上市公司高管相对薪酬差距与公司绩效相关性研究

对高管薪酬与公司绩效的已有研究主要集中在高管薪酬总额以及绝对薪酬差距方面。现采用相对薪酬差距指标,以沪深两市435家制造业上市公司的年报数据为基础,对高管薪酬与公司绩效之间的相关性进行了实证研究。研究结果表明,高管相对薪酬差距对公司绩效无正向显著性,并呈现出负向影响的趋势,结果符合行为理论提出的假说。     

Executive Pay and Performance: The Empirical Importance of the Participation Constraint

The low elasticity of top executive pay to performance in recent empirical work presents a puzzle since it is clear from the data that in practice both pay and performance measures have moved closely in line in recent years. This paper demonstrates that cross-section and time-series estimates of the pay performance elasticity differ significantly unless the effect of average executive pay is included. It is argued that this can be seen as the effect of the participation constraint in a principal agent model, more commonly known as "the going rate". The going rate must be paid to executives to deter them from taking up their outside option, which is the opportunity to leave the current firm and sign an incentive contract with another firm. Thus the outside option will depend on performance by other firms. Since performance is correlated between firms, this generates a larger time-series pay performance elasticity as perceived by the executive. The paper also considers the possibility that the going

rate may induce incentive effects. The predictions of this argument are tested on a panel of data for large UK companies     

Are Stock Options Grants to CEOs of Stagnant Firms Fair and Justified?

Prior research has examined several ethical questions related to executive compensation. The issues that have received most attention are whether executives’ pay is fair and justified by performance. Since more recent studies show that stock options grants constitute the single largest component in executive compensation, we examine the relations of these grants to economic determinants and corporate governance for firms in the stagnant stage of their lifecycle. We find that, on average, stock options grants comprise a significant portion of annual CEO compensation (26.4%) for stagnant firms. We also find that economic (corporate governance) factors explain less (or more) of the cross-sectional variation in stock options grants for stagnant firms than for growth firms. Furthermore, we document lower pay-performance sensitivity (i.e., weaker incentive alignment) and no improvement in future firm performance from past stock options grants to CEOs of stagnant firms. In particular, our study provides empirical evidence on some inefficiencies associated with stock options grants to CEOs of low potential (stagnant) firms, a long-standing concern of business ethics researchers (Moriarty, 2005; Nichols and Subramaniam, 2001; Perel, 2003). Our results also provide support for the corporate governance reforms discussed in Matsumura and Shin (2005), especially those proposed provisions that curtail the power of CEOs in the governance of firms.     

Replacing executive stock options with share units: A Canadian study

Are share units a better compensation tool than stock options? This paper studies the impact of a transition within the compensation structures of CEOs of companies listed on the TSX Composite Index. Specifically, we ask whether replacing options with units-based compensation reduces the volatility of these companies' stock prices while promoting better returns. Our findings show that a shift to share units reduces large-cap Canadian companies' total risk through its idiosyncratic component. This transition is also accompanied by an increase in their risk-adjusted accounting and market performance. This suggests that share units are better for compensation contracts.     

混合所有制企业的民营化程度如何影响高管薪酬-业绩敏感性？

在中国深化改革、推进转型的特殊背景下，探索出一条适合中国混合所有制企业实际情况的高管薪酬制度改革路径是现阶段中国国有企业改革亟待解决的问题之一。高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性是判断薪酬激励契约有效性的主要指标，基于此，文章首先构建一个委托-代理框架下的寡头市场模型，从理论上分析混合所有制企业的民营化程度与高管薪酬-业绩敏感性之间的关系；其次选择2007—2016年沪深两市A股经过民营化的国有控股上市公司数据进行实证检验。结果发现：总体上，提高混合所有制企业的民营化程度会显著增强高管薪酬-业绩敏感性；进一步分析发现，混合所有制企业中非国有股比例小于67%时，提高民营化程度会降低高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性；非国有股比例介于67%~75%之间时，提高民营化程度对高管薪酬-业绩敏感性没有显著影响；非国有股比例大于75%时，提高民营化程度会提升高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性。     

The Effect of Ethical Fund Portfolio Inclusion on Executive Compensation

This paper divides firms in the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) into two groups based on inclusion in or exclusion from the Domini Social Index (DSI). Inclusion in the DSI is interpreted as a positive indicator of ethical status. Using data for the 1992–2003 period, I provide evidence that chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, other executive compensation, and director compensation tend to be lower in DSI firms than in other firms in the S&P 500. This applies to the unconditional group averages (and medians) and is particularly striking given that DSI firms as a group had better financial performance than the other firms. This finding is also true in a regression framework that controls for other influences on compensation, including firm size and financial performance. In a regression context, the estimated discount for CEOs of DSI firms is approximately 12% for both current compensation (salary and bonuses) and total compensation (including the value of options). These results are consistent with the expectation that some senior executives require a “compensating differential” to accept positions in firms with less attractive ethical status. It is also consistent with the expectation that some firms with positive ethical status might use more restraint in setting executive compensation.James Brander is the Asia-Pacific Professor of International Business in the Sauder School of Business at the University of British Columbia. An economist, his research areas include international trade, industrial organization and finance. He is a former editor of the Canadian Journal of Economics and has published widely, including the textbook “Government Policy Toward Business”.     

管理层权力、TMT网络与高管薪酬

文章基于管理层权力理论和社会网络理论,以2010〖KG-*4〗-〖KG-*6〗2014年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了管理层权力对高管薪酬的影响,并考察TMT网络的调节作用。研究发现：管理层权力显著提高了高管薪酬水平,但显著降低了高管薪酬业绩敏感度;而TMT网络显著增强了它们之间的相关关系。研究为管理层权力与高管薪酬之间关系的研究提供了增量证据,为完善我国高管薪酬激励制度、抑制管理层权力、规范高管之间的兼任行为提供了参考和借鉴。     

Founding Family Firms,CEO Incentive Pay,and Dual Agency Problems

This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by examining relations between family involvement and CEO compensation. Using a panel of 362 small U.S. listed firms, we analyze how founding families influence firm performance through option portfolio price sensitivity. Consistent with the dual agency framework, we find that family firms have lower CEO incentive pay, which is further reduced by higher executive ownership. Interestingly, such incentive pay offsets the positive impact that families have on firm valuation. Collectively, our results show that, compared with nonfamily firms, lower incentive pay adopted by family firms due to lower agency costs mitigates the direct effect of family involvement on firm performance. Once accounting for CEO incentive pay, we do not observe performance differences between family and nonfamily firms.     

职业经理人薪酬实证研究述评

职业经理人薪酬是近年来国内外理论界关注的热点问题.本文对职业经理人薪酬的实证研究进行了全面回顾,并对今后我国职业经理人的薪酬研究作出了展望.     

The Role of Executive Stock Options in On‐Market Share Buybacks*

The increasing use of on‐market buyback programs in Australia may not be fully explained by the typical motivations of information signaling and free cash flows offered by previous researchers. For some firms at least, management may believe the shares are overvalued. It is in this context that we examine whether managers of firms with high levels of executive stock options have an incentive to initiate buyback programs. It has been argued that managers may be motivated to undertake on‐market buyback programs in order to neutralize the dilution of earnings per share caused by their stock options, rather than for signaling purposes. Our findings are consistent with this argument because we find that the higher the proportion of executive stock options outstanding the more likely it is for firms to undertake larger on‐market buyback programs. Overall our results indicate that the existence of executive stock options influences managers' decision to implement on‐market buyback programs but that it is not the only factor that managers take into consideration.     

Revisiting the risk-taking effect of executive stock options on firm performance

While the relation between equity-based compensation and firm performance has been widely discussed, the findings on how executive stock options (ESOs) affect firm value are still inconclusive. This research examines the risk-taking effect of ESOs on firm performance by taking into consideration managers' personal risk aversion. A three-stage-least-squares approach is adopted to examine a simultaneous system of equations describing option compensation, risk-taking, and firm performance. Evidence confirms that ESOs increase managerial risk-taking, but such risk-taking is constrained by managers' personal risk aversion. In addition, evidence indicates that managerial risk-taking induced by ESOs would increase both long-term and near-term stock returns. The negative impact on near-term and the positive impact on long-term returns on investment imply that it takes time for accounting performance to reflect the risk-taking effect of ESOs. These results further indicate that managers focus their concerns more on stock risk and return rather than near-term accounting results.     

Generalizations regarding the growth and decline of manufacturer and store brands

Stimulating growth or staving off decline in market share are core objectives for brand managers, including retailers who now offer store brands (SBs). This study identifies how changes in brand penetration and repeat-purchase loyalty accompany changes in brand share. We examine 1093 changes in brand share over 63 packaged goods categories in the UK from 2003 to 2007, covering both growth and decline. Two measures of repeat purchase loyalty are used—annual purchase frequency (PF) and share of category requirements (SCR). Our results show that brand share growth is accompanied by greater change in penetration than in loyalty, at a ratio of approximately 3:1. This finding generalizes across brand type, loyalty measure, retailer SB or manufacturer brand (MB), category purchase frequency, category type, and initial brand share. However, while brand share growth is accompanied by stronger changes in SCR than PF for MBs; the reverse is the case for SBs. For MB decline, both penetration and SCR change are significant correlates. However for SBs, the decline in brand share happens predominantly in loyalty—more strongly in SCR, followed by PF. Therefore, both brand types need to focus on building penetration to grow. While MBs also need to prevent light buyers from lapsing, SBs need to pay more attention to retaining heavy buyers to avoid repertoire demotion.     

Underpaid and Corrupt Executives in China’s State Sector

This study examines the role of executive compensation in public governance. We collect data on corruption cases that involve top-level executives in Chinese listed state-controlled firms. We find a significant positive relationship between underpayment of executives and the likelihood of an investigation into corrupt behavior. We also show that corruption is positively associated with firm performance and that the relationship between underpayment of executives and corruption is influenced by firm performance, suggesting that top managers are more likely to engage in illicit behavior if they are compensated poorly while the firms under their control perform well. Finally, we find that pay-performance sensitivity decreases when top executives are involved in corruption investigations, indicating a lack of pecuniary incentives. Our empirical findings point toward an important relationship between executive compensation and corrupt behavior, thus providing valuable input to the understanding of executive pay and its effects in China’s state sector.     

中美银行业员工报酬业绩敏感度比较研究

金融危机之后,银行业员工过高的薪酬水平,引发社会各界的多方质疑,本文试图对不同制度背景下中美银行业员工报酬业绩敏感度进行比较研究。我们发现:两国银行业员工绩效报酬机制存在显著差异,美国银行业员工薪酬与公司绩效呈显著正相关关系,而我国银行业员工薪酬与公司绩效相关性较弱,需要进一步完善银行业报酬激励机制。     

CEO Regulatory Foci,Environmental Dynamism,and Small Firm Performance

This research proposes and tests that regulatory foci of small business chief executive officers (promotion focus and prevention focus) relate to firm performance differentially when levels of environmental uncertainty vary. Results suggest that a promotion focus is positively related to firm performance, whereas a prevention focus is negatively related to firm performance. Further, these relationships are moderated by the degree of environmental dynamism such that in more dynamic environments, the relationship between promotion focus and firm performance is strengthened, whereas the relationship between prevention focus and firm performance is negatively affected. The reverse was found for less dynamic environments. Theoretical and practical implications as well as future research avenues are offered.     

The political determinants of executive compensation: Evidence from an emerging economy

In regulated economies, corporate governance mechanisms such as executive compensation are less driven by market-based forces but more subject to political influence. We study the political determinants of executive compensation for all listed Chinese firms in the context of an exogenous shock that removed market frictions in share-tradability. Under strong political constraints, state ownership reduced the managerial pay levels and increased pay-for-performance sensitivity (to asset-based benchmarks). Board independence and compensation committees do not curb managerial pay, and market-based factors do not have a significant influence. However, these effects reversed following the governance shock (removal of market frictions in share tradability).     

The Impact of Key Retail Accounts on Supplier Performance: A Collaborative Perspective of Resource Dependency Theory

Existing literature suggests that the increasing concentration in the retail industry is allowing powerful retailers to exploit their weaker suppliers, which causes the suppliers’ performance to suffer. This study takes a collaborative perspective of resource dependency theory and suggests that when suppliers engage in supply chain relationships with key retail account (KRA) customers, their performance may improve, depending on the varying levels of the supplier's and KRAs’ market shares. The empirical analysis of data from two large retailers, Wal-Mart and Target, and a broad cross-section of their suppliers provides ample support for most of the hypotheses set forth in this paper: Suppliers that depend on KRAs for a significant share of their total revenues relinquish some of their leverage in the marketplace, but as the KRAs gain market share, their suppliers’ performance tends to increase. Cumulatively, these results provide evidence of collaborative supplier–KRA relationships, such that a supplier's dependency on KRAs may positively affect supplier performance. This finding supports a more positive, symbiotic view of dependency, resulting in important implications for key account management, supply chain management, and retail research and practice.     

Executive Compensation and Earnings Persistence

Governing boards utilize executive compensation contracts in an attempt to align executive actions with corporate goals. The objective is to ensure that executive performance provides value to the organization in terms of successful outcomes. A key performance criteria typically specified in CEO compensation contracts is earnings targets. However, using earnings as a performance evaluation may be problematic because some firms exhibit robust and sustained earnings over time (high earnings persistence), and other firms, such as high growth oriented firms, exhibit weak or sometimes negative earnings over time (low earnings persistence). Our study reveals that the effect of high earnings persistence results in firms that focus more heavily on cash compensation (salary and bonus) rather than on equity compensation (stock options, etc.) to compensate executive performance. Additionally, for firms characterized by low earnings persistence, our study indicates that cash flows from operations act as a supplementary performance measure to accounting earnings, and become increasingly important as a means to justify executive cash compensation.     

Customer satisfaction underappreciation: The relation of customer satisfaction to CEO compensation

Customer satisfaction contributes to firm financial performance, but does it contribute to top executives' pay? Our empirical evidence shows that it may not. Customer-satisfying executives tend to have lower pay than their productive peers, even if both satisfaction and productivity contribute to firm financial performance. Thus, customer satisfaction is underappreciated, which may result in both less societal welfare and worse company performance. We propose a board myopia mechanism to account for this phenomenon. In facing short-term financial performance pressure from investors, and the asymmetric information availability between accounting-based and market-based assets for compensation decisions, the board of directors may be myopic, underappreciating executives who invest in market-based assets such as customer satisfaction that drive long-term returns. We examine this satisfaction underappreciation phenomenon empirically using 23 years of panel data that detail firm productivity, customer satisfaction, firm financial performance, and executive compensation. The longitudinal data are analyzed using fixed-effect panel models and a simultaneous system of panel vector autoregression equations with interactions to assess the direct effect of firm financial performance and its carryover effect to executive compensation across executives who are productive, customer-satisfying, or both. The results confirm that customer-satisfying executives are underappreciated: being productive is financially rewarding for both firms and executives, while being customer-satisfying is financially rewarding for firms but not as much for executives. We further demonstrate that using total shareholder returns to benchmark firm financial performance and reward executives with a higher proportion of stock compensation can encourage a long-term focus that alleviates this customer underappreciation.     

Were Small Producers the Engines of Growth in the Canadian Manufacturing Sector in the 1980s?

Small firms are often seen to be the engines of growth. There are two main sources of empirical evidence that are adduced to support this conclusion. The first is that job creation has been coming mainly from small firms. The second is that the share of employment accounted for by small firms has increased in the past two decades. Both of these sources rely on a simple metric-employment. This paper asks whether changes in this metric affect the view of the role that small firms play in the growth process.The first section of the paper maintains employment as the measure that is used to evaluate the importance of small firms but modifies the raw measure of employment to correct for the fact that small firms pay lower wages than large firms. When this is done, small producers are no longer found to outperform large producers in terms of job creation over the 1970s and 1980s in the Canadian manufacturing sector.The second section of the paper changes the metric used to evaluate relative performance by moving from employment to output and labour productivity. The paper demonstrates that while small producers have increased their employment share dramatically, they have barely changed their output share. Small firms have been falling behind large firms both with respect to wages paid and labour productivity.