风险分类对保险市场效率的影响分析

本文将社会福利作为衡量保险市场效率的标准,分析保险人的风险分类行为是否有助于信息不对称保险市场效率的提高.本文首先证明了信息不对称保险市场存在市场失灵,然后比较了实施风险分类前后社会福利的差异.结论表明:当保险市场处于R-S均衡时,准确性较高的分类能使社会福利得到改进,准确性不高的分类不能使社会福利得到改进;当保险市场...     

发达保险市场法人公司准入制度浅谈

法人公司准入是保险市场监管的源头环节和重要内容,也是监管部门平衡保险市场、实施宏观调控和微观管理的重要手段。通过对保险市场主体资格的确立、审核和确认,监管部门筛选合格主体进入保险市场开展保险经营活动,有助于保险市场的安全和高效运转。     

我国环境责任保险制度模式选择

我国全面进入工业化阶段,环境污染事故处于频发期,亟需构建我国的环境责任保险制度。构建的基点是选定环境责任保险的模式,国外在环境责任保险方面主要存在三种模式,以环境责任自愿保险为主,强制保险为辅的英法模式：以环境责任强制保险为主导的美国、瑞典、芬兰模式,环境责任强制保险与财务保证或担保相结合的德国模式。考虑到我国目前环境问题压力和保险市场的不成熟,我们应该选择以环境责任强制保险为主导,以环境责任自愿保险为辅的模式作为过渡,随着环境责任保险在我国的成熟发展,逐步从环境责任强制保险向自愿保险转变。     

车险捆绑销售析

《中华人民共和国道路交通安全法》(以下简称《道交法》)于2004年5月1日起正式施行。为了有效地保护交通事故中的受害者，消除“穷肇事”和消灭或减少“肇事逃逸”事件的发生，《道交法》第十七条明确规定，国家实行机动车第三者责任强制保险制度。《道交法》实施以来，保险市场上出现了一些保险机构拒绝单独承保机动车第三者责任保险的情形，有些公司以推行第三者责任强制保险为由强行捆绑销售车损险及多个附加险。     

欠发达地区信贷市场与经济发展——以内蒙古为例

相对于股票市场、保险市场来说,信贷市场一直以来都是欠发达西部地区金融发展的首要力量。本文以内蒙古为例,用12盟市2001年-2007年的面板数据,实证分析了信贷市场对当地经济发展速度与效率的影响。结果表明当前内蒙古的信贷市场有助于经济增长速度的加快,却不能对经济效率的提高发挥作用。     

对我国保险保障基金制度的思考

由于保险经营的特殊性和经营环境的不确定性,很多国家建立了保险保障基金制度。但是,保险市场中存在的信息不对称容易导致道德风险、委托代理、市场效率与社会福利降低等问题。本文通过分析保险保障制度造成的负面效应和国际经验,提出了一系列的政策建议,包括确定合理的风险费率及补偿额度,以完善我国的保险保障基金制度。     

强制险上路

今年7月1日起,《机动车交通事故责任强制保险条例》正式实施,我国将推出第一款机动车强制保险。     

保险业市场结构、产寿险结构对“保险-经济增长”系统的影响

本文运用2004～2014年季度数据建立经济增长与保险业发展的非线性动力系统模型,引入保险市场结构与产寿险结构作为控制变量,较为全面、系统的研究和比较了不同控制方案对经济系统的影响。研究发现,我国经济增长与保险业发展存在长期均衡的非线性关系;保险市场集中度降低可以促进经济增长,产寿险结构对经济增长的影响存在差异;在对该经济系统进行最优控制时,需要根据实际情况确定控制偏好,在控制时间、社会福利损失与控制成本之间进行选择;最优控制的结果要求降低保险市场集中度,提高寿险业相对于产险业的规模。     

政府干预、寻租竞争与农业保险的市场运作——基于江苏省淮安市的调查

"政府引导、市场运作"是近年来我国政策性农业保险推行的基本原则。尽管这种安排有助于发挥政府和市场两方面的力量,但是却赋予了地方政府对农业保险市场过大的干预权限。江苏淮安市农业保险市场的案例表明,政府的干预会导致寻租竞争现象的产生,最终损害农业保险的运行效率。为完善农业保险市场运作机制,我国可借鉴美国的经验,统筹农业保险监管职能,合理约束地方政府权限,完善基础数据信息,建立服务评价机制。     

如何完善保险监管

保险监管体制的有效性和规范性是决定保险市场有序和稳定发展的重要基础.保险监管机构作为保险市场监管的主体在整个监管体系中发挥着主导作用,确立有效的监管体制模式,能够提高监管的效率,避免保险市场过分波动.     

Improving the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off: Mandatory Savings Accounts for Social Insurance

In the modern welfare state a substantial part of an individual's tax bill is transferred back to the same individual taxpayer in the form of social transfers. This provides a rationale for financing part of social insurance through mandatory savings accounts. We analyze the behavioral and welfare effects of compulsory savings accounts in an intertemporal model with uncertainty, involuntary unemployment, endogenous retirement decisions, credit constraints, and heterogeneous agents. We show that the introduction of (early) retirement and unemployment accounts generates a Pareto improvement by enabling the government to provide lifetime income insurance and liquidity insurance in a more efficient manner.     

我国保险市场结构的福利分析

本文基于产业组织理论模型分析了保险业市场结构及其相应的福利影响。以社会福利最大化的情形作为基准,考察了寡头竞争市场结构下低、高价保险的产出以及相关的社会福利状况。研究结果表明,保险业寡头竞争的市场结构并没有实现社会福利最大化,政府应对低、高价保险采取不同的政策,以谋求最优产出配置。     

Premium setting and bank behavior in a voluntary deposit insurance scheme

This study analyzes the effect of premium rates on banks’ incentives to join a deposit insurance scheme and their incentives to invest in risky projects under a voluntary deposit insurance scheme. We find that in order to maximize social welfare, the insurance agency must either set the premium rate to be low so as to attract all banks to join the insurance scheme, or not to have the deposit insurance at all. However, the low premium rate in the voluntary scheme does not balance the budget of the deposit insurance. We also show that in the compulsory deposit insurance scheme, however, it is possible to impose an optimal premium rate that can balance the insurance agency’s budget and achieve the highest social welfare. The results also present the dominance of the compulsory scheme over the voluntary scheme in terms of maximizing social welfare and balancing the budget.

Insurance markets and unisex tariffs: is the European Court of Justice improving or destroying welfare?

We analyze the effects of mandatory unisex tariffs in insurance contracts, such as those required by a recent ruling of the European Court of Justice, on equilibrium insurance premia and equilibrium welfare. In a unified framework, we provide a quantitative analysis of the associated insurance market equilibria in both monopolistic and competitive insurance markets. We investigate the welfare loss caused by regulatory adverse selection and show that unisex tariffs may cause market distortions that significantly reduce overall social welfare.     

Consumption Externality and Equilibrium Underinsurance

Relative consumption has been found to be crucial in many areas, such as asset pricing, the design of taxation, and economic growth. This article extends this line of research to the individual's insurance decision. We first define “keeping up with the Joneses” in the purchase of insurance and find that jealousy does not necessarily give rise to “keeping up with the Joneses.” We also identify several sufficient conditions that cause the optimal coverage in the private market to be less than the social optimum (equilibrium underinsurance). Jealousy is found to be neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for equilibrium underinsurance. We further show that a social welfare maximizing government could adopt a tax system to correct for the consumption externality and make individuals better off.     

Mandatory Pensions and the Intensity of Adverse Selection in Life Insurance Markets

This article examines the impact of varying mandatory pensions on saving, life insurance, and annuity markets in an adverse selection economy. Under reasonable restrictions, we find unambiguous effects on market size, participation rates, and equilibrium prices. The degree of adverse selection, whether a market is active or inactive, and social welfare are analyzed.     

Opting Out of Public Insurance: Is It Socially Acceptable?

The privatization of social services is being increasingly discussed. The market of social services is often characterized by market failures, like informational asymmetries, externalities, distributional problems, which all justify public intervention. But the quality of services provided by public authorities or by private insurers in the context of health insurance is different and could be observable. The public reimbursement of health care is often conditional on rules, like the choice of the physician or the hospital, that induce a disutility of using social insurance instead of private insurance. An alternative solution to a complete privatization is to allow some individuals to opt out. We can imagine that the government allows and even in some cases favors part of the population leaving the public health insurance system. We analyze the situations where the opting out is welfare improving. We then study the optimal policy depending on the characteristics of the economy considering a Rawlsian criterion.     

美国强制车险费率制度的特点及其启示——以马萨诸塞州为例

我国交强险实施一年多来社会效益显著，但费率的合理性问题也成为公众关注的焦点之一。本文围绕马萨诸塞州强制车险几十年来的运作实践，深入分析其费率“不过高也不过低”的监管机制，得出费率精算的细化与微调以及允许费率下浮和费率听证的一系列具体做法值得我们借鉴。     

金融创新如何缓解信任品市场失灵?——中国食品安全责任强制保险的自然实验

信任品市场(如食品、医药等)存在的问题一直困扰着中国和世界很多国家。关于产品和服务质量的信息不对称(道德风险和逆向选择)会导致信任品市场失灵。缓解信任品市场失灵,一种常见的解决方案是政府监管;而经济学家认为更加基于市场的解决方案(例如强制责任保险等金融创新)可能更为有效。在理论上,强制责任保险有两种相反的效应:保险公司的监督减少了道德风险 vs. 保险加剧了企业的道德风险,但一直亟待实证检验。幸运的是,中国食品安全责任强制保险的改革实验走在了世界的前列。本文利用了中国在不同地区、不同时间推行的这个自然实验,通过双重差分的方法识别出责任保险对于信任品市场的因果效应。本文的研究发现,强制责任保险能显著降低食品安全事故发生概率。这表明政府强制推行的金融创新可以成为信任品市场失灵的一种有效的替代性解决方案。