高管职务消费对企业业绩影响机理研究——基于产权性质的视角

本文利用中国上市公司2007—2013年数据,研究高管职务消费对企业业绩的影响及其作用机理。研究发现,非国有企业中高管职务消费与企业业绩正相关,而国有企业中高管职务消费与企业业绩无显著关系。进一步分析发现,非国有企业中高管职务消费与销售收入增长率无显著关系,但与政府补贴显著正相关,说明非国有企业中高管职务消费用于维护政府关系而非客户关系;而在国有企业中,上述两个方面均无显著关系,说明国有企业中高管职务消费既没有用于维护政府关系,也没有用于维护客户关系。最后,通过考察高管职务消费的影响因素,本文发现,国有企业中管理层权力与高管职务消费显著正相关,而非国有企业中两者无显著关系。本文认为,国有企业中高管职务消费是一种高管代理问题,表现为一种腐败;非国有企业中高管职务消费是一种政府关系资本投资,能提升企业业绩。     

高管薪酬激励、产权性质与企业绩效——基于股权集中度的调节效应

本文以高管薪酬激励为视角，将高管薪酬激励、股权集中度与企业绩效放在一个统一的分析框架下，以产权性质为依据，收集了 2007~2015 年国有企业与民营企业的面板数据，分别实证检验了高管薪酬激励与企业绩效的关系，以及股权集中度是否在其中发挥调节作用。研究发现：高管薪酬激励对企业绩效有显著的促进作用，并且国有企业中的促进作用要强于民营企业；股权集中度在国有企业中对于高管薪酬激励与企业绩效之间的关系有显著的负向调节作用，而在民营企业中不存在显著调节作用。     

高管薪酬诱发盈余管理的实证研究

本文从高管薪酬激励视角研究了我国上市公司的盈余管理行为,发现高管薪酬与盈余管理显著正相关,即高管有为提高自身薪酬进行盈余管理的动机,但高管持股比例与盈余管理相关性不强。此外,与非国有上市公司相比,国有上市公司高管薪酬诱发盈余管理的程度有所下降。实证研究结果还表明,上市公司董事会或薪酬委员会在订立高管薪酬契约时并没有考虑高管的盈余管理行为。     

防范中国式肥猫

高管薪酬问题是一个世界性难题,尤其是金融行业高管薪酬,一直让世界各国政府头疼不已。一方面,企业内部高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距日益增大,相差100倍的例子屡见不鲜,收入差距的扩大给经济的持续发展和社会稳定造成了很大威胁;另一方面,高管薪酬易涨难跌的现象非常普遍,企业盈利的时候高管的收益丰厚,而企业亏损的时候高管可以通过辞职、跳槽逃避责任,薪水却丝毫不受影响,这种收益和风险极不对等的事情造成了高级经理人市场的扭曲,也损害了社会公平。最有代表性的例子是2008年金融危机之后,那些巨亏银行的高管一边在接受政府的巨额纾困,一边还领取天价薪酬,新闻一爆出顿时让美国民众愤慨不已,进而掀起了轰轰烈烈的占领华尔街运动。     

高管激励对研发投入影响研究——终极控制权的调节作用

本文以医药制造类上市公司 2013 ～2015 年数据为样本， 实证研究了高管激励与研发投入之间关系以及不同终极控制权性质下高管激励对研发投入的影响。 结果表明： 高管持股、 高管薪酬与研发投入之间均呈现 “倒U 形” 非线性关系， 即随着高管持股比例与高管薪酬水平的增大， 研发投入先增加后减少， 高管激励只在一定合理范围内对企业研发投入产生较强的促进作用， 过高或过低的激励力度均不能有效提升企业的研发投入； 与非国有控制企业相比， 国有控制企业的高管持股对研发投入的影响更大、而高管薪酬对研发投入的影响不明显。     

高管薪酬研究文献综述

本文以委托代理为理论基础,对影响高管薪酬的问题进行阐述。一直以来高管薪酬问题被认为是解决股东与管理层之间委托代理问题的关键,文章对国内外研究进行了综述与概括,并提出了高管薪酬现状存在的两个问题:高管薪酬与所持股份比例的确定;政治关系对高管薪酬的影响。     

高管薪酬“实证真相”

在不同资本市场上市的中国企业,在同一高管人才库的供给需求关系影响下,高管薪酬水平将逐渐趋同,高管薪酬与公司绩效的相关性将进一步增强,企业间的高管薪酬差距会进一步增大。会有更多的公司迫于人才竞争压力推出长期激励计划     

高管薪酬激励、创业战略导向与创业型企业成长性关系研究

本文基于2012～2014年创业板上市公司的非平衡面板数据，研究了高管薪酬激励与创业型企业成长性之间的关系，探讨了创业战略导向作为企业内部的增长战略倾向对上述关系的调节作用。研究结果表明：高管货币薪酬、权益薪酬、薪酬差距与创业型企业成长显著正相关；创业战略导向会负向调节高管货币薪酬与创业型企业成长性之间的关系、正向调节权益薪酬与创业型企业成长性之间的关系，而对薪酬差距与创业型企业成长之间关系的调节作用未得到验证。     

国有配售电企业高管薪酬激励研究

正研究表明,高管薪酬激励与企业经营绩效呈现较明显的正相关性,通过实施高管薪酬激励,不仅能"引得进、留得住"高管,还能将高管薪酬与企业业绩挂钩,使企业高管与股东目标一致,激励高管努力工作,有效解决代理成本过高问题。国有配售电企业高管薪酬激励存在的问题与困难高管薪酬结构单一,薪酬与企业业绩相关性不高。目前国有配售电企业高管的薪酬结构除了按照行政级别确定以外,更为常见的是年薪制,一般包括基本薪酬与绩效薪酬两个部分。     

国企高管薪酬制度制定策略分析

在当前世界经济危机背景下,企业纷纷缩减开支,而国企高管的年薪却动辄几十万、几百万。企业高管和职工之间如此高的薪酬差距,成为社会关注的焦点。本文从薪酬制度的角度,分析国企高管薪酬制度存在的问题和改善的措施。一、国企高管薪酬制度存在的问题和改善的措施。     

Leveraging foreign institutional logic in the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms

Research summary : We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option pay, which was developed with shareholder‐oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have self‐serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option pay. The study shows the active role of managers in facilitating the diffusion of a new governance practice embodying new institutional logic. Managerial summary : Why have Japanese firms adopted stock option pay for executives? Inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented tradition in corporate governance, such pay has been believed to prioritize managerial attention to the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders. However, to the extent that shareholders' interests are legitimate in the Japanese context, executives who have self‐serving incentives to adopt such pay can leverage the need to look after shareholders' interest in their firms to legitimize their decisions. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that foreign ownership (representing shareholders' interests) is more likely to be associated with the adoption of stock option pay when managers are motivated to receive such pay, such as when they have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, or poor sales growth. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Informativeness of performance measures and Chinese executive compensation

We provide evidence on the use of accounting versus stock market performance measures as determinants of Chinese top managers’ compensation over 2001–2007. We theorize and find that (1) accounting returns are weighted more heavily in general than stock returns in determining top executive compensation, (2) state-owned enterprises (SOEs) rely significantly less on stock market returns than do non-SOEs, (3) firms located in high marketization regions rely more heavily on stock market returns to reward managers, and (4) firms with better internal governance quality rely more on stock returns to reward executives. We discuss our findings with particular reference to the Chinese context of our research.     

Labor market power and the distorting effects of international trade

This article examines how final product trade with China shapes and interacts with labor market imperfections that create market power in labor markets and prevent an efficient market outcome. I develop a framework for measuring such labor market power distortions in monetary terms and document large degrees of these distortions in Germany's manufacturing sector. Import competition only exerts labor market disciplining effects if firms, rather than employees, possess labor market power. Otherwise, increasing export demand and import competition both fortify existing distortions, which decreases labor market efficiency. This widens the gap between potential and realized output and thus diminishes classical gains from trade.     

高管特征、企业异质性与企业技术创新绩效——来自风电产业上市公司的经验数据

技术创新是解决目前风电产业产能过剩、缺乏核心技术发展瓶颈的重要路径，最新文献已经发现高管特征和企业异质性对企业技术创新绩效的影响，但研究结论尚存在分歧。本文以沪深两市风电产业上市公司为研究对象进行实证研究发现：高管持股和女性高管对风电企业技术创新绩效具有显著的促进作用；国有风电企业和省会城市风电企业的技术创新优势会因内部治理结构短板而丧失。将企业异质性作为调节变量进一步研究发现，国有企业中高管持股和女性高管对风电企业技术创新绩效的正向影响更加显著；区位在省会企业中高管持股和女性高管对风电企业技术创新绩效的正向影响更加显著。     

Corporate tournaments and executive compensation: Evidence from the U.K.

This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 500 individual executives, in the late 1990s. Our results provide some evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business context. Firstly, we find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level and secondly, that the gap between CEO pay and other board executives (i.e., tournament prize) is positively related to the number of participants in the tournament. However, we also show that the variation in executive team pay has little role in determining company performance. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of participative leadership behavior on psychological empowerment and organizational commitment in Chinese state-owned enterprises: the moderating role of organizational tenure

We investigated whether participative leadership behavior can produce psychological empowerment, which in turn, leads to organizational commitment for employees of Chinese state-owned enterprises. Based on the data collected from 173 employees in two state-owned enterprises, we found that participative leadership behavior was associated with organizational commitment, but not with all four dimensions of psychological empowerment, namely, meaning, competence, self-determination, and impact. Our findings also showed that while participative leadership behavior tended to make short-tenure employees feel competent and thus, more committed to an organization, such leadership behavior did not have a significant impact on competence as well as organizational commitment for long-tenure employees.     

How middle managers manage the political environment to achieve market goals: Insights from China's state‐owned enterprises

Research summary: Although the middle management literature has identified various bridging roles performed by middle managers in the market environment, it is relatively vague about whether and how they manage the political environment to achieve market‐related goals. In an inductive field study of four large state‐owned enterprises based in mainland Communist China, operational middle managers were found to take an active role in dealing with political actors to achieve market efficiency in their local environments, performing two distinct bridging strategies. Our field study suggests that middle managers are better equipped than their bosses (top executives) as well as their subordinates (frontline employees) to perform the bridging function between competing market and political imperatives in various local settings. Managerial summary: For firms that operate in diverse geographies, it is challenging for a handful of top executives to deal with numerous political actors. This burden could be shared with operational middle managers, who play a bridging role by drawing on their operational knowledge and local networks. Our research on middle managers who work under the scrutiny of political actors in China found that they bridge market and political ideology by conveying common features that seem legitimate to both. They also bridge market goals and political actors with personal affect. Compared to top executives and frontline employees, middle managers have unique advantages in performing these bridging functions. Firms can enhance their strategy execution ability by training middle managers in dealing with political actors in diverse contexts. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

国有企业经营者薪酬激励效应的实证研究

薪酬机制是国有企业改革中的难点问题,如何发挥薪酬作为国有企业经营者提升企业业绩的激励作用更是建立科学、公平的国有企业薪酬机制的焦点问题。文章通过对2005年～2006年国有上市公司的实证分析得到企业规模、净资产收益率、所在区域、国家股比例和经营者任期是国有企业经营者薪酬水平的决定因素,而独立董事和监事会并没有发挥应有作用。对薪酬激励效应实证的结果表明,国有企业经营者年薪和持股比例的激励效应较强,高管团队的薪酬差距也有助于企业业绩提升。     

Executive Compensation and Ethnic Minority Status

We examine the compensation of ethnic minority executives in listed U.S. firms. The total pay of African American executives is 9 percent lower than that earned by Caucasians. This is due to lower base salary, lower bonus, and lower restricted stock grants. The lower bonus is due to a lower sensitivity to above‐average firm performance. African Americans also earn significantly less on the exercise of stock options, increasing the pay gap to 17 percent for total ex‐post pay. In contrast to African Americans, the compensation of Hispanic and Asian executives is comparable to Caucasians.     

公司治理对国有和非国有企业效率的影响研究——基于2012~2015 年我国制造业上市公司数据

公司治理特征与公司绩效之间的关系一直是理论研究和实证分析的焦点。DEA 方法在公司治理与企业绩效之间的关系分析中的应用已受到越来越多的关注。本文选取2012~2015 年我国制造业上市公司数据，运用主成分分析和混合DEA 模型来剖析公司治理和公司效率之间的关系。输入变量是固定资产的净值、员工数量和公司治理，而输出变量是总收入和税前利润。对于国有和非国有制造业上市企业，公司治理是一个重要的影响公司效率的因素。研究结果表明：国有和非国有制造企业可以通过有效地使用员工、固定资产和改进公司治理来提高效率；而低效的公司治理是国有与非国有上市制造业企业效率低下的主要原因；同时，由于过度的公司治理，国有企业的低效率远高于非国有企业，这表明非国有企业的公司治理效率高于国有企业。