绿色金融、绿色创新与经济高质量发展

在可持续增长理论的基础上,本文将减排技术内生化,建立带有环境约束并包含金融部门的经济增长模型,解释了绿色金融通过支持绿色创新提升经济增长质量的内在机制。这一理论得到了基于中国省级面板数据中介效应分析的支持。本文为绿色金融的经济学建模提供了新的思路,推进了绿色金融的“功能”理论,论证了绿色金融对经济增长质量影响的“绿色创新渠道”,这意味着绿色金融不限于对少数清洁行业的支持,针对高污染、高能耗行业内部环保技术升级的金融服务也至关重要,是未来绿色金融政策需要关注的问题。     

数字金融、空间溢出与经济绿色增长

中国经济亟需转换增长动力，实现绿色增长。本文从理论和实证两方面研究了数字金融对城市绿色增长的影响。基于空间杜宾模型（SDM）研究发现：（1）2011—2019年，数字金融对城市绿色增长具有显著的促进作用。（2）数字金融会对邻近城市绿色增长产生虹吸效应。这种虹吸效应在大城市中表现得更为明显，小城市则没有显著的虹吸效应。随着邻近城市人力资本的提高，数字金融的虹吸效应将显著减弱。（3）数字金融的虹吸效应主要来源于覆盖广度和使用深度。数字化程度的提高能够减弱这种虹吸效应，促进邻居城市绿色增长，但目前的金融数字化程度还未显著发挥作用。（4）机制检验结果表明，数字金融通过推动绿色技术创新和产业结构升级促进经济绿色增长，其中推动绿色技术创新发挥了主要作用。本文为推进数字金融发展、促进经济绿色增长提供政策启示。     

绿色金融发展的理论框架分析

绿色金融是金融与绿色发展融合共生的结果。本文在科学阐明绿色金融内涵的基础之上,构建绿色金融发展的理论框架,分析绿色金融的现状和问题,并提出对应的政策建议。     

绿色金融发展、产业结构升级与经济可持续增长

本文基于2005-2018年30个省市的面板数据测算了经济可持续增长、技术进步、产业结构优化指标数据,采用双重差分模型实证分析了绿色金融政策与上述指标之间的传导机制与影响效应。研究结果表明:第一,绿色金融政策可以通过提高企业技术、推动产业结构优化,从而给经济可持续增长施加正向影响;第二,绿色金融对经济可持续增长的边际效应呈现先上升后下降的倒U型特征,加入企业技术进步的交互项发现,边际正效应经过2期后开始显著且呈现持续上升趋势,而加入产业结构优化升级的交互项发现,边际正效应在5年内显著且变化趋势呈现一定的周期特性。基于上述研究结论,一是要不断加快推进绿色金融产品与服务的创新,加大绿色金融政策的实施力度;二是要加强绿色金融政策与供给侧结构性改革政策之间的匹配与协同,减少政策效应的周期波动,确保政策效应的长期可持续性。     

金融集聚、产业结构升级与绿色经济增长

基于中国2007-2016年省级面板数据,构建空间面板计量模型、空间效应分解模型,实证分析了金融集聚及产业结构升级的绿色经济增长效应,实证研究显示:金融集聚及产业结构升级对我国绿色经济增长具有显著的正向促进作用,但是产业结构升级的空间溢出效应并不显著,且金融集聚增强了产业结构升级对绿色经济增长的正向促进作用。从空间效应分解来看,由于区域间经济发展水平,金融开放水平、产业发展阶段的不同,致使金融集聚和产业结构升级对绿色经济增长的影响存在着显著的区域差异。     

金融业应当让利吗?——基本事实、理论分析与全球实证证据

支持实体经济高质量发展是现代金融业的使命，也是中国金融学的核心理论问题。作为支持实体经济的重要手段，金融让利政策受到了社会各界的广泛支持，但相关理论研究还有待深入。在大量文献和经济学事实的基础上，本文将马克思生息资本理论与西方经济增长理论有机结合，将马克思“利息来源于利润”的著名观点融入现代经济增长框架，解释了金融业利润过高对经济增长的影响机制。基于全球面板数据的实证证据，支持了模型的核心推论。研究表明，促进金融业让利的根本在于构建合理的“产业—金融”利润分配机制，通过反垄断、提供公共信息、倡导金融机构社会责任等方式控制金融部门的议价优势，是增强金融服务实体经济能力的有效手段。     

基于DSGE模型的绿色信贷激励政策研究

在绿色金融政策实践与有关学术理论快速发展的背景下,本文以绿色信贷的激励政策为切入点,提供一种分析绿色金融政策的理论模型分析框架,并基于模型开展量化的政策效果分析。本文在真实商业周期框架的基础上引入银行部门,通过拆分厂商部门为“绿色”与“其它”两部分,并设置中央银行与财政部门的相关政策,纳入了绿色信贷激励政策。研究发现,针对绿色信贷的贴息、定向降准、再贷款(调整再贷款利率与质押率)均是有效且合意的激励政策,一定强度的政策不仅能够提高绿色信贷量,在绿色意义上优化经济结构,而且对总产出、总就业不会造成显著的负面影响,从而带来“经济”与“环境”双赢的结果。     

绿色金融、资金配置与城市绿色创新

绿色金融对优化信贷资金配置，构建以市场为导向的绿色技术创新体系具有重要指引作用。本文采用2012—2019年287个地级市面板数据，构建双重差分实证研究框架，分析绿色金融能否助力提高城市绿色创新水平。研究发现，绿色金融可以通过优化信贷资金配置助力清洁和非重污染行业绿色创新发展，从而能有效提升城市绿色创新水平，且经过一系列稳健性检验后该结论依旧成立。绿色金融对城市绿色创新水平的影响作用在区域间存在显著差异，主要表现为对东部、中部和环保监管程度大的地区的绿色创新水平推动作用更大。进一步拓展发现，绿色金融能同时实现经济效益和环境效益，即促进了经济增长并减少了污染排放。本文的启示在于：第一，应持续强化落实绿色金融政策实施，扩大试点范围；第二，建立支持绿色信贷的政策体系，不断完善信贷制度；第三，加强区域创新联动，推动区域创新协调发展；第四，加强环境监管并建立绿色创新扶持政策，助推行业高效协同发展。     

绿色金融改革创新对碳减排的影响及作用机制

绿色金融作为推进低碳经济转型的重要抓手，是实现“双碳”目标的重要手段。基于“双碳”目标，探究绿色金融改革创新政策的碳减排效应具有积极的现实意义。本文利用2011—2020年283个地级市样本数据，以2017年绿色金融试验点作为外生冲击，构建双重差分模型探究该政策的碳减排效应，并进一步分析其作用机制。研究结果表明：该政策能显著抑制二氧化碳的排放强度，并且碳减排效应随着时间的推移越发显著；作用渠道研究显示，该政策可通过促进实质型技术创新水平实现碳减排，而偏向型技术进步、FD I技术溢出效应只对政策的碳减排效应起调节效应；在异质性检验中，政策在中部地区的实施效应最显著，但在西部地区并没起到显著的抑制作用。基于此，本文提出积极推广试验点经验、建立健全绿色金融政策体系、加强技术研发资金投入、制定并完善区域间金融发展的信息共享机制等建议。     

金融发展影响城乡收入差距的作用机制:一个理论分析框架

作为现代经济中资源配置的核心,金融具有显著的收入分配功能。通过构建一个理论分析框架,本文论证了金融发展通过非均衡效应、门槛效应、减贫效应和推动经济增长效应,能够直接或间接的影响城乡居民的收入差距。同时,针对于不同的作用机制所产生的结果,本文也提出了相应的解决对策。     

经营风险与企业杠杆率

本文从理论和实证两方面考察企业经营风险将如何影响其杠杆率。其中,企业面临的经营风险被定义为在企业所属“年份×城市×二位行业”层面内除自身外其他所有企业资产收益率(ROA)的分布标准差。整体而言,当企业经营风险上升时,其投资和负债决策将更加保守,表现为资产负债表收缩和杠杆率下降。分债务期限来看,杠杆率的变化又可分为“规模效应”和“结构效应”,前者指向投资、负债决策的整体收缩,后者指向债务结构中短期负债占比的下降。经营风险上升时,杠杆率下降主要体现为短期债务的缩减;分所有制来看,非国有企业对经营风险的敏感度较强,国有企业对经营风险的敏感度较小,这与两类企业的融资难易程度相符。     

中国企业杠杆:一个周期性问题?

一直以来,企业部门杠杆率在中国宏观杠杆率中占有重要的地位。通过构建企业杠杆率的动态局部调整模型,本文区分了经济周期对企业杠杆率的直接和间接影响,并利用中国工业企业数据库对二者进行测算。结果显示,用观察经济周期哑变量估计系数的方式来判断经济周期对企业杠杆率的影响,会显著高估企业杠杆率顺周期调整的程度,因为这只捕捉了周期的直接影响。在同时考虑了经济周期对杠杆率的间接影响后,我们发现:第一,中国企业杠杆率总体仍具有顺周期性。这表明货币政策在维护物价水平、熨平经济周期波动时,能够对企业杠杆率稳定产生一定的正向溢出效应。因此,双支柱调控框架具有内在一致性,可以形成政策合力。第二,中国企业杠杆率变动的顺周期性较弱,尤其是国有企业。因此,想要在保持物价和经济增长稳定的同时实现稳杠杆,货币政策和宏观审慎政策需相互协调配合。本文的研究为思考双支柱调控框架的分工与协调提供了有益的微观基础。     

经营负债杠杆与金融负债杠杆效应的差异性检验

本文将企业的负债划分为经营负债与金融负债,以2001—2005年期间沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,比较检验了经营负债杠杆与金融负债杠杆对公司创值能力和成长性影响的差异性。结果发现:①经营负债杠杆比金融负债杠杆对公司的创值能力和成长性产生更大更显著的积极效应,即拥有更多的经营负债更能提升公司的创值能力和成长性;②两种负债的杠杆效应均存在"规模效应",即公司的规模越小,杠杆效应越强;③金融负债杠杆与经营负债杠杆具有显著的互补性,即随着金融负债杠杆比率的增加,经营负债杠杆效应会显著增强;反之亦然。显然,本文的研究结论对企业制定其负债安排策略具有一定的启示意义。     

杠杆率变动、固定资产投资与研发活动——兼论金融赋能高质量发展

本文通过构建一个包含企业固定资产投资与研发投资的理论模型,分析得出企业杠杆率变动与投资行为的非线性关系。实证结果表明,低杠杆下,杠杆率的增大会使企业增加固定资产和研发投资的规模。对于财务柔性更强、发展前景更好的企业,杠杆率的提升能够增大此类企业的研发投入占比,即企业开展更多能够提升技术水平的研发活动。进一步研究发现,短期杠杆与商业信用杠杆的提升有助于财务柔性较好的企业提高研发投资占比,而对于发展前景不佳的僵尸企业,长期杠杆和银行杠杆的提升反而会使其扩大固定资产投资,加剧产能过剩问题。本文的政策含义在于,要在保持宏观杠杆率基本稳定的前提下,引导金融资源更多投入到创新型经济上,给予优质及前景较好的企业一定杠杆率调整空间和自由度,使其能够更好地利用社会资金,激励其开展研发活动,促进金融更好地服务实体经济,赋能高质量发展。     

EXCHANGEABLE DEBT CALLS AND SECURITY RETURNS

Exchangeable calls are not convertible into the calling firm's common stock but into the common stock of a target firm in which the calling firm has an ownership position. In addition to reducing leverage, exchangeables change the asset composition of the calling firm through the divestiture of the calling firm's ownership stake in the target firm. In contrast to the evidence on convertible calls, our findings indicate that announcements of exchangeable debt calls are not associated with an abnormal capital loss for the calling firm shareholders. For target firms, announcements of exchangeable calls reduce shareholder wealth. A lower probability of takeover resulting from diffusion of ownership concentration of the target firm's common stock may contribute to this result.     

On the relation between ownership structure and capital structure

The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Prior evidence has demonstrated an association between ownership structure and firm value. This paper extends the literature by examining a further link between ownership structure and capital structure. Using an agency framework, it is argued that the distribution of equity ownership among corporate managers and external blockholders may have a significant relation with leverage. The empirical results provide support for a positive relation between external blockholders and leverage, and non-linear relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage. The results also suggest that the relation between external block ownership and leverage varies across the level of managerial share ownership. These results are consistent with active monitoring by blockholders, and the effects of convergence-of-interests and management entrenchment.     

Leverage, options liabilities, and corporate bond pricing

The two major problems with typical structural models are the failure to attain a positive credit spread in the very short term, and overestimation of the overall level of the credit spread. We recognize the presence of option liabilities in a firm’s capital structure and the effect they have on the firm’s credit spread. Including option liabilities and employing a regime switching interest rate process to capture the business cycle resolves the above-mentioned drawbacks in explaining credit spreads. We find that the credit spread overestimation problem in one of the structural models, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (J Finan 56:1929–1957, 2001), can be resolved by combining option liabilities and the regime-switching interest rate process when dealing with an investment grade bond, whereas with junk bonds, only the regime-switching interest rate process is needed. We also examine vulnerable option values, debt values, and zero-coupon bond values with different model settings and leverage ratios.      

Operational Improvement: The Key to Value Creation in Private Equity

With credit tightening having reduced the availability of leverage and intensified the competition for new deals, the economic recession has caused many companies in private equity firm portfolios to under-perform. These changes are forcing the private equity firms to depend even more on their ability to improve operating performance to achieve their investment goals and generate attractive returns. But few PE firms have proved capable of achieving such improvements in portfolio companies consistently over time.
In this paper, the authors discuss several ways that private equity firms use their operating expertise to drive value in their portfolio companies. They also examine the analytical framework used by some PE firms when assessing and prioritizing the many operational initiatives that could be undertaken within a newly acquired company. Part of that examination involves a detailed look at how private equity firms assemble an attractive mix of operational improvement projects in their initial 100-day plans. Finally, the authors explore one of the challenges faced by private equity firms when attempting to implement operational enhancements in newly acquired companies: bringing about change without alienating company management.
The real-world application of this approach is demonstrated with a case study that shows how one private equity buyer put its operational skills into practice to help create value within a mid-sized portfolio company.     

Macroeconomic Conditions and the Puzzles of Credit Spreads and Capital Structure

I build a dynamic capital structure model that demonstrates how business cycle variation in expected growth rates, economic uncertainty, and risk premia influences firms' financing policies. Countercyclical fluctuations in risk prices, default probabilities, and default losses arise endogenously through firms' responses to macroeconomic conditions. These comovements generate large credit risk premia for investment grade firms, which helps address the credit spread puzzle and the under‐leverage puzzle in a unified framework. The model generates interesting dynamics for financing and defaults, including market timing in debt issuance and credit contagion. It also provides a novel procedure to estimate state‐dependent default losses.     

Macroeconomic conditions and a firm’s investment decisions

We propose a model of a firm’s reversible investment decision with macroeconomic conditions based on optimal switching of a diffusion regime. The switching costs and the cash flow generated from the firm depend on a business cycle alternating via a Markov chain, and the triggers of investment and disinvestment in each state are determined endogenously. Provided the investment costs are cyclical due to high wages and rents in a boom, the investment tends to be delayed in boom, while the disinvestment is likely to be made earlier in terms of the level of switching triggers. This result shows us that the ‘hysteresis’ of investment is a rigorous phenomenon that does not change dramatically depending on business cycle. Yet, the business cycle may still amplify and propagate the exogenous shocks from macroeconomic conditions as far as the persistence of business cycle is concerned. In particular, the investment is deferred and the disinvestment occurs earlier when recession lasts longer and boom ends soon.