中国的“影子保险”:来自监管自然实验的证据

影子保险在金融稳定中扮演着重要角色,但现有文献较多关注影子银行,对影子保险关注不足。“影子保险”即保险公司通过再保险方式将保险业务转移给不受监管或者受监管较弱的关联企业的活动,这会推高其真实的杠杆水平,增加金融体系脆弱性。然而,由于影子保险的不透明性和缺少自然实验,现有研究仅基于有限数据或模型给出简单的特征事实或结构性估计,很少能从因果关系上清楚地识别影子保险活动及其机制。本文利用中国加强对中资保险公司(处理组)再保险关联交易监管的政策冲击这一自然实验,使用微观数据和双重差分方法,识别了中国金融体系中的影子保险活动。研究发现,相关监管有效降低了影子保险活动,这一效应对集团公司的影响尤为显著;在机制方面,相关监管通过影响中资保险公司资产负债表两端的结构性调整进而降低了其风险承担行为,提高了经营稳定性。本文方法对识别金融机构的监管套利和防范系统性金融风险具有一定参考意义。     

政策连续性、非金融企业影子银行化与社会责任承担

基于2006-2017年非金融类A股上市公司数据,本文考察了非金融企业影子银行化对社会责任承担的影响,并进一步研究了政策连续性对非金融企业影子银行化与社会责任承担之间关系的影响。研究发现,非金融企业影子银行化会抑制社会责任承担行为,且这种效应在市场套利动机强、公司治理水平较低、外部融资能力弱的企业中更为明显。政策连续性程度提高会减弱非金融企业影子银行化与社会责任承担之间的负向关系。因此,本文提出抑制经济“脱实向虚”,增强政策稳定性和连续性,促进实体经济平稳发展的政策建议。     

我国影子银行体系的发展和管理研究

国际金融危机爆发以来,影子银行体系的迅速发展及其影响成为当前金融界一项重要的研究内容。从国内外现有文献来看,绝大部分是以西方国家的影子银行为研究对象。该文从对比分析中西方影子银行体系间的差别人手,对我国影子银行机构的特征及类别进行了归纳,估算了我国影子银行体系的规模,分析了影子银行快速发展会对金融稳定造成的影0向,并就加强我国影子银行体系管理提出相关政策建议。     

Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability

We develop a macroeconomic model in which commercial banks can offload risky loans to a “shadow” banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. The model can account both for the business cycle comovement between output, traditional bank, and shadow bank credit, and for the behavior of macroeconomic variables in a liquidity crisis centered on shadow banks. We find that following a liquidity shock, stabilization policy aimed solely at the market in securitized assets is relatively ineffective.     

Economic, Demographic, and Institutional Determinants of Life Insurance Consumption across Countries

Life insurance has become an increasingly important part ofthe financial sector over the past 40 years, providing a rangeof financial services for consumers and becoming a major sourceof investment in the capital market. But what drives the largevariation in life insurance consumption across countries remainsunclear. Using a panel with data aggregated at different frequenciesfor 68 economies in 1961–2000, this article finds thateconomic indicators—such as inflation, income per capita,and banking sector development—and religious and institutionalindicators are the most robust predictors of the use of lifeinsurance. Education, life expectancy, the young dependencyratio, and the size of the social security system appear tohave no robust association with life insurance consumption.The results highlight the importance of price stability andbanking sector development in fully realizing the savings andinvestment functions of life insurance in an economy.     

论美国影子银行体系的发展、运作、影响及监管

第二次世界大战结束特别是20世纪70年代以来,由货币政策目标与金融监管框架之间的不一致性所引发的金融创新以及机构投资者对安全性资产的超额需求共同推动了影子银行体系在美国迅速发展。美国的影子银行体系主要由政府支持的影子银行体系、"内部"影子银行体系以及"外部"影子银行体系组成,但其各自的信贷中介程序和复杂程度不尽相同。影子银行体系的迅速发展对美国以及全球金融体系都产生了重要而复杂的影响。尽管《多德—弗兰克法》为美国乃至全球金融监管改革指明了方向,但旨在有效规范影子银行体系发展的金融监管体制改革之路依然漫长。     

From me to you: Measuring connectedness between Eurozone financial institutions

This paper aims to analyse the tail risk spillover between banks, insurance companies and the shadow banking system in the Eurozone contest. These intra-sectoral interdependencies between financial market participants have contributed to the spread of instability in the financial system. Therefore mapping these links is important for policy-makers to provide supervisory tools and can be a key input into the design of macroprudential policies. For this purpose, we adopt the Tail-Event driven NETwork (TENET) risk model. The TENET is a useful method to map the tail interconnection between the three sectors and to provide systemic risk measures that take into account the “too big to fail” and “too big to interconnected” concepts. The results suggest that each financial sector has a significant impact on the other. By comparing the contribution of each sector, we show that banks are the largest emitters of risk. However, also shadow banking firms are systemic important, given their high level of connection. The work provides a clear view of risk spillovers and interconnection dynamics during the crisis providing a meaningful ranking of the systemic important financial institutions.     

中国影子银行的经济学分析:定义、构成和规模测算

2008年国际金融危机以后,中国金融体系发生的重大变化之一是影子银行的较快发展,其规模迅速膨胀,交易结构日趋复杂,各类市场主体都牵涉其中。这些变化吸引了政策制订者和学术界的广泛关注。本文给出了中国影子银行的功能性定义,即依赖于银行信用、从事银行业务、但又没接受严格的银行业监管的金融业务,具体指传统的银行表内贷款和债券投资以外的,具备完整的信用转换、期限转换和流动性转换功能的金融业务。本文逐项分析影子银行业务,详细总结各类型业务的交易结构、业务主体、业务实质、资金来源、法律基础、资产负债表表示,准确测算了2002年至今影子银行总量和资产负债表结构月度数据。只从资产负债表的负债端着手加总,既完整地涵盖了影子银行的全部业务,得到其宏观总量,又剔除了重复计算。本文测算数据为后续研究打下了基础。     

金融错配、非金融企业影子银行化与经济“脱实向虚”

当前,我国一些非金融企业通过直接或间接的方式从事影子银行业务。本文利用2004-2015年上市公司数据研究发现,金融错配程度的提高整体上会提高企业影子银行化规模,并且这种效应仅在金融深化程度较高、经济资源市场化配置程度偏低的地区显著;僵尸企业和盈利性较差的企业,分别受到“利润追逐”和“投资替代”机制的影响,金融错配对其影子银行化趋势的正向作用更为明显。机制检验发现,金融错配水平的上升通过提高融资约束程度从而降低企业实体投资水平,这种效应在资产专用性较强的企业中更为明显;金融错配主要通过融资约束程度和实体投资规模,而非资本回报率渠道作用于企业影子银行化行为。本文研究对于提高信贷资源配置效率,防范经济“脱实向虚”具有较强的政策意义。     

金融错配、非金融企业影子银行化与经济“脱实向虚”

当前,我国一些非金融企业通过直接或间接的方式从事影子银行业务。本文利用2004-2015年上市公司数据研究发现,金融错配程度的提高整体上会提高企业影子银行化规模,并且这种效应仅在金融深化程度较高、经济资源市场化配置程度偏低的地区显著;僵尸企业和盈利性较差的企业,分别受到“利润追逐”和“投资替代”机制的影响,金融错配对其影子银行化趋势的正向作用更为明显。机制检验发现,金融错配水平的上升通过提高融资约束程度从而降低企业实体投资水平,这种效应在资产专用性较强的企业中更为明显;金融错配主要通过融资约束程度和实体投资规模,而非资本回报率渠道作用于企业影子银行化行为。本文研究对于提高信贷资源配置效率,防范经济“脱实向虚”具有较强的政策意义。     

The Impact of Enterprises’ Shadow Banking Activities on Business Performance: A Test Based on Mediator Effect of Investment Scale and Investment Efficiency

ABSTRACT

In recent years, China’s financial sector has gradually been alienated from the real sector, allowing financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage add their own value to finance. High interest rates in the financial industry have led to changes in the real sector, revealing a trend toward “financialization” and “quasi-financialization”; a typical example of this includes nonfinancial enterprises’ shadow banking activities. In this article, we use annual data from 2004 to 2015 of A share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, to examine the influence of nonfinancial enterprises’ shadow banking activities on business performance. The results show that, overall, enterprises’ shadow banking activity improve operating performance. In addition, from the perspective of earning structure, nonfinancial enterprises’ shadow banking business increases financial benefits, but has a significantly negative effect on operating income. Further tests show that enterprises engaged in shadow banking activities will impact operating income through the two intermediary variables of investment scale and investment efficiency. However, the negative effect of investment in crowding out operating income is greater than that of the efficiency-improving effect on operating income. This article provides policy guidance in terms of recognizing diverse aspects of shadow banking system that divorce the real economy from the financial economy.     

Bank liabilities channel

The financial intermediation sector is important not only for channeling resources from agents in excess of funds to agents in need of funds (lending channel). By issuing liabilities it also creates financial assets held by other sectors of the economy for insurance or liquidity purpose. When the intermediation sector creates less liabilities or their value falls, agents are less willing to engage in activities that are individually risky but desirable in aggregate (bank liabilities channel). The paper shows how financial crises driven by self-fulfilling expectations about the liquidity of the banking sector are transmitted to the real sector of the economy. Since the government could also create financial assets by borrowing, the paper analyzes how public debt affects the issuance of liabilities by the financial intermediation sector.     

Bank credit risk and macro-prudential policies: Role of counter-cyclical capital buffer

This paper investigates the impact of macro-prudential policy (proxied by the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB)) on bank credit risk during uncertain times, as banking sector stability is crucial in promoting financial intermediation. Using a unique daily data set consisting of 4939 credit default swaps (CDS) of 70 banks from 25 countries over the period 2010–2019, we find that CCyB tightening decreases bank-level CDS spreads, while CCyB loosening increases CDS spreads. This heterogeneous effect of CCyB arises due to its asymmetric effect on the capital ratio (i.e., the equity-to-total assets ratio) of banks. Tightening CCyB significantly increases capital, whereas loosening CCyB does not impact capital. Thus, the risks that emanate from the banking sector during periods of heightened uncertainty and financial distress can be significantly dampened when CCyB regulation is enabled. Consequently, macro-prudential policies for banks to hold higher levels of capital during good times are justified to contain financial market risks during downturns.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

存款保险、市场竞争与银行经营稳健性

本文基于银行存款市场空间竞争模型,探讨存款保险制度的实施效果和福利效应,及其与市场竞争政策的交互作用。研究表明,政府隐性担保尽管能够保障存款人利益,但会降低存款人对银行经营稳健性的要求,使得银行追求高风险高收益资产从而降低经营稳健性;而市场化的存款保险制度通过费率与风险挂钩的激励机制,能够有效提升银行经营稳健性,同时避免过高政策成本负担,实现较高的社会福利水平。随着市场竞争强化,引入风险差别费率保险制度,在提升银行经营稳健性和增进社会福利方面的效果逐渐增强。模型分析表明,当长期允许机构自由进出市场时,政府强化竞争政策短期可能降低银行的经营稳健性,但长期内高风险银行逐渐退出市场而更有效率的低风险银行进入市场,这种柔性市场退出机制使得银行业整体经营稳健性增强。因此,在金融市场中强化竞争政策,推行并完善当前市场化的风险差别费率存款保险制度,长期内有助于在保护存款人利益的同时,提升银行稳健性和社会福利。     

金融双语

存款保险制度 存款保险制度主要是通过建立存款保险机构，运用风险补偿机制来保护存款人免受因金融机构破产而导致的财物损失，从而提高公众对银行部门的信任，有助于金融系统的稳定。同时，通过防止流动性恐慌，存款保险还可以使实体经济避开银行体系不稳定造成的部分恶劣影响。存款保险制度有隐性的和显性的两种。     

中国银行业竞争与非金融企业影子银行化

本文结合非金融企业影子银行化的形成机制以及中国金融市场发展的特征事实,从“供给侧”和“需求侧”双重视角探究银行竞争如何抑制非金融企业影子银行化。以2003—2019年中国非金融上市企业为研究样本,分析发现,银行竞争能够显著降低非金融企业影子银行化。进一步以放松中小商业银行分支机构市场准入为标志事件构造准自然实验,基于双重差分法的计量结果为识别银行竞争对非金融企业影子银行化的抑制效应提供了稳健的经验证据。机制分析发现,银行业竞争通过弱化“信贷扭曲”和“监管套利”两个维度的作用机制抑制非金融企业影子银行化。异质性分析表明,银行竞争对非金融企业影子银行化的抑制作用在融资约束较高和投资机会较少的样本中尤为明显。     

中国金融部门杠杆周期分析——基于1998-2018年的数据证明

结合中国经济金融体系发展实践,以银行部门（其他存款性公司）总资产/实收资本作为代理指标分析中国金融部门杠杆率的周期性特征,并对周期形成原因进行探究,对我国金融部门杠杆周期与金融周期的顺周期性进行检验。结果显示：在观测期内,中国金融部门杠杆经历了多个短周期,短周期长度在9～16个季度（约2～4年）不等,并经历了至少1次中周期,中周期时间约为35个季度（约9年）;我国金融部门杠杆周期与国家金融监管政策密切相关;我国金融部门的杠杆周期与金融周期并不必然表现为顺周期性。因此,我国应当更加注重金融监管政策和信贷政策的配合协同,科学反映金融部门杠杆情况,维护金融稳定,防止发生系统性金融风险。     

How does corporate social responsibility affect financial performance,financial stability,and financial inclusion in the banking sector? Evidence from Pakistan

This paper examines the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the financial performance, financial inclusion, and financial stability of the banking sector, focusing on annual data for 20 Pakistani commercial banks for the period 2008–2017. The results suggest that CSR, as well as age and size, has a positive impact on all three factors. However, high levels of leverage reduce financial inclusion and financial stability, while financial inclusion is also negatively associated with the tangibility of assets.     

中国式影子银行监管的新思维

"影子银行系统"是一个新鲜的概念,由2007年美国次贷危机诱发的全球金融危机引发了国际社会对影子银行系统的广泛关注。当前关于影子银行系统的认识仍然处于基础阶段,大部分文献探讨的是欧美发达国家的影子银行体系以及如何对其进行监测或监管。本文对欧美发达国家的影子银行体系与中国影子银行体系的不同进行深入地对比分析,认为中国的影子银行体系有其独有的环境和特点,提出对我国影子银行体系的监管应当采取规范引导为主和分类化监管的新思维。