Bank recapitalization and economic recovery after financial crises

Does support to distressed banks early on during financial crises mitigate the macroeconomic consequences of financial distress, and if so does it matter what form the intervention takes? We analyze the effects of government and central bank interventions in 69 systemic banking crises since 1980, of which 29 are part of the recent global financial crisis. Our estimation approach controls for the correlation between intervention measures and the time-invariant component of unobservable crisis severity. We find that timely bank recapitalizations substantially reduce the duration of recessions, underscoring the distortions caused by zombie banks and the costs of regulatory forbearance.     

Financial crises and emerging stock markets volatility: do internal factors matter?

This paper has two central aims. The first one is to deal empirically with the effects of financial crises on emerging stock markets volatility. The second objective consists in testing if the level of stock market development affects this relationship. For this purpose, we estimate a static panel data model for a sample of nine emerging economies from January 1990 to December 2006. We consider three types of financial crises, i.e. banking, currency and twin crises. Our empirical results suggest that the onset of financial crises strongly increased stock market volatility. In addition, we find that the biggest impact is exerted by twin crises. When dealing with the second objective, our results show that the market size and the liquidity level can attenuate the effects of banking and currency crises, but not the one associated to twin crises. Nevertheless, the degree of stock market integration seems to reduce the effects of banking, currency and twin crises on stock market volatility.     

宏观审慎政策协调能否抑制国际性银行危机传染？——基于跨境金融关联视角的实证研究

本文基于跨境金融关联视角对宏观审慎政策能否抑制国际性银行危机传染这一重要的理论与实践问题进行了实证研究。选取亚洲金融危机和全球金融危机时期遭受冲击的10个代表性国家作为样本,构建Logit模型和多元回归模型探讨本国及具有金融关联的国家协调实施宏观审慎政策对本国系统性银行危机传染的影响。研究表明,具有金融关联的国家出现金融危机会显著增加本国系统性银行危机的发生概率,具有金融关联的国家实施宏观审慎政策对本国信贷的影响比对房价的影响更明显,本国及具有金融关联的国家协调实施宏观审慎政策会显著降低本国系统性银行危机的发生概率。在调整银行危机指标及考虑贸易关联和流动性风险的影响后,研究结果依然保持稳健。本文的研究结论揭示了加强宏观审慎政策协调有助于维护全球金融稳定,对于中国政策当局强化宏观审慎管理具有极其重要的政策含义。     

An analysis of the causes of recent banking crises

The incidence of systemic banking crises has risen over the past twenty years and the costs have been high. Although each country's experience has country-specific factors, several common elements appear in most crisis countries: (1) volatility in the macro economy; (2) the inheritance of structural weaknesses in the economy and financial system; (3) hazardous banking practices; (4) hazardous incentive structures and moral hazard within the financial system; (5) ineffective regulation; (6) weak monitoring and supervision by official agencies; (7) the absence of effective market discipline on banks, and (8) structurally unsound corporate governance mechanisms within banks and their borrowing customers. Causes of such crises are complex and a myopic focus on single factors (e. g. instability in the macro economy, weak regulation, etc.) misses the essential feature of interrelated and multidimensional causal factors. Although macro-instability has been a common feature, and may often have been the proximate cause, banking crises usually emerge because instability in the economy reveals existing weaknesses within the banking system.     

美国次贷危机的信用扩张过度的金融分析

信用扩张过度是指信用货币膨胀速度快于实体经济产出的增长速度。它可以是价格型的、数量型的,也可以是制度型的及市场型的。它是金融危机的根源。这次美国金融危机是信用无限扩张的结果。这种信用无限扩张的主要工具是影子银行。影子银行的目的就通过信用的无限扩张来提高金融资产的杠杆率,过度地使用公共性的金融体系,从而为金融机构谋取利润最大化,但其风险要整个社会承担。     

The spread of deposit insurance and the global rise in bank asset risk since the 1970s

We construct a new measure of deposit insurance generosity for many countries, empirically model the exogenous international influences on the adoption and generosity of deposit insurance and use a novel econometric method to explore the causal chain from the expansion of deposit insurance generosity to increased overall lending, increased lending to households, increased banking system leverage, and more severe and frequent banking crises. Greater deposit insurance generosity robustly produces greater overall lending relative to bank assets and more lending to households relative to both bank assets and GDP, and results in higher banking system leverage. Our estimates, however, are not conclusive regarding whether greater deposit insurance generosity resulted in greater total loans relative to GDP or in more frequent or severe banking crises.     

Financial liberalization,insurance market,and the likelihood of financial crises

This paper provides empirical evidence to investigate the direct impact of financial liberalization on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and examines the roles of insurance market, country risk, and economic conditional variables on the relationship between financial liberalization and financial crises in 39 countries. Our empirical results support that financial liberalization does have a significantly negative impact on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and that the indirect effects of insurance development and lower country risk decrease the probability of crises, but the indirect effect of economic conditional proxies is enhanced with the likelihood of a financial crisis. The policy implication is that the government or authority should strengthen the positive role of the insurance sector in order to combat financial crises.     

Financial markets development,business cycles,and bank risk in South America

In this paper, we examine whether banking crises or business cycles affect the influence of financial markets development on bank risk in a sample of 37 publicly listed commercial banks in seven South American countries over a 22-year period between 1991 and 2012. Banking crises in this region offer a natural setting in which the impact of financial markets development on bank risk is examined. We find that financial markets development improves banks’ capitalization ratio and reduces their exposure to non-traditional banking activities, suggesting that financial markets development on average reduces bank risk. In addition, banking crises and business cycles appear to moderate the impact of financial markets development on bank risk. In the aftermath of banking crises, banks appear to concentrate more on their core traditional banking activities.     

How likely is contagion in financial networks?

Interconnections among financial institutions create potential channels for contagion and amplification of shocks to the financial system. We estimate the extent to which interconnections increase expected losses and defaults under a wide range of shock distributions. In contrast to most work on financial networks, we assume only minimal information about network structure and rely instead on information about the individual institutions that are the nodes of the network. The key node-level quantities are asset size, leverage, and a financial connectivity measure given by the fraction of a financial institution’s liabilities held by other financial institutions. We combine these measures to derive explicit bounds on the potential magnitude of network effects on contagion and loss amplification. Spillover effects are most significant when node sizes are heterogeneous and the originating node is highly leveraged and has high financial connectivity. Our results also highlight the importance of mechanisms that go beyond simple spillover effects to magnify shocks; these include bankruptcy costs, and mark-to-market losses resulting from credit quality deterioration or a loss of confidence. We illustrate the results with data on the European banking system.     

Correlation and spillover effects between the US and international banking sectors: New evidence and implications for risk management

This paper quantitatively examines return transmission and volatility spillovers between banking sector stocks in the US and eight other countries by applying our newly extended VAR-DCC-MEGARCH-M model with asymmetric spillovers and Student-t or skew-t errors. Our investigations clarify almost unidirectional stock return transmission from the US banking sector to all other eight international banking sectors. In addition, we also uncover bidirectional volatility spillovers between the US and other eight international banking sector stocks, which are all tied to the leverage effect. Moreover, using the dynamic conditional variances and covariances from our extended model, we derive the time-varying optimal hedge ratios and optimal portfolio weights. These analyses reveal that, except for such extraordinary periods as during financial crises, we can hedge the US banking sector stocks with other international banking sector stocks, and that well-balanced portfolios of the US and other banking sector stocks are optimal. Furthermore, additional analysis using gold, silver, and platinum futures reveals that we can hedge international banking sector stocks with precious metal futures highly effectively, and that well-balanced portfolios of banking stocks and precious metals are optimal. Based on the results from our analyses, this paper derives many significant interpretations and implications for financial and systemic risk management.     

The Interplay between Regulations and Financial Stability

The crisis demonstrated that microprudential regulation focusing on the risks taken by individual banks is not sufficient to prevent crises. This is because it ignores systemic risk. Six types of systemic risk are identified, namely: (i) panics – banking crises due to multiple equilibria; (ii) banking crises due to asset price falls; (iii) contagion; (iv) financial architecture; (v) foreign exchange mismatches in the banking system; (vi) behavioral effects from Knightian uncertainty. We focus on the first three as they are arguably the main causes of the 2007–9 crisis and consider regulatory and other policies to counteract them.     

Financial stress and economic contractions

This paper examines why some financial stress episodes lead to economic downturns. The paper identifies episodes of financial turmoil in advanced economies using a financial stress index (FSI), and proposes an analytical framework to assess the impact of financial stress – in particular banking distress – on the real economy. It concludes that financial turmoil characterized by banking distress is more likely to be associated with deeper and longer downturns than stress mainly in securities or foreign exchange markets. Economies with more arm's-length financial systems seem to be more exposed to contractions in activity following financial stress, due to the greater procyclicality of leverage in their banking systems.     

Asset prices and banking distress: A macroeconomic approach

This paper links banking with asset prices in a dynamic macroeconomic model, to provide a simple characterization of financial instability. In contrast with historical bank runs, recent banking crises were driven by deteriorating bank assets. Hence, in contrast with bank run models, this paper focuses on the interaction of falling asset prices, bank losses, credit contraction and bankruptcies. This interaction can explain credit crunches, financial instability, and banking crises, either as fundamental or as self-fulfilling outcomes. The model distinguishes between macroeconomic and financial stability. Its simplicity helps understand balance sheet effects and delivers closed-form solutions without resorting to linearization. For instance, the critical threshold beyond which an asset price decline triggers financial instability can be related explicitly to the structural parameters of the economy.     

Does financial connectedness predict crises?

The global financial crisis has reignited interest in models of crisis prediction. It has also raised the question whether financial interconnectedness—a possible source of systemic risk—can serve as an early warning indicator of crises. In this paper, we examine the ability of connectedness in the global network of financial linkages to predict systemic banking crises during the 1978–2010 period. Our results indicate that increases in a country’s own connectedness and decreases in its neighbours’ connectedness are associated with a higher probability of banking crises after controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals. Our findings suggest that financial interconnectedness has early warning potential, especially for the 2007–2010 wave of systemic banking crises.     

What Is Systemic Risk?

The traditional view of risk in a financial system is that it is the summation of individual risks within the system. However, the financial crisis that started in 2007 has driven home that this view of risk is inadequate. It is the interactions of financial institutions and markets that determine the systemic risks that drive financial crises. We identify four types of systemic risk. These are (i) panics—banking crises due to multiple equilibria; (ii) banking crises due to asset price falls; (iii) contagion; and (iv) foreign exchange mismatches in the banking system.     

国际资本流动“突然停止”、银行危机及其产出效应

国际资本流动突然停止是新兴市场国家金融全球化和金融开放早期面临的重要障碍。本文运用20个新兴市场国家1976~2006年间的面板数据,考察突然停止和银行危机对宏观经济产出的影响。研究发现:突然停止或银行危机都不必然导致产出的大幅下降;如果银行部门不发生系统性的危机,突然停止对产出没有显著影响;给定国际资本流动不出现大幅的逆转,银行危机对产出的影响也不显著;突然停止和银行危机的叠加则对产出造成严重的负面冲击,经济增长率显著下滑。研究结论有重要的政策含义,表明构建一个稳固的银行体系对于一国金融开放和金融自由化过程中的经济安全至关重要。     

债务杠杆、财务脆弱性与家庭异质性消费行为

本文通过引入财务脆弱性来描述家庭无法及时或完全履行偿债义务而发生的财务困境,实证分析了债务杠杆对家庭消费的异质性影响。理论机制分析和基于中国家庭金融调查(CHFS)数据的实证研究表明,家庭债务杠杆会提升财务脆弱性,从而弱化跨期消费平滑能力,强化消费预算约束,导致家庭落入“高边际消费倾向、低消费支出水平”的低层次消费路径上。进一步分析发现,对于通过负债投资多套房的家庭而言,高债务杠杆会明显增加不确定冲击下的财务脆弱性,进而对消费产生更大的抑制效应;亲友民间借贷的履约机制相对灵活,可以缓解财务脆弱性对家庭消费的抑制效应;债务杠杆上升引致的财务脆弱性,对耐用消费品支出的压缩效应大于非耐用消费品,对农村家庭消费支出的挤占效应大于城镇家庭。本文的研究为我国“不宜依赖消费金融扩大消费”“规范发展消费信贷”等提供了理论解释,对金融服务促进消费发展具有一定政策启示。     

透明度、信息披露与银行危机

加大银行业的透明度和对银行行为的信息披露有助于防范和化解银行危机,但并不像有些人说的那样万能,因为,银行危机往往反映了严重的宏观经济问题,此外,加大银行体系的透明度和信息披露的力度确实能减少由银行危机带来的损失,并促进银行业迅速复苏。     

The dialectical role of information and disinformation in regulation-induced banking crises

The severity of banking crises increases with disinformation about the losses banks incur in making politically directed loans and about the budgetary costs to the government of standing ready to absorb these losses increases. When (as it eventually must) such disinformation begins to lose credibility, silent runs test the government's commitment to supporting its insolvent banks. An open banking crisis does not emerge until the size of unbooked obligations has become large enough to overwhelm the government's implicit and explicit support system. Multilateral assistance offered countries that experience banking crises should transmit incentives for prompt insolvency resolution, for reliable information disclosure, and for developing plans for dealing with future financial disasters.     

银行业危机:金融泡沫视角的分析

自20世纪80年代以来,银行业危机爆发越显频繁。然而,通过对银行业危机内部形成机理分析可以发现,银行业危机的爆发其实是伴随着金融泡沫的形成与破灭这一过程的。在金融泡沫的形成过程中,银行往往会给一些高风险行业发放贷款,从而增加银行经营风险;而在金融泡沫破灭之后,这将直接或间接地导致银行产生大量的不良贷款,从而使银行业危机最终爆发。因此,我国应尽快化解国有商业银行的不良资产;完善银行微观治理结构;建立和完善金融监管机制。