Can CFOs resist undue pressure from CEOs to manage earnings?

Building upon the premise that, under certain conditions, the ability of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to pressure the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is limited, we develop a measure of CFO resistance that captures the ability of the CFO to resist undue pressure from the CEO to manage earnings. In doing so, we consider various sources of power for both the CEO and CFO, and a market setting where CFO resistance is perceived to be high. We find that firms with resistant CFOs are less likely to engage in earnings management than firms with non-resistant CFOs, ceteris paribus. Additionally, while confirming prior evidence that CEOs with strong incentives are more likely to manage earnings, we show that this effect is significantly less pronounced in the presence of resistant CFOs. Overall, our findings suggest that firms can improve the quality of financial reporting by creating conditions that enable CFO resistance.     

CFO gender and earnings management: evidence from China

We study the effect of chief financial officer (CFO) gender on earnings management (EM) in China’s listed firms from 1999 to 2011. In the cross-sectional analysis, we find that female CFO firm-years exhibit significantly lower discretionary accruals, lower total accruals, lower abnormal production costs, and higher abnormal discretionary expenditures, than the male CFO firm-years. We further examine the relation between CFO gender and EM surrounding CFO transitions. We find that the departing male CFOs are more aggressive than the departing female CFOs in managing up earnings during their last year with the firm and the newly appointed male CFOs are more aggressive than the new female CFOs in managing down earnings during their first year on the job. The evidence surrounding CFO transitions suggests that male CFOs are more aggressive than female CFOs in manipulating earnings, either in the last attempt to save their jobs or to take bigger credit for any future performance gains. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that female CFOs engage in less EM and are more conservative in financial reporting than their male counterparts.     

CAP Forum on Enron: Former Audit Firm Personnel as CFOs: Effect on Earnings Management*

Corporate hiring of former audit personnel to fill key financial positions is a practice that has attracted attention from the media, the accounting profession, and regulators. The concern is that the former external auditor who now holds a key position with the client may be able to circumvent the audit or exert pressure on the audit team and adversely influence audit quality. We compare a sample of 172 test companies that appointed to the position of chief financial officer (CFO) personnel who are former employees of the companies' auditors, with a control sample of companies that appointed new CFOs who were not affiliated with their auditors. We investigate whether the level of discretionary accruals is greater for the test sample compared with the control sample during the two years following appointment of the CFO. Both univariate and multivariate results for signed discretionary accruals suggest some support for the hypothesis that firms with affiliated CFOs are associated with greater earnings management than firms with unaffiliated CFOs. Furthermore, the results for signed discretionary accruals suggest that the association is stronger for nonpartners who moved from the audit firm to the client with little or no time gap. On average, the results for absolute discretionary accruals do not suggest differences in earnings management between affiliated and unaffiliated CFOs. However, they do indicate some earnings management relative to unaffiliated CFOs by CFOs who had little or no time gap between leaving the audit firm and joining the client firm, although at a weaker level of significance.     

CFO role and CFO compensation: An empirical analysis of their implications

Given concerns over CFO pay, especially incentives, and considering the tension between a CFO’s fiduciary responsibility and being a key member of the firm’s executive team, we examine the determinants and effects of CFO compensation amount, incentive intensity, and proximity to CEO compensation in a sample of European companies (FTE 500, 2005–2009). First, we focus on the CFO role as a determinant of CFO compensation. Like prior work, we proxy for CFO roles by using hand-collected public data on education and past professional experience, but we supplement these proxies with proprietary data to more directly capture the firm-specific nature of the CFO job in term of its similarity with that of the CEO. We thus argue how CFOs can have varied roles characterized by different levels of financial expertise and CEO-likeness, and document that it is this latter aspect that is associated with CFO compensation. Second, we study the effects of CFO compensation design on outcomes in the CFO’s realm related to financial reporting. We find that CFO financial expertise is positively associated with financial reporting quality, while a CFO’s pay long-term incentive intensity and a CFO’s incentive compensation proximity with the CEO are negatively associated with financial reporting quality. Overall, then, our results suggest that CFOs get rewarded for their CEO-likeness, and particularly for their being similar to the CEO in terms of tasks and decision making authority. But it is their financial expertise that is positively related to financial reporting quality. At the same time, using compensation that is more incentive intensive and more similar to that of the CEO appears to be potentially detrimental to the quality of financial reporting. These results are relevant for boards involved in selecting highly expert CFOs, and their compensation committees charged with defining subsequently effective incentive compensation plans for those CFOs.     

CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most influence on earnings management?

This study examines the association between chief financial officer (CFO) equity incentives and earnings management. Chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives have been shown to be associated with accruals management and the likelihood of beating analyst forecasts (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Cheng and Warfield, 2005). Because CFOs’ primary responsibility is financial reporting, CFO equity incentives should play a stronger role than those of the CEO in earnings management. We find that the magnitude of accruals and the likelihood of beating analyst forecasts are more sensitive to CFO equity incentives than to those of the CEO. Our evidence supports the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) new disclosure requirement on CFO compensation.     

CFO narcissism and audit fees: Evidence from listed companies in China

This paper examines the effects of CFO narcissism on audit fees in China. Using the size of CFO signatures in annual audit reports to measure individual narcissism, we find that CFO narcissism is associated with higher audit fees. We find empirical evidence that CFO narcissism significantly increases the audit fees of listed companies, and this effect is stronger in state-owned enterprises. This paper also explores the mediating effects of financial information and the engagement of prestigious Big-4 and Big-10 firms. The results show that companies with narcissistic CFOs have lower quality financial information and prefer more prestigious firms, which leads to higher audit fees. This research highlights the importance of CFO narcissism in corporate performance and provides new evidence that will be useful for listed companies that plan to hire senior executives.     

Are CFO debt-like compensation incentives associated with financial reporting quality?

We investigate whether CFO debt-like compensation incentives and their alignment with CEO debt-like compensation incentives are associated with financial reporting quality. He (2015) finds that CEO debt-like compensation incentives are associated with higher financial reporting quality. Consistent with agency theory, we extend He (2015) by considering CFO debt-like compensation incentives. Overall, we find that CFO debt-like compensation incentives are associated with better financial reporting quality while controlling for CEO debt-like compensation incentives. These effects are present when the CEO and CFO compensation incentives are aligned with the same party. Further, the CFO effect dominates that of the CEO when examining discretionary accruals, and complements the CEO effect for accrual quality. However, we are unable to find any evidence of an incremental joint effect from the alignment of the CEO and CFO debt-like compensation incentives.     

Overconfidence and tax avoidance: The role of CEO and CFO interaction

We investigate how overconfident CEOs and CFOs may interact to influence firms’ tax avoidance. We adopt an equity measure to capture overconfident CEOs and CFOs and utilize multiple measures to identify companies’ tax-avoidance activities. We document that CFOs, as CEOs’ business partners, play an important role in facilitating and executing overconfident CEOs’ decisions in regard to tax avoidance. Specifically, we find that companies are more likely to engage in tax-avoidance activities when they have both overconfident CEOs and overconfident CFOs, compared with companies that have other combinations of CEO/CFO overconfidence (e.g., an overconfident CEO with a non-overconfident CFO), which is consistent with the False Consensus Effect Theory. Our study helps investors, regulators, and policymakers understand companies’ decision-making processes with regard to tax avoidance.     

Powerful CEOs and stock price crash risk

We find that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) are associated with higher crash risk. The positive association between CEO power and crash risk holds when controlling for earnings management, tax avoidance, chief executive officer's option incentives, and CEO overconfidence. Firms with powerful CEOs have higher probability of financial restatements, lower proportion of negative to positive earnings guidance, and lower ratio of negative to positive words in their financial statements. The association between powerful CEOs and higher crash risk is mostly evident among firms with higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock prices and when CEOs have lower general skills. External monitoring mechanisms weaken but do not eliminate the association between powerful founder CEOs and higher crash risk.     

CFO gender and financial reporting transparency in banks

We investigate the effect of CFO gender on the timeliness of loan loss provision (LLP) reporting using a large sample of US banks from 2007 to 2016. Our findings show that women CFOs are associated with timelier forward-looking provisioning than men counterparts, suggesting that they follow a more transparent approach to financial reporting policies. Our results hold under different model specifications, including the use of bank and CEO fixed effects. We further address endogeneity concerns by showing that the timeliness of LLP reporting improves significantly for banks experiencing a man-followed-by-woman CFO transition. Overall, our study supports the notion that women CFOs are associated with higher financial reporting transparency and provides further insights into how CFO gender affects risk-aversion and ethics in banks, with wider implications about the importance of women’s representation in the finance-based industry.     

Financial Expert CEOs and Earnings Management Around Initial Public Offerings

This study examines the association between financial expert CEOs and earnings management (EM) around initial public offerings. We identify financial expert CEOs as those having past experience in either banking or investment firms, large auditing firms, or finance-related roles. We find strong evidence that newly listed firms with financial expert CEOs are less likely to engage in either accrual-based or real EM in the offering year than those with non-financial expert CEOs. In particular, our results are robust after controlling for the potential selection issue that occurs due to non-random matching of CEOs to firms. In addition, we employ alternative measures of financial expertise, including past experience in a CFO position, financial experience variety, and professional qualifications. We document that CEOs who used to work as CFOs and those who gained varied financial experience are less likely to manage earnings through both accruals and real activities. Moreover, CEOs who have a professional qualification in finance and/or accounting are also associated with lower accrual-based EM.     

The influence of CEO and CFO power on accruals and real earnings management

In this study, we examine the effect of CEO and CFO power on both accruals and real earnings management (AEM and REM, respectively), and the extent to which CEO and CFO power mitigate the effect of one another on AEM and REM. We further examine whether the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) altered these effects. In the pre-SOX period, we find that AEM (REM) is greater when the CEO (CFO) is powerful relative to the CFO (CEO). In the post-SOX period, however, we find that the effect of relative CEO power on AEM subsides, whereas the effect of relative CFO power on REM persists. Additionally, we find evidence to suggest that powerful CFOs inhibit the AEM preferences of powerful CEOs in both the pre- and post-SOX periods. Finally, we find evidence to suggest that powerful CEOs inhibit the REM preferences of powerful CEOs in the pre-SOX period, but not in the post-SOX period. Collectively, our results suggest that the power of the CEO relative to the CFO is an important factor in the both the type and magnitude of earnings management.

     

Financial controller turnover: An early warning sign of deteriorating financial reporting quality

This study examines the relation between financial controller turnover and public firms’ financial reporting quality. Exploiting a special institutional setting in China, where financial controllers along with CEOs and CFOs are required to attest to the accuracy and completeness of firms’ annual reports, we find that: (a) financial controller turnover is negatively associated with financial reporting quality, (b) the negative relation between financial controller turnover and financial reporting quality is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, in firms with weaker corporate governance, and in areas with higher regulatory enforcement intensity, and (c) financial controller turnover is not related to real earnings management. Further analyses show that financial controller turnover is associated with the incidence of subsequent financial report restatements and enforcement actions by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Financial controller turnover also precedes top executive turnover and can be viewed as an early warning sign of deteriorating financial reporting quality. Such information content is incremental to that of top executive turnover. Our analyses also show that firms with financial controller turnover have higher initial stock returns but underperform their counterparts in the long run.     

Managers: Their Effects on Accruals and Firm Policies

This paper investigates whether top executives have significant individual‐specific effects on accruals that cannot be explained by firm characteristics. Exploiting individual executive and firm data from a period of 37 years, we find that individual executives play a significant role in determining firms’ accruals. We examine whether executives’ effects on accruals are related to their personal styles on firm policies, investment, financing and operating decisions. Our results show that individual executives’ effects on accruals are more correlated with their operating decisions than investment and financing decisions. We next investigate whether managers themselves also have a personal style for directly affecting accruals. We compare effects exerted by CEOs to CFOs. We find CEOs are more likely to affect accruals through firm policy decisions and CFOs are more likely to affect accruals through accounting decisions. CFOs tend to report more ‘solid’ earnings than CEOs, i.e., CFOs are more likely to push accruals to zero.     

Manager‐Specific Effects on Earnings Guidance: An Analysis of Top Executive Turnovers

We investigate how managers contribute to the provision of earnings guidance by examining the association between top executive turnovers and guidance. Although firm and industry characteristics are important determinants of guidance, we conclude that CEOs participate in firm‐level policy decisions, whereas CFOs are involved in the formation or discussion of guidance. Among firms that historically issued frequent guidance, breaks in guidance following CEO turnovers are relatively permanent and are potentially attributable to firm‐initiated changes in guidance policy. Breaks following CFO turnovers, however, likely reflect uncertainty on the part of the newly appointed executive—they are concentrated in the two quarters following the turnover, are associated with the background of the newly appointed CFO, and extend to the relative precision of the guidance. Among firms that did not issue guidance historically, we find some evidence that newly appointed externally hired CEOs increase the likelihood of providing guidance.     

Chief executive officer trustworthiness and green innovation

This study examines the influence of chief executive officer (CEO) trustworthiness on green innovation. We argue that firms led by trustworthy CEOs have a higher likelihood of adopting socially acceptable policies in response to environmental issues. Drawing on social norms perspective, we find that CEO trustworthiness is positively associated with green innovation using a sample of Chinese manufacturing firms from 2003 to 2018. Findings suggest that hiring trustworthy CEOs allows firms to cope with environmental issues.     

Chief financial officer overconfidence and stock price crash risk

Numerous studies have shown the prevalence of overconfidence among Chief Financial Officers (CFOs). Surprisingly, the real effect of CFO overconfidence is under-researched. Using data from a large sample of US-listed firms over the period 1993–2019 and adopting an eclectic theoretical approach, we find that overconfident CFOs are more likely to increase stock price crash risk than non-overconfident CFOs through risk-taking and bad news hoarding. These findings pass a series of robustness tests. Furthermore, departing from most overconfident studies that merely examine one type of top managers (i.e., Chief Executive Officer (CEO)), we consider the influence of CEO and CFO overconfidence jointly. Interestingly, we find that CFO overconfidence outweighs CEO overconfidence in influencing stock price crash risk. Moreover, the overconfidence effect is intensified when overconfident CFOs collaborate with overconfident CEOs, thus raising stock price crash risk. However, stronger governance and a transparent information environment constrain overconfident CFOs' effect on stock price crash risk. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of CFO overconfidence in determining stock return tail risks.     

Charitable inclination and the chief executive officer's pay package

Using chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) lifetime nonemployment experience in prominent charitable organizations to create a proxy for CEO charitable inclination, I find that charitably inclined CEOs receive a significant pay premium. The pay premium sensitivity to CEO charitable inclination is particularly pronounced for male, external, and specialist CEOs who are employed at firms that are undiversified, larger, less debt reliant, poor performing, facing high product‐market competition, and that keep nonmanipulative financial statements and demonstrate high inclination to social responsibility in the area of diversity, employee relations, and internal governance. This research contributes to the broader debate on labor market pricing of CEO characteristics.     

CEOs versus CFOs: Incentives and corporate policies

We undertake a broad-based study of the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on corporate financial policies and show that the risk-taking incentives of chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) significantly influence their firms’ financial policies. In particular, we find that CEOs’ risk-decreasing (-increasing) incentives are associated with lower (higher) leverage and higher (lower) cash balances. CFOs’ risk-decreasing (-increasing) incentives are associated with safer (riskier) debt-maturity choices and higher (lower) earnings-smoothing through accounting accruals. We exploit the stock option expensing regulation of 2004 to establish a causal link between managerial incentives and corporate policies. Our findings have important implications for optimal corporate compensation design.     

CFO Fiduciary Responsibilities and Annual Bonus Incentives

We examine how firms design bonus plans of their CFOs. CFOs participate in decision making much like other executives, but they also have significant fiduciary responsibilities for reporting firms' financial results. Responsibility for financial reporting raises the question of whether it is appropriate to pay CFOs annual bonuses contingent on self-reported financial performance. In this paper, we provide a framework that characterizes CFO bonuses as a tradeoff between CFOs' decision-making responsibilities and their fiduciary duties over financial reporting. This framework yields a number of implications that we examine empirically using a proprietary survey of CFO compensation practices of public and private firms. Our main finding shows that from 2003 to 2007 public entities (relative to private entities) reduced the percentage of CFO bonuses contingent on financial performance. We interpret this result as evidence that firms mitigate misreporting practices in part by deemphasizing CFO incentive compensation.