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1.
The UK current account deficit reached a peak in excess of £20bn in 1989, equivalent to 4 per cent of GDP. In the next two years, as recession took its toll of domestic spending, it shrank quickly - on the latest data the deficit was only £4.4bn last year, 3/4 per cent of nominal GDP. Over the same period the trade gap narrowed front £25bn to £10bn, in each case taking the deficit back to the levels of 1987, before the late 1980s' boom really got under way. Since 1989, therefore, both 011 trade and the current account, there has been a significant reduction in the external deficit. Yet it remains the case that, despite the length of the recession - non-oil GDP has fallen for six successive quarters - the current account is still in deficit. Moreover, despite there being no concrete data to point to the beginnings of recovery, the shortfall is widening. The low point was the second quarter of last year, with a rare current surplus recorded in June, since when the trade deficit has steadily widened again as the consequence primarily of a 5.5per cent increase in the volume of imports over the last 12 months. Why is it that, in contrast with the experience in the 1980-81 downturn, this recession has not produced a trade or even a current account surplus? Does this mean that the recovery, when it does come, will inevitably widen the deficit with the possible consequence that ‘balance of payments problems’ will undermine the pound inside the ERM? We conclude that, while it is disappointing that UK producers have not managed to claw back more of the domestic market - in contrast with the experience of exporters in world markets - our forecast of a current account deficit of 0–2 per cent of GDP should be relatively easily financed and will riot therefore cause serious problem for economic policy. This conclusion would riot necessarily hold if the recovery occurs more rapidly than we expect arid sucks in a greater volume of imports. It may be the case that the UK will continue to run a current deficit with Japan in particular as the counterpart to ongoing Japanese direct investment in this country.  相似文献   

2.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(Z3):1-29
Overview: Outlook bright despite fears of protectionism
  • ? President Trump's decision to impose tariffs on some steel and aluminium imports has increased the downside risk of a surge in protectionist measures. But for now, our view is that the direct impact of the US move will be small. Our global GDP growth forecasts for 2018 is unchanged at 3.2% while we have nudged up 2019 from 2.9% to 3.0%.
  • ? Available data suggest that the healthy pace of world GDP growth in Q4 has been maintained into Q1. The global composite PMI rose again in February, to its highest level in almost three and a half years. And in the first two months of the year, Chinese import growth remained solid, suggesting that, for now, it is still an important support for world trade. Although our advanced economy leading indicator has fallen back a touch since the turn of the year, it remains consistent with robust growth.
  • ? Another plus is that the recent equity market sell‐off has not yet morphed into a fullblown correction. As with other ‘tantrums’ over recent years, we do not expect this to have any notable spill‐overs for growth.
  • ? But the bigger concern is now the potential for a sharp increase in economic protectionism. While the imposition of tariffs on some US steel and aluminium imports will have repercussions for foreign producers and worsen US cost competitiveness, the sector is too small to have major knock‐on implications for global growth. The main worry is if this triggers retaliation that spins into a damaging trade war. Although this downside risk has grown, in our view it remains a tail risk. Neither the US nor its trading partners will benefit from a raft of tariffs being imposed. And the political gains for Trump may prove illusory if retaliatory measures disproportionately affect US regions where he and the Republican party are politically vulnerable.
  • ? In all, our baseline view remains little changed and we still see another year of healthy GDP growth. Although downside risks to the outlook have risen since the start of the year, they are still lower than two or three years ago.
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3.
Forecast Summary     
《Economic Outlook》1991,16(1):2-3
Although hard evidence of recovery is still elusive, our forecast indicates that the trough of the recession occurred in the second quarter and that output fell 4 per cent peak-to-trough. We estimate that GDP rose 112 per cent in the third quarter - though only because of a rebound in North Sea oil production - and that for 1991 CIS a whole it will be 2 per cent down on 1990 levels. Next year GDP is forecast to rise 2 per cent but it is not until 1993 that the 1990 output peak is passed. Unemployment therefore still has a considerable way to rise - to a peak of 2.8 million in 1993. In the first year of full EMS membership, the economy has made an accelerated transition to European levels of inflation. Against a background of modest growth, it should be possible to consolidate this progress and we expect retail price inflation to average little more than 3 per cent over the next four years. Similar rapid progress has been achieved on the balance of payments where there is a trade surplus on manufactured goods for the first time since 1982. Here, however, we are less confident that the reduction in the trade gap can be sustained. In the recovery phase we expect imports to rise more rapidly than exports with the result that the current account deficit rises from £6bn this year to £8bn in 1992 and £10bn-£12bn in 1993-5.  相似文献   

4.
Forecast Summary     
《Economic Outlook》1986,10(5):2-3
Short-term economic prospects for the UK will depend critically on what happens to oil prices and on the government's response to any changes. Our central case assumes that North Sea oil averages £20 a barrel for the remainder of the year and that the government holds the sterling index at about 74. In the Focus we also examine the sensitivity of the forecast to changes in oil prices. The willingness of the government to let the exchange rate fall in response to the fall in oil prices means that we still expect GDP to grow by about 21/2. per cent in 1986 and we expect inflation to fall below 4 per cent by the middle of the year. Lower oil prices generate a faster growth of world output; the UK benefits from this and we are forecasting growth of nearly 3 per cent in 1987 with inflation falling further.  相似文献   

5.
冯鑫明 《价值工程》2010,29(19):255-256,F0003
在推动经济增长的各种因素中,进出口贸易无疑是一个重要的因素。本文对近几年的镇江市生产总值和贸易发展展开了研究,并利用Eviews软件和SPSS软件,对镇江的生产总值、进口额和出口额进行了相关性分析和回归分析,最终得出两者之间存在正相关性,进而提出努力发展镇江市进出口的相关建议,以更好的发挥进出口贸易对经济增长的促进作用。  相似文献   

6.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(1):10-17
  • ? If Brexit negotiations were to break down, the UK would face a significant increase in trade disruption from March 2019, even if it were able to put some basic trading arrangements in place. In a scenario where key sectors face extra friction, we find that the level of UK GDP would be 2.0% – or £16bn in cash terms – lower at the end of 2020 compared with our baseline. The impact on the remaining EU countries, including Ireland, would be much smaller .
  • ? This article focuses on what a cliff‐edge Brexit means for trade costs and prices. This is only part of the equation – such a scenario would also influence supply chains and migration, while there is also potential for policymakers to mitigate some of the negative effects via looser policy.
  • ? The notion that the UK could simply walk away from Brexit negotiations and rely on WTO rules to trade with the world is deeply flawed. The UK would need to re‐establish more than 750 very complex international arrangements just to maintain the status quo. We expect only the most critical issues – such as air travel – to be resolved by March 2019. Exporters also face a substantial increase in non‐tariff barriers.
  • ? A breakdown in talks would also see both sides levying tariffs on imports from each other from March 2019, raising the cost of importing UK goods into the EU by 3.5% and by 3.1% for goods imported into the UK from the EU. For the UK, this will apply to roughly 60% of its goods exports and imports, but for all EU countries except Ireland the share would be less than 10%.
  • ? The additional trade frictions would knock around 1pp a year off UK GDP growth in 2019 and 2020, resulting in a period of very weak growth. And the risks to this scenario are skewed to the downside – a slump in confidence or failure to establish the necessary customs infrastructure in time could easily generate a worse outcome
  相似文献   

7.
WORLD OUTLOOK     
The slowdown in the world economy, which followed last year's oil price collapse and which awakened fears that the world was on the threshold of a new recession, is coming to an end. Output growth in the first half of the year was stronger than we had previously expected and a gentle acceleration is forecast over the next eighteen months. In contrast to this improvement on output, there has been little or no progress on the major problems of the world economy, including the USA's twin structural deficits, budget and trade, and the international debt crisis. Moreover, with the US facing elections in just over a year's time, no economic initiative is likely until 1989. Hence the prevailing view that the US and world economies will "muddle through" for another year. But in 1989 a new US administration is likely to face up to the trade and budget imbalances and many US forecasters believe that the required fiscal tightening will lead to recession. As we explain below, this is not our view and the forecast embodies steady 3 per cent growth in the world economy over the medium term. Inflation has now passed the low point brought about by the oil price collapse. On our forecast of output, inflation is expected to remain close to its present underlying rate of 4 per cent.  相似文献   

8.
Forecast Summary     
《Economic Outlook》1992,16(9):2-3
Even if output recovers in the second quarter (as we expect), it looks as if there will be no increase in GDP this year in comparison with 1991. This reflects the weak start to the year, in which non-oil output registered its seventh successive quarterly decline. Through the year (fourth quarter to fourth quarter), however, we expect GDP to rise 1.5 per cent, laying the basis for a stronger recovery in 1993. Even so, it is not until late next year that output returns to its previous peak Paradoxically, we have raised our forecast of domestic demand from February (on a milder stock rundown) but imports are taking a disproportionate amount of the extra demand, holding back domestic output and aggravating the current account deficit. From nearly £9bn this year, we see the deficit rising to over £14bn by the middle of the decade, equivalent to 13/4 per cent of GDP. While this is disappointing, it should be relatively easily financed even with lower interest rates providing the pound is held at its present DM 2.95 parity. we assume no ERM realignment which underpins a further drop in inflation to 4 per cent later this year and to 3-3 1/2 per cent by the mid 1990s. The weakness of output means that unemployment continues to rise for another 12 months, peaking in the middle of 1993 at three million, and that public sector finances will move still further into deficit - we project a PSBR this year of £30bn and a peak of £34bn in 1993-4, equivalent to 5 1/4 per cent of GDP.  相似文献   

9.
Forecast Summary     
《Economic Outlook》1992,16(5):2-3
Nearly two years after the I990peak in output, the economy continues to 'bump along the bottom' of an L-shaped recession, which has turned into as severe a downturn as its predecessors in 1974-5 and 1980-1. The origins of the recession lie in the weakness of domestic demand, which has failed to respond to the 4.5per cent cut in interest rates that has taken place since we joined the ERM. It is now the turn of fiscalpolicy: public spending was raised in the Autumn Statement and, as the General Election approaches, the odds are on tax cuts in next month's Budget. This relaxation of monetary and fiscal policy should produce recovery and we see output moving ahead from the second quarter onwards. Nevertheless, the outlook for I992 is weaker than before: we forecast a rise in GDP of a little over I per cent, rather less for manufacturing industry. In 1993 and beyond n growth rate of around 2112per cent should be possible but it is the second half of next year before output passes its previous peak. This suggests that unemployment will rise for at least another year - to a peak in the summer of I993 of 2.8 million. The combination of a stable exchange rate inside the ERM and protracted recession has produced a rapid reduction in inflation and the current account deficit. As long as the pound maintains its present parity, inflation should moderate further, to the 3–4 per cent range by the end of the year and beyond. On the trade side, in contrast, imports have already bottomed out and exports are struggling in a weak world economy. This suggests that, as the recovery gets under way, the deficit on current account will widen from last year's £6bn to £8bn this year and £10bn by I995.  相似文献   

10.
We have updated our October forecast to take into account recent events in equity and foreign exchange markets as well as the Autumn Statement. As far as the prospects for the world economy are concerned, we have taken a gloomier view than the Treasury. On this basis we also obtain slower growth in the UK next year: output is forecast to rise 2.2 per cent compared with 2.8 per cent in October and 2.7 per cent in the official forecast. Inflation and the balance of payments are little changed from October. For next year's Budget we continue to assume a cut in the standard rate of income tax to 25 per cent though, on our calculations, this requires a PSBR it 1988–9 of newly £2bn whereas the Autumn Statement forecast assumed a constant PSBR of £1bn  相似文献   

11.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(Z1):1-29
Overview: entering 2018 with plenty of momentum
  • ? Further evidence that the global economy ended last year on a high note is consistent with our view that world GDP growth in 2018 will be around 3.2%, a little better than the likely rise of 3% in 2017 and the best annual outturn since 2011.
  • ? The global economy has entered 2018 with plenty of momentum. In December, the global composite PMI continued to trend upwards, rising to its highest level of 2017. This was primarily down to developments in the manufacturing sector, with several emerging markets recording especially strong gains.
  • ? While the strength of the manufacturing PMI bodes well for global trade, other timely trade indicators, particularly from Asia, have been less positive. On balance, though, we have nudged up our forecast for world trade growth iwn 2018 to 4.8%. But this would still be a slowdown after last year's estimated rise of 6%.
  • ? This partly reflects the change in the drivers of GDP growth from 2017. We still expect a modest slowdown in China, triggering a sharper drop‐off in import growth there. Eurozone GDP growth is also likely to slow slightly, to 2.2%, which is still well above our estimate of potential growth. By contrast, we have nudged up our US GDP growth forecast for this year to 2.8% – 0.5pp higher than the probable 2017 outturn – as looser fiscal policy will not be fully offset by tighter monetary policy. The recent rise in commodity prices, further dollar weakness and still‐strong global trade growth all bode well for prospects in many emerging markets.
  • ? Some commentators have questioned the durability of the global economic expansion, reflecting the long period of uninterrupted GDP growth and concerns that a financial market slowdown could eventually impinge on growth. But economic expansions do not die of old age. And while equity markets look expensive on many metrics, we expect strong earnings growth to push equity prices higher over the coming months. Meanwhile, although various geopolitical risks remain, more generally economic uncertainty has diminished.
  相似文献   

12.
The world economy is in poor shape. OECD industrial production fell 0.5per cent in both 1991 and 1992 arid though it may now have stopped falling it is still, on our estimates, below year-earlier levels. The US recovery continues to disappoint; recession persists in Japan and Europe; inflationary pressures, already weak, are waning. Next month's UK forecast would normally be based on the world forecast published in June's International Economic Outlook, when we were looking for G7 output to rise 1.2 per cent this year, 2.5 per cent next. But this now looks on the high side and although a detailed revision to the world forecast mist wait until the December IEO, as at1 input to the UK forecast we are shading our G7 growth forecasts - to I per cent this year and 2.25 per cent in 1994. Similar downward revisions are also in train at the OECD arid IMF, according to recent press reports. The more sluggish output performance is already having mi impact on the oil price, which has fallen below £16 a barrel. Together, these developments imply lower world inflation and, particularly in post-ERM Europe, a faster easing of monetary policy than we had allowed for in June.  相似文献   

13.
The paper presents a new methodology, based on tensor decomposition, to map dynamic trade networks and to assess its strength in forecasting economic fluctuations at different periods of time in Asia. Using the monthly merchandise import and export data across 33 Asian economies, together with the US, EU and UK, we detect the community structure of the evolving network and we identify clusters and central nodes inside each of them. Our findings show that data are well represented by two communities, in which People's Republic of China and Japan play the major role. We then analyze the synchronisation between GDP growth and trade. Furthermore we apply our model to the prediction of economic fluctuations. Our findings show that the model leads to an increase in predictive accuracy, as higher order interactions between countries are taken into account.  相似文献   

14.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(Z2):1-29
Overview: Financial turmoil will not derail expansion
  • ? The further run of broadly positive economic news has been overshadowed by the recent financial market turmoil. We do not expect the latter to be the catalyst for any notable economic slowdown and have left our world GDP growth forecast for 2018 unchanged at 3.2%, which would be the strongest result since 2011, up from an estimated 3.0% in 2017.
  • ? January survey data continued to strike a positive tone. Indeed, the global composite PMI rose to its highest level during the current upswing and points to a further acceleration in global GDP growth. Meanwhile, less timely world trade data showed strong growth in November after a weaker performance in September and October.
  • ? Of course, these developments predate recent financial market developments. The key issue is whether the equity market sell‐off triggers significant spillovers to the wider economy. If the market reversal is to have notable repercussions, it will need to morph from a tantrum into a full‐blown crisis. For now, we still expect interest rates generally to edge higher, with three rate hikes still seen in the US this year.
  • ? Despite the recent fall, equity prices are still up sharply compared with a few months ago and earnings growth remains solid. Against this backdrop, further weakness would probably require an additional trigger, such as a sustained rise in bond yields in response to a reassessment of the inflation and monetary policy outlook. Although inflation concerns have risen recently, our view remains that price pressures will rise only gradually in the advanced economies and that the upside risks to both inflation and bond yields remain well contained.
  • ? The upshot is that recent events have not prompted us to reassess the outlook for this year or beyond. We continue to expect world GDP growth to pick up to 3.2% this year, reflecting strong growth in both the advanced economies and the emerging markets. And our forecast for 2019 is also unchanged at 2.9%. In turn, world trade growth remains quite strong, helped by the weaker US$, but is seen slowing to 5% this year from just over 6% in 2017, with a further modest easing to 4.3% in 2019.
  相似文献   

15.
The framework and results of an international multi-region input–output (MRIO) model for the UK are presented. A time series of balanced input–output tables for the UK was constructed for the period 1992 to 2004 by using a matrix balancing procedure that is able to handle conflicting external data and inconsistent constraints. Detailed sectoral and country-specific trade data for the UK were compiled and reconciled with the UK input–output data, and economic and environmental accounts for three world regions were integrated in a UK-specific MRIO model. This was subsequently used to calculate a time series of national carbon footprints for the UK from 1992 to 2004. Greenhouse gas emissions embedded in UK trade are distinguished by destination of imports to intermediate and final demand. Most greenhouse gases show a significant increase over time in consumer emissions and a widening gap between producer and consumer emissions. Net CO2 emissions embedded in UK imports increased from 4.3% of producer emissions in 1992 to a maximum of 20% in 2002. The total estimated UK carbon footprint in 2004 was 730 Mt for CO2 and 934 Mt CO2 equivalents for all greenhouse gases.  相似文献   

16.
This paper studies the association between trade reform, growth, and trade adjustment assistance in a sample of developing countries that underwent trade reforms during 1987–2004. Our analysis explicitly differentiates between a group of countries that received trade adjustment loans from the World Bank and a non-recipient group. The results suggest that trade adjustment assistance is positively associated with economic growth after trade reform in the medium to long run. In comparison to a pre-reform period and to the non-recipient group, the recipient countries registered 0.2 percent higher growth of real GDP per capita, 5.0 percent higher import growth, and 2.5 percent higher export growth over a period of three to five years after trade reform.  相似文献   

17.
《Economic Systems》2022,46(2):100982
Economic growth is driven by numerous factors. However, traditional economic theory focuses on certain key reasons, while ignoring the impact of other factors. Since 1978, China has achieved unprecedented economic growth, but also faces low per capita GDP. To clarify the driving forces behind this situation, we used per capita GDP to represent China’s economic growth and performed total factor analysis based on 13 variables in 7 socioeconomic dimensions using panel data from 30 Chinese provinces over the 40 years since China opened to the west in 1978. We found similar determinants in different regressions. Internal trade, privatization and investment were the primary factors driving Chinese economic development. Surprisingly, we found that the contribution of foreign trade to economic growth (per capita GDP) was weak. Education had a much smaller contribution than science and technology. Using per capita income as the dependent variable to provide a robustness test, we found that China’s income distribution has not paralleled its economic development and the distribution of the benefits of GDP growth to citizens must be improved. China’s experience demonstrates that promoting economic growth requires coordinated development of many factors, and that different policy preferences should be adopted to meet different economic development conditions.  相似文献   

18.
进口高质量中间品是发展中国家实现技术追赶的重要途径;贸易自由化会降低进口高质量中间产品的贸易成本和相对价格,促进企业进口中间品质量升级。基于此,本文利用细分关税数据、海关数据和工业企业数据,将加工贸易作为控制组、一般贸易作为处理组,采用倍差法经验分析贸易自由化对中国企业进口中间品质量的影响。结论发现:伴随关税下降,中国企业进口中间品质量整体增长,且一般贸易组增长速度远快于加工贸易组。同加工贸易相比,关税下降1%一般贸易进口中间品质量增长高出0.06%~3.74%。这一作用在持续进口企业中,在基础设施完善、市场化水平高、经济集聚程度高的地区更明显。上述结论通过了同趋势假设、内生性等一系列稳健性检验。  相似文献   

19.
陆光洲 《价值工程》2012,31(20):172-175
本文通过对广西1978~2009年进出口贸易与经济增长的数据进行统计比较并建立分布滞后和时间序列综合模型回归分析,得出无论是出口贸易还是进口贸易都对经济增长有促进作用,并获得充分的证据支持进口贸易在推动经济增长中的重要性要胜过出口贸易的观点。通过实证研究对广西进出口贸易发展带来一些有益的启示。  相似文献   

20.
WORLD OUTLOOK     
The recent weakness of the world economy does not undermine the relatively optimistic forecast for 1987 which we presented in May. At that time we suggested that activity would be sluggish for most of this year as a result of the impact effect of the OPEC III oil price collapse. But we also argued that by the end of the year there would be clear signs of a consumer-led recovery as the personal sector adjusted to the real income gains and lower inflation benefits of the lower oil price and the reduction in nominal interest rates which followed. There is mounting evidence of rising consumer spending, particularly in Europe and it is something of a puzzle that output has not risen to meet this demand. The explanation is partly that producer confidence has lagged behind that of consumers, so that demand has been met from stock, and partly that spending has been supplied from countries outside the OECD, especially the NICs in the Far East. Nevertheless, we are convinced that our earlier view of OECD output prospects next year remains the most likely though, in recognition of the growing importance of non-OECD competition, we have adjusted the output forecast down slightly. OECD GNP is expected to rise 2.6 per cent this year, with an acceleration to over 4 per cent in 1987 arid 1988. Moreover, we believe this can be achieved without a rebound in inflation, which is forecast to be stable at about its present level of 2 1/2 per cent.  相似文献   

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