Environmental Protection and Trade Liberalization in a Small Open Dual Economy

The author investigates the conditions under which environmental protection and trade liberalization might improve urban unemployment and welfare in a small open Harris–Todaro model with polluting urban manufacturing. While a tariff reduction decreases manufacturing employment, a rise in the pollution tax rate may increase it when a dirty input is complementary to capital. Environmental protection and trade liberalization are consistent in reducing the level of urban unemployment because they lower it under the same condition. They are consistent in increasing GDP if a rise in the pollution tax rate decreases manufacturing employment. Otherwise, trade liberalization will mitigate a decrease in GDP because of environmental protection if the degree of urbanization is low and if rural technology exhibits weak diminishing returns to labor. This GDP effect plays a central role in welfare improvement.     

Managerial capital,occupational choice and inequality in a global economy

This study proposes a simple theory of trade with endogenous firm productivity, occupational choice and income inequality. Individuals with different managerial talent choose to become entrepreneurs or workers. Entrepreneurs enhance firm productivity by investing in managerial capital. The model generates three income classes: low‐income workers facing the prospect of unemployment, middle‐income entrepreneurs managing domestic firms and high‐income entrepreneurs managing global firms. Trade liberalization policies raise unemployment and improve welfare. A reduction in per‐unit trade costs raises top incomes and generates labour‐market polarization. A reduction in fixed exporting costs has an ambiguous effect on top incomes and personal income distribution. Policies reducing labour‐market frictions or the costs of managerial‐capital acquisition create more jobs and improve welfare. The income distributional effects of labour‐market policies depend on which policy is implemented.     

Trade and inequality in a directed search model with firm and worker heterogeneity

This paper integrates the insight that exporting firms are typically more productive and employ higher‐skilled workers into a directed search model of the labour market. The model generates a skill premium as well as residual wage inequality among identical workers. A trade liberalization increases the skill premium and likely increases residual inequality among high‐skilled workers. The calibrated model generates results consistent with the prior literature examining the effect of the Canada‐US Free Trade Agreement on the Canadian labour market: a significant decrease in employment in manufacturing, but only a small change in unemployment and wages.     

A Behavioral Model of Unemployment,Sociotropic Concerns,and the Political Economy of Trade Policy

We present a behavioral model in which agents are concerned about the scarring effects from unemployment for themselves and others and explore the manner in which unemployment matters for trade policy. We derive three policy implications: the government has an incentive to increase employment in sectors characterized by “good jobs,” where the good job/bad job characterization depends on an industry's job creation and destruction rates; the government has an incentive to pursue this policy in a gradual fashion by channeling new and unemployed workers into the appropriate sector; and opposition to trade liberalization can be reduced by welfare state policies.     

Trade liberalization and unemployment: Theory and evidence from India

A widely held view among the public is that trade liberalization increases unemployment. Using state and industry-level unemployment and trade protection data from India, we find no evidence of any unemployment increasing effect of trade reforms. In fact, our state-level analysis reveals that urban unemployment declines with trade liberalization in states with flexible labor markets and larger employment shares in net exporter industries. Moreover, our industry-level analysis indicates that workers in industries experiencing greater reductions in trade protection were less likely to become unemployed, especially in net export industries. Our results can be explained within a theoretical framework incorporating trade and search-generated unemployment and some institutional features of the Indian economy.     

Trade‐Induced Unemployment: How Much Do We Care?

It is a common perception that a government, especially in the face of elections, is particularly sensitive to the presence of trade‐induced unemployment. In this paper, I ask: how much weight does the incumbent politician actually attach to unemployment resulting from trade? To answer, I build a model that captures government's sympathy to trade‐affected workers and allows me to decompose the channels through which trade‐induced unemployment affects the level of sectoral protection chosen by a politically‐driven incumbent official. I provide empirical evidence that the US government is very sensitive to the presence and the magnitude of trade‐induced unemployment. Specifically, I estimate the weight that the office holder attaches to the welfare of trade‐affected workers to be positive, significant, and four times larger than the weight on the welfare of those who are not affected by trade.     

Trade,Wage Gaps,and Specific Human Capital Accumulation*

We develop a new framework for the analysis of the impact of trade liberalization on the wage structure and on welfare. Our model focuses on the decision of workers to accumulate firm‐specific skills, by “on‐the‐job” training, knowing that this means their future wages will have to be negotiated, and that the outcome of negotiation will depend on the profitability prospect of firms operating in a new trading environment. We show that trade liberalization may reduce the welfare of a developing country because of its adverse effect on skill accumulation. We also explore the effects of trade liberalization on the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers.     

North–South Trade Liberalization and Economic Welfare

We consider a general equilibrium model of a developing economy (the South) that opens to trade with a developed economy (the North). The southern economy is characterized by open urban unemployment and rural–urban migration, a competitive agricultural sector and a monopolistically competitive manufacturing sector. Hence, there is potential for both inter‐ and intra‐industry trade to arise on liberalization, in addition to distortionary effects of duality. Southern comparative advantage in agriculture may arise from the labor market distortion and the basis for intra‐industry trade is love for variety. We characterize various configurations of the trade pattern, and the resulting welfare consequences of opening to trade in this context. We illustrate a new mechanism under which in some circumstances it may be possible for trade liberalization to lower economic welfare in the South.     

Optimal policy and the role of social contacts in a search model with heterogeneous workers

This paper develops a search model with heterogeneous workers and social networks. High‐ability workers are more productive and have a larger number of professional contacts. Firms can choose between a vacancy in the regular market and a job opening in the referral market. The model predicts that a larger number of social contacts is associated with a larger wage gap between high‐ and low‐ability workers and a larger difference in the unemployment rates. The net welfare gain of referrals is estimated at 1.2%. There are three reasons for the inefficiency of the decentralized equilibrium. First is the traditional search externality described by Hosios. Second, firms share their profits with workers, whereas the social optimum implies that full surplus should be given to firms in the referral market. This inefficiency can be internalized by means of referral subsidies. Third, there is the “pooling inefficiency” in the regular market. If high‐ability workers are sufficiently more productive they impose a positive externality on low‐ability workers and should be rewarded by positive transfers. On the contrary, if productivity differences are small, high‐ability workers achieve unreasonably high wages by referring each other and reduce employment chances of low‐ability workers. In this latter case, high‐ability workers should be penalized. If optimal policy is implemented the net welfare gain of referrals rises up to 1.8%.     

Intra‐industry Trade Liberalization: Why Skilled Workers are More Likely to Support Free Trade

This paper presents a theoretical model and empirical analysis that connects the prevalence of intra‐industry trade with increased wage inequality from trade liberalization in both skilled and unskilled labor abundant countries. The Stolper–Samuelson effect is incorporated into an intra‐industry trade liberalization (intra‐ITL) hypothesis where skilled labor opposes protectionism in all countries engaged in intra‐industry trade because skilled workers gain at the expense of unskilled workers from multilateral trade liberalization within the skill‐intensive sector. We examine empirical evidence on whether skilled individuals are more supportive of trade liberalization than unskilled individuals across 31 countries with different levels of intra‐industry trade and skill endowments. We find that the extent to which countries engage in intra‐industry trade in high‐tech commodities is strongly linked with the intensity of opposition to protection by skilled labor. Regression results strongly support our hypothesis that skilled workers, almost everywhere, are more likely to support free trade.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

Heterogeneous firms,trade liberalization and agglomeration

Abstract In this study, we develop an economic model to examine agglomeration of heterogeneous firms following trade liberalization. In a closed economy, we show that high‐productivity firms are more likely to agglomerate because they benefit more from agglomeration than their low‐productivity counterparts. However, trade liberalization, especially with a high‐productivity partner, favours partial agglomeration; that is, low‐productivity firms relocate away from the region where high‐productivity firms agglomerate. Consequently, the welfare gap between the domestic regions of an economy narrows following trade liberalization. The latter result suggests that trade liberalization promotes regional economic development.     

An Eaton–Kortum model of trade and growth

We combine a multi‐country, continuum‐good Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) with a multi‐country AK model of Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) to examine how trade liberalization affects countries' growth rates and extensive margins of trade over time. Focusing on the three‐country case, we obtain three main results. First, a permanent fall in any trade cost raises the balanced growth rate. Second, trade liberalization increases the liberalizing countries' long‐run fractions of exported varieties to all destinations. Third, the long‐run effects of trade liberalization are different from its short‐run effects, which can reverse the welfare implications of the static Eaton–Kortum model.     

A Regional Analysis of the Impact of Trade and Foreign Direct Investment on Wages in Mexico, 1984–2000

The conventional Heckscher–Ohlin model of trade predicts an equalizing effect of trade on wages in developing countries abundant in less‐skilled labor. Contrary to these predictions, skill premiums and skill demand increased in Mexico following trade liberalization. “New” trade theories have offered several channels through which trade can increase relative wages and demand for skilled workers. One such channel is foreign direct investment and outsourcing. Using the Mexican Household Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) covering 1984–2000, the author examines the relationship between the demand for skill and maquiladora employment across regions and states. In contrast to previous studies based on manufacturing data for the 1980s, little evidence is found that growth in maquiladora employment is positively related to the increase in relative wages or wage‐bill share of more educated workers.     

A Schumpeterian North–South Growth Model of Trade and Wage Inequality*

The paper presents a dynamic general‐equilibrium model of interindustry North–South trade that is used to analyze the effects of trade liberalization on the Northern wage distribution. Both countries have a low‐tech sector where consumer goods of constant quality are produced by use of unskilled labor. The North also has a high‐tech sector that employs skilled labor and features a quality‐ladder model structure with endogenous growth. Both innovation and skill acquisition rates are endogenously determined. In a balanced trade equilibrium, it is found that Southern‐originated (Northern‐originated) trade liberalization leads to an increase (decrease) in Northern wage inequality both between skilled and unskilled workers and within the group of skilled workers. The endogenous change in the Southern terms of trade determines the direction of change in unskilled wages in both the North and the South.     

Varying Political Economy Weights of Protection: The Case of Colombia

In this paper, we examine trade policy determinants and trade reform in a developing country setting using a political economy model. The government determines tariffs by balancing the political support from producers vs. consumers, while placing a higher political weight on producers’ welfare relative to average citizens. We then expand the model in several directions to guide our subsequent estimations at the three‐digit industry level for Colombia between 1983 and 1998. We account for import substitution motives for protection but describe how the government's move away from these policies leads to unilateral trade liberalization. We innovatively allow the political weights to vary based on key industry variables beyond a common denominator. The sectors with higher employment, labor cost, and preferential trade agreement (PTA) import shares receive a larger political weight compared to otherwise similar sectors. The novelty of our approach is estimating the effect of sectoral characteristics on protection filtered through the political weights. We obtain more realistic estimates for these weights and provide some evidence for a slowing down effect of PTAs on trade liberalization.     

The labor market effects of trade union heterogeneity

Empirical evidence suggests that the bargaining power of trade unions differs across firms and sectors. Standard models of unionization ignore this pattern by assuming a uniform bargaining strength. In this paper, we incorporate union heterogeneity into a Melitz (2003) type model. Union bargaining power is assumed to be firm-specific and varies with firm productivity. This framework allows us to re-analyze the labor market effects of (i) a symmetric increase in the bargaining power of all unions and (ii) trade liberalization. We show that union heterogeneity unambiguously reduces the negative employment effects of stronger unions. Firm-specific bargaining power creates a link between unionization and the entry and exit of firms, implying a reduction of the unions' expected bargaining power. Moreover, union heterogeneity constitutes an (un)employment effect of trade liberalization. If unions are most powerful in the high-productivity (low-productivity) firms, trade liberalization will increase (decrease) unemployment.     

International Outsourcing and Unemployment in a Minimum‐wage Economy

To explore the impact of international outsourcing on unemployment and social welfare, the conventional trade model is extended by including both economies of scale and a minimum‐wage constraint in the unskilled‐labor market. In the paper, the scale economies are linked with the production of the most skill‐intensive good. It is shown that within such a framework, there is a trade‐off between a more socially desirable endowment allocation and a greater level of employment. Therefore, even though outsourcing could raise aggregate employment, this benefit is at the cost of further exacerbating the resource misallocation. In this way, the extensions to the traditional framework explored in the paper generate new insights as to why outsourcing may cause a net welfare loss to the home country.     

Strategic R&D Commitment and the Gains from Trade

This paper examines how trade liberalization affects innovation, profits and welfare in a model of reciprocal markets when firms pre‐commit to research and development (R&D). We establish that the equilibrium is not always unique and show that, with trade, R&D commitment leads to higher levels of innovation, lower profits, higher consumer surplus and higher welfare than when R&D is chosen simultaneously to output levels. Furthermore, if the effectiveness of R&D is sufficiently high, trade always yields higher welfare than autarky, implying that R&D commitment may significantly enhance the welfare gains from trade liberalization.     

Populism,Fairness and Competition: Should We Care and What Could We Do?

The rise of populism in a number of countries is one of the most visible signs of the weakening of enthusiasm for trade liberalization and market competition. Market competition is increasingly denounced as leading to unfair results by those who lose jobs, and in some cases risk losing their employment prospects because of the pressure of competition, or those who see their wages stagnate or be reduced. Their perception is that pro‐competitive policies benefit capitalists and a small coterie of highly skilled workers to the detriment of the low‐skilled majority. In a number of countries there have been calls by politicians to reconsider the trade liberalization policy which was actively pursued in recent decades and to change the standard applied by competition law enforcers from a strict consumer welfare standard to a consideration of the trade‐off between efficiency and fairness. The competition community has, to a large extent, strongly resisted such possibilities, arguing that protectionist policies had failed in the past and that the concept of fairness is at best vague, lack economic foundation, and could lead to a weakening of incentives to achieve efficient static and dynamic performances. The article examines three issues related to this debate. First, we examine the theoretical and practical reasons for which some categories of workers lose in the competitive process. Second, we discuss the relationship between inequality and fairness and the contribution of behavioural economics to the exploration of what people consider to be fair or unfair in vertical relationships (i.e. between employees and employers or between consumers and suppliers). Third, we discuss alternative ways in which competition authorities could reconcile fairness and efficiency in their advocacy or enforcement activities.