Customer relationship management in competitive environments: The positive implications of a short-term focus

Researchers and business thought leaders have emphasized that firms must think and act with a long-term horizon when managing customer relationships. We demonstrate that, in contrast to this widely held view, profits in competitive environments may be maximized when firms ignore the future and instead maximize period-by-period profits from customers. Intuitively, while a long-term focus yields more loyal customers, it greatly increases short-term price competition to gain and keep customers. Consequently, overall firm profits and customer lifetime value may be lower when firms directly maximize multi-period profits from customers. Specifically, we analyze a model with segment-level pricing where firms in a duopoly can choose between period-by-period and multi-period profit maximization and demonstrate that, in many cases, a symmetric focus on period-by-period profit maximization emerges as the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium. We extend the model in two directions. First, we demonstrate that this superiority of the short-term focus endures even when a revenue expansion effect applies—that is, when customer loyalty leads to enhanced revenues. Second, we examine the case where customers are strategic and incorporate the long-term implications of their choices into their decision-making. Here we demonstrate that it may pay for firms to be myopic even when customers are strategic. The focus on multi-period surplus makes customers less price sensitive to price variations at the early stage of the game. Consequently, the focus on maximizing period-by-period profits enables the firms to charge higher upfront prices and leverage this lower price sensitivity into higher profits. Overall, our results highlight the paradox that, when it comes to managing customer relationships in competitive environments, a short-term focus may constitute the optimal long-term strategy.

忠诚计划及其有效顾客的识别与培育

本文通过忠诚计划对顾客行为的影响分析以及忠诚计划的预期利润分析，指出了忠诚计划实施成本与预期利润荻取的不确定性是忠诚计划屡遭失败的原因。而这种预期利润不确定性的根本原因在于，没有很好地对有效顾客进行识别。本文的研究结论是，只有通过对有效顾客的识别，培育有效顾客的忠诚，才是忠诚计划成功的关键所在。     

Business Customers' Behaviour – A Challenge for the Relationship Marketing Concept?

While B2B relationship marketing has been enthusiastically endorsed, business customers' behaviour suggests that suppliers should be cautious when establishing relationship marketing strategies with customers. In particular a supplier should be sure that customers see value in the maintenance of the relationship.

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Changing Perceptions and Changing Behavior in Customer Relationships

We formulate a theoretical model in which we postulate that if customers' behavior is perceived as not optimal, customers will adjust this behavior based on their current satisfaction and payment equity. Furthermore, customers will also include new experiences. In our empirical study we particularly investigate customer referrals and the amount of services purchased. Our results show positive effects of current satisfaction and payment equity on referrals, while also changes in satisfaction and payment equity affect customer referrals. With respect to the amount of services purchased, our estimation results reveal a positive significant effect of only changes in satisfaction.     

Pricing and coordination with consideration of piracy for digital goods in supply chains

Sales of digital goods via traditional channels are affected by those on digital channels, and thus a competitive relationship often exists. In addition, due to the ease of piracy, digital goods may suffer from a fall in demand, which intensifies competition. This study considers a single supplier who sells digital goods, which may be pirated, to customers through two independent and different retail channels, such as traditional and digital ones, which may compete with each other in terms of service and price. To consider the effects of piracy on demand, a Stackelberg game is utilized to determine the optimal gain-sharing ratio and the equilibrium prices for all channel members with an aim to maximize the profit of the entire supply chain. It is found that an increase in piracy would force retailers to compete in a smaller market, and thus lead to a decrease in profits for each channel member. Therefore, a retailer who has a greater market share and is capable of managing a lower piracy rate would gain more profits by setting a higher price.     

游戏直播平台管理层面多维分析及对策研究

游戏直播自2014年以来迅速奠定其在网络直播领域的重要地位,带着资本青睐快速成长步入成熟期。但从2018年开始伴随着行业人口红利消退,资本市场开始降温,多家游戏直播平台相继关停。究其原因为游戏直播行业仍为新兴产业,平台管理还处于探索期,尚未形成完善的平台管理机制。研究从战略管理、主播管理、内容管理及用户管理四方面解剖游戏直播平台管理现状及问题,依此提出科学有效的管理对策,以期引导游戏直播平台健全平台管理机制,助力游戏直播平台健康发展。     

服务补贴与具有相同供应商的供应链博弈研究

针对由两个零售商和一个共同的供应商组成的供应链,供应商将具有可替代性的两种产品通过两个零售商进行销售,零售商为其产品提供服务,供应商为零售商提供服务补贴。分析得出:向零售商提供服务补贴虽然能够提高零售商针对自己产品所提供的服务水平,增加其产品的市场占有率和供应商的利润,但并不能增加零售商的利润,反而会使其利润减少。如果在供应商向零售商提供服务补贴的供应链中采用纳什讨价还价机制,不仅可以使产品的服务和销量保持在不采用纳什讨价还价机制的供应商向零售商提供服务补贴时供应链的水平,还可以使供应商和零售商的利润都增加,此时供应商愿意提供服务补贴,零售商愿意接受服务补贴。     

不断改进质量 赢得顾客满意

在激烈的市场竞争中处于领先地位的企业 ,都是各行业领域中的质量先驱。由于顾客对质量需求呈现出多样性 ,因此 ,企业在市场竞争中必须为顾客提供一条“满意链” ,在这条“顾客满意链”上 ,顾客对产品使用价值的满意 ,顾客对产品附加价值的满意 ,顾客对企业服务的满意和顾客对产品的社会性满意是“链节”。顾客满意是企业质量改进的思想基础 ,质量改进是动态的和持续性的。处处站在顾客的立场上 ,使顾客满意的工作贯穿于产品质量形成的全过程 ,是当今全面质量管理思想的新扩展。质量改进是一个不断发展的概念 ,与传统质量改进相比 ,现代质量改进的思想内涵在于突出强调质量改进的持续性 ,并把持续改进确定为企业的一个恒久目标     

Understanding multi-channel banking customers

This paper contributes to the knowledge of the impact of the multi-channel strategy by analyzing its effects on one key aspect of the behavior of financial services customers. We analyze the factors influencing the extent of multi-channel shopping. Using a customer database, the study estimates one latent class regression model to control for heterogeneity, finding that customers' acquisition of diverse financial products and services and the total number of financial services are antecedents of multi-channel behavior. The study contributes a new measure to better assess the level of multi-channel consumer behavior.     

Signaling quality with new product preannouncements: Vaporware and the role of reference quality

This research develops a signaling game that captures the essential dynamics of new product preannouncements (preannouncement/launch/market feedback). New product preannouncements are preannouncing firms' formal efforts to inform their competitors and customers about the future availability, superior quality and introductory price of their upcoming new products. In a market, two firms compete (entrant preannounces and incumbent responds) across two periods. The entrant has private information about the true quality of a new product (the incumbent and customers do not know it), and this informational asymmetry provides the entrant with a preannouncement dilemma. Should the entrant preannounce and, if the entrant does, should the entrant tell the truth about quality? Preannouncements often get customers who might buy now from a competitor to wait for a higher quality to be available. Therefore, the entrant may have an incentive to bluff the quality of a new product in order to enhance the likelihood of customers' waiting. However, because the quality exaggeration is also likely to increase customers' quality expectations, the entrant may suffer a significant sales penalty if the entrant does not deliver the promised quality. Through the signaling game, this paper derives conditions under which such a bluff does/does not put the preannouncing firm at risk (i.e., this paper derives the separating/pooling equilibria that are the focus of signaling games).     

Towards Successful E-Business Strategies: A Hierarchy of Three Management Models

Although only few managers deny the potential of ebusinesses, many are struggling with the question how their company can best exploit the Internet. Managers need tools that guide them in their quest for effective applications. In this paper, we present three models that provide structure to this search process. Model development was guided by two requirements: the focus of each model should be on delivering superior customer value, and the models should correspond to models managers are familiar with (e.g., process oriented). The Strategic Internet Applications Model (SIAM) details that e-business strategies can focus on current customers, new customers, the product, or the position within the business network. Companies may decide to customise products or services, or to redefine their role within the business network. The Customer Interaction Cycle (CIC) describes the interaction process between a supplier and a customer, and highlights instances where a supplier can provide added value. The third model is the ADOF model, an acronym for Accessibility, Design, Offer, and Fulfillment. This model embraces the metaphor of a funnel, built up of four sequential rings. The model postulates that the degree of operational success of Web sites can be managed by optimizing the combination of the four rings in the funnel.     

政府采购供应商的权利救济

政府采购的双重属性决定供应商权利救济体系的多重性、复杂性。供应商权利救济体系的不完善,导致供应商权利救济障碍。解决途径是完善行政救济的实体和程序,依据《民法》和《行政法》原理构造具有联系性、协调性和明确性的供应商权利救济体系。     

餐饮企业提高顾客忠诚度的策略选择

随着生活节奏的加快,人们生活方式发生了改变,需要餐饮企业提供相应的满足人们需要的菜品和服务。餐饮企业之间的竞争激烈,要提高竞争力,必须提高餐饮企业顾客忠诚度。为此,餐饮企业必须以低成本策略让顾客吃得起,以差异化策略比竞争对手更好地满足顾客的需要,以此提高对顾客的吸引力;用亲情服务留住顾客,以产品和服务创新留住顾客,以优良的菜品和服务质量留住顾客,增加顾客的回头率;用先进的企业文化来树立企业的良好形象,开展数据库营销,构造与顾客交流的平台。     

基于口碑效应的客户终身价值改进模型

本文认为,客户终身价值(CLV)模型是客户关系管理的核心,企业决策者应将有限的资源投放到最有价值客户身上,保持和提高这些客户的价值,为企业赢得长远利益。文章在剖析前人客户终身价值模型的基础上,建立了基于口碑效应的客户终身价值改进模型,更客观地反映了客户消费行为,提高了客户终身价值模型预测的准确性。通过改进模型计算可以知道,满意客户因为积极的口碑效应使自身客户价值放大,不满意客户因为消极的口碑效应使自身客户价值缩小。     

Mitigating the effect of service encounters

Although marketers believe that encounters with service employees are a major determinant of customers' perceived service quality and value, there is little empirical evidence that quantifies this relationship. This paper considers the role of employee service encounters, such as repair visits and sales calls, within a comprehensive model of customers' assessments of service quality and value. It is estimated with survey data that describe small business customers' ratings of a local telephone company. In contrast with marketing folklore, most employee service encounters do not affect perceived service quality, but they have a strong effect on perceived service value. By quantifying the effect of sales calls, repair visits, billing contacts and so forth, we find that service encounters frequently do not compensate for service failures and disruptions.     

整合营销传播的心理作用模式

整合营销传播的终极战场在于顾客心智,而顾客进行购买决策的依据在于对品牌的价值判断。建立了基于顾客价值的购买决策模型,指出顾客认同价值是顾客进行购买决策的依据,而顾客认同价值的大小由顾客对品牌的认知价值和情感价值决定。整合营销传播就是要通过影响顾客心理,提高品牌认知价值和品牌情感价值,以此建立顾客忠诚。     

Dynamic learning in behavioral games: A hidden Markov mixture of experts approach

Over the course of a repeated game, players often exhibit learning in selecting their best response. Research in economics and marketing has identified two key types of learning rules: belief and reinforcement. It has been shown that players use either one of these learning rules or a combination of them, as in the Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) model. Accounting for such learning may help in understanding and predicting the outcomes of games. In this research, we demonstrate that players not only employ learning rules to determine what actions to choose based on past choices and outcomes, but also change their learning rules over the course of the game. We investigate the degree of state dependence in learning and uncover the latent learning rules and learning paths used by the players. We build a non-homogeneous hidden Markov mixture of experts model which captures shifts between different learning rules over the course of a repeated game. The transition between the learning rule states can be affected by the players?? experiences in the previous round of the game. We empirically validate our model using data from six games that have been previously used in the literature. We demonstrate that one can obtain a richer understanding of how different learning rules impact the observed strategy choices of players by accounting for the latent dynamics in the learning rules. In addition, we show that such an approach can improve our ability to predict observed choices in games.     

Digital coupon promotion and platform selection in the presence of delivery effort

In recent years, physical retailers have started selling products to consumers through either third-party or self-operated online platforms. Doing so, they face demand which depends on digital coupon promotions, delivery effort by the platform (i.e., deliver products from retailers to consumers), and channel preference. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to examine the interactions between the physical retailer's distribution channel choices and coupon promotions. In normal operation, retailers prefer to pay lower fees to the third-party platform, but we find, counterintuitively, that when carrying on a digital coupon promotion, the retailer can be better off paying a higher participation fee to the third-party platform. We also identify the conditions under which the retailer prefers the third-party platform over the self-operated platform with and without coupon promotions. Furthermore, we show that digital coupon promotions and delivery effort boost the retailer's profits by price discriminating among consumers with differing purchase utilities.     

A Model of Supplier Responses to Just-In-Time Delivery Requirements

When buyers provide incentives for suppliers to deliver just-in-time, suppliers can respond by choosing to hold additional inventory, reducing the variance of flow time to facilitate just-in-time production, or both. A model characterizing the supplier's optimal response to incentives for JIT delivery is presented. The model shows a situation where the optimal action of the supplier is to hold more inventory. When incentives for on-time delivery are increased, the supplier responds by decreasing the variance of flow time and by increasing the lead time allowance. However, the lead time allowance increases more quickly than the variance is reduced, resulting. in a net increase in the amount of inventory that must be held by the supplier. The result is that inventory is pushed upstream. This paper does not suggest that inventory is always pushed upstream in JIT purchasing. Rather, it provides a counter-example to those who presume that holding more inventory is always a non-optimal response to buyer's requests for JIT delivery.     

制造型供应商不同产品特征与品牌导向的关系机理--基于我国产业市场的实证研究

本文以信息整合理论为依据,将供应商产品特征视为其实施品牌导向的前置变量,并把供应商产品特征划分为产品重要性与产品复杂性两类,探讨不同产品特征与品牌导向的关系。对184家制造型供应商数据进行实证分析,结果发现,供应商产品重要性与品牌导向具有倒U型关系,产品复杂性与品牌导向具有U型关系,同时市场竞争强度会增强上述两组变量间的非线性关系。