规定了独立董事应具备一定的任职条件,但未能明确规定上市公司应对独立董事进行规范的评价。在独立董事运行机制框架内建立一个对独立董事的业绩进行评估的约束机制成为当前的迫切需要。本文分析了上市公司独立董事业绩评价体系框架的构建,提出业绩评价的主体、组织方式以及评价具体内容、方法指标等,以期能够合理有效地激励、监督和制约独立董事。     

引入第三方调节机制的我国独立董事制度再设计

独立董事制度引入我国已经有十余年的历史,取得一定效果的同时也受到很多质疑。本文从博弈论的视角分析了独立董事在我国未能充分发挥作用的原因,提出引入第三方独立董事数据库的建议,改变目前独立董事制度的选聘制度、薪酬发放方式以及激励和约束机制,以期解决独立董事目前的困局。     

我国上市公司独立董事制度若干特征分析

From three different perspectives, namely, the basic characteristics of independent directors, the percentage of independent directors on board and its relation to company performance, and the remuneration for independent directors and its relation to company performance, we could summarize implementation characteristics of the independent director institution in China: the age distribution of independent directors is relatively even and the majority of them are academic staff and researchers with business administration backgrounds; a positive relationship between the independent director’s remuneration and company performance, as well as between the number of independent directors on board and the company performance. Translated from Guanli Shijie 管理世界 (Management World), 2003, (6): 110–121     

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Will Change the Governance of Non Profit Organizations

As a public director of a NASDAQ stock exchange listed public corporation, I have seen how quickly the reforms in corporate governance imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have changed procedures and policies in public corporations. In areas such as transparency of financial records and other financial matters including compensation of top executives and conflict of interest policies affecting both corporate boards of directors and employees of the corporation the reforms of this new federal law have quickly changed corporate practices in many corporations. Many persons who have studied this new law believe that these changes will benefit the public, shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders in the modern corporation by increasing the reputation of these organizations for integrity and transparency. Stock exchanges such as NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange now require all listed companies to have (after a transition time) a majority of independent directors on their boards of directors. Only independent directors may serve on the audit, nominating and compensation committees of boards in most cases. Some exceptions are made to these rules for foreign and domestic issues of companies where a majority of the voting power is held by one person. According to Morrison & Foster LLP, Corporate Board Advisory March , 2004, NASDAQ requires that the board of directors of a listed company determine that an independent director does not have a relationship that would “interfere with the exercise of independent judgment” in carrying out the responsibilities of a director. Donald Grunewald served as President of Mercy College from 1972 to 1984. He has served as a member of the board of trustees of several colleges and proprietary educational institutions and on the boards of other charitable institutions. Currently he is a member of the Board of Directors of EVCI Career Colleges, Inc., a NASDAQ listed corporation.     

浙江省上市公司董事会组成与公司绩效研究

利用浙江省上市公司的数据,应用SPSS统计软件,选择净资产收益率和每股收益作为被解释变量,选择董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事长与总经理的两职是否分离和控股股东担任董事比例四个指标作为解释变量,建立回归模型,对浙江省上市公司董事会组成与公司绩效关系进行实证分析。结果显示,控股股东成员担任的董事比例与浙江省上市公司业绩正相关,而且,董事长与总经理分设是现代公司治理的发展趋势。     

对国有独资公司完善法人治理结构的探讨

国有独资公司是国企转轨公司制运作的较为常见的实现形式，一方面这是国有企业建立企业制度的积极探索，另一方面又因其具有股东唯一的特殊产权结构造成内部法人治理制度的局限性。文章分析了国有独资公司法人治理结构的缺陷，明确应以董事会建设为核心，以引进外部董事为措施，完善国有独自公司的法人治理结构。     

Regulatory Sanctions on Independent Directors and Their Consequences to the Director Labor Market: Evidence from China

We investigate the regulatory sanctions imposed on independent directors for their firms’ financial frauds in China. These regulatory sanctions are prima-facie evidence of significant lapses in business ethics. During the period 2003–2010, 302-person-time independent directors were penalized by the regulator (the China Securities Regulatory Commission—the CSRC), and the two stock exchanges. We find that the independent directors with accounting experiences are more likely to be penalized by the CSRC, though they do not suffer more severe penalties than do the other sanctioned independent directors. We also find that independent directors suffer less severe penalties than do the insider directors. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the sanctions on independent directors are tied to their assumed ethical and legal responsibilities. Following a regulatory sanction, penalized independent directors experience a significant decline in the number of other board seats held. However, they can gain board seats in better quality firms. We find that interlocked firms that share penalized independent directors with the fraud firm do not suffer from a valuation decline. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory sanctions have not triggered further sanctions on the penalized directors in the labor market but they have, instead, created a disincentive for these directors to serve on the company boards of high-risk firms.     

我国董事会约束机制现状及其问题——对我国500家上市公司的描述性实证分析

完善的董事会约束机制是确保上市公司董事会有效参与公司决策与监督的关键。由于我国上市公司处于由行政型治理向经济型治理转化的过程中,公司治理的各项外部监督机制如公司控制权市场、产品市场、专业董事市场等对上市公司董事会的约束力较弱。掌握董事会治理的状况,强化对董事会的约束,对提高董事会治理的效率具有一定的指导意义。     

The value of independent directors: Evidence from China

This paper comprehensively investigates the contribution of independent directors to Chinese listed enterprises through a unique natural experiment. Our results show that in China, independent directors who are incumbent or retired government officials can promote the performance of privately controlled listed enterprises, while other independent directors make little contribution to Chinese listed enterprises. In fact, Chinese independent directors cannot play monitoring and advising roles effectively and even exacerbate the agency problem in listed enterprises. Among them, government official independent directors, however, enable privately controlled listed enterprises to access public resources to enhance firm performance. It can be concluded that Chinese independent directors act as “vases for decoration” on boards. Even worse, government official independent directors play important roles in firms' rent-seeking activities. Our findings provide sufficient new evidence for the classic theory of independent directors and may shed light on corporate governance in other emerging economies.     

反思独立董事制度

独立董事制度是为缓解上市公司内部人控制完善公司治理而建立的。在新情形下 ,其存在独立性难保、目标定位不明确、信息不对称等问题。明确独立董事法律责任并建立风险就业机制 ,强化信誉机制促使其在公司治理中发挥作用 ,关键取决与独立董事的力量与企业内部其他监控力量的并行使用 ,使公司决策控制权与决策经营权相分离 ,以增强独立董事对管理层的监督和控制。     

社会网络视角下独立董事与企业创新绩效

本文以2007~2015年中国A股上市公司为样本,利用社会网络分析方法,考察不同专业背景独立董事的网络中心度对企业创新绩效影响的差异.研究发现:独立董事网络有助于企业创新绩效的提高,即独立董事网络中心度与企业创新绩效有显著的正相关关系;对独立董事的专业背景进行区分后,发现上市公司拥有技术背景独立董事时,公司独立董事网络中心度与创新绩效的正向关系显著增强.独立董事的网络位置是影响企业创新绩效的重要因素,这种影响随公司是否拥有技术背景独立董事而不同.     

Board independence, firm performance and ownership concentration: Evidence from Chile

What determines the composition of companies' boards in the context of high ownership concentration? Are independent directors important as an internal governance mechanism in companies with high ownership concentration? Do markets favor companies whose controlling shareholders use voting rights to elect professional directors?Using a four-year, 160-company panel data, and controlling for endogeneity, this paper addresses these three related questions, finding that an increase in the proportion of outside directors affects company value. The paper also finds that companies that present more exacerbated agency conflicts tend to incorporate professional directors to the boards, in an effort to improve corporate governance and ameliorate the agency problem.