Liquidity skewness in the London Stock Exchange

We study liquidity on the London Stock Exchange. We find that the average bid-ask spread declines, but that the skewness of the spread increases. These results are robust to firm size, trading volume and price level. Our findings hold when the bid-ask spread is estimated utilising high frequency data. We find that the bid-ask spread prior to earnings announcements dates is significantly higher than that of post earnings announcements, suggesting that asymmetric information has driven the increase in liquidity skewness. We also find that the effect of earnings announcements is more pronounced in the 2007 global financial crisis, consistent with the notion that extreme market downturns amplify asymmetric information. Our overall evidence also implies that increased competition and transparent trading environments limit market makers' abilities to cross-subsidize bid-ask spreads between periods of high and low levels of asymmetric information.     

Trade Disclosure,Information Learning and Securities Market Performance

In this paper we examine the effect of information disclosure on securities market performance when liquidity traders are able to acquire information about inside trading. We show that the bid-ask spread increases with the liquidity trader's learning efficiency, which is greater when trade information is disclosed. The bid-ask spread is always higher when trade information is not disclosed. However, the discrepancy between the bid-ask spreads with and without information disclosure narrows when the learning efficiency increases. We also show that the gains of the informed traders in a market without trade information disclosure are reduced in the presence of the liquidity trader's learning. Nevertheless, liquidity traders do not necessarily benefit from increased transparency. In particular, liquidity traders may face higher trading costs.     

Liquidity in auction and specialist market structures: Evidence from the Italian bourse

Several studies find that bid-ask spreads for stocks listed on the NYSE are lower than for stocks listed on NASDAQ. While this suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity than competing dealer markets, the nature of trading on the NYSE, which comprises a specialist competing with limit order flow, obfuscates the comparison. In 2001, a structural change was implemented on the Italian Bourse. Many stocks that traded in an auction market switched to a specialist market, where the specialist controls order flow. Results confirm that liquidity is significantly improved when stocks commence trading in the specialist market. Analysis of the components of the bid-ask spread reveal that the adverse selection component of the spread is significantly reduced. This evidence suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity to market participants.     

CHANGES IN TRADING ACTIVITY FOLLOWING STOCK SPLITS AND THEIR EFFECT ON VOLATILITY AND THE ADVERSE-INFORMATION COMPONENT OF THE BID-ASK SPREAD

We examine changes in trading activity around stock splits and their effect on volatility and the adverse-information component of the bid-ask spread. Even after controlling for microstructure biases, we find a significant increase in volatility after the split. Changes in total volatility and in its permanent component are positively related to changes in the number of trades. This suggests that both informed and noise traders contribute to changes in trading activity. Further, while the adverse-information component of the spread increases unconditionally after the split, the change is negatively related to the change in trading activity. The results suggest that a crucial determinant of liquidity changes after a stock split is the success of the split in attracting new trades in the security.     

Determinants of Trading Profits: The Liquidity Provision Decision

Theories show that liquidity provision implies negative contemporaneous correlation between trades and returns. Dealers on the Taiwan Stock Exchange are granted typical dealer trading advantages without obligations to provide liquidity and, thus, are ideal to test whether these advantages lead to voluntary liquidity provision (earning bid-ask spreads) or information trading (trading in the direction of the market). We find a strong positive correlation in aggregate, implying that these unrestricted dealers prefer information trading. We also find that smaller dealers are more likely to provide liquidity and that small-cap stocks (with larger bid-ask spreads) are more profitable for liquidity provision.     

Stock repurchases and treasury share sales: Do they stabilize price and enhance liquidity?

Can companies reduce the volatility and increase the liquidity of their stocks by trading them? In the context of the Italian stock market, where companies have far more leeway to sell as well as buy their own stocks than in the U.S., the answer is yes. We examine the effects of trading (open-market share repurchases and treasury shares sales) on liquidity (bid-ask spread) and volatility (return variance). Further, we examine the impact of shareholder approvals of repurchase programs on liquidity and volatility. We find clear evidence that trading increases liquidity and reduces volatility. These results are consistent with our analysis of the motives Italian companies give for making share repurchases.     

A microstructure examination of trading activity following stock splits

In a study of 1,131 stock splits spanning the period 1983–1989 we observe an increase in the number of trades as well as a reduction in the mean trade size following the split. Combined with earlier reported findings of an increase in the number of shareholders postsplit, we conclude that the number of liquidity traders increases after a split. We confirm the previously observed increase in the bid-ask spread following a split, and upon decomposition of the spread find an increase in its adverse selection component in the postsplit period. This is consistent with the finding by Brennan and Hughes (1991) of an increase in the number of analysts following a stock after a split. Further, observing a decrease in market depth following a split we determine that Kyle-type models incorporating diverse private information for informed traders most correctly describe the nature of security trading. Since this decrease in postsplit market depth is not related to the trading volume or the split factor, we reject price correction explanations for stock splits.     

OPTIONS LISTING, MARKET LIQUIDITY AND STOCK BEHAVIOUR: SOME CANADIAN EVIDENCE

This study examines the price behaviour, trading volume and liquidity of stocks in the Canadian market at the time of options listing. Unlike some studies examining similar effects in the United States, the present one finds no evidence to indicate that either daily return volatility or trading volume is affected by the listing. Similarly, liquidity, as measured by the bid-ask spread, is unaffected. At the same time, cross-sectional tests indicate an inverse relationship between before-to-after trading volume and the before-to-after bid-ask spread.     

Adverse selection, volume and transactions around dividend announcements in a continuous auction system

We show that liquidity providers do not significantly respond to changes in information asymmetry risks, at least when we analyse their trading behaviour around dividend announcements of a representative sample of stocks in a continuous auction trading mechanism. the implicit bid-ask spread does not seem to change beyond what is normally conveyed through an increased number of transactions. We also document that the information in the trading behaviour of investors is primarily contained in the number of daily transactions.     

The optimal bid-ask price strategies of high-frequency trading and the effect on market liquidity

We propose a model for determining the optimal bid-ask spread strategy by a high-frequency trader (HFT) who has an informational advantage and receives information about the true value of a security. We employ an information cost function that includes volatility and the volume of the asset. Subsequently, we characterize the optimal bid-ask price strategies and obtain a stable bid-ask spread. We assume that orders submitted by low-frequency traders (LFTs) and news events arrive at the market with Poisson processes. Additionally, our model supports the trading of the two-sided quote in one period. We find that more LFTs and a higher exchange latency both hurt market liquidity. The HFT prefers to choose a two-sided quote to gain more profits while cautiously chooses a one-sided quote during times of high volatility. The model generates some testable implications with supporting empirical evidence from the NASDAQ-OMX Nordic Market.     

Internal control reporting and market liquidity

We investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on information asymmetry by analyzing the relation between SOX Sections 302 and 404 control reports and market liquidity using bid-ask spreads. Lower market liquidity indicates higher levels of information asymmetry implying that market participants perceive financial statement misstatement risk is higher. If SOX disclosures contain relevant information, then one would expect firms reporting internal control material weaknesses to have lower market liquidity. Accordingly, we find that market liquidity is lower (i.e., bid-ask spreads are higher) for firms reporting ineffective control compared to firms reporting effective control using either annual SOX 404 internal control reports or quarterly SOX 302 disclosure control reports, which suggests that SOX 302 and 404 reports provide useful information for identifying firms with a higher risk of financial statement misstatement. However, we do not find consistent results using two alternative liquidity measures: trading volume and market quality indices. We then examine whether changes in control reports are associated with changes in market liquidity. We generally do not find that firms with improved (deteriorated) control reports experience a larger decrease (increase) in bid-ask spreads or larger increases (decreases) in trading volume and market quality indices compared to other firms, suggesting that market participants do not discern a change in information asymmetry when the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting changes.     

BID-ASK SPREAD AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE

In this paper we examine the relation between bid-ask spread and ownership structure variables based on 1985 data for 1,063 NYSE firms. We document a nonpositive relation between bid-ask spread and insider ownership and conclude that spread is unrelated to insider trading. We also find a robust significantly negative relation between spread and institutional ownership. Finally, we find a positive but generally insignificant relation between spread and blockholdings. Overall, our evidence does not support the predictions of asymmetric information models in markets with anonymous trading.     

Liquidity,liquidity risk,and information flow: Lessons from an emerging market

This paper examines the role of public and private information flows in intraday liquidity and intraday liquidity risk in the Tunisian stock market. Our empirical results are based on ARMA and GARCH-type models and show that, for major Tunisian stocks, gradually elapsed public information together with gradually elapsed private information in the market is the dominant factor in liquidity improvements in the Tunisian stock market. Liquidity improvements are generated by a decrease in the bid-ask spread accompanied by an increase in the depth at best limit. Our results clearly indicate that the arrival of public information in a sequential manner is the dominant factor generating increases in liquidity risk related to the bid-ask spread, while the advent of private information in a contemporaneous manner is the dominant factor generating increases in liquidity risk related to the depth at best limit. Additionally, our results show that liquidity risk persistence disappears when trading volume and order imbalance are included as explanatory variables in the conditional variance equation.     

Dealer Markets Under Stress: The Performance of NASDAQ Market Makers During the November 15, 1991, Market Break

The liquidity of the NASDAQ market was seriously undermined during the crash on October 19, 1987, when bid-ask spreads widened dramatically and dealers reputedly withdrew from market making. This paper studies the liquidity of 36 NASDAQ issues on November 15, 1991, when average prices fell over 4%, representing the first major correction in the post-crash era. We find that bid-ask spreads, the percentage of dealers posting inside quotes, and trading volume remained virtually unaffected. Effective spreads were also largely unaffected, except for trades in excess of 1,000 shares among issues whose market makers avoided odd-eighth quotes. Our evidence implies that, unlike October 1987, the liquidity of the NASDAQ market did not deteriorate appreciably during this episode of unusual market stress.     

Noise trading and the price formation process

This study proposes the dispersion in daily net initiated order flow across brokers as a proxy for the level of noise trading in a stock, and applies this proxy to test some basic implications of market microstructure theory. We use data from the Australian Stock Exchange, a computerized limit order market where price, quantity, and broker identity for each incoming order are shown on broker screens. We find daily movements in our noise measure are positively associated with trading volume and market depth, and negatively related to the bid-ask spread. We find monthly movements in our noise measure are negatively associated with the probability of informed trading, and positively correlated with the arrival rate of uninformed traders. We also find the sensitivity of stock prices to net initiated order flow decreases in the level of noise trading. In addition we find that, after controlling for noise trading, the sensitivity of stock prices to net initiated order flow is significantly greater on Mondays. These empirical results consistently support the implications of various models of market microstructure, suggesting that our proxy provides useful information as a daily measure of noise trading.     

VOLATILITY AND LIQUIDITY AT NYSE OPENING CALLS: A CLOSER LOOK

The literature suggests that the bid-ask spread is responsible, at least in part, for greater price volatility and more negative autocorrelation at the open than at the close. In this study, we find that these phenomena are not related to the bid-ask spread, but are related instead to pricing errors by specialists or limit-order traders around the open. We use George, Kaul, and Nimalendran's (1991) model, which is less biased than Roll's (1984) model, to estimate the implied spread. The results show that, on average, the implied spread earned by liquidity suppliers is lower at the open than at the close. These results refute the contention that specialists exploit their monopoly position and earn a higher profit at the opening call. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that specialists set a lower cost of immediacy to encourage trading and the release of more information at the opening call. This could reduce information asymmetry and make subsequent trades in the continuous market more profitable.     

Transaction costs,liquidity risk,and the CCAPM

In this paper, we make a liquidity adjustment to the consumption-based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) and show that the liquidity-adjusted CCAPM is a generalized model of Acharya and Pedersen (2005). Using different proxies for transaction costs such as the effective trading costs measure of Hasbrouck (2009) and the bid-ask spread estimates of Corwin and Schultz (2012), we find that the liquidity-adjusted CCAPM explains a larger fraction of the cross-sectional return variations.     

THE DEALERS' PRICE/SIZE QUOTE AND MARKET LIQUIDITY

We model trading in a competitive securities market where informed traders and liquidity traders transact with dealers. The dealers' entire published quote is modeled: bid-ask prices and the number of shares the dealer is willing to buy/sell at these prices (i.e., size quotes). We argue that size quotes are a more informative indicator of market liquidity than the bid-ask spread's adverse-selection component. Moreover, the size quotes reveal several market characteristics that cannot be inferred from the bid-ask spread's adverse-selection component alone. The model generates a number of empirically testable predictions that clarify certain key elements of market liquidity.     

Types of agency cost,corporate governance and liquidity

We study the relationship between governance and liquidity when the agency costs of entrenched management and self-serving controlling shareholders are present. Using a sample of Chinese firms, we show a positive relationship between governance and liquidity. We also find striking differences between firms faced with different types of agency conflicts. Specifically, governance measures such as management compensation, controlling shareholder monitoring and board independence are more effective in lowering the bid-ask spread for state-owned enterprises prone to management entrenchment. In contrast, multiple-layer corporate structures and a higher degree of separation between control and cash flow rights are associated with higher bid-ask spreads in non-state firms characterized by self-serving controlling shareholders. Our study highlights how governance might have different liquidity effects between firms faced with different types of agency conflicts.     

Liquidity costs: Screen-based trading versus open outcry

The results reported in this paper challenge the popular belief that screen-based trading offered lower liquidity costs than the open-outcry approach during its first year of side-by-side operation in the U.S. financial derivatives market. Using time and sales data from the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) market profile data series, effective bid-ask spreads are estimated on the basis of daily and intraday measures of the Thompson-Waller and Smith-Whaley estimators. We find liquidity costs on the screen-based system vary with time and the level of floor trading activity. In particular, a one-tick market is observed just before the opening of the Chicago trading floor (6:30 to 7:30 am). However, subsequent intraday spreads exhibit the familiar “reverse J-shaped pattern”—highest following the opening of floor trading, declining until afternoon, and then increasing until close. Meanwhile, daily spread estimates average almost a quarter-tick higher on the screen-based market relative to the one-tick spread commonly associated with open outcry. This relationship remained robust across sample time-series and conservative price-change specifications. Since the study was conducted, electronic trading has become the predominant exchange medium for financial derivatives at the CBOT, following the example set in Europe's traditional futures exchanges, e.g. France's Matif, Germany's Deutsche Bourse and the U.K.'s Liffe.