对称市场结构、产业研发效率与政府的研发政策

本文在Spencer和Brander(1983)提出的第三国市场模型基础上,分析对称市场结构下,行业的研发效率对一国最优研发政策的影响。研究结果表明,无论他国政府干预其国内企业研发与否,仅当行业研发效率较高(低)时,本国政府的最优研发政策为补贴(征税)。因此,Leahy和Neary(2001)关于研发补贴政策的稳健性同样不适用于一国为寡头市场结构的情形。     

生产分割、异质产品与战略性研发政策

本文利用Spencer和Brander(1983)的第三国市场模型,考虑一个中间品垄断企业向位于本国的一个下游企业和位于外国的另一个下游企业同时出口中间品时,一国政府的战略性研发政策。研究结果表明,一国最优的战略性研发政策是对生产外包企业的研发进行征税,而对生产内包企业的研发进行补贴。此外,两国的战略性研发政策随产品差异度的变化而有可能导致"零和博弈",也有可能陷入"囚徒困境"。而当两国进行研发政策合作时,两国的最优研发政策为补贴,这与Spencer和Brander(1983)的结论正好相反。     

基于技术风险的研发联盟政府补贴政策研究

文章考虑研发存在技术风险,建立了合作研发博弈模型,研究了政府不同财政补贴方式（研发投入补贴和产品补贴）下的企业研发和生产策略。通过理论和数值仿真分析找出了不同补贴政策下的企业最优策略和相应的社会福利,并就政府的研发补贴政策提出了相应建议。研究表明,两种补贴政策均无法实现社会福利的最优解,研发难度较小的情况下宜采用研发投入补贴,研发难度较大的情况下应采用产品补贴,以此提高企业研发投入和社会福利。     

外溢效应、预先承诺和最优研发政策

根据企业与政府预先承诺能力不同，本文在一个研发活动中存在外溢效应的动态框架下考察了三种情形下的最优研发政策：FCE（完全预先承诺均衡）情形下，存在转移租金激励、外溢及反外溢激励的权衡，且在外溢及反外溢激励较大的情形下，最优政策表现为研发课税；GCE（仅政府预先承诺均）情形下，除了前三种激励，还增加了一项抵消企业策略行为的补贴激励项；SE（序贯均衡）情形下，进一步增加了抵消国内公司操纵第二政府时期补贴策略行为的补贴激励项。在具有显著外溢效应的情形下，SE有可能削弱通常的“市场换技术”论调。     

开放经济条件下的最优产业政策——横向与纵向的利润转移分析

本文分析当一国进口中间产品并出口最终产品时的最优产业政策。在我们的模型里，本国和外国企业在最终产品市场上进行古诺或伯特兰竞争，他们从完全垄断的第三国企业进口中间产品。假设中间产品提供商先决定中间产品的价格，然后下游企业决定减低成本的投资规模和最终产品的产量。最优的产业政策要综合考虑水平利润转移和垂直利润转移的影响，本国政府应该对研发投资补贴还是征税取决于投资的相对回报、技术外溢程度和最终产品的差异性；我们还发现一个特殊的技术外溢值，当中最优的产业政策一定是征税，而这个值又受最终产品的差异性影响。     

谈判势力与中间品关税政策研究

中间品国际贸易对全球贸易举足轻重。当前文献聚焦于最终品关税政策的研究，对中间品关税政策的模型研究关注不足。构建拥有一体化企业和中间品生产企业的D国和拥有依赖中间品进口才能完成生产的最终品生产企业的F国在第三国市场开展产量竞争的博弈模型，分析企业同时或先后进入市场时中间品生产企业的谈判势力对两国中间品关税政策的影响。研究发现：①无论企业是否同时进入第三国市场，一体化企业所在国家均会选择对中间品选择出口征税干预政策，其社会福利与企业进入顺序相关。当最终品生产企业先进入市场或一体化企业与最终品生产企业同时进入市场时，D国社会福利相较于自由贸易时得到优化，当一体化企业先进入市场时，D国社会福利遭到恶化，两国实行的贸易政策陷入“囚徒困境”。②当F国实行贸易干预时，中间品关税政策与企业进入顺序密切相关。当最终品生产企业先进入市场时，F国将对中间产品进口征税；当一体化企业先进入市场或双方同时进入市场时，若谈判势力相对较强，F国将实行征税，反之则会实行进口补贴。     

经济中最优私有比重——经济体制改革的模型描述

文章通过构建混合寡头竞争博弈模型,在封闭经济、具有外来竞争者的封闭经济和开放经济情形下,证明经济中最优私有比重的存在性。模型假定随着私有化的深入,国有企业的生产边际成本会降低。基本结论是:(1)在封闭经济、具有外来竞争者的封闭经济和开放经济情形下,最优私有比重都是存在的;(2)在任意固定的私有比重下,存在最优关税;(3)在具有外来竞争者的封闭经济或者开放经济下,本国关税对本国企业起到了保护作用,随着关税的增加,本国企业的产量会增加,进口和市场产品总量会减少;(4)随着我国私有经济在经济总量中比例的增大,我国企业将向国外市场出口更多的产品,而且国外市场中的产品总量也随着我国私有化水平的提高越来越大。我们的结论可为我国政府进行经济体制改革提供一定的理论依据。     

国际贸易中企业产品消费减污与政府R&D投资政策:基于Bertrand竞争的分析

本文以产品消费排污为基础 ,借鉴国际贸易中垂直差异产品的标准模型 ,建立国际贸易中差异减污模型 ,分析发达国家及发展中国家企业的产品消费减污选择及政府针对消费减污R&D投资的政策博弈。国际贸易中垂直差异产品的文献显示 ,发达国家与发展中国家的政府在产品 R&D投资政策上呈现不对称性 :非合作 Nash补贴 /征税均衡的特征是发展中国家进行投资补贴 ,发达国家进行投资征税。由于消费者剩余和产品消费负外部性的引入 ,本研究的结果却显示两国政府在产品减污 R&D投资政策上呈现对称性 :两国政府都对本国企业的产品减污 R&D给予补贴     

基于Stackelberg模型的出口补贴政策对经济的影响分析

出口补贴政策一直是各国政府重点研究的战略性贸易政策之一。本文在Stackelberg寡头垄断模型的基础上，分析了当两国企业共同竞争海外市场时，追随者企业所在国的补贴政策对各国经济活动的影响效果。结果显示，补贴政策会增加本国企业的产量，提高本国企业的利润和净福利，甚至会在产品价格下降的情况下提高本国总体福利水平。     

政府支持对中小企业研发投入的影响研究

政府支持对提升中小企业研发投入具有重要意义。基于信号理论和委托代理理论分析资金型政府支持、非资金型政府支持对中小企业研发投入的差异化影响，并进一步探究行业竞争度在这一过程中所发挥的调节作用。利用 309 家中小企业的调研数据进行实证检验，研究结果表明：（1）适度的资金型政府支持有利于促进中小企业研发投入，即资金型政府支持与中小企业研发投入之间存在倒 U 型关系，非资金型政府支持对中小企业研发投入具有正向影响。（2）行业竞争度削弱了资金型政府支持对中小企业研发投入的倒 U 型影响。（3）行业竞争度正向调节非资金型政府支持与中小企业研发投入的关系，即提升行业竞争程度可以增强非资金型政府支持对中小企业研发投入的促进作用。该研究结论有助于我国政府合理制定扶持政策，为中小企业科学使用政府支持以促进研发活动提供有益启示。     

The effect of export tax rebates on export performance: Theory and evidence from China

This paper develops a Cournot quantity competition model to examine the effect of export tax rebate policy on export performance. The main conclusions drawn are as follows: (i) when a government raises the export rebate rate, the output of final goods for export by the domestic firm increases, while the output of the foreign competitor decreases; (ii) when a government raises the export rebate rate, the profit of the domestic firm increases, while that of the foreign competitor decreases; and (iii) the optimum export rebate rate is positive and greater than 1, indicating that the domestic government not only refunds fully the custom duties paid by the domestic firm on imported intermediate goods, but also offers export subsidies for its export of final goods.To corroborate the conclusions drawn based on the theoretical model, empirical analysis was carried out using the statistical data of China from 1985 to 2002. The test results of Spearman rank correlation coefficient show that China's export tax rebate policy has significant positive correlation with its exports, final domestic consumption, and foreign exchange reserve.     

反倾销政策与研发竞争

借助异质产品的Bertrand双寡头模型,本文分析了一国反倾销政策对该国企业和外国企业的研发、产品价格及社会福利的影响。研究结论表明:与自由贸易相比,当产品的差异度较小时,受反倾销政策保护的企业会策略性地利用反倾销政策而退出国外市场,减少研发投入,进而提高产品价格,而遭受反倾销政策约束的外国企业由于其研发投入的边际收入增加,因而会增加研发投入,降低产品价格。此外,反倾销政策的存在还有可能促进各国社会福利的提升。     

中间品、资本品进口的研发溢出效应

本文按照BEC分类法把进口商品分为中间品、资本品和消费品,中间品主要指零部件,资本品主要指机器设备。在对进口贸易研发溢出模型修正的基础上,考察了中间品进口、资本品进口以及控制变量国内研发资本和外国直接投资对中国全要素生产率的影响。结果显示,中间品进口和外国直接投资对我国全要素生产率有显著的正向影响,而资本品进口和国内研发资本对中国全要素生产率有负向影响。在此基础上,根据中国的国情对这些结果进行了合理的解释。     

Local Content Requirements, Vertical Cooperation, and Foreign Direct Investment

Local content requirements (LCRs) have been observed empirically to 1) protect vertically integrated domestic industries and 2) induce inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in intermediate goods production. We examine the effects of an LCR in the context of potential FDI in upstream manufacturing by a foreign multinational and potential vertical cooperation between a host country's upstream and downstream producers. In case of vertical cooperation domestic producers have an incentive to set the price of the intermediate strategically to discourage FDI. Vertical cooperation is found to enhance the rent-shifting effect of the LCR, whereas the FDI response increases price competition and reduces domestic profits. In both cases, manufacturing efficiency and foreign welfare decrease, suggesting the need for multilateral agreement in the WTO to curb the continuing but disguised use of LCRs in industrialized countries.     

Exporting versus Direct Investment under Local Sourcing

This paper examines a setting where foreign direct investment (FDI) shifts demand for an intermediate good from the source to the host country. A domestic and a foreign firm choose between exports or FDI, always sourcing the intermediate locally. We show that by increasing the price of the intermediate, outward FDI can act as a cost-raising strategy for a firm and that attracting FDI can raise host country welfare. Two-way FDI is the equilibrium when the countries have similar market sizes. However, such FDI reduces global welfare relative to two-way exporting since it eliminates indirect competition between suppliers. JEL no. F12, F13, F23, L13     

Competitiveness and Subsidy or Tax Policy for New Technology Adoption in Duopoly

We consider a problem of subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption by duopolistic firms. The technology is developed in and transferred by a foreign country to the domestic country. It is free but each firm must expend some fixed set-up cost for education of its staff to adopt and use it. Assuming that each firm maximizes the weighted average of absolute and relative profits, we examine the relationship between competitiveness and subsidy or tax policies for technology adoption, and show that when firm behavior is not competitive (the weight on the relative profit is small), the optimal policy of the government may be taxation; when firm behavior is competitive (the weight on the relative profit is large), the optimal policy is subsidization or inaction and not taxation. However, if firm behavior is extremely competitive (close to perfect competition), taxation case re-emerges.     

Upstream privatization and downstream licensing

This study attempts to investigate the impact of downstream foreign licensing on upstream privatization policy in a vertically related market, in which a public firm and a domestic private firm supply exclusively to downstream domestic and foreign firms, respectively. We show that downstream licensing occurs when the cost differential between downstream duopolists is small, and the optimal strategy under licensing is upstream partial privatization. In addition, downstream foreign licensing facilitates upstream privatization. We further show that downstream licensing improves (reduces) local welfare when the cost differential is large (small).     

Trade Policy Versus Competition Policy: Substitutes or Complements?

This paper deals with the difference between trade policy and competition policy for domestic prices, wages, and employment when product and labour markets are imperfectly competitive. We show that in the presence of country-specific institutions like trade unions, trade policy and competition policy are no longer substitutes in disciplining product and labour market distortions. While both domestic entry and foreign imports affect domestic price-cost margins, they differ in their effectiveness and their impact on the domestic labour market. The results in this paper suggest that enforcement of competition policy without a sufficient degree of openness to imports is typically not a first-best outcome. While domestic entry increases union welfare, foreign imports reduce it. Competition policy in the presence of labour unions is insufficient to reduce labour market distortions, while international competition reduces both labour and product distortions.     

Optimal commercial policy with imperfect foreign supply

Conclusion Maximizing social welfare when there is one foreign firm requires the imposition of fixed domestic price, which results in increased imports from the foreign firm until it engages in marginal cost pricing. A license fee captures (replaces) the foreign firm's economic profit (loss). Extension to the case where foreign supply consists of more than one firm differs from the one-firm analysis in that, while optimale policy consists of the setting of both a license fee and price level for the import, this may entail levying a tariff on imports from the foreign firms. The fee or tariff, but not both, may be negative.