The valuation impact of reconciling pro forma earnings to GAAP earnings

Regulation G requires all companies to quantitatively reconcile pro forma earnings with GAAP earnings. This paper provides three findings related to the impact of reconciliations on mispricing of pro forma earnings. First, prior to Reg G, we find that mispricing of pro forma earnings is limited to firms with low reconciliation quality. There is no evidence of mispricing for firms with high reconciliation quality. Second, we find no evidence of mispricing after Reg G. Third, there is a cross-Reg G reduction of mispricing for firms whose reconciliation quality improves, and there continues to be no mispricing for firms that have high reconciliation quality both before and after Reg G. Together, our results support the notion that better reconciliations reduce the extent of mispricing.     

Pro forma accounting disclosures: The effect of reconciliations and financial reporting knowledge on nonprofessional investors' judgments

Regulation G requires companies that report non-GAAP or “pro forma” earnings provide a reconciliation. While nonprofessional investors are a large, heterogeneous population with varying degrees of financial reporting knowledge, previous research treats them as a homogenous group. The study examines how differences in financial reporting knowledge and information viewing behavior affect the influence of reconciled pro forma earnings disclosures on nonprofessional investors' judgments. Lower-knowledge investors appear to incorporate information on differences between GAAP and pro forma earnings in their judgments as long as they view this information in the reconciliation. However, higher-knowledge investors appear to consistently incorporate information on differences between GAAP and pro forma earnings in their judgments regardless of the relative amount of time they spend viewing the reconciliation relative to other disclosures. Our results suggest that knowledge differences influence how nonprofessional investors acquire and use information on differences between GAAP and pro forma earnings.     

US Managers' Use of 'Pro Forma' Adjustments to Meet Strategic Earnings Targets

Abstract:  The practice of reporting manager-adjusted 'pro forma' earnings numbers in quarterly earnings press releases has attracted considerable attention in recent years in the United States. Prior research suggests that while some managers report these adjusted numbers to better reflect core earnings, others may use these earnings adjustments to meet strategic earnings targets on a pro forma basis when they fall short based on GAAP reporting standards. Assuming the latter motivation could potentially mislead investors, the difficulty lies in distinguishing the 'good guys' from the 'bad guys.' Using hand-collected pro forma earnings data, we investigate the extent to which different types of earnings adjustments affect the spread between pro forma earnings and GAAP earnings from continuing operations. Moreover, we investigate which types of adjustments managers use to meet strategic earnings targets. In addition to the exclusion of one-time items like restructuring charges, the results indicate that managers often exclude recurring expenses such as depreciation, research and development, and stock-based compensation to meet these strategic targets. The exclusion of recurring items is especially indicative of aggressive pro forma reporting. Finally, we find that firms that report adjusted earnings numbers only sporadically are more likely than firms that adjust earnings figures on a regular basis to use pro forma reporting to achieve strategic earnings targets by excluding recurring items.     

Why do pro forma and Street earnings not reflect changes in GAAP? Evidence from SFAS 123R

This study examines how key market participants??managers and analysts??responded to SFAS 123R??s controversial requirement that firms recognize stock-based compensation expense. Despite mandated recognition of the expense, some firms?? managers exclude it from pro forma earnings and some firms?? analysts exclude it from Street earnings. We find evidence consistent with managers opportunistically excluding the expense to increase earnings, smooth earnings, and meet earnings benchmarks but no evidence that these exclusions result in an earnings measure that better predicts future firm performance. In contrast, we find that analysts exclude the expense from earnings forecasts when exclusion increases earnings?? predictive ability for future performance and that opportunism generally does not explain exclusion by analysts incremental to exclusion by managers. Thus our findings indicate that opportunism is the primary explanation for exclusion of the expense from pro forma earnings and predictive ability is the primary explanation for exclusion from Street earnings. Our findings suggest the controversy surrounding the recognition of stock-based compensation expense may be attributable to cross-sectional variation in the relevance of the expense for equity valuation, as well as to differing incentives of market participants.     

The Informativeness of Dividends and Associated Tax Credits

This paper investigates the informativeness of dividends and the associated tax credits with respect to earnings persistence. After confirming that dividend‐paying firms have more persistent earnings than non‐dividend‐paying firms, we show that the taxation status of the dividend is also important. Firms that pay dividends with a full tax credit attached have significantly more persistent earnings than firms that pay dividends which carry no associated tax credit. Consistent with higher levels of tax credits identifying more mature firms, those paying dividends with full tax credits have significantly less persistent losses than firms that pay dividends with only partial tax credits. Further, market pricing tests confirm that the incremental information in dividends and tax credits contributes to reductions in market mispricing of the persistence of earnings and earnings components. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and controlling for dividend size and firm age.     

Pro forma disclosures,audit fees,and auditor resignations

The disclosure of non-GAAP (pro forma) earnings numbers by managers in the post-SOX era continues to attract attention from regulators, media, and researchers. However, there is limited empirical evidence on how auditors view clients that emphasize pro forma earnings over GAAP earnings. We study the extent to which audit fees and auditor resignations are associated with opportunistic non-GAAP disclosures. We find that during the pre-SOX period, optimistic pro forma differences, measured using either IBES actual earnings or hand-collected pro forma earnings, are associated with higher audit fees and a higher likelihood of auditor resignations. Additional results indicate that auditors seem to be more concerned with non-GAAP earnings disclosures in the post-SOX period.     

VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PRACTICES: THE USE OF PRO FORMA REPORTING

This article looks at how U.S. managers supplement GAAP earnings with pro forma reporting. Pro forma measures, which are not audited, are typically determined through an adjustment to GAAP-based earnings. For example, a manager may choose to present an alternative to GAAP earnings that excludes period write-offs and one-time restructuring charges in order to present a more value-relevant picture of the company's performance.
The authors find that 77% of S&P 500 companies report pro forma results, and that pro forma measures are generally given greater prominence than GAAP earnings in corporate press releases. Based on the evidence, U.S. managers are using pro forma reporting strategically to affect investor perception of corporate performance. The SEC has recently issued rules to ensure that pro forma disclosure is not misleading. The authors present some guidelines on voluntary disclosure that might help forestall further regulation and preserve the ability to pursue this potentially informative practice.     

Pro forma disclosure and investor sophistication: External validation of experimental evidence using archival data

Insights on how ordinary, less-sophisticated investors interpret and process management-issued pro forma earnings numbers are useful to regulators because of concerns that pro forma disclosures are misleading to ordinary investors. Two recent experimental studies [Frederickson, J. R., & Miller, J. S. (2004). The effects of pro forma earnings disclosures on analysts’ and nonprofessional investors’ equity valuation judgments. The Accounting Review, 79(3), 667–686; Elliott, W. B. (2006). Are investors influenced by pro forma emphasis and reconciliations in earnings announcements? The Accounting Review, 81(1), 113–133] find that the existence of a pro forma number in the earnings press release as well as the relative placement of the pro forma and GAAP earnings figures within the press release affect the judgments of less-sophisticated investors but not those of more-sophisticated investors. Experimental and archival methodologies complement one another and results that persist in both settings are likely to be robust to both internal and external validity concerns. Therefore, we complement experimental evidence using trade-size-based proxies constructed from intraday transactions data to distinguish the trading activities of less-sophisticated investors from more-sophisticated investors. Our results suggest that less-sophisticated investors rely significantly more on quarterly earnings press releases that include a pro forma number than on those that do not, while more-sophisticated investors exhibit the opposite behavior. This result is consistent with Frederickson and Miller’s experimental evidence. Further, consistent with Elliott’s results, we find that less-sophisticated investors rely more on the pro forma figure when it is placed before the GAAP earnings number in the press release, while more-sophisticated investors’ trading behavior is unaffected by the relative placement of the two earnings metrics. We conclude that the existence of a pro forma number as well as its strategic placement in the press release generally affect the judgments of less-sophisticated (but not more-sophisticated) investors and these inferences are robust because they persist in both experimental and archival settings.     

Pricing and Mispricing Effects of SFAS 131

Abstract:  We investigate the effects of the introduction of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 (SFAS 131) on the market's valuation of foreign earnings. Thomas (1999) documents that investors discount the value of foreign earnings for US multinational companies. He conjectures but does not test the possibility that this finding is due to poor disclosure related to foreign operations. We find strong evidence that the introduction of the standard is positively associated with the pricing of foreign earnings. In addition, we use both the Mishkin (1983) test and a zero-investment hedge portfolio test and find that investors' mispricing of foreign earnings lessens (and in fact disappears) after SFAS 131. This study is one of the first attempts to show that improved disclosure reduces mispricing.     

Timing,earnings management and over-reaction around pure placings

This paper provides new evidence about firms conducting pure placings in the UK. It examines their abnormal performance (stock and operating), earnings management (accrual and real activities) and abnormal growth prospects for up to three years surrounding the event. It questions whether (i) timing, (ii) earnings management and/or (iii) over-reaction hypotheses can explain these performance, earnings quality and growth paths. The results document that pure placing firms have high earnings quality and abnormally high growth opportunities at the announcement. For this reason, the market is overenthusiastic. It expects more than what is eventually fulfilled, in line with the over-reaction hypothesis. Weak evidence that placing firms may exploit market timing is noted, whilst there is no supportive evidence of earnings management. These findings distinguish the earnings quality and growth opportunities of pure placing firms from that of firms conducting open offers, firm commitment offers and other seasoned equity offerings (SEO) that are not private placements, for which prior evidence reports mainly timing and/or earnings management prior to the event. This paper facilitates a better understanding of UK SEO.     

Press Release Disclosure of ‘Pro Forma’ Earnings Metrics by Large German Corporations – Empirical Evidence and Regulatory Recommendations

This paper is set against the background of recent regulatory action and standard-setting activities pertaining to the disclosure of so-called ‘pro forma’ earnings. For a sample of large corporations listed on the Frankfurt stock exchange, I individually analyze quarterly earnings announcements published for the fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Given voiced concern about the potential of pro forma metrics to misrepresent firm performance and thus to potentially mislead investors, research questions pertain to the use, the calculation and the presentation of pro forma earnings, and the impact of recent recommendations issued by European securities commissions. The results indicate that firms make extensive use of so-called ‘EB’ (earnings before) metrics and, more importantly, of pure non-GAAP performance measures, both in terms of frequency and reporting emphasis. The transparency of adjustments to GAAP earnings turns out to be low. Year-to-year analysis suggests that recent recommendations by European securities regulators have had no discernible impact on these disclosure patterns. Taken together, this evidence suggests that regulatory concern may be warranted. At the same time, it points out the need for more research into the determinants and the investor reception of pro forma earnings disclosures in EU jurisdictions.     

The Market Response to Beating After‐tax Earnings Targets Revisited using Analysts’ Pre‐tax Earnings Forecasts and Concurrent Tax Note Disclosures

We investigate whether the premium for achieving after‐tax earnings targets is informed by the availability of pre‐tax and after‐tax earnings forecasts. We find evidence the premium is discounted for firms achieving only after‐tax earnings forecasts compared with firms achieving both forecast targets. This is likely due to the uncertainty about future profitability and earnings quality created by failing to attain pre‐tax earnings targets. For firms achieving only pre‐tax earnings forecasts, no premium is documented. Taken together, our results indicate that while pre‐tax earnings forecasts may not move the market, they have an informational role in providing a context for assessing the achievement of after‐tax earnings targets. We also consider the usefulness of the tax note disclosures of deferred tax assets from carry‐forward losses for assessing the premium for achieving after‐tax earnings targets. Reflecting the duality of this tax deferral, we find evidence that recognition of these tax assets conveys information about lower earnings quality when recognition is likely to be opportunistic (in the case of firms achieving only after‐tax forecasts), and provides a signal of future profitability (in the case of firms achieving only pre‐tax forecasts).     

Discussion of “The Predictive Value of Expenses Excluded from Pro Forma Earnings”

Doyle et al. (2003, this issue) provide evidence that IBES exclusions have incremental explanatory power (over GAAP earnings) for future cash flows, for market-adjusted returns at the earnings announcement date, and for future market-adjusted returns. They argue that this evidence supports the viewpoint that the current regulatory concern about the use of pro forma earnings may be warranted. My contention in this discussion is that one can readily posit alternative explanations for each of the empirical results, in turn suggesting that the results do not provide a basis for regulatory concern. Further, since there is considerable evidence that IBES earnings differ from pro forma earnings, it is not clear that the empirical analyzes in this paper may be used to draw any conclusions about pro forma earnings.     

Evaluating the information content of earnings forecasts

This study develops a framework to compare the ability of alternative earnings forecast approaches to capture the market expectation of future earnings. Given prior evidence of analysts’ systematic optimistic bias, we decompose earnings surprises into analysts’ earnings surprises and adjustments based on alternative forecasting models. An equal market response to these two components indicates that the associated earnings forecast is a sufficient estimate of the market expectation of future earnings. To apply our framework, we examine four recent regression-based earnings forecasting models, alongside a simple earnings-based random walk model and analysts’ forecasts. Using the earnings forecasts of the model that satisfies our sufficiency condition, we identify a set of stocks for which the market is unduly pessimistic about future earnings. The investment strategy of buying and holding these stocks generates statistically signi?cant abnormal returns. We offer an explanation as to why this and similar strategies might be successful.     

The Predictive Value of Expenses Excluded from Pro Forma Earnings

We investigate the informational properties of pro forma earnings. This increasingly popular measure of earnings excludes certain expenses that the company deems non-recurring, non-cash, or otherwise unimportant for understanding the future value of the firm. We find, however, that these expenses are far from unimportant. Higher levels of exclusions lead to predictably lower future cash flows. We also find that investors do not fully appreciate the lower cash flow implications at the time of the earnings announcement. A trading strategy based on the excluded expenses yields a large positive abnormal return in the years following the announcement, and persists after controlling for various risk factors and other anomalies.     

投资者注意力、应计误定价与盈余操纵

基于应计误定价视角,以投资者认知特征分析为切入点,本文检验了投资者注意力、应计误定价及盈余操纵间的关系。研究发现:(1)投资者注意力具有认知效应,投资者注意力的提高能够显著提高其对盈余构成信息的认知效率,并降低市场中投资者对应计信息的定价高估;(2)投资者注意力具有治理效应,即投资者对股票的充分注意能够显著降低管理层主观的盈余操纵行为。综合而言,投资者注意力具有"认知效应"和"治理效应",投资者注意力调节了投资者的认知效率并提升了对会计盈余构成信息的定价效率,进一步影响了管理层主观的盈余操纵行为。深化投资者注意力的研究具有很高的理论价值和现实意义。     

Investor Sentiment and Pro Forma Earnings Disclosures

We examine the influence of investor sentiment on managers’ discretionary disclosure of “pro forma” (adjusted) earnings metrics in earnings press releases. We find that managers’ propensity to disclose an adjusted earnings metric (especially one that exceeds the GAAP earnings number) increases with the level of investor sentiment. Furthermore, our analyses suggest that, as investor sentiment increases, managers: (1) exclude higher levels of both recurring and nonrecurring expenses in calculating the pro forma earnings number and (2) emphasize the pro forma figure by placing it more prominently within the earnings press release. Additional analyses indicate that the association between investor sentiment and managers’ pro forma disclosure decisions at least partly reflects opportunistic motives. Finally, we find that managers’ own sentiment‐driven expectations also play a role in their pro forma disclosure decisions.     

Earnings seasonality,management earnings forecasts and stock returns

We examine whether management earnings forecasts (MEFs) help reduce the stock return seasonality associated with earnings seasonality around earnings announcements (EAs) in Chinese A-share markets. We find that firms in historically low earnings seasons outperform firms in high earnings seasons by 2.1% around MEFs. Firms in low earnings seasons also have higher trading volume and return volatility than their counterparts around EAs and MEFs. MEFs significantly reduce the ability of historical seasonal earnings rankings to negatively predict announcement returns, volume and volatility around EAs. The reduction effects are stronger when MEFs are voluntary or made closer to EAs. The evidence suggests that MEFs facilitate the correction of investors’ tendency to extrapolate earnings seasonality and its resulted stock mispricing.     

The informativeness of pro forma and street earnings: an examination of information asymmetry around earnings announcements

Using adverse-selection cost as a proxy for information asymmetry, we find evidence that non-GAAP earnings numbers issued by management (pro forma earnings) and analysts (street earnings) improve price discovery. First, information asymmetry before an earnings announcement is positively associated with the probability of a non-GAAP earnings number at the forthcoming earnings announcement. Second, the post-announcement reduction in information asymmetry is greater when managers or analysts issue non-GAAP earnings at the earnings announcement and when the magnitude of the non-GAAP earnings adjustment is larger. Our results suggest that earnings adjustments by analysts and managers increase the amount and precision of earnings information and help to narrow information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders following earnings announcements. Alternatively, the findings may be attributable to characteristics of non-GAAP firms and overall better reporting quality for those firms rather than non-GAAP earnings disclosure per se.