论资产专用性与纵向一体化

资产专用性通过影响企业的治理成本和生产成本来影响纵向一体化决策,资本专用性越强,企业就越倾向于实行纵向一体化。而纵向一体化过程反过来又对资产专用性产生影响,企业实行纵向一体化的过程会使资产专用性增强。     

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF HOLD‐UP PROBLEM AND NON‐EXCLUSIVE FRANCHISE CONTRACT

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model that examines the emergence of non‐exclusive franchise contracts in the presence of the franchisor hold‐up problem. Our model of an endogenous franchising network underscores the trade‐off between the cost associated with specifying and enforcing the contractual terms and the cost associated with broadening the relationships with multiple franchisors. We show that when the contracting cost relative to the relational cost is high and when the economies of specialization is low, a non‐exclusive franchise contract is an optimal contractual arrangement to mitigate franchisor opportunism.     

交易费用、资产专用性与纵向一体化间关系的实证研究

利用2006—2009年我国沪深两市上市公司的数据,并对交易费用进行细分,实证分析了不同的交易费用、资产专用性对纵向一体化的影响。结果表明:企业的纵向一体化行为具有显著的行业差异;管理性交易费用、资本市场交易费用和商品市场交易费用是显著影响企业纵向一体化行为的重要因素;资产专用性与纵向一体化水平之间存在显著的正相关关系。     

Exclusion via Non‐Exclusive Contracts

We establish that non‐linear vertical contracts can allow an incumbent to exclude an upstream rival in a setting that does not rely on the exclusivity of the incumbent's contracts with downstream firms or any limits on distribution channels available to the incumbent or rival. The optimal contract we describe is a three‐part quantity discounting contract that involves the payment of an allowance to a downstream distributor and a marginal wholesale price below the incumbent's marginal cost for sufficiently large quantities. The optimal contract is robust to allowing parties to renegotiate contracts in case of entry.     

Limited attention and the optimal incompleteness of contracts

A decision-maker's limited attention is allocated between writingnew contracts and directing current contracts. More time spentwriting a new contract makes the contract more complete. A morecomplete contract performs better and generates higher returns.The optimal allocation of attention implies two types of contracts,relational and market. A relational contract, which is directedperiodically, is optimally less complete than a market contract,which is not directed. The completeness of relational contractsdecreases with the ability to direct contracts, since changingcircumstances can be dealt with later. In addition, the completenessof relational contracts increases with the ability to writenew contracts, since more complete relational contracts aredirected less frequently and leave more time for writing newcontracts. The optimal allocation of attention to relationalcontracts is socially efficient even though it does not maximizethe discounted expected returns of the firm.     

Honesty,Diligence and Skill: Risk Sharing and Specialization in the Kiryu Silk Weaving Cluster,Japan

Many economies have seen growth in industrial clusters during their industrialization, and the relational contracts between manufacturers and subcontractors are often the organizational basis of clusters. We predict that, if manufacturers form relational contracts with subcontractors, if manufacturers closely collude with each other when trading with subcontractors, if information about subcontractors’ past actions is only imperfectly shared by manufacturers as hearsay, and if demand shock is considerable, then premium subcontractors suffer more from market volatility than ordinary subcontractors would and hence, it is optimal for manufacturers to shield premium subcontractors against the risk. We then study Kiryu, a kimono weaving cluster that expanded from the late nineteenth century with the development of new synthetic dyeing techniques. We show that premium subcontracting weavers were allowed long‐term relational contracts and specialization, which shielded already honest weavers against market volatility and induced them to be diligent and to acquire skills.     

Globalization,Tax Distortions,and Public‐Sector Retrenchment*

It is widely perceived that globalization inevitably leads to a retrenchment of tax‐financed public‐sector activities. The argument is that tax distortions increase when production is more easily relocated across countries (the elasticity argument). We question this perception in a model that captures standard mechanisms from trade and open‐economy models. Importantly, the retrenchment argument overlooks the fact that the basic effect of integration (i.e., gains from trade) tends to lower the marginal costs of public funds. Moreover, the elasticity argument is not unambiguously supported, and there is no race to the bottom as a result of the perceived terms‐of‐trade effects of non‐cooperative fiscal policies.     

Risky business: Institutions vs. social networks in FDI

Political economy scholarship on foreign direct investment (FDI) emphasizes variation in host country political risk but overlooks variation in investors' sensitivity to political risk. We show that relational contracting, relationship‐based contract enforcement, is more efficient for high‐risk, human capital‐intensive activities for which the costs of writing legally enforceable contracts are prohibitive. We disaggregate FDI into two distinct varieties: mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and venture capital (VC). We propose that VC flows are less sensitive to host institutions but correlate strongly with skilled migrant networks that monitor compliance and impose reputational costs. Our empirical analysis of dyadic VC and M&A flows covers over 100 countries during 1980–2009. We address other mechanisms through which migrant networks facilitate FDI and verify our results hold at the country‐industry level. These findings suggest that relational contracting facilitates global integration of dynamic, knowledge‐intensive industries even when formal institutions are weak.     

工业园区废弃物交易生态协作激励机制

在分析工业园区废弃物交易存在资产专用性和不确定性等问题的基础上,通过构建园区废弃物交易生态协作收益模型,分别探讨了社会最优条件下、单期交易条件下和关系契约条件下有助于废弃物交易双方生态协作的最优激励机制安排。研究结果表明:资产专用性和不确定性等导致单期交易下生态协作存在效率损失,此时根据生产效率分配协作租金可最大程度地减少生态协作效率损失;关系契约推动了生态协作效率的提升,利用企业可通过隐藏废弃物在利用环节的价值增值信息以及调节奖励支付规则等获得社会最优条件下的生态协作收益;废弃物交易双方越关注未来的预期收益,废弃物交易中的协作程度越高,废弃物交易双方获取的生态协作收益就越大;废弃物再利用的成本越高,越需要交易双方进行长期协作,越需要对园区进行政策干预。     

NONSTATIONARY RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION*

I develop a model of nonstationary relational contracts in order to study internal wage dynamics. Workers are heterogeneous, and each worker’s ability is both private information and fixed for all time. Learning therefore occurs within employment relationships. The inferences, however, are confounded by moral hazard. Incentive provision is restricted by an inability to commit to long‐term contracts. Relational contracts, which must be self‐enforcing, must therefore be used. The wage dynamics in the optimal contract, which are pinned down by the tension between incentive provision and contractual enforcement, are intimately related to the learning effect.     

Financial Globalization,Financial Crises,and the External Portfolio Structure of Emerging Markets*

We study the transitional dynamics of financial integration in emerging economies using a two‐sector model with a collateral constraint on external debt and trading costs incurred by foreign investors. The probability of a financial crisis displays overshooting; it rises sharply initially and then falls sharply, but remains non‐zero in the long run. While equity holdings fall permanently, bond holdings initially fall, but rise after the probability of a crisis peaks. Conversely, asset returns and asset prices first rise and then fall. These results are in line with the post‐globalization dynamics observed in emerging markets, and the higher frequency of crises that they display.     

Repeated Protection for Sale

This paper addresses whether the efficient equilibria characterized by Grossman and Helpman's one‐shot protection‐for‐sale game are renegotiation‐proof in an infinitely repeated setting. We propose a simple strategy profile that can support the efficient, truthful equilibrium in each period as a strongly renegotiation‐proof subgame perfect equilibrium. This result provides another plausible reason to explain why the truthful equilibrium may be focal in the game of protection‐for‐sale. In addition, when the timing of the contributions is specified explicitly, the special interest groups should minimize the upfront payment to the government before policy implementation to reduce the possibility of the collapse of such relational contracts.     

THE EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP IN NGOS’ COMMERCIAL VENTURES

ABSTRACT: Amidst pressure to become self‐financing, Non‐Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have become increasingly involved in profit‐generating business ventures. Because NGOs are traditionally financed by donations with the expectation that they focus on their social mission, the commercialization of NGOs has generated criticism. This paper examines the effect of ownership on investment incentives in NGOs’ commercial ventures, using an incomplete contracts framework. NGO‐ownership helps minimize the tension between primary social mission and managerial decisions. However, external ownership provides better incentives to invest in mission‐enhancing innovations. Finally, because relationships with firms are repeated, NGOs may use relational contracts to align their ventures’ incentives. However, such contracts need to be credible to work.     

市场互联性、关系型合约与经济转型

本文通过将单一市场的关系型合约推广到互联的关系型合约,刻画了社会分工程度(市场范围)与微观治理机制(基于关系型合约的治理还是基于正式合约的治理)之间的互动关系:基于何种合约来治理受市场范围的影响,市场范围越小,关系型合约越重要,正式合约越不重要;反之则反是。特别地,从这个视角看,计划经济向市场经济转型的过程,是劳动分工不断深化和市场范围不断扩大的过程,在微观治理上是一个从互联的关系型合约不断向正式合约过渡的过程。中国的渐进式改革之所以成功,很大程度上是由于渐进式改革使原来自我实施的关系型合约没有受到很大程度的破坏,在正式合约缺位时,关系型合约仍然能够维持社会经济的运行;俄罗斯的激进式改革几乎在一夜之间破坏了自我实施的关系型合约的可维持性,而短期内又不可能建立依赖正式合约的治理模式,出现了微观治理失效。本文还解释了中国经济在缺乏正式的法律和产权体系下取得骄人绩效的“悖论”,即由于关系型合约的自我实施性,因而并不需要相应的正式制度安排。本文总体上支持“后华盛顿共识”的渐进改革路径,并为其提供了动态的微观机制。     

PERFORMANCE‐BASED FEE CONTRACT AND RISK‐TAKING STRATEGY IN ASSET MANAGEMENT TOURNAMENT

This paper investigates how performance‐based fee (PBF) contracts affect strategic risk‐taking behaviours of fund managers in an asset management tournament. In the perfect equilibrium, managers with better mid‐year performance will hold the risky asset with a higher probability in the remaining of the year, compared to managers with poorer mid‐year performance. If the volume of the cash flow into the winner fund is contingent on its level of success, the winning fund will take a more aggressive approach. When the PBF contract pays more heed to relative performance against the benchmark, managers are more likely to adopt aggressive strategies.     

Unionized oligopoly and vertical integration

Labor market structures may have important effects on imperfectly competitive rivalries between firms. This paper examines the consequences of unionization for the rivalry between duopoly firms in two types of contracts: vertical integration and vertical separation. If a franchise fee is used to extract the retailer’s profit, then it is in the individual interest of each manufacturer to choose vertical separation and charge his retailer a wholesale price in excess of the unit production cost, depending on the specific time structures. These arguments could make integration preferable for the manufacturer if the wage bargaining power of the union is relatively powerful.     

新经济中的虚拟一体化组织

虚拟一体化是现代企业有效利用社会资源的一种常用组织形式。它不仅增强了企业的柔性和敏捷性,降低了交易成本和管理成本,而且其协调机制---隐性契约在克服因企业追求降低生产成本而提高资产专用性所引起的垄断租金和专用性准租金方面比纵向一体化和明示契约都具有优势。     

生态工业园企业合作非正式契约的博弈分析

企业间稳定的合作关系是生态工业园顺利成长的前提条件．要保证这种合作关系就必须有强有力的制度保障。新制度经济学理论提出将长期契约用来代替纵向一体化经营，同时将长期契约分为正式契约和非正式契约。由于正式契约的非完备性和未来的不确定性，提高了它的实施成本，因此，非正式契约在规范园区企业行为方面提供了强有力的保证。本文对防止园区企业机会主义行为的非正式契约进行了博弈分析．着重用不完全信息下的动态博弈理论阐释非正式契约运行的内在机理，并对如何规范园区企业间合作关系提出了建议与对策，以期有助于生态工业园的健康成长。     

Incentive contracts and bank performance

This paper, using unique survey data from the banking industry in rural China, investigates the effect of incentive contracts on performance. In the context of China's economic transition, we find that the incentive contracts have a positive effect on the bank manager's performance in deposit taking and non‐performing loan reduction. This finding is robust when we control for the endogeneity of incentive contracts. Our empirical results present evidence on the positive effects of incentive‐based banking reforms in rural China.     

Inefficient Credit Booms

This paper studies the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in an economy with financial frictions hit by aggregate shocks. In particular, it shows that competitive financial contracts can result in excessive borrowing ex ante and excessive volatility ex post . Even though from a first-best perspective the equilibrium always displays under-borrowing, from a second-best point of view excessive borrowing can arise. The inefficiency is due to the combination of limited commitment in financial contracts and the fact that asset prices are determined in a spot market. This generates a pecuniary externality that is not internalized in private contracts. The model provides a framework to evaluate preventive policies, which can be used during a credit boom to reduce the expected costs of a financial crisis.