“递进”买方势力视角下两部收费制的规制机理研究--兼论政府反垄断部门应对策略

近年来,两部收费制策略引发的反垄断案件频发,下游买方势力的逐渐增强使得纵向控制规制问题变得更加错综复杂。以往研究对买方势力动态变化影响企业策略性决策以及弱化上游市场竞争的问题关注不足。基于此,构建由上游在位者、潜在进入者和下游零售商组成的纵向产业链模型,以下游零售商买方势力的递进变化为切入点,深度剖析两部收费制策略的内在规制机理。结果表明:当下游企业没有买方势力或者具有较弱的抗衡势力时,两部收费制策略从本质上并未弱化上游市场竞争。然而,一旦潜在进入者无法打破在位者建立的进入壁垒,在位者便会充分利用其市场支配地位实施转售价格维持、搭售等一系列纵向控制手段,进而弱化上游市场竞争,以期实现“一家独大”。当下游企业主导交易时,在满足一定条件下,通道费合约会产生排他效应,其弱化上游竞争的程度有限。因此,政府反垄断部门制定规制政策应充分考虑企业纵向控制和逆纵向控制行为。     

规制权力配置、下游垄断与中国电力产业的接入歧视-理论分析与初步的实证检验

本文构建了一个"上游竞争、下游垄断"结构下接入歧视的简化模型,分析了部分纵向一体化的买方垄断者对独立发电企业实施接入价格和数量歧视的动机和条件。在揭示歧视行为与规制重建滞后之间的特征性事实的基础上,我们利用500多家发电企业和区域电网的相关数据,从统计描述和回归分析两个方面对理论假设进行了初步的检验,结果证明了两类接入歧视,特别是价格歧视的存在。     

规制权力配置、下游垄断与中国电力产业的接入歧视—理论分析与初步的实证检验

本文构建了一个“上游竞争、下游垄断”结构下接入歧视的简化模型,分析了部分纵向一体化的买方垄断者对独立发电企业实施接入价格和数量歧视的动机和条件。在揭示歧视行为与规制重建滞后之间的特征性事实的基础上,我们利用500多家发电企业和区域电网的相关数据,从统计描述和回归分析两个方面对理论假设进行了初步的检验,结果证明了两类接入歧视,特别是价格歧视的存在。     

网络产业Ramsey接入定价方法研究

网络产业放松规制、引入竞争的改革使得上游"瓶颈"环节和下游竞争性环节出现了"业务分离",催生了接入问题,并成为网络产业规制改革能否成功和有效竞争的关键.通过对用于指导网络产业单向接入定价的Ramsey接入定价方法的研究,得出结论:短期内,将接入服务和最终产品无差别对待的做法可能遭受到较大的实阻碍,从而整体最高价格上限规制的实施显得不太可能.因此,比较现实的做法是,在接入服务市场上,允许在位企业实施两部制(或多部制)接入定价方法.     

上游产品市场中的环境税机制研究——基于完全信息静态博弈视角

本文通过构建纵向关联市场结构下博弈模型,探讨下游市场特性如何影响上游污染企业环境税的制定.研究结果表明,下游市场最终产品差异性与上游企业环境税的征收起点呈正相关关系.进一步研究发现,当下游企业同时进入市场时,上游企业最优环境税低于“庇古税”.而当下游企业依次进入最终产品市场时,最优环境税与“庇古税”的关系则取决于污染排放造成的边际社会损失.当污染对社会福利损害比较小(大)时,最优环境税低(高)于“庇古税”.     

混合所有制下纵向一体化的竞争及反竞争效应

本文研究混合所有制下企业纵向一体化所产生的竞争及反竞争效应,发现企业的产权结构及市场结构同时对一体化的反竞争效应有着重要影响。使用数值模拟方法,研究显示在上游混合所有制企业实施前向一体化下,只有当参与一体化企业数量较多且混合所有制企业中私有产权比重较大条件下形成的市场圈定才具有反竞争效应;而在下游私有产权企业实施的后向一体化中,市场圈定在一体化企业数量较少且私有产权比重较小,或者在参与一体化企业数量较多的两种情形中出现,且两种类型的市场圈定均具有反竞争效应。这些结果意味着在国有产权占重要地位的经济中,对纵向一体化的反垄断控制标准应与私有产权背景下有较大的不同。     

电信企业的兼并、分拆和接入的规制

电信企业在不同的纵向结构和接入规制制度下表现出不同的行为和效率。在强制接入但接入费率不受规制的情况下,市话长话兼营结构下的长话资费比分离结构下的资费高。但在接入全面规制或完全市场化的情况下,兼营结构的效率较分离结构为高。在三种规制制度下,生产者的利润在分离结构下都比较高,而消费者却在兼营结构下得利较多。这些结论表明接入的规制应该跟产业政策和竞争政策结合起来考虑。本文还发现如果互联费率高于边际成本,那么网络经营者越多,市话资费可能会越高。     

溢出效应、价格规制与企业投资激励——以电信产业“共建共享”政策为视角

电信运营商不愿参与"共建共享"缘于这项政策可能会降低产品差异化程度,加剧竞争。文章基于三阶段轮辐模型,从福利经济学角度考察无规制和存在接入价格规制情形下的最优投资水平发现,如果企业为争夺老用户竞争,溢出效应不仅会降低投资厂商与接入厂商之间的差异化,而且会导致厂商投资更加偏离社会最优投资水平;如果企业定位于拓展新用户,溢出效应反而可以提高全行业的经济效益,同时使得更多消费者享受到电信服务。但是,为消除市场失灵带来的投资偏离而采取价格规制政策会进一步扭曲厂商投资的激励。基于此,文章认为在电信用户迅速增长的今天,政府应出台更多"共建共享"的配套政策促进企业投资。     

电信企业的兼并、分拆和接入的规制

电信企业在不同的纵向结构和接入规制制度下表现出不同的行为和效率。在强制接入但接入费率不受规制的情况下，市话长话兼营结构下的长话资费比分离结构下的资费高。但在接入全面规制或完全市场化的情况下，兼营结构的效率较分离结构为高。在三种规制制度下，生产的利润在分离结构下都比较高，而消费却在兼营结构下得利较多。这些结论表明接入的规制应该跟产业政策和竞争政策结合起来考虑。本还发现如果互联费率高于边际成本，那么网络经营越多，市话资费可能会越高。     

非对称竞争与企业创新——来自《公平竞争审查制度》实施的证据

“上游市场垄断、下游市场竞争”的非对称竞争格局，在一定程度上阻碍了中国产业链整体效率和创新水平的提升。随着竞争政策的深入开展，《公平竞争审查制度》有助于规制地方政策制定行为，降低行业进入壁垒、维护市场主体平等，将深刻改变非对称竞争格局。本文基于《公平竞争审查制度》实施对上下游制度性壁垒产生的差异化影响，以2011—2021年A股上市公司样本数据构造双重差分模型，考察了非对称竞争格局改变对企业研发创新决策的影响。研究结果表明：《公平竞争审查制度》能通过削弱上游制度性优势来改善非对称竞争格局，并促使上游企业增加相对创新产出。《公平竞争审查制度》既规制了制度性行业壁垒带来的“隐性补贴”,削弱了上游企业的市场势力和纵向加价能力；同时也削减了政府补助、税收优惠和信贷倾斜等“显性补贴”,增加企业成本并减弱了企业向下游转嫁成本的能力。市场压力和成本压力共同促使上游企业转向创新发展。本文为竞争政策如何影响企业创新提供了纵向视角的经验支持。     

海外市场需求与跨国垂直并购——基于低端下游企业的视角

本文构建了一个产品从低端到高端分布的Hotelling模型,以探讨我国低端下游企业进行跨国垂直并购的时机选择和决定因素。研究表明,垂直并购国外高端上游企业能实现扩大市场份额、提升产品定位的双重效能。海外市场需求环境对低端下游企业拓展战略起关键性作用。在正常需求条件下,与直接出口及先并购国内上游企业再出口两种模式相比,跨国垂直并购并非最优选择。在遭受负向需求冲击时,国外上游企业生产成本的大幅上升以及国外下游竞争对手品牌价值的下降给跨国垂直并购带来了契机,此时在技术密集度较高的上游产业进行跨国垂直并购成为国内低端下游企业的最优选择。如果并购能实现足够大的品牌价值效应,还会改善被并购企业所在国的社会福利水平。     

Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist

A natural monopolist whose cost is private information produces a good which is combined with another good that can be produced by the monopolist or by other firms. The agency that regulates the monopolist can impose any of several different market structures in the industry: integrated monopoly, vertical separation with free entry downstream, or liberalization downstream (both integrated and independent production). When several firms produce downstream, a Cournot quantity-setting game with free entry determines the market price. We derive the optimal contracts to offer the monopolist under all three market structures and examine the influence of downstream cost differences on access prices.We then study the optimal regulatory policy where the regulator can condition the downstream market structure on the monopolist's cost report to the regulator. The optimal regulatory policy awards a monopoly to a low-cost upstream firm, but requires free entry downstream if the monopolist reports high upstream costs. Thus, the choice of market structure is an additional tool to limit rent extraction by the monopolist. Simulation analysis reveals the possibility of significant welfare gains from this additional regulatory tool.     

Local content and emission taxes when the number of foreign firms is endogenous

We consider a vertical relationship where an upstream monopolist supplies input to downstream duopolistic firms. Under the assumption that downstream firms produce under a soft capacity restriction, we show that the balance between price and quantity in downstream firms’ strategy is endogenous. In this way, the monopolist’s charge for input co-determines downstream market conduct. We spell out some consequences of this, for example, that an increase of downstream capacity costs can result in increased output. We discuss other implications in relation to pass-through and incidence of cost changes.     

Incentives for input foreclosure

We analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm to foreclose downstream rivals in a model of upstream price competition between suppliers of only imperfectly substitutable inputs. Our main motivation is a critical assessment of common assertions that draw inferences from pre-merger observable variables to post-merger incentives to foreclose. In particular, we find that, contrary to some commonly expressed views, high margins on the downstream and low margins on the upstream market are not good predictors for the incentives of a newly integrated firm to foreclose rivals. Besides this contribution to policy, our model also extends existing results in the literature on vertical foreclosure through allowing for the interaction of product differentiation on the upstream and on the downstream market.     

垂直关系中产品信誉效应的博弈分析

当一家厂商的行为或活动对产品信誉造成正面或负面影响后,其他相关厂商也要同时承受正面或负面的后果。在垂直关系中,下游零售商提供劣质服务产生了有损于信誉的负面效应,会对制造商和其他零售商造成更大的损害。而一家零售商提供优质服务增进产品信誉时,他只能在承受全部成本的情况下获得较少的利益。本文的理论模型说明,市场竞争的结果可能会形成零售商只愿意提供劣质服务的态势。通过采取排他性经营区域、排他性交易和拒绝供应等机制安排能够有效地化解损害信誉的行为,既能够保护整个垂直关系相关的厂商,同时也能使消费者得到更多的服务,促进经济活动的效率。     

WELFARE-IMPROVING PRIVATIZATION POLICY IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY

This article considers the vertical structure of the telecommunications industry and examines the welfare effects of privatization on the public enterprise, where the public enterprise supplies the essential network service of the upstream market and competes against private, independent firms in a mixed downstream market. It is shown that the cost advantage of the independent rivals improves welfare postprivatization. Several relevant and current policy issues on the process of privatization in the telecommunications industry are also discussed. (JEL L50, D42)     

The Influence of a Neighbouring Market on Product Qualities and Prices

This paper analyses a model of vertical product differentiation in which there is a primary market with two firms and a secondary market with no firms. Consumers in the secondary market incur a cost when purchasing the product from the primary market. The firms sequentially choose product quality and then simultaneously choose prices. Firm 1 always chooses the maximum quality, while firm 2's quality and the prices depend on the cost. Also, the cost determines which firm(s), if either, serves the secondary market. It is shown that the firms and the consumers of each market prefer different levels of costs.     

Monopolization through endogenous vertical mergers

While endogenous merger analysis has been applied to horizontal mergers, the thrust of vertical merger analysis has been based on exogenous mergers. The goal of this paper is to analyze endogenous vertical mergers. I consider a market structure with a downstream monopolist and an oligopolistic upstream industry. The downstream monopolist chooses to buy a certain number of the upstream firms. Mergers are endogenous, in the sense that the bids made by the downstream firm must be accepted by each of the integrated upstream firms, and must not exceed the increase in the profits of the downstream firm. It is shown that the unique equilibrium is complete monopolization: the buyer buys all the firms in the upstream industry. This result is consistent with the result that vertical mergers are profitable. However, it is in contrast with horizontal endogenous mergers, where complete monopolization is generally not an equilibrium.     

WHY DO LARGE FIRMS TEND TO INTEGRATE VERTICALLY?

We provide a theoretical framework to discuss the relation between firm size and vertical structures. The framework is based on a Hotelling model with three downstream and three upstream firms. We show that vertical integration enhances the degree of product differentiation and show the strategic complementarity of product positioning. We also show that the downstream firm that has the largest market share is more likely to integrate vertically. Enhancing the degree of product differentiation is more beneficial for the large firm than for the rest of the downstream firms because the large firm supplies a large amount of product.     

Conjectural Variations, Market Power, and Optimal Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry

The paper introduces the conjectural variations and bargaining approaches into a vertical model wherein a foreign upstream firm supplies one input to two downstream firms that produce differentiated products for the export market. Various downstream firms’ competition modes and upstream's pricing schemes emerge as special cases of this formulation. The authors show that the optimal export policy of a downstream country depends crucially on the downstream firms’ conjectures of rivals’ responses, the upstream firm's pricing schemes, their relative bargaining powers, and the degree of product differentiation. If the upstream's pricing or bargaining power is strong (weak) and if the downstream's degree of competition is high (low), a tax (subsidy) is optimal owing to a strong (weak) vertical profit‐shifting effect and a weak (strong) horizontal effect.