Europe's precautionary principle: promise and pitfalls

The European Union, through a recent 'Communication' from the Commission, has sought to legitimize the precautionary principle while establishing criteria for adoption of appropriate precautionary measures. Although the precautionary principle is not new and indeed reflects a basic human instinct, this article argues that the EC makes a constructive contribution towards formalizing it by describing the principle in the context of established processes of risk analysis: objective scientific evaluation, risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. The EC's reference to a broad spectrum of precautionary measures, subject to specific managerial criteria, also offers some assurance that the principle shall be implemented through thoughtful processes of decision making. There are pitfalls in the EC approach that should be rectified in future refinements of the principle. Critical terms need to be defined, the evidentiary hurdles for precaution need to be clarified, and checks and balances against ill-considered application of the principle need to be strengthened. A systematic process of ranking hazards and targeting cost-effective protection opportunities should be implemented by the EC as a counterweight to enactment of precautionary measures on a crisis-by-crisis basis.     

Decision-analytic refinements of the precautionary principle

In public decision making about uncertain technological hazards, the precautionary principle calls for prompt protective action rather than delay of protections until scientific uncertainty is resolved. The precautionary principle has a sound basis in decision theory, particularly in situations where the potential hazards are serious and the costs of protective actions are tolerable. This article suggests that the precautionary principle should be refined to address three complications: (1) situations where the exposures to be reduced or prevented may have beneficial as well as hazardous consequences; (2) situations where the protective action itself will create potential hazards; and (3) situations where targeted research investments, coupled with delay of protective action, are likely to support wiser public decisions than prompt protective action. Each of these complications is shown to be relevant to contemporary policy debates about application of the precautionary principle. The usefulness of the precautionary principle in public decision making will be enhanced if these decision-analytic refinements are adopted in formal definitions of the principle.     

The precautionary principle and EMF: implementation and evaluation

The precautionary principle, a recommendation to consider action to avoid a possible harm even if it is not certain to occur, is variously defined and interpreted. We present a range of definitions with an emphasis on their requirements for strength of evidence of harm and for actions to be taken. We describe the variety of approaches that have been adopted in developing policy to address the issue of possible health effects of electric and magnetic fields (EMF) in the face of scientific uncertainty. Further, we discuss specific aspects of scientific uncertainty regarding EMF health risks particularly relevant to the development of precautionary principle policy. We define and discuss prudent avoidance and other unique features of applications of the precautionary principle to EMF. We conclude with examples from EMF policy decisions of risk tradeoffs that need to be considered in developing any precautionary principle policy, and provide recommendations for better ways to define and implement the precautionary principle.     

The EC courts' contribution to refining the parameters of precaution

By virtue of its ambiguity, it has largely been left to the courts to flesh out the scope and application of the precautionary principle. This paper examines the contribution made by EC courts to defining the parameters of precautionary decision making. In so doing, it illustrates that, though the precautionary principle is seen to operate in a number of regulatory contexts, discernible trends in judicial interpretations of precaution and the underlying notion of ‘uncertainty’ can nevertheless be identified. In contrast with early judgments, the courts are beginning to explicitly interpret risk assessment processes as having a pivotal role in determining precautionary intervention. Rather than finding simply that circumstances of uncertainty warrant precautionary measures, the courts have started to require that clear, or ‘concrete’, evidence of harm, deriving from risk assessment, is established before intervention is justified. This paper posits three explanations for this shift: (i) the ‘better regulation’ initiative within Europe; (ii) the Commission's Communication on the Precautionary Principle; and (iii) WTO litigation on precautionary safeguard measures. The judicial move to affiliate precaution with risk assessment processes in decision making can be seen as a reflection of these factors.     

Procedure for the Implementation of the Precautionary Principle in Biosafety Commissions

In order to fulfil their responsibilities under the precautionary principle, biosafety commissions should lay down guidelines concerning the understanding and application of this principle and work towards an operational procedure. With this contribution, we propose a step‐wise procedure that aims to establish the understanding of the precautionary principle within biosafety commissions and to provide a methodological approach for the application of this principle to specific cases in the course of risk assessment. This approach is based on systematically investigating the consensus view within a group of 15 biosafety experts with the help of sets of checklists. For step 1, we propose a checklist of 13 criteria aimed at defining the understanding of the precautionary principle. For step 2, we propose 4 criteria for the decision on whether or not to use the precautionary principle. For step 3, 11 criteria for the use of the precautionary principle are presented. In step 4, additional criteria for specific applications could be included. In step 5, possible recommendations to decision‐making authorities are proposed.     

The precautionary principle: an 'unprincipled' approach to biotechnology regulation

A tenet of administrative law, particularly in the United States, is that regulators must base their decisions on 'intelligible principles' to provide consistency, predictability, transparency and accountability. The precautionary principle, which purports to provide a new decision rule for making environmental decisions under conditions of uncertainty, fails to provide such an intelligible principle for making decisions. The precautionary principle is ambiguous on the use of the two major criteria currently used to make environmental decisions - significant risk and cost-benefit balancing - yet offers no new specific decision criteria in their place. The second fundamental problem with the precautionary principle is that it is based on the unsubstantiated premise that the current regulatory system is insufficiently protective. The current system already tends to err on the side of the safety, as it should, but the relevant question is just how precautious should we be? As illustrated by the example of genetically modified organisms, the prudent level of precaution depends on factors such as the magnitude, distribution and uncertainty of risks, the extent of exposure, and the trade-offs and lost benefits in foregoing the risk. These are precisely the factors that are considered under the current risk-based approach, which the precautionary principle seeks to replace.     

Science and proven experience: a Swedish variety of evidence-based medicine and a way to better risk analysis?

A key question for evidence-based medicine (EBM) is how best to model the way in which EBM should ‘[integrate] individual clinical expertise and the best external evidence’. We argue that the formulations and models available in the literature today are modest variations on a common theme and face very similar problems when it comes to risk analysis, which is here understood as a decision procedure comprising a factual assessment of risk, the risk assessment, and the decision what to do based on this assessment, the risk management. Both the early and updated models of evidence-based clinical decisions presented in the writings of Haynes, Devereaux and Guyatt assume that EBM consists of, among other things, evidence from clinical research together with information about patients’ values and clinical expertise. On this A-view, EBM describes all that goes on in a specific justifiable medical decision. There is, however, an alternative interpretation of EBM, the B-view, in which EBM describes just one component of the decision situation (a component usually based on evidence from clinical research) and in which, together with other types of evidence, EBM leads to a justifiable clincial decision but does not describe the decision itself. This B-view is inspired by a 100-years older version of EBM, a Swedish standard requiring medical decision-making, professional risk-taking and practice to be in accordance with ‘science and proven experience’ (VBE). In the paper, we outline how the Swedish concept leads to an improved understanding of the way in which scientific evidence and clinical experience can and cannot be integrated in light of EBM. How scientific evidence and clinical experience is integrated influences both the way we do risk assessment and risk management. In addition, the paper sketches the as yet unexplored historical background to VBE and EBM.     

Choosing between precautions for nanoparticles in the workplace: complementing the precautionary principle with caring

Workers who develop and use nanoparticles are on the front line of exposure to the purported risks of nanoparticles. Employers have a legal duty to protect their employees against any work-related harm. However, it is difficult to perform the required risk assessment and management when dealing with uncertainty. Risk ethicists have therefore argued for using the precautionary principle to guide such decisions on uncertain risks. In this paper, I argue that if we want to make use of innovative products, such as nanomaterials, but lack the knowledge and shared standards for choosing between protective measures, the precautionary principle is underdetermined. For the use of nanoparticles in working environments, there are several guidelines that suggest different precautionary strategies for dealing with their purported risks, but choosing between these guidelines proves difficult in the absence of a clear, scientific, decision principle. I therefore explore the ethics of care to develop a complementary decision criterion for the precautionary principle. From this perspective, the caring qualities of working relationships are key in comparing precautions with each other. I propose three conditions for assessing risk management strategies based on (1) the existence of a mutual concern for employee health and safety, (2) the connectedness and continuity of the relationships between employer and employee, and (3) the responsiveness of employers to employee needs. Using these criteria will support choosing between precautions, by shifting attention from the acceptability of imposing a risk to creating a social context in which the imposition of the residual risks can be considered acceptable.     

Obituary

The environmental risk associated with genetically modified organisms (GMO) implies that new approaches to risk assessment, risk management and risk communication are needed. In this paper we discuss the role of the precautionary principle in policy responses to GMO risk. We first discuss application of the criteria in the European Environment Agency report “Late lessons from early warnings: The precautionary principle 1896–2000” to environmental GMO risk, with focus on crop plants. Moreover, we discuss Bayesian analysis in the context of improving the informational basis for decision‐making under uncertainty. Finally, environmental uncertainties are intertwined with economic uncertainties. Providing incentives for improved risk assessment, risk management and risk communication is crucial for enhancing environmental and social responsibility and thereby facilitate implementation of precautionary approaches. We discuss environmental and social screening of companies as an example of how such incentives can be provided.     

Simultane Optimierung von Managementregeln im Asset-Liability-Management deutscher Lebensversicherer

In this article, we discuss the effects of different management decision rules on asset liability management of German Life Insurance companies and the optimization of these rules. We use a simulation based model according to dynamic simultaneous ALM.It turns out that management decision rules have a strong influence on the outcome of dynamic ALM in comparison to static projections. Choosing suitable management decision rules can make an asset liability model significantly more realistic and adaptable to the individual situations of different insurers. Furthermore, it can dramatically reduce an insurance company’s risk by determining which behavior makes sense, from a risk management point of view.Moreover, the simultaneous optimization of management decision rules within dynamic asset liability management improves the achievements even more, since it leads to advanced parameter values that yield enhanced results.     

Technocratic precautionary principle: Korean risk governance of mad cow disease

This study investigates the multiplicity of sciences and the assemblage of technocracy with the precautionary principle (PP) in the Korean risk governance of mad cow disease (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [BSE]). It conducts a policy typological analysis and a sociocultural analysis of the PP. Korean BSE policies are built on the technocratic PP. This principle emphasizes the scientific evidence of risk, although taking precautionary policy actions against BSE. This principle led to the absence of a total BSE inspection, a specified risk material policy for Korean cattle, a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point policy for beef processing and circulation, and an animal feed ban on nonruminants. Moreover, the BSE debate is not one about a unified science vs. a unified PP, but rather it concerns complex struggles between PPs in alliance with different sciences.     

The influence of the precautionary principle on science-based decision-making: questionable applications to risks of radiofrequency fields

The precautionary principle, recognized by the European Commission as a 'full-fledged and general principle of international law,' has been advanced as a paradigm for response to potential risks to the environment or health when scientific data are uncertain. But lacking the elements and operational qualities that characterize principles that have proven useful in law, politics, science, and ethics, the precautionary principle lends itself to regulation based on the perception of a threat or fear itself. In the absence of scientific evidence for risk, recent application of the precautionary principle to questions about radiofrequency electromagnetic fields of cellular telephones and cellular telephone base stations has produced wasteful and misguided regulations and questionable advice to the public. The formation of scientific 'fire brigades' is suggested for rapid acquisition of targeted scientific data needed so that precautionary policies on technologically driven issues can be based on quantitative risk assessment.     

RISK-TAKING INCENTIVES OF BANKS AND RISK-ADJUSTED DEPOSIT INSURANCE

The manager of a depository institution is shown to exhibit risk-taking behavior under the current insurance arrangement. Perfect monitoring or risk-based deposit insurance would eliminate this incentive if information were symmetric between bank managers and the insuring agency. Absent symmetric information, it is shown that a recently suggested scheme, where insurers collect insurance premiums based on projected and actual risk levels, does not control the risk-taking incentive. The only way to control this incentive through insurance rates is to levy a relatively high premium, which is not actuarially fair.     

The post-normal science of precaution

Science now finds itself in a new and troubled situation. The traditional optimistic picture is problematic and compromised at every turn. The scientific system now faces a crisis of confidence, of legitimacy and ultimately of power. We can usefully distinguish two sorts of science. The ‘mainstream’ is reductionist in style, and increasingly linked to industry. By contrast, the ‘post-normal’ approach embodies the precautionary principle. It depends on public debate, and involves an essential role for the ‘extended peer community’. It is based on the recent recognition of the influence of values on all research, even including the basic statistical tests of significance. It is the appropriate methodology when either systems uncertainties or decision stakes are high; under those conditions the puzzle-solving approach of ‘normal science’ is obsolete. This is a drastic cultural change for science, which many scientists will difficult to accept. But there is no turning back; we can understand post-normal science as the extension of democracy appropriate to the conditions of our age.     

货币政策和银行风险承担：一种非线性关系

宽松的货币政策会通过估值、收入和现金流机制,追逐收益机制以及中央银行沟通和反应机制等渠道增加银行风险承担,通过风险转移机制降低银行风险承担,从而导致货币政策与银行风险承担之间可能存在复杂的非线性关系。本文使用面板阈值模型,基于我国银行业数据研究了货币政策对银行风险承担的影响,发现我国货币政策对银行风险承担的影响存在门限效应,即货币政策对银行风险承担的影响取决于货币政策基准利率偏离泰勒规则利率的程度。当这种偏离小于门限值时,宽松货币政策会增加银行风险承担;当这种偏离大于门限值时,宽松货币政策会降低银行风险承担。本文研究对更好地理解我国货币政策对银行风险承担及金融稳定的影响有一定参考意义。     

Five caveats for risk–risk analysis

Risk analysis should be symmetrical in the sense that when evaluating an option for decision-making, we assess the risks that it may increase in the same way as those that it may decrease. However, implementing such symmetry is not always easy. In this contribution, five complications that have to be dealt with are introduced and briefly discussed: (1) We need to take all types of advantages and disadvantages into account, not only the risks. (2) There is more than one way to weigh risks against each other. (3) Decision-makers may legitimately put more weight on the direct effects of their decisions than on more indirect and uncertain effects, in particular, if the latter fall outside of their area of responsibility. (4) When a trade-off between risks is unsatisfactory, we should search for innovative solutions that make the trade-off unnecessary. (5) An exclusive focus on risks does not solve the incommensurability problem.     

创新影响了银行风险承担吗?——基于中国上市银行的实证检验

本文将银行内部创新因素和外部创新环境引入银行风险承担研究框架,从理论和实证两个方面分析创新对银行风险承担的影响。研究结果发现,创新与银行风险承担之间呈现"U型"的关系,适度创新能够弱化银行风险承担,过度创新会加剧银行风险承担。进一步研究发现,内部创新对非五大行具有当期和滞后的双重影响,而对五大行仅具有当期效应。外部创新对五大行具有当期和滞后的双重影响,而对非五大行的当期影响不显著。企业还款能力、银行贷款质量和创新资产规模是创新影响银行风险承担的重要中介机制。此外,五大行对创新的敏感性小于非五大行,五大行可接受的创新区间大于非五大行。     

Noise

The effects of noise on the world, and on our views of the world, are profound. Noise in the sense of a large number of small events is often a causal factor much more powerful than a small number of large events can be. Noise makes trading in financial markets possible, and thus allows us to observe prices for financial assets. Noise causes markets to be somewhat inefficient, but often prevents us from taking advantage of inefficiencies. Noise in the form of uncertainty about future tastes and technology by sector causes business cycles, and makes them highly resistant to improvement through government intervention. Noise in the form of expectations that need not follow rational rules causes inflation to be what it is, at least in the absence of a gold standard or fixed exchange rates. Noise in the form of uncertainty about what relative prices would be with other exchange rates makes us think incorrectly that changes in exchange rates or inflation rates cause changes in trade or investment flows or economic activity. Most generally, noise makes it very difficult to test either practical or academic theories about the way that financial or economic markets work. We are forced to act largely in the dark.