Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

改进的效率测算模型、影子银行与中国商业银行效率

商业银行及其效率的高低是金融供给侧结构性改革的关键环节,而可以压缩的“坏”投入和影子银行对商业银行效率产生重要影响。本文首次建立理论模型并分析影子银行影响商业银行效率的路径;方法上,同时区分投入和产出的“好”或“坏”,拓展只区分产出的“好”或“坏”的效率测算模型;实证上,首次测算并分析“坏”投入、影子银行业务对商业银行利润、风险和效率的影响。结果表明:理论上,影子银行会同时增加风险承担和利润,但无法确定经风险调整后的利润增加能否提升效率;只区分产出的模型高估了效率,尤其是显著高估四大行和股份制商业银行第一阶段的效率,大型商业银行依靠网点的扩张不利于效率的提升;影子银行业务提升了四大国有银行尤其是股份制银行的效率,但对中小型商业银行效率影响较小。总的来看,压缩“坏”投入和规范影子银行是增加有效金融供给、优化金融供给结构和提升银行效率的重要途径。     

理性看待影子银行,努力改善金融环境

影子银行并非你想象中的那么“坏”.存在即合理.影子银行之所以得到生存和发展,是因为它适应了市场经济发展的需要.注意了影子银行的存在,就应全面地去探讨它,以达到齐家共管之效.笔者认为,影子银行之所以到处能“开花”,是因为银行受的管制太严.要有良性的金融市场,就要有良好的金融环境.     

影子银行：体系、内生性风险及国际监管取向

摘要：全球金融危机后,国际社会从一个新的视角——影子银行体系来分析现代金融体系,并重构现代国际金融监管制度。影子银行体系的有效监管必须具有翔实的微观基础,比如体系边界、风险特征及表现形式等。国际上对影子银行体系并无公认的定义。影子银行具有证券化程度高、信息不透明、杠杆率较高等特征,这直接引致其存在诸多内生性金融风险,国际社会倾向于采用“类银行化”的监管路径对影子银行进行金融监管。国际社会采取的一系列法律、政策措施对我国影子银行监管具有一定的启示。     

CEO Bonus Compensation and Bank Default Risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe

We investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. For a sample of U.S. and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk‐reducing effect when banks are financially distressed or when banks operate under weak bank regulatory regimes. Our results link bonus compensation in banking to financial stability and caution that attempts to regulate bonus pay need to tailor CEO incentives to the riskiness of banks and to regulatory regimes.     

Syndicated Leveraged Loans During and After the Crisis and the Role of the Shadow Banking System

In an article published in this journal in 1998, Nobel laureate Merton Miller argued that one of the best weapons available to national economies in their defense against the macroeconomic effects of banking crises is the availability of non‐bank financial institutions and products—or what we now refer to as the “shadow banking system.” Although Miller may have exaggerated the independence of bank‐ and market‐based sources of financing, the author argues that events during and after the recent crisis have shown Miller's claims about the importance of non‐bank investors in the provision of credit to be fundamentally correct. Critics of securitization and the shadow banking system tend to focus on the subprime mortgage story in which the sudden re‐pricing of credit risk and the resulting disappearance of investment demand for ABCP, private‐label mortgage‐related ABS, and ABS CDOs created unexpected and significant downward price pressure on those asset types. But the leveraged loan market tells a very different story. In contrast to the near complete disappearance of private mortgage securitizations, the extraordinary recovery of the U.S. syndicated leveraged loan market demonstrates that the relation between commercial and shadow banking has proved to be a highly productive and resilient one—and very much a two‐way street. When leveraged loans and CLOs experienced problems from 2007 through 2009 due primarily to the widespread liquidity and credit market disruptions that affected essentially all structured credit products, institutional investors in leveraged loans disappeared and the leveraged loan primary market imploded. But when institutional participants recognized the value of the underlying asset—corporate loans—and regained confidence in shadow‐banking products, leveraged lending by banks recovered quickly and dramatically. This outcome is viewed as vindicating Professor Miller's statement about the benefits of shadow markets and securitization— namely, the role of non‐bank investors in diversifying the risk of credit creation while at the same time improving the price discovery process in different markets. The recent history of the U.S. leveraged loan market demonstrates that shadow banking system participants play a critical role in meeting the total demand for such loans, and that the ebbs and flows from institutional leveraged loan markets are strongly connected with the health and integrity of the underlying leveraged bank loan market.     

A Model of Shadow Banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which banks originate and trade loans, assemble them into diversified portfolios, and finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, bank assets and leverage move together, banks become interconnected through markets, and banks increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce idiosyncratic risk through diversification. The shadow banking system is stable and welfare improving under rational expectations, but vulnerable to crises and liquidity dry‐ups when investors neglect tail risks.     

中国影子银行的经济学分析:定义、构成和规模测算

2008年国际金融危机以后,中国金融体系发生的重大变化之一是影子银行的较快发展,其规模迅速膨胀,交易结构日趋复杂,各类市场主体都牵涉其中。这些变化吸引了政策制订者和学术界的广泛关注。本文给出了中国影子银行的功能性定义,即依赖于银行信用、从事银行业务、但又没接受严格的银行业监管的金融业务,具体指传统的银行表内贷款和债券投资以外的,具备完整的信用转换、期限转换和流动性转换功能的金融业务。本文逐项分析影子银行业务,详细总结各类型业务的交易结构、业务主体、业务实质、资金来源、法律基础、资产负债表表示,准确测算了2002年至今影子银行总量和资产负债表结构月度数据。只从资产负债表的负债端着手加总,既完整地涵盖了影子银行的全部业务,得到其宏观总量,又剔除了重复计算。本文测算数据为后续研究打下了基础。     

Shadow banking shadowed in banks’ balance sheets: Evidence from China’s commercial banks

Using hand‐collected data, we creatively construct an ‘on‐balance‐sheet shadow banking business’ (OBS‐SBB) measure to precisely quantify commercial banks’ shadow banking activity concealed on their balance sheets. We show that OBS‐SBB activities could both increase individual and systemic risks. To further test the underlying mechanisms, we use China’s implementation of Basel III as an exogenous shock and employ the difference‐in‐differences approach. We find that banks demand OBS‐SBB in order to bypass capital requirements, previously less‐capitalised banks significantly increase their OBS‐SBB ex‐post, and greater impact is found among small and medium‐sized banks and during loose monetary policy periods.     

审计质量对影子银行业务风险的影响研究 ——基于中国商业银行数据的实证研究

以中国68家非上市银行和16家上市银行2007-2017年的数据为样本,检验注册会计师审计在抑制商业银行从事影子银行业务风险中发挥的重要作用,并探究高质量的审计对商业银行从事影子银行业务风险的具体影响.研究表明:国际四大会计师事务所的审计质量更高,更能有效抑制银行从事影子银行业务的风险;股权集中度较高和处于法律保护水平较低地区的银行从事影子银行业务的风险更大,高质量的审计对其风险的抑制效果更强.     

政策连续性、非金融企业影子银行化与社会责任承担

基于2006-2017年非金融类A股上市公司数据,本文考察了非金融企业影子银行化对社会责任承担的影响,并进一步研究了政策连续性对非金融企业影子银行化与社会责任承担之间关系的影响。研究发现,非金融企业影子银行化会抑制社会责任承担行为,且这种效应在市场套利动机强、公司治理水平较低、外部融资能力弱的企业中更为明显。政策连续性程度提高会减弱非金融企业影子银行化与社会责任承担之间的负向关系。因此,本文提出抑制经济“脱实向虚”,增强政策稳定性和连续性,促进实体经济平稳发展的政策建议。     

美国的影子银行系统

影子银行是指游离于传统商业银行体系之外的、从事与传统银行相类似的金融活动但却不受监管或几乎不受监管的金融实体。次贷危机爆发前,美国的影子银行体系发展达到巅峰状态。在本次金融危机中,影子银行系统备受诟病,被认为是此次危机的罪魁祸首。文章对美国影子银行系统的构成、业务流程及投融资活动等进行了梳理,以期为理解次贷危机前美国金融体系的运行特征提供启示。     

Inside debt and shadow banking

This study examines the effect of inside debt arising from CEO compensation deferral policies on shadow banking. We construct a parsimonious model that shows that increased bank inside debt leads to increased shadow banking. Using a CEO compensation deferral policy imposed on the Chinese banking industry in 2010, we empirically test our theoretical prediction on the effect of inside debt on shadow banking proxied by non-principal-guaranteed wealth management products. We find that banks that adopt the CEO compensation deferral policy exhibit higher levels of shadow banking than their counterparts and that this result is not contingent on bank size or the extent of government control. Moreover, the effect of inside debt on shadow banking is stronger in banks with higher loan-to-deposit and non-performing-loan ratios and in banks with CEO turnover, suggesting that the compensation deferral policy induces CEOs, especially newly appointed CEOs, to do more shadow banking to circumvent regulations regarding the balance-sheet risk and to boost performance.     

我国影子银行发展及其对经济金融的影响研究——以山东省为例

本文基于我国对影子银行的定义测算其规模,并在此基础上采用2002—2014年的月度数据和结构VAR模型(SVAR)实证研究了影子银行对宏观经济发展和金融体系的影响。结果表明,近些年我国影子银行发展规模均以较为平稳的速度增长;影子银行短期内对经济增长有负面影响,但总体来看其发展对我国宏观经济具有积极作用;影子银行发展对我国金融发展具有一定的促进作用,但其规模过度扩张将会增加商业银行流动性风险,弱化其信用中介功能,对金融稳定产生负向冲击效应。最后在总结研究结论的基础上提出政策建议。     

中国影子银行发展趋势与展望

在多角度界定影子银行的基础上,总结中国影子银行的主要特征,即处于初期发展阶段、杠杆率相对较低、主体独立性低、金融创新活跃地带。从欧美国家影子银行发展实践来看,中国影子银行是金融体制过渡性的产物,代表了未来金融创新的方向,其发展趋势主要包括：业务发展：由银行表外业务向资产证券化业务转变;运作模式：由＂一对一＂对接向＂多对多＂对接转变;融资结构：由非标债权融资向标准化债权融资转变;体系构成：由商业银行为主向非银行金融机构为主转变;监管动向：由机构监管向机构监管与功能监管相结合转变。     

对国内影子银行发展的监管建议

近些年来,影子银行的规模越来越大,在我国的金融中的作用也越来越大,在促进经济发展的同时,伴随而来的是影子银行蕴藏的风险。目前,我国在影子银行的监管方面尚处于起步阶段。本文主要分析阐述了国内影子银行在发展中存在的问题以及如何实现对影子银行的监管。     

Can banks default overnight? Modelling endogenous contagion on the O/N interbank market

We propose a new model of the liquidity-driven banking system focusing on overnight interbank loans. This significant branch of the interbank market is commonly neglected in the banking system modelling and systemic risk analysis. We construct a model where banks are allowed to use both the interbank and the securities markets to manage their liquidity demand and supply as driven by prudential requirements in a volatile environment. The network of interbank loans is dynamic and simulated every day. We show how the intrasystem cash fluctuations alone, without any external shocks, may lead to systemic defaults, and what may be a symptom of the self-organized criticality of the system. We also analyze the impact of different prudential regulations and market conditions on the interbank market resilience. We confirm that the central bank’s asset purchase programmes, limiting the declines in government bond prices, can successfully stabilize banks’ liquidity demands. The model can be used to analyze the interbank market impact of macroprudential tools.     

Systemic Risk in the Chinese Shadow Banking System: A Sector-Level Perspective

We propose to measure the systemic risk in the shadow banking sector. Instead of testing how many institutions will fail due to the initial breakdown of one institution as extant network models do, we associate the systemic risk of one shadow banking sector with the total amount of unexpected losses it might generate both directly and indirectly. Our model focuses on balance sheet contagion and applies a loop algorithm to risk transfer. The result shows that trust companies were the main culprit of financial instability and commercial banks assumed the main risks over 2007–12 in the Chinese shadow banking system.     

Shadow price of equity and political connectedness: A study of Chinese commercial banks

This study estimates the shadow price of equity capital applying a directional distance function for Chinese commercial banks. Using an unbalanced panel of 746 observations from 2013 to 2019, we find that the average shadow price of equity in the Chinese banking system is 2.94%. Moreover, in our sample, the price of equity of most banks is lower than that of deposits, suggesting that the majority of sampled banks are underleveraged during the study period. We also find that politically connected banks have higher prices of equity than their non-politically connected counterparts, and that the price of equity is positively related to ownership concentration. Furthermore, large politically related banks tend to have lower shadow prices of equity than large non-politically related banks, although large banks usually have higher prices of equity than small banks.     

Dividend payout strategies and bank survival likelihood: A cross-country analysis

In this cross-country study, we examine whether dividend payout decisions affect the survival likelihood of banks. Using unique international banking data from 11 countries from 2010 to 2019, we find that higher levels of cash dividend payouts increase a bank's survival likelihood, as paying dividends lowers agency problems and cost of debt and facilitates greater public monitoring. Our extended analysis shows an inverted U-shaped relation between large dividends and survival likelihood. At higher levels, payout is related to a safer position of banks in terms of default; however, at very high levels of dividends, when the levels of payouts exceed a threshold, such payout lowers the likelihood of survival. We additionally investigate the effect of the bank type to assess whether differential effects could be realised under the constrained dividend model of Islamic banks compared to the conventional banking model. Our results, interestingly, show that the positive effect of dividend payouts on bank survival is more pronounced in conventional than Islamic banks. This finding is explained by the dominant liquidity management challenges pertaining to the Islamic banking business model in which banks retain more cash and pay lower dividends. Our findings offer important insights and policy implications for regulators, bankers and a broad set of stakeholders engaging with both banking sectors.