中国转型期腐败和反腐败问题研究(上篇)

本文分析了中国转型期腐败行为的类型，程度和发展演变趋势，并运用制度分析法剖析了诱发腐败的动机结构，机会结构和软约束机构，作者认为，经过艰苦探索，党和政府已经找到了在改革开放和建设社会主义现代化建设的新的历史条件下有效遏止腐败的新路，即依靠体制改革和制度创新从源头上预防和治理腐败并在这方面取得了可喜的成就，最后，笔者就中国下一步如何进行反腐败体制改革和制度创新，从治理和善治的角度提出了一整套政策性建议。     

公共经济学视角下的国企腐败治理机制研究

腐败是国之大敌,国企腐败更是腐败的重灾区,其腐败金额之高,涉及面之广让人触目惊心。如何从经济制度建设的角度约束此类腐败行为,以维护国家正常经济秩序和保障民众福祉,已经成为当前公共经济学的重要研究课题。文章从"经济人"假设、委托—代理理论、寻租理论以及新经济学理论四个角度来探讨国企腐败产生的根源,并在此基础上提出国企腐败制度建设要从内外两个方面加以治理,内部要建立"精英职业经理人"制度,外部要建立人大常委会主导的收支预算审计制度,以确保在不降低国企运行效率的前提下最大程度地抑制腐败。     

对预算会计制度改革的探讨

国家为了从源头治理腐败,不断提高政府资金的使用效益,合理配置政府资源,对预算会计制度进行了一系列的改革,先后推行了部门预算、政府采购、国库集中收付、收支两条线等制度的改革和创新。这些制度的实施和整体推进,既增强了政府的宏观调控能力,提高了财政资金的使用效益。又较好地治理和防范了腐败。预算会计制度的改革和创新必须是对会计体系、预算会计制度的改革,并与之形成相配套的制度体系,以推进预算会计制度改革和创新的步伐。     

政府采购过程中寻租活动存在的原因及其治理

政府采购是从源头上治理腐败的重要措施，这已是人们的共识。但在实施政府采购的过程中，由于权力渗透、制度缺陷、技术落后等因素的存在，寻租行为仍将存在。应该从完善集中采购制度、加强监督制约机制以及加快信息化建设三个方面分析了治理寻租行为的对策。     

从第二次反收购立法潮看美国公司治理结构制度的演进

1987年，美国35个州不顾联邦最高法院的裁定，再次纷纷颁布了反收购立法，对公司内以管理者为代表的利益相关者和股东之间的关系给予了制度性地重新确认，标志着美国公司治理结构制度安排内重大创新的发生。从经济学的角度对这一变迁过程进行分析，表明是人力资本的专用性使利益相关者承担了原有制度安排下的外部成本，而寻求对不能内化于制度的成本的补偿构成了此次创新的动因，提出美国公司治理结构的制度创新我国公司治理结构建设的启示。     

基于博弈理论的建设领域寻租治理探讨

建设领域是腐败案件的高发区,近年来查处的发生在工程承发包、土地出让、房地产开发、物资采购等环节的腐败案件呈上升趋势。通过分析我国建设领域权力寻租的特点,探究寻租现象背后的根源,建立了建设领域经济体制改革的合作博弈模型,提出寻租治理的策略,为建设领域寻租治理提供了新的视角。     

我国黑色经济的现状及治理对策

黑色经济是对社会构成直接危害的法律禁止的各种经济活动的总称,黑色经济在我国社会经济生活中已占有一定比重.治理黑色经济是一项艰巨复杂的社会系统工程,要从建立完善的且运行有序的法律体系、构建完善的市场经济运行制度体系、加快政治体制改革以治理权力腐败、大力推进和深化公民道德建设、加强国家对黑色经济活动的监测和预警等方面建立治理黑色经济的完整体系.     

廉政保证金制度的实践与观点综述

腐败向来为人们所深恶痛绝，为了治理腐败，各种促进廉政的措施层出不穷。近年来，我国一些地方试行的公务员廉政保证金制度就是一种新的防止腐败的制度规定，这种制度被认为是“用经济学手段治理腐败的一种尝试”。但这一制度从推出至今，一直成为社会舆论议论的热点。我们现在试行的廉政保证金制度，无论是在理论上还是在实践方面确实有一些问题需要进行研究。但要深入开展这一方面的研究，就很有必要对过去一段时间以来试行的这一制度的概念、来源、各地的主要做法和围绕着这一制度的争议做一个梳理。     

银行腐败的经济学分析

银行腐败产生的制度基础在于剩余索取权与剩余控制权的不对称、不统一,因此必须从制度安排上去控制银行腐败问题。我国商业银行应通过制度创新消除银行腐败,包括（1）把国有银行改造成分公司制商业银行：（2）完善公司制商业银行的内部治理结构;（3）建立健全公司制商业银行的外部治理结构。     

从制度经济学视角看金融腐败

文章在简要回顾近年来金融领域发生的一系列大案要案基础上，利用制度经济学理论对我国经济转轨时期金融腐败产生的制度根源进行了阐释，认为只有从制度上进行合理的设计，实行有效的机制改革，才能对金融腐败进行有效治理。     

腐败问题研究

文章就腐败问题提出了两个论点。第一,政府机构和政治进程的结构是决定腐败程度的关键因素。软弱的政府因对其附属机构无法进行有效的控制从而导致了较高程度的腐败。第二,与税收相比,腐败的非法性和隐蔽性使其更容易受到扭曲,代价也更大。这些结论说明了为什么在一些欠发达国家,腐败程度如此之高,给发展带来的代价如此之大。     

腐败与反腐败的理论逻辑

在经济飞速发展和改革逐步深入的今天,腐败问题已成为危害经济社会生活的毒瘤,而反腐败工作也日益提上了议事日程。本文描述了腐败对政治、经济与社会的危害,并在系统地分析了腐败成因的基础上,详细地论述了预防与治理并举的反腐败逻辑。     

Corruption and Age

In recent years the topic of corruption has attracted a great deal of attention. However, there is still a lack of substantial empirical evidence about the determinants of corruption. The major aim in the paper is to investigate empirically the correlation between age and justifiability of corruption. We use data on eight Western European countries from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey that span the period from 1981 to 1999 to distinguish between an age effect (the changing attitudes of the same cohort over time) and a cohort effect (the differences in attitudes among similar age groups in different time periods). The results suggest that there is a strong age effect and no cohort effect.     

Corruption in America

We use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the U.S. to investigate the causes and consequences of corruption. More educated states, and to a smaller degree richer states, have less corruption. This relationship holds even when we use historical factors like Congregationalism in 1890 as an instrument for the level of schooling today. The level of corruption is also correlated with the level of income inequality and racial fractionalization, and uncorrelated with the size of government. There is a weak negative relationship between corruption and economic development in a state. These results echo the cross-country findings, and support the view that the correlation between development and good political outcomes occurs because education improves political institutions.     

Corruption and privatization

This paper analyses the relation between corruption and privatization. In particular, we study how corruption affects the acquisition price and the post-privatization market structure. The model predicts that privatization in countries with highly corrupt government results in a higher degree of market concentration than in countries where governments are less corrupt. The acquisition price is also likely to be higher when a government is highly corrupt than when government officials are honest or moderately corrupt. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, we demonstrate that a stronger propensity to embezzle state revenues may reduce government officials' benefits from corruption. The reason is that the more eager the government officials are to take bribes, the cheaper they are to buy.     

Corruption and Reputation

This paper examines corruption in a random matching game where past actions are imperfectly observed and players have the option to continue trading with their existing partners. It shows that the effect of individual reputations for honesty may outweigh the effect of a bad collective reputation depending on the expected value of a continued match relative to the corruption gain.     

学术腐败之我见

陈述了学术腐败的4种表现形式及其危害性，并提出了相应的对策。     

Corruption for sales

This paper investigates the impact of corruption on foreign affiliates’ sales of German multinationals that differ in their level of experience in the foreign market. We exploit the panel dimension of a detailed firm-level dataset to show that more experienced firms are less likely to suffer from the costs related to corruption. Controlling for persistent and unobserved factors at the country and firm levels, we show that corruption reduces unambiguously the sales of new entering firms, while having no impact on the sales of incumbents.     

Organizational Cultures of Corruption

Systematic differences in the incidence of corruption between countries can be explained by models of coordination failure that suggest that corruption can only be reduced by a “big push” across an entire economy. However, there is significant evidence that corruption is often sustained as an organizational culture, and can be combated with targeted effort in individual organizations one at a time. In this paper, we propose a model that reconciles these two theories of corruption. We explore a model of corruption with two principal elements. First, agents suffer a moral cost if their corruption behavior diverges from the level they perceive to be the social norm; second, the perception of the norm is imperfect; it gives more weight to the behavior of colleagues with whom the agent interacts regularly. This leads to the possibility that different organizations within the same country may stabilize at widely different levels of corruption. Furthermore, the level of corruption in an organization is persistent, implying that some organizations may have established internal “cultures” of corruption. The organizational foci are determined primarily by the opportunities and (moral) costs of corruption. Depending on the values of these parameters, the degree of corruption across departments may be relatively uniform or widely dispersed. These results also explain another surprising empirical observation: that in different countries similar government departments such as tax and education rank very differently relative to each other in the extent to which they are corrupt. This is difficult to explain in incentive‐based models if similar departments face similar incentives in different countries.