PRIVATIZATION,EMPLOYEE SHARE OWNERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF EIRCOM

ABSTRACT: Sizeable employee share ownership plans (ESOPs) have been a unique feature of Ireland's privatization programme. Since the sale in 1999 of the national telecommunications operator, Eircom, the norm has been to allocate 14.9 per cent of equity to employees. We examine the role of the Eircom ESOP in the post‐privatization governance of the company. We find that the ESOP sought to maximize returns to employees as shareholders rather than behave in the interests of a wider set of stakeholders. This is explained in terms of the internal governance of the ESOP, namely its structure and rules, as well as the composition and motivations of the board of the ESOP Trustee.     

职工持股法律制度的若干问题研究

职工持股制度(简称ESOP或ESOPs)从20世纪50年代中期开始,在西方国家特别是美国和日本普遍推行,它已成为企业中一个重要的制度。文章针对职工持股法律制度的具体问题进行了分析。首先,对职工持股制在实践中的若干具体问题的探讨,集中于职工持股制度适用的企业和职工范围、职工股占总股本的份额、职工购股资金、预留股的设置、职工股的流转等问题的讨论。其次,对中国职工持股制度中问题提出了立法建议。     

Concentration and Inefficiency in the Defense Sector: Policy Options

This article, which is a part of a larger comprehensive study of the effects of employee ownership and worker participation on productivity in the United States, focuses on and documents the lack of worker participation in employee-owned firms [Rooney 1987]. It is estimated that more than 7,000 U.S. firms covering some 10 million employees have some degree of employee ownership [Rosen, Klein and Young 1986, p. 15]. By employee ownership, we simply mean that most of the employees own some shares of stock in the company in which they work. While most employee-owned firms have less than a majority ownership stake, several hundred U.S. firms are majority emp10yeeowned, and are the target of this study.     

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR PROFIT SHARING, GAINSHARING, ESOPs, AND TQM

Empirical evidence suggests that profit sharing, gainsharing, employee ownership, worker participation, and Total Quality Management (TQM) may increase productivity and firm performance. Nevertheless, one needs to ground the case for government intervention in support of each of these programs on arguments concerning externalities or merit goods. This paper argues that no one yet has offered a convincing case of this nature. It also discusses the U.S. government's support for ESOPs and suggests reasons for its disappointing results in the hope that future policy experiments will not repeat these mistakes.     

混合所有制、股权激励与融资决策中的防御行为--基于动态权衡理论的证据

文章基于动态权衡理论,以1999-2014年上市公司为样本,运用混合所有制改革这一“自然实验”条件,研究了高管股权激励对其融资决策中防御行为的影响,分离出激励和治理双重效应。研究发现：(1)股权激励有助于抑制高管融资决策中的防御行为,但这种效应只存在于民营企业中;(2)对于国有企业,只在股权分置改革后才观察到类似效果,而股改前高管在减少债务融资的同时,提高了股权激励水平,自我激励问题明显;(3)公司股权混合度越高,其在赋予高管股权激励上越谨慎,但在国有股比例较高的公司中,混合所有制改革显著提高了股权激励水平;(4)股权混合安排显著改进了股权激励契约在抑制高管防御行为方面的效率,这种效应在非国有股比例较高的公司中更强。     

Worker inflow,outflow, and churning

Linked employer–employee data from Finnish business sector is used in analysing worker turnover. The data set is an unbalanced panel with over 219?000 observations in 1991–97. The churning (excess worker turnover), worker inflow, and worker outflow rates are explained by plant and employee characteristics. The probabilities of observing non-zero churning, inflow, and outflow rates increase with plant size. The magnitudes of the non-zero churning and inflow rates depend positively on size, but the magnitude of outflow rate depends negatively on size. High-wage plants have low turnover; plants with large within-plant variation in wages have high turnover. Average tenure of employees has a negative impact on turnover. High plant employment growth increases churning and separation but reduces hiring in the next year. Also controlled are average age and education of employees, shares of women and homeowners among employees, foreign ownership, ownership changes, and regional unemployment.     

Non-standard methods in the privatization strategies of the Czech Republic,Hungary and Poland1

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland followed different strategies in the use of non-standard methods of privatization. In regard to restitution, the Czech Republic carried out physical return of property, Hungary weakly implemented financial compensation and Poland has not yet approved a programme. Management and employee buyouts were eschewed in the Czech Republic, took the form of employee stock ownership plans in Hungary and were accomplished chiefly by lease-purchase in Poland. The Czech mass privatization programme distributed a considerable amount of joint-stock company shares free through voucher auctions in which citizens participated directly or through financial intermediaries. In contrast, the Polish programme provided citizens free shares in investment trusts that exercise corporate governance over operating companies and restrure them for divestiture. Hungary's programme, which offered people only interest-free loans to buy some shares in intial public offerings, was abandoned soon after its start.     

员工个人特征对ESOP激励效果的影响——对HD公司的案例研究

以HD公司为研究对象,运用实地访谈和因子分析、方差分析等统计分析方法,研究员工个人特征通过激励机制对ESOP实施效果的影响。结果表明,公司员工整体素质影响了ESOP的实施效果;不同工龄的员工在工作态度上具有显著性差异;不同文化程度、工龄和岗位层次的员工在获利预期上具有显著性差异。根据这些结果,笔者就完善ESOP的实施提出了建议。     

Employee share ownership in a unionised duopoly

Profit sharing schemes have been analysed assuming Cournot competition and decentralised wage negotiations, and it has been found that firms share profits in equilibrium. This paper analyses a different remuneration system: employee share ownership. We find that whether firms choose to share ownership or not depends on both the type of competition in the product market and the way in which workers organise to negotiate wages. If wage setting is decentralised, under duopolistic Cournot competition both firms share ownership. If wage setting is centralised, only one firm shares ownership if the degree to which goods are substitutes takes an intermediate value; otherwise, the two firms share ownership. In this case, if the union sets the same wage for all workers neither firm shares ownership. Therefore, centralised wage setting discourages share ownership. Finally, under Bertrand competition neither firm shares ownership regardless of how workers are organised to negotiate wages.     

员工持股、信息透明度与企业创新 ——基于员工持股计划的准自然实验

自2014年6月证监会重启员工持股计划以来,已有超过8%的上市公司推出员工持股计划预案。以2010—2017年A股上市公司为研究样本,基于多时点DID研究框架,用以控制可能存在的内生性问题。实证检验企业实施员工持股计划（ESOP）对企业创新活动的影响效果,以此揭示中国混合所有制改革背景下实施员工持股计划（ESOP）的真实效果。结果发现：实施ESOP的企业相较于未实施ESOP的企业具有更高的创新产出,并且在信息透明度更高的企业中这种促进作用更显著;相比于国有企业,在非国有企业实施ESOP对创新活动的促进作用更强。进一步通过中介效应对机制进行检验发现,实施ESOP后可以提高管理层创新意愿进而促进创新投入。研究揭示了ESOP对企业创新活动影响可能存在的作用机制,对广大投资者理解ESOP公司治理作用具有一定启示意义。     

员工持股计划、融资约束与国有企业双元创新产出

在当前中国国有企业因其特殊的产权关系和管理体制而只能获得较低创新产出的背景下,本文从制度创新与技术创新的协同视角出发,在公司治理的理论框架下引入了双元创新的相关研究,从而详细地探讨了国有企业员工持股计划的实施如何通过缓解企业面临的融资约束,进而影响到企业整体创新产出及双元创新产出提升的微观作用机制,并利用2004—2020年中国A股国有上市公司的相关数据进行实证检验后发现,国有企业员工持股计划的实施明显有助于企业整体创新产出和利用式创新产出的提升,而对于企业探索式创新产出的提升却并无显著影响,且具体作用机制与理论分析部分相符,但作用效果却会因企业内部特征的不同及员工持股计划的设计特征差异而具有明显区别。由此,应该积极推进国有企业以多种方式开展员工持股计划,特别要在高技术型和高学历员工占比较高的国有企业中优先实施员工持股计划,并进一步优化持股计划的方案设计,从而更好地发挥出各类员工在企业创新活动中的主体作用。     

Strategic vote manipulation in a simple democracy

In both the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) and employee buyouts, the common and crucial phenomenon is that some workers have two sources of income, namely wages and shares of profit. We analyze that phenomenon in an economy where workers are nonunionized and wages are determined by voting. If the employers sell a certain amount of shares of the capital stock to some non-risk-loving workers, these workers vote for the lowest possible wage along with the employers. As a result, all workers become equally worse off because of the competition among workers to buy those shares.     

Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private ownership concentration,identity and board composition

We examine and analyze the post-privatization corporate governance of a sample of 52 newly privatized Egyptian firms over a period of 10 years, from 1995 to 2005. We look at the ownership structure that results from privatization and its evolution; the determinants of private ownership concentration; and the impact of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition on firm performance. We find that the state gives up control over time to the private sector, but still controls, on average, more than 35% of these firms. We also document a trend in private ownership concentration over time, mostly to the benefit of foreign investors. Firm size, sales growth, industry affiliation, and timing and method of privatization seem to play a key role in determining private ownership concentration. Ownership concentration and ownership identity, in particular foreign investors, prove to have a positive impact on firm performance, while employee ownership concentration has a negative one. The higher proportion of outside directors and the change in the board composition following privatization have a positive effect on firm performance. These results could have some important policy implications where private ownership by foreign investors seems to add more value to firms, while selling state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to employees is not recommended. Also, the state is highly advised to relinquish control and allow for changes in the board of directors following privatization as changing ownership, per se, might not have a positive impact on firm performance unless it is coupled with a new management style.     

Post–Privatization Effects of Management and Employee Buy–outs

Management and employee buy–outs have played a significant role in the privatization of state–owned enterprises. Key research and policy issues are raised concerning whether insider ownership promotes or impedes restructuring and adaptation. This paper reviews and synthesizes studies of the effects of privatization management and employee buy–outs in both developed and transition economies. Trends in privatization buy–outs and conceptual issues concerning the expected effects of privatization buy–outs both in terms of performance and survival are discussed. A review of empirical evidence is presented in terms of the impact of buy–outs on employee attitudes, human resource management, strategy and restructuring, financial and economic performance, together with fresh evidence on survival. Privatization buy–outs can lead to significant restructuring but their impact depends on institutional context and policy. Restructuring may be greater where insiders purchase shares rather than acquiring them virtually free through voucher programmes.     

EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION: AN EVALUATION OF LABOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on employee participation (EP) and the legal status of EP programs. The effect of EP on firm performance theoretically is indeterminate. However, properly implemented, EP can increase productivity and advance employee interests. Read literally, the National Labor Relations Act's (NLRA) prohibition of company-dominated unions prohibits EP in nonunion workplaces. This paper critiques four proposals to amend the NLRA based on the EP literature. EP is most likely to increase productivity if employees receive decision-making power. Two policies would accomplish this: (i) government mandated employee participation committees or (ii) increased legal protection of unions. The latter policy promotes power-sharing in a voluntary system. A third approach, abolishing the prohibition of company-dominated unions without otherwise changing labor laws, would encourage all forms of EP and union decline .     

Mergers and acquisitions in the european union frame

In the first step, the research analyzes the different European waves of mergers and acquisitions and the restructuring market characteristics. It is followed by a study of such corporate restructuring methods as divestitures, spin-offs, split-ups, split-offs, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), and equity carveouts, paying special attention to corporate mergers and acquisitions, the different types and their diversity of targets. The European situation regarding mergers and acquisitions, their different characteristics, and the way to do them are studied in the tables.     

The Social Shaping of the Participation of Employees in Environmental Work within Enterprises - Experiences from a Danish Context

The paper deals with the shaping of the participation of employees in environmental work within enterprises. The paper is based on two case studies on Danish enterprises, which, as part of the development of their environmental work, emphasized employee involvement. The cases show that it is difficult to maintain the participation of employees in environmental work, even in enterprises with an intention to do so. The cases contribute to the identification of those situations during the shaping of environmental work in an enterprise where choices concerning employee participation are made: (1) The need of management to involve employees in the environmental work; (2) The competence building among employees and local supervisors; and (3) The stabilization of the environmental work into routines and structures. The theoretical approach draws on organizational theory emphasizing the connection between environmental strategies, measures and competence needs, and the shaping of the participation of employees as social processes formed by the existing culture and the pressure generated by the preventive environmental work.     

The Social Shaping of the Participation of Employees in Environmental Work within Enterprises - Experiences from a Danish Context

The paper deals with the shaping of the participation of employees in environmental work within enterprises. The paper is based on two case studies on Danish enterprises, which, as part of the development of their environmental work, emphasized employee involvement. The cases show that it is difficult to maintain the participation of employees in environmental work, even in enterprises with an intention to do so. The cases contribute to the identification of those situations during the shaping of environmental work in an enterprise where choices concerning employee participation are made: (1) The need of management to involve employees in the environmental work; (2) The competence building among employees and local supervisors; and (3) The stabilization of the environmental work into routines and structures. The theoretical approach draws on organizational theory emphasizing the connection between environmental strategies, measures and competence needs, and the shaping of the participation of employees as social processes formed by the existing culture and the pressure generated by the preventive environmental work.     

员工股权激励对中小企业创新会产生补充的促进效应吗？

高管与核心技术员工作用于创新的不同过程,同时也是股权激励计划的主要激励对象,两者股权激励的互动效应对创新的影响值得探讨。选取2009—2015年成功实施股权激励的深A上市中小板与创业板公司为研究对象,考察员工股权激励对高管股权激励在中小企业创新中的影响及其作用机制。研究结果表明：实施股权激励计划能够显著增加企业研发投入与创新产出;相较于高管,核心技术员工股权激励强度越大,企业创新数量越多、质量越高;高管股权激励降低了创新转化效率。进一步地,融资支持效应和人才激励效应是员工股权激励补充促进创新的重要机制;代理成本在高管股权激励与研发投入关系中起遮掩作用。     

Employee ownership: A theoretical and empirical investigation of management entrenchment vs. reward management

Employee ownership is often used not only as a reward management tool but also as an entrenchment mechanism. The literature suggests that good managers use employee ownership as a reward management tool, whereas bad managers implement it for entrenchment, thus suggesting the existence of an equilibrium level of employee ownership. The contributions of this paper are both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, this paper fills a gap in the published research by taking into account both positive and negative outcomes of employee ownership. Our model produces three main conclusions: (i) Low-performing managers use employee ownership as an entrenchment mechanism (ii) that increases the signaling cost of employee ownership for high-performing managers. (iii) We suggest that employee ownership should not be left only to the management's discretion because both types of managers have an incentive to implement employee ownership. Our empirical study investigates how employee ownership affects management tenure. This study takes into account the two main motives for employee ownership examined by the model (i.e., management entrenchment and reward management). We find a positive relationship between employee ownership and management tenure. This result provides new evidence that employee ownership can be used as an entrenchment mechanism.