CRA Lending in a Changing Context: Evidence of Interaction with FHA and Subprime Originations

This article uses a unique demonstration program to examine the interaction of CRA-related lending with subprime and FHA lending activity. Specifically, the empirical analysis identifies the extent to which the origination of a CRA mortgage substitutes for FHA and subprime originations during the period 1998–2006. The results suggest that in the years prior to the expansion of the subprime market (1998–2001), the origination of CRA loans carried a small substitution effect with respect to FHA originations, with little to no impact on subprime originations. Conversely, during the years of the subprime industry’s growth (2002–2006), CRA originations substituted at a much higher rate for high-cost originations. These findings are suggestive about the dynamic role of community reinvestment lending within the changing context of the broader mortgage market. To the extent that CRA originations carry lower foreclosure risk than many subprime products, they also carry implications for the extent of neighborhood externalities in the wake of the subprime foreclosure crisis.     

Predatory lending and the subprime crisis

We measure the effect of a 2006 antipredatory pilot program in Chicago on mortgage default rates to test whether predatory lending was a key element in fueling the subprime crisis. Under the program, risky borrowers or risky mortgage contracts or both triggered review sessions by housing counselors who shared their findings with the state regulator. The pilot program cut market activity in half, largely through the exit of lenders specializing in risky loans and through a decline in the share of subprime borrowers. Our results suggest that predatory lending practices contributed to high mortgage default rates among subprime borrowers, raising them by about a third.     

Subprime Borrowers: Mortgage Transitions and Outcomes

Public policy concerns increasingly have focused on subprime lending. Our research uses a survey of prime and subprime borrowers to address whether borrowers inappropriately are channeled to the subprime segment, if once having taken out a subprime mortgage borrowers are stuck in this market segment, and whether borrowers face higher costs by taking out subprime mortgages. We find that subprime borrowers are less knowledgeable about the mortgage process, are less likely to search for the best mortgage rates, and are less likely to be offered a choice among alternative mortgage terms and instruments—possibly making them more vulnerable to unfavorable mortgage outcomes. Our analysis of market segmentation confirms that typical mortgage underwriting criteria are most important in explaining whether borrowers obtain prime or subprime mortgages—higher credit risk borrowers are more likely to get a subprime loan. Our results further show that search behavior and other demographic factors including adverse life events, age, and Hispanic ethnicity contribute to explaining market segment, suggesting that borrowers may inappropriately receive subprime mortgages. While we find some persistence to market segment—borrowers are more likely to take out a subprime mortgage if their previous mortgage came from the subprime segment—we also find that market segment is not immutable. Analysis of the survey responses indicates that borrowers with subprime mortgages significantly are more dissatisfied with their mortgage outcomes. This is not surprising because subprime borrowers look worse across typical mortgage underwriting criteria. Consistent with policy concerns, however, despite holding constant these and other factors, taking out a mortgage in the subprime segment, by itself, appears to increase dissatisfaction with mortgage outcomes. We do not provide a definitive answer to the question of whether subprime lending, on balance, serves homebuyers well by providing access to mortgage credit to those otherwise constrained, or rather serves homebuyers poorly by inappropriately assigning them to a market where costs are high and the ability to transition to more attractive prime mortgages remains low. Our analysis, however, does provide some empirical support for concerns raised by critics of subprime lending, and for this reason justifies continued public policy debate and analysis.     

Regulation of Subprime Mortgage Products: An Analysis of North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law

This paper estimates the effect of North Carolina's high-cost mortgage law on the subprime mortgage market in that state. The results indicate that creditors sharply restricted lending to higher risk consumers in North Carolina following passage of the law. Creditors did not restrict lending in neighboring states or to lower risk consumers in North Carolina. These results suggest that the restriction in North Carolina was due to rationing in response to higher costs imposed by the law. The findings of this study are of importance beyond North Carolina. Other states and municipalities have proposed or passed similar or more restrictive laws. These laws risk taking back some of the gains in credit availability that lower income and higher risk consumers gained in the 1990s.     

The Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Lending

Subprime lending in the residential mortgage market, characterized by relatively high credit risk and interest rates or fees, has developed over the past decade into a prominent segment of the market (Temkin, 2000). Recent research indicates that there is geographical concentration of subprime mortgages in Census tracts where there are high concentrations of low-income and minority households. The growth in subprime lending represents an expansion in the supply of mortgage credit among households who do not meet prime market underwriting standards. Nonetheless, its apparent concentration in minority and lower income neighborhoods has generated concerns that these households may not be obtaining equal opportunity in the prime mortgage market. Such lending may undermine revitalization to the extent that it is associated with so-called predatory practices.     

Borrower Self-Selection,Underwriting Costs,and Subprime Mortgage Credit Supply

In the U.S., households participate in two very different types of credit markets. Personal lending is characterized by continuous risk-based pricing in which lenders offer households a continuous distribution of borrowing possibilities based on estimates of their creditworthiness. This contrasts sharply with mortgage markets where lenders specialize in specific risk categories of borrowers and mortgage supply is stepwise linear. The contrast between continuous lending for personal loans and discrete lending by specialized lenders for mortgage credit has led to concerns regarding the efficiency and equity of mortgage lending. This paper sheds both theoretical and empirical light on the differences in the two credit markets. The theory section demonstrates why, in a perfectly competitive credit market where all lenders have the same underwriting technology, mortgage credit supply curves are stepwise linear and lenders specialize in prime or subprime lending. The empirical section then provides evidence that borrowers are being effectively sorted based on risk characteristics by the market.     

美国猎杀贷款的法律规制与启示

美国次级贷危机的发生,次级贷款营销和发放环节中存在的诱导性、不公平的行为即猎杀贷款是一个重要原因。随着我国的金融管制放开、利率放开和金融创新的推进,极有可能也会有类似情况出现,有必要通过对美国猎杀贷款现象及法律规制研究来完善我国对于此类现象的法律监管。本文对猎杀贷款的表现、美国法律对猎杀贷款的规定进行研究,对美国相关法律存在的问题进行分析,结合我国目前现状,提出应借鉴美国这方面的经验和教训。     

Do Predatory Lending Laws Influence Mortgage Lending? An Analysis of the North Carolina Predatory Lending Law

In this paper, we examine the effect of the 1999 North Carolina predatory lending law on mortgage activity in that state as compared to other states in the Southeastern United States. Using 1998–2000 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, we find that the North Carolina law reduced the overall level of subprime mortgage lending activity. Furthermore, we find that the North Carolina decline was caused by a decline in loan application volume and not by a change in loan denial rates, suggesting less aggressive marketing in that state after the imposition of the law. Finally, the impact of the legislation was different by both the type of financial service provider and borrower. Specifically, non-bank subprime lending contracted faster in North Carolina when compared to the control group, while both minority and low-income applicants were also less likely to get loans following the legislation. These results have wide ranging policy implications given that several predatory lending proposals are currently before Congress, as well as proposed in almost forty other states.     

Global retail lending in the aftermath of the US financial crisis: Distinguishing between supply and demand effects

This paper examines the broader effects of the US financial crisis on global lending to retail customers. In particular we examine retail bank lending in Germany using a unique data set of German savings banks during the period 2006 through 2008 for which we have the universe of loan applications and loans granted. Our experimental setting allows us to distinguish between savings banks affected by the US financial crisis through their holdings in Landesbanken with substantial subprime exposure and unaffected savings banks. The data enable us to distinguish between demand and supply side effects of bank lending and find that the US financial crisis induced a contraction in the supply of retail lending in Germany. While demand for loans goes down, it is not substantially different for the affected and nonaffected banks. More important, we find evidence of a significant supply side effect in that the affected banks reject substantially more loan applications than nonaffected banks. This result is particularly strong for smaller and more liquidity-constrained banks as well as for mortgage as compared with consumer loans. We also find that bank-depositor relationships help mitigate these supply side effects.     

Villains or scapegoats? The role of subprime borrowers in driving the U.S. housing boom

An expansion in mortgage credit to subprime borrowers is widely believed to have been a principal driver of the 2002-2006 U.S. house price boom. By contrast, this paper documents a robust, negative correlation between the growth in the share of purchase mortgages to subprime borrowers and house price appreciation at the county-level during this time. Using two different instrumental variables approaches, we also establish causal evidence that house price appreciation lowered the share of purchase loans to subprime borrowers. Further analysis using micro-level credit bureau data shows that higher house price appreciation reduced the transition rate into first-time homeownership for subprime individuals. Finally, the paper documents that subprime borrowers did not play a significant role in the increased speculative activity and underwriting fraud that the literature has linked directly to the housing boom. Taken together, these results are more consistent with subprime borrowers being priced out of housing boom markets rather than inflating prices in those markets.     

The Economics of Low-Income Mortgage Lending

The presumption that mortgage markets for low-income borrowers and neighborhoods are underserved by lenders has led to a variety of increased government interventions on the supply side of the housing market. Although many studies of low-income lending at the neighborhood level have been published, none is from the firm's perspective. We adopt such a framework to test the twin propositions that the low-income mortgage market is no different from the non-low-income mortgage market and that the low-income mortgage market is underserved.We examine empirically whether the operating costs including credit losses, revenues, and profits of savings and loan institutions engaged in more low-income lending differ systematically from those that do less low-income lending. We find that firms engaged in more low-income mortgage lending have higher costs than those engaged in less low-income lending, which is consistent with higher credit risk for low-income loans. Nevertheless, these firms are no more profitable than those that do less low-income lending, which is inconsistent with a market for low-income mortgage lending that is currently underserved.     

FHA vs. Subprime Mortgage Originations: Is FHA the Answer to Subprime Lending?

We analyze originations of mortgages guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and of subprime mortgages—loans that dominate the non-prime mortgage market for riskier borrowers. Using home purchase and refinance loans data for 2005, we estimate that a sizeable number of borrowers who got subprime loans would have qualified for FHA loans, implying a potential net flow of borrowers from subprime to FHA, especially for refinance loans at a rate of about 30%. Also, consistent with the FHA’s modernization proposal to increase its loan limits, we find that increasing the limits on FHA loans could help to attract borrowers, mostly of home purchase loans, who are likely to be constrained by the lower-priced house limits. Our findings are generally in line with the recent increased flow of mortgages to FHA, and suggest that FHA loans could be the answer to the current subprime lending crisis.     

The risk-relevance of securitizations during the recent financial crisis

We investigate changes in the risk-relevance of securitized subprime, other nonconforming, and commercial mortgages for sponsor-originators during the recent financial crisis. Using the volatility of realized stock returns, option-implied volatility, and credit spreads, we observe a pronounced increase in the risk-relevance of subprime securitizations as early as 2006. Furthermore, reflecting the evolution of the financial crisis in waves, we find that investors recognized the increased credit risk of other nonconforming and commercial mortgage securitizations as the financial crisis progressed. Additional analyses show that risk-relevance varies cross-sectionally with structural characteristics such as monoline credit-enhancement and the presence of special servicers for commercial mortgage securitizations. Our results inform the current debates on the opacity of securitization structures and highlight the need to take into account cross-sectional and inter-temporal heterogeneity in risk-relevance across securitized asset classes and securitization characteristics (e.g., quality and type of collateral and transaction structure).     

Estimation of Housing Price Jump Risks and Their Impact on the Valuation of Mortgage Insurance Contracts

Housing price jump risk and the subprime crisis have drawn more attention to the precise estimation of mortgage insurance premiums. This study derives the pricing formula for mortgage insurance premiums by assuming that the housing price process follows the jump diffusion process, capturing important characteristics of abnormal shock events. This assumption is consistent with the empirical observation of the U.S. monthly national average new home returns from 1986 to 2008. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of price jump risk on mortgage insurance premiums from shock frequency of the abnormal events, abnormal mean and volatility of jump size, and normal volatility. Empirical results indicate that the abnormal volatility of jump size has the most significant impact on mortgage insurance premiums.     

GSE Activity and Mortgage Supply in Lower-Income and Minority Neighborhoods: The Effect of the Affordable Housing Goals

I estimate the credit supply effect of the Underserved Areas Goal (UAG), which establishes GSE purchase goals for mortgages to lower-income and minority neighborhoods. Taking advantage of discontinuous census tract eligibility rules and abrupt changes in tract eligibility, I find some evidence of a small UAG effect on GSE purchases and mortgage originations, without crowding-out of FHA and subprime lending. The results also suggest that the GSEs exploit the law??s lack of precision-targeting, yielding effects that might diverge from the law??s intent.     

An Early Assessment of Residential Mortgage Performance in China

The residential mortgage market becomes a financial engine for the booming residential housing development and sustained economic growth in China. Our study provides the first rigorous empirical analysis on the earlier performance of residential mortgage market in China based on a unique micro dataset of mortgage loan history collected from a major residential mortgage lender in China. We found that while the option theory fails to explain prepayment and default behavior in the residential mortgage market in China, other non-option theory related financial economic factors play major roles in determining the prepayment and default risks in China. We also found that borrower’s characteristics are significant in determining prepayment behavior, hence may be used as an effective tool for screening potential high risk borrowers in the loan origination process. Adopting a risk-based pricing in residential mortgage lending in China can improve the efficiency of the market, and enhance the credit availability to the most needed households, i.e., the younger households, blue-collar workers, lower income households, and help them become homeowners.     

The impact of securitization on the expansion of subprime credit

This paper investigates the relationship between securitization activity and the extension of subprime credit. The analysis is motivated by two sets of compelling empirical facts. First, the origination of subprime mortgages exploded between the years 2003 and 2005. Second, the securitization of subprime loans increased substantially over the same time period, driven primarily by the five largest independent broker/dealer investment banks. We argue that the relative shift in the securitization activity of investment banks was driven by forces exogenous to factors impacting lending decisions in the primary mortgage market and resulted in lower ZIP code denial rates, higher subprime origination rates, and higher subsequent default rates. Consistent with recent findings in the literature, we provide evidence that the increased securitization activity of investment banks reduced lenders' incentives to carefully screen borrowers.     

The Economic Effects of Legal Restrictions on High-Cost Mortgages

We analyze the effects of state predatory mortgage lending laws, which have been a model for recent changes in the United States federal legislation enacted to regulate the mortgage contract terms common in higher-risk mortgage market segments. Using the Rothschild-Stiglitz approach to model credit markets under asymmetric information, legal restrictions are shown to reduce the use and attractiveness of mortgage credit. Consistent with model predictions, empirical results indicate that originations of regulated high-cost mortgages were significantly less than predicted in states with more restrictive laws. The differences between predicted and actual originations of high-cost mortgages in states with less restrictive laws were not significant. These differences were also not significant for non-high-cost originations across all states. Thus, credit regulation was differentially associated with reduction in originations of high-cost mortgages, and non-high-cost lending did not consistently expand in areas where high-cost mortgages were restricted.     

美国次级住房抵押贷款危机的原因及影响

需求大于供给导致美国次级住房抵押贷款快速增长,"贷款—分散"模式链条上各主体的收益激励结构和次级贷款品种设计导致的次级债市场扭曲繁荣,进而导致次级债危机。次级债危机将在较长的时间里困扰美国经济,但是从次级贷款支持证券及其衍生产品的分档设计可以预测该市场的绝大部分投资者不会因次级债危机而受到损失。     

Optimal Stopping and Losses on Subprime Mortgages

Lender losses on mortgage loans arise from a two-stage process. In the first stage, the borrower stops making payments if and when default is optimal. The second stage is a lengthy and costly period during which the lender employs legal remedies to obtain possession and execute a sale of the collateral. This research uses data on subprime mortgage losses to explore the role of borrower and collateral characteristics, and local legal requirements, as well as traditional option variables in the decisions of borrowers and lenders. Although subprime borrowers default earlier, which should reduce lender losses, these borrowers, nevertheless, impose greater realized losses on mortgage lenders.