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股东与高管之间的代理问题一直是公司治理研究的热点话题,有关股权激励与公司业绩之间的关系现有研究存在较大的争议.本文通过梳理分析国内外有关股权激励的研究文献,重点关注股权激励与企业业绩之间的关系及实施股权激励的动机,通过对深圳万科股份有限公司2011年推行的股权激励方案的研究,对我国经济转轨和社会转型背景下的上市公司的股权激励方案具有一定启示作用. 相似文献
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作为长效机制,股权激励是为了促进公司业绩增长。国内外学者对股权激励与公司业绩之间的关系以及它的实施效果进行了大量相关研究,有学者认为二者之间正相关,也有学者认为二者之间不相关。本文充分利用中国上市公司2005-2009年公布的财务数据,根据其后续进展情况进行分类和分析,通过纵向比较法直观地验证股权激励的实施与企业绩效之间并无明显的关系,再利用因子分析法和相关分析,进一步验证股权激励实施的力度对公司绩效的影响,从而揭示股权激励与公司业绩之间并无明显相关性。 相似文献
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自2014年《关于上市公司实施员工持股计划试点的指导意见》出台之后,员工股权激励的治理效应备受关注,其与高管股权激励的互动效应则一直是有待突破的迷雾。本文以2006-2017年我国实施股权激励的A股上市公司为研究样本,考察不同类型的股权激励强度对公司业绩的影响。研究发现,当前我国上市公司高管股权激励的预期作用并不确定,不过员工股权激励充当了有效的补救角色,有助于公司业绩的提升。进一步研究发现,上述关系在实施限制性股票激励模式、股权激励有效期较长、员工搭便车程度较低、激励员工人数较多以及企业性质为非国有企业的条件下更显著。本文研究结论对于企业完善股权激励制度并充分发挥员工股权激励的价值效应提供了明确的经验证据。 相似文献
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本文依据中国沪深两市实施股票期权的37家制造类上市公司业绩数据,对实施股票期权与公司业绩之间的关系进行了详细的分析.研究结果表明,公司的股票期权激励水平与公司业绩之间有显著的正相关关系,同时公司资产规模和营业收入增长率与公司业绩也呈正相关关系,而公司资产负债率与公司业绩负相关.股票期权激励水平越高,资产规模和营业收入增长率越大,资产负债率越低,则公司业绩就越好. 相似文献
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2005年4月以来的股权分置改革使我国上市公司的股权开始进入全流通时代,我国资本市场的所有基本功能得以正常发挥,上市公司对高管进行股权激励成为现实可能,故对于股权激励有效性的研究意义重大。本文选取2009-2011年间处于实施状态中的沪深股市发行A股上市公司为样本,研究股权激励水平与企业绩效之间的相关关系,实证结果表明:激励股总数比例越大,企业绩效越好,越有益于降低代理成本;高管人员所授予激励股占当期总激励权益总额的比例有益于提高公司价值,缓解委托代理冲突;除了股权激励水平外,企业规模的适度扩大也有益于公司绩效的提升;董事长与总经理两职合一会影响董事会的独立性与有效性,降低企业价值。上述研究可为提高实施股权激励的上市公司的经营业绩提供一定程度的参考。 相似文献
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2005年4月以来的股权分置改革使我国上市公司的股权开始进入全流通时代,我国资本市场的所有基本功能得以正常发挥,上市公司对高管进行股权激励成为现实可能,故对于股权激励有效性的研究意义重大。本文选取2009-2011年间处于实施状态中的沪深股市发行A股上市公司为样本,研究股权激励水平与企业绩效之间的相关关系,实证结果表明:激励股总数比例越大,企业绩效越好,越有益于降低代理成本;高管人员所授予激励股占当期总激励权益总额的比例有益于提高公司价值,缓解委托代理冲突;除了股权激励水平外,企业规模的适度扩大也有益于公司绩效的提升;董事长与总经理两职合一会影响董事会的独立性与有效性,降低企业价值。上述研究可为提高实施股权激励的上市公司的经营业绩提供一定程度的参考。 相似文献
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Augustine Duru Raghavan J. Iyengar Ernest M. Zampelli 《Journal of Corporate Finance》2012,18(5):1286-1305
This study examines the causal link between a firm's leverage decisions and the characteristics of its CEO bonus plans. Results from a simultaneous equations model strongly suggest that highly levered firms are less likely to use return on equity (ROE) or ROE-based accounting performance measures to determine executive bonuses. Estimates also indicate that firms with fewer debt covenants, higher interest rates on debt, and a greater proportion of executive pay in the form of stock options are less likely to adopt ROE-based measures for use in CEO bonus plans. These findings lend strong support to the efficient contracting hypothesis. The conflicting interests of corporate stakeholders, especially between stockholders and creditors, encourage firms to tie executive pay to performance metrics like return on assets (ROA) that will strike the optimal balance between the agency costs of debt and the agency costs of equity.Data availability: all data are available from public sources. 相似文献
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本文以2002—2011年716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性框架下,运用动态面板System GMM估计方法,在考虑了高管薪酬与其他治理机制间的交互作用情况下,研究了高管薪酬与公司绩效间的动态关系。研究结果表明:(1)前期高管持股比例与公司绩效呈负相关,前期高管货币薪酬与公司绩效呈正相关;(2)前期公司绩效对高管薪酬产生了显著的反馈效应;(3)高管薪酬与其他公司治理机制间存在"交互效应",即高管薪酬与其他治理机制间的相互作用对公司绩效产生了显著的影响;(4)高管薪酬与公司绩效间存在动态内生性。 相似文献
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The implied cost of equity capital,corporate investment and chief executive officer turnover
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This study investigates how the cost of equity capital, along with corporate investment, affects chief executive officer (CEO) turnover decisions. We hypothesize that the cost of equity conveys information about firm performance uncertainty that is informative of CEO talent. Consistently, our empirical results show that the likelihood of CEO turnover is positively associated with the implied cost of equity, after controlling for earnings and stock performance measures and risk factors. Additional analysis of reverse causality supports the causal effect of the high cost of equity on CEO dismissals. We also find that the positive association is more pronounced for firms that are more likely to suffer from underinvestment problems. These results suggest that the cost of equity plays a more important role in assessing CEO performance when the firm needs more external equity capital to pursue investment opportunities. 相似文献
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自2014年《关于上市公司实施员工持股计划试点的指导意见》颁布以来,受到资本市场的广泛关注和支持,实施员工持股计划的公司逐渐增加。与此同时,控股股东股权质押可能引起的控制权转移风险也成为需要重点关注的问题。那么,有质押的控股股东是否会策略性地利用员工持股计划来缓解风险?本文利用2013—2018年A股上市公司的样本,考察控股股东质押对员工持股计划的影响。研究发现:前期控股股东有股权质押、质押率越高的公司随后推行员工持股计划的可能性越大,该效应随着控制权转移风险的提高而增大;控股股东股权质押的员工持股计划进行短期市值管理是有效的,但并未显著提升公司长期价值,提示控股股东存在借其进行内部人利益绑定和市值管理的动机;进一步研究表明,公司内部治理机制对控股股东股权质押下推行员工持股计划的效果有限。 相似文献
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We examine the effect of personal taxes on CEOs’ decisions to sell their equity, controlling for diversification, managerial overconfidence, and other determinants. While CEOs frequently sell large amounts of their unrestricted firm equity, the tax burden associated with the sale significantly deters them from selling equity even after controlling for other determinants like diversification. We also find that both taxable institutional investors and CEOs respond to taxes in their selling of equity, although CEOs appear to be less tax-sensitive. Our findings underscore the importance of taxes in corporate and managerial decisions and they have implications for executive compensation policies. 相似文献
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Constantinos G. Chalevas 《The International Journal of Accounting》2011,46(2):138-174
This study investigates empirically the effect of corporate governance principles on executive compensation and firm performance prior to and after the adoption of the first Greek Law on corporate governance. Prior to the adoption of the law, managers were not compensated in line with their performance. Since its introduction, a significant link has been observed between executive compensation and company performance as measured by accounting measures of performance. Following the adoption of corporate governance principles by law, the main mechanism that controls executive compensation is the election of independent non-executive board members. The results are robust to alternative accounting measures of performance. 相似文献
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Does investing in sustainability leaders affect portfolio performance? Analyzing two mutually exclusive leading and lagging global corporate sustainability portfolios (Dow Jones) finds that (1) leading sustainability firms do not underperform the market portfolio, and (2) their lagging counterparts outperform the market portfolio and the leading portfolio. Notably, we find leading (lagging) corporate social performance (CSP) firms exhibit significantly lower (higher) idiosyncratic risk and that idiosyncratic risk might be priced by the broader global equity market. We develop an idiosyncratic risk factor and find that its inclusion significantly reduces the apparent difference in performance between leading and lagging CSP portfolios. 相似文献
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This paper investigates the role of pensions as an element of total executive compensation, and the relationship between pensions and performance‐based compensation in executive pay. Using hand‐collected data on FTSE 100 CEOs and senior executives from 2004?2011, we document that pensions function as a substitute for performance‐based compensation (primarily bonuses) in both cross‐sectional and time‐series settings. We also examine the effect of corporate governance characteristics on executive pensions. We find that corporate governance characteristics associated with stronger board monitoring play a constraining role on the magnitude of pensions. Our evidence of substitution effects between pensions and performance‐based compensation is consistent with a managerial power view of executive compensation‐setting, and the use of pensions as a ‘stealth’ element of compensation. Our findings are robust to considering different types of pensions, product market competition, and cross‐listing. Sub‐period analysis shows that pensions decrease and substitution effects weaken following the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, we find no evidence that the use of compensation consultants with potential conflicts of interest is associated with higher pensions. Overall, our study contributes to a greater understanding of the role of pensions in executive compensation, and shows the importance of including pensions in analysis of executive compensation. 相似文献