Political connections and the cost of equity capital

Motivated by recent research on the costs and benefits of political connection, we examine the cost of equity capital of politically connected firms. Using propensity score matching models, we find that politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital than their non-connected peers. We find further that political connections are more valuable for firms with stronger ties to political power. In additional analyses, we find that the effect of political connection on firms' equity financing costs is influenced by the prevailing country-level institutional and political environment, and by firm characteristics. Taken together, our findings provide strong evidence that investors require a lower cost of capital for politically connected firms, which suggests that politically connected firms are generally considered less risky than non-connected firms.     

Politically connected boards,family and business group affiliations,and cost of capital: Evidence from Indonesia

We investigate the effect of politically connected boards (both supervisory boards [SBs] and boards of directors [BODs]) on cost of debt and equity capital of listed companies in Indonesia which has established a two-tier corporate governance system. The results, based on 250 firms, suggest that companies with politically connected SBs experience lower cost of debt and equity capital, whereas politically connected BODs have no association with cost of either debt or equity. Furthermore, we find that family firms and firms belonging to business groups with politically connected SBs enjoy lower cost of debt and equity capital. Our main results are robust to alternative measures and to tests for endogeneity.     

Political and Interlocking Connections in the Boardroom on Private Equity Placements

This study examines the influence of directors who are politically connected and/or have boardroom interlocking on private equity placements (PEPs) in Chinese listed firms. We document that interlocked directors can significantly influence the propensity to apply for PEPs and approval of PEPs and reduce the cost of PEPs while providing greater access to proceeds from PEPs through lowering information asymmetry and information cost. Although politically connected directors have a significant role in the approval of PEPs, they are more likely to reduce the monitoring effects and increase agency problems, which lead to increased cost of PEPs and reduced proceeds from PEPs. The results also reveal that political connection diminishes the benefits of interlocking directors for firms having directors with both interlocking and political ties.     

Political considerations in the decision of Chinese SOEs to list in Hong Kong

This paper investigates why Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with strong political connections (i.e., politically connected firms) are more likely to list overseas than non-politically connected firms. We find that connected firms' post-overseas listing performance is worse than that of non-connected firms. This evidence suggests that connected firms' managers list their firms overseas for private (political) benefits. Consistent with this private benefits explanation, we further find that connected firms' managers are more likely to receive political media coverage or a promotion to a senior government position subsequent to overseas listing than domestic listing.     

The effects of private equity and venture capital on sales and employment growth in small and medium-sized businesses

We study the effects private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) financing have on small and mid-sized single entity business establishments from 1995 to 2009. We focus on single entity establishments to cleanly examine the impact of PE and VC financing on establishments’ organic growth. This study reveals that PE and VC financing have positive impacts on single entity business establishments’ net sales and employment growth. The impact of PE financing on establishments’ growth is slower and smaller than VC financing. However, we find that the benefit of PE financing lasts longer than VC financing. We also find that ethnic minority, female, and foreign business owners are less likely to receive PE and VC financing. Finally, we find evidence that although establishments with government contracts are more likely to receive PE and VC financing, those contracts fail to produce marginal post-funding growth and employment benefits.     

Private equity bids in Australia: an exploratory study

In this study, we provide an insight into how private equity players choose their targets and the bid arrangements they prefer. We test our expectations of the unique features of private equity targets using a sample of 23 listed private equity target firms during 2001–2007. We find, relative to a benchmark sample of 81 corporate targets matched by year and industry, the private equity target firms to be larger, more profitable, use their assets more efficiently, more highly levered and have greater cash flow. Multivariate testing indicates that private equity targets have relatively greater financial slack, greater financial stability, greater free cash flow and lower measurable growth prospects. All conclusions are found to be robust to a control sample of 502 takeover bids during 2001–2007.     

Political connections,tax benefits and firm performance: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the different effects of political connections on the firm performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises. Using data on Chinese listed firms from 1999 to 2007, we find that private firms with politically connected managers outperform those without such managers, whereas local SOEs with connected managers underperform those without such managers. Moreover, we find that private firms with politically connected managers enjoy tax benefits, whereas local SOEs with politically connected managers are prone to more severe over-investment problems. Our study reconciles the mixed findings of previous studies on the effect of political connections on firm performance.     

Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts

We analyze the likelihood of government bailouts of 450 politically connected firms from 35 countries during 1997–2002. Politically connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out than similar nonconnected firms. Additionally, politically connected firms are disproportionately more likely to be bailed out when the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank provides financial assistance to the firm's home government. Further, among bailed‐out firms, those that are politically connected exhibit significantly worse financial performance than their nonconnected peers at the time of and following the bailout. This evidence suggests that, at least in some countries, political connections influence the allocation of capital through the mechanism of financial assistance when connected companies confront economic distress.     

Earnings credibility in politically connected family firms

We investigate whether politically connected family firms provide the market with more or less credible earnings compared with unconnected family firms. Our results evidence that politically connected family firms show higher earnings informativeness than unconnected family firms. Our findings are consistent with the market perceiving that, in the presence of political ties, family firms are more likely to reduce information asymmetries by signalling their superior earnings quality.     

The politics of government investment

This paper investigates the relation between corporate political connections and government investment. We study various forms of political influence, ranging from passive connections between firms and politicians, such as those based on politicians’ voting districts, to active forms, such as lobbying, campaign contributions, and employment of connected directors. Using hand-collected data on firm applications for capital under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), we find that politically connected firms are more likely to be funded, controlling for other characteristics. Yet investments in politically connected firms underperform those in unconnected firms. Overall, we show that connections between firms and regulators are associated with distortions in investment efficiency.     

Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms

We extend recent research on the links between political connections and financial reporting by examining the role of auditor choice. Our evidence that public firms with political connections are more likely to appoint a Big 4 auditor supports the intuition that insiders in these firms are eager to improve accounting transparency to convince outside investors that they refrain from exploiting their connections to divert corporate resources. In evidence consistent with another prediction, we find that this link is stronger for connected firms with ownership structures conducive to insiders seizing private benefits at the expense of minority investors. We also find that the relation between political connections and auditor choice is stronger for firms operating in countries with relatively poor institutional infrastructure, implying that tough external monitoring by Big 4 auditors becomes more valuable for preventing diversion in these situations. Finally, we report that connected firms with Big 4 auditors exhibit less earnings management and enjoy greater transparency, higher valuations, and cheaper equity financing.     

政治联系、预算软约束与政府补助的配置效率——基于中国民营上市公司的经验研究

本文以2004～2008年的民营上市公司为样本,实证研究了民营企业的政治联系对预算软约束及政府补助效率的影响。研究发现,政治联系是一把双刃剑:一方面,政治联系的民营企业容易受到政府干预,由此承担了较重的雇员负担,也因此获得了较多的政府补助,从而支持了林毅夫等对预算软约束的政策性负担层面的解释。另一方面,虽然政治联系未直接发挥关系作用,但会增加雇员负担一定时的政府补助。进一步地,在政治联系的民营企业中,政府补助对公司绩效的促进作用显著低于无政治联系的民营企业,揭示了政治联系改变了政府补助的流向,降低了政府补助资金的配置效率。     

Political Connections and Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Indonesia

This paper examines whether politically connected firms use related party transactions as a tunneling mechanism in Indonesia. We further investigate whether the presence of tunneling compels managers to manage earnings to conceal such expropriation of resources. Our study is motivated by conflicting evidence in the extant literature about the role of political connections and related party transactions. Using data from Indonesia, we document that politically connected firms use related party loans to tunnel resources, and that this effect is more pronounced for firms with government connections. We further document that politically connected firms manage earnings to conceal their tunneling activities. By documenting the role of related party transactions as a specific channel through which connected firms expropriate resources, we enrich the political connection and related party transactions literature.     

Does political connection distort competition and encourage corporate risk taking? International evidence

We investigate the impact of political connection on corporate risk-taking by connected firms, their industry counterparts, as well as non-rival firms from 48 countries. We find that political connection induces higher risk taking by connected firms. By contrast, we do not find evidence that political connection, with the attendant potential competitive distortions in the industry, induces higher risk taking by competitors. We focus on non-financial industries. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the inability to avail themselves of political rents compels the non-connected rivals to adopt more conservative strategies. However, large rival firms, generally considered to be too-important-to-fail, exhibit evidence of higher risk taking. The top size quartile industry rivals take as much risk as the politically connected firms. The higher risk exhibited by large rivals of politically connected firms suggests that our baseline regression results of lower risk-taking among rivals of politically connected firms are biased upward by firms that would be considered too-big-to-fail. This finding also suggests that the too-big-to fail phenomenon is not unique to banks. Our results are robust to the use of alternative measures of risk, to the exclusion of privatized and state-owned firms, and to controlling for the effects of financial crisis.     

Do private equity consortiums facilitate collusion in takeover bidding?

We address whether the joint bidding by private equity consortiums facilitates collusion in the takeover market. We employ a sample of 870 takeovers of publicly traded targets in the 2003 to 2007 period, the time period which is the focus of investigation by the Justice Department and the source of cases for class action lawsuits. A unique aspect of our analysis is that we determine the identification of private equity bidders from actual merger documents rather than rely on sources such as Securities Data Corp and that we analyze both prominent private equity bidders as well as smaller private equity firms. Our analysis finds competitive reasons for consortium formation based on scale, risk and bidder expertise. We also find that both single private equity bidders and private equity consortiums are associated with significantly greater levels of takeover competition than other types of bidders. While we find some evidence that target abnormal returns are lower in private equity consortium deals for narrow windows around the initial takeover-related announcement date, we find that these results do not hold for longer event windows that better account for the differences in the takeover process across types of bidders. Analysis that controls for the endogenous selection of consortium formation also fails to find any negative effect of consortiums on either takeover competition or target returns. We also do not find any negative effects of consortiums formed by prominent private equity firms. We interpret the evidence to be inconsistent with a collusive explanation for consortium formation in the 2003 to 2007 period and to be consistent with competitive reasons for consortium formation.     

Private equity alliances in mergers

This paper examines reasons for alliance formation between private equity bidders when compared to sole-sponsored private equity deals. Testing a comprehensive set of hypotheses, we find strong evidence for the relative-risk hypothesis of Robinson (2008), as private bidders are more likely to form an alliance in a diversifying acquisition. We also find that private equity alliances involved more profitable target firms when compared to sole-sponsored private equity deals. Finally, we find that the significantly lower abnormal returns for target firms in private equity alliance deals are eliminated once we control for differences in the types of target firms acquired by private equity alliances and single private equity bidders. The last result suggests that private equity alliances do not generate significantly lower target returns because of collusion.     

Do Political Connections Affect Firm Performance? Evidence from a Developing Country

We investigate how politicians serving on the boards of directors influence firm performance. The results show a negative relationship between political connections and firm performance. Specifically, politically connected firms underperform nonconnected firms directors by almost 17 percent and 15 percent based on return on assets and return on equity, respectively. By stratifying the sample duration into two periods based on the political environment, we find that this effect is more pronounced in autocratic as opposed to democratic regimes. Finally, our results also suggest that the performance of connected firms with more growth opportunities is not affected by political connections.     

Political connections and debt restructurings

This paper presents evidence that distressed firms with politically connected executives and board members are more likely to reorganize outside of court than to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This relation is more evident for firms that have more political importance, such as major employers within a state, firms located in swing states, and in periods leading up to major election dates. The evidence suggests that the expected costs of financial distress are lower for politically connected firms which may partially explain the higher leverage ratios of politically connected firms documented in the extant literature.     

Political connection and cost of debt: Some Malaysian evidence

This paper investigates the association between Malaysian politically connected (PCON) firms and the cost of debt. We extend previous research that finds Malaysian PCON firms are perceived as being of higher risk by the market, and by audit firms, by providing evidence that lenders also perceive these firms as being of higher risk. We also find that PCON firms have a significantly (1) higher extent of leverage, (2) higher likelihood of reporting a loss, (3) higher likelihood of having negative equity, and (4) higher likelihood of being audited by a big audit firm. We suggest that PCON firms are charged higher interest rates by lenders as a result of efficient contracting given their higher inherent risks. Additionally, we find that CEO duality present in PCON firms is perceived by lenders as being more risky, and that a higher proportion of independent directors on the audit committee mitigate this perceived risk.     

Private equity in the global economy: Evidence on industry spillovers

Using a novel dataset on global private equity investments in 19 industries across 52 countries, we find that labor productivity, employment, profitability, and capital expenditures increase for publicly-listed companies in the same country and industry as private equity investments. Our results show that positive externalities created by private equity firms are absorbed by other companies within the same industry. Consistent with prior literature on competitive spillovers, these effects are more pronounced in country-industries with higher levels of competition, stronger institutions, and moderate levels of technological development suggesting that the competitive pressures from private equity-backed firms cause industry peers to react.