The estimation of a disequilibrium real wage equation for Britain

An aggregate wage equation is formulated based on a disequilibrium labor market model. The specification allows for an important special case to be tested, namely the equilibrium hypothesis that real wages move instantaneously to equate the demand for and supply of labor. The hypothesis that the British labor market has been in equilibrium is rejected. The adjustment path for real wages is monotonic and dominated by demand factors. Real wages move quickly to eliminate excess demand but the results contradict the monetarist contention that the aggregate labor market is continuously in a temporary, if not full, equilibrium.     

Migration and imperfect labor markets: Theory and cross-country evidence from Denmark,Germany and the UK

We investigate the labor market effects of immigration in Denmark, Germany and the UK, three countries which are characterized by considerable differences in labor market institutions and welfare states. Institutions such as collective bargaining, minimum wages, employment protection and unemployment benefits affect the way in which wages respond to labor supply shocks, and, hence, the labor market effects of immigration. We employ a wage-setting approach which assumes that wages decline with the unemployment rate, albeit imperfectly. We find that the wage and employment effects of immigration depend on wage flexibility and the composition of the labor supply shock. In Germany immigration involves only moderate wage, but large unemployment effects, since immigrants are concentrated in labor market segments with low wage flexibility. The reverse is true for the UK and Denmark.     

无就业增长与非均衡劳工市场动态学

本文直接模拟了劳工市场的非均衡过程、工资动态轨迹、经济人的最优行为和适应性优化行为。劳动供给源于家庭的效用最大化 ,劳动需求源于企业的利润最大化。企业的适应性优化行为和若干制度因素构成了工资刚性的基本要素 ,劳工市场的供求力量也是影响工资变动的重要因素。根据劳动生产率的变化对工资进行适应性的调节是现实世界企业工资决策的普遍实践。工资刚性与高劳动生产率并存是造成无就业增长的真正原因     

A Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic Disequilibrium model for business cycle analysis

A Dynamic Stochastic Disequilibrium model is proposed for business cycle analysis. The core innovation and fundamental deviation from the corresponding full-employment Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model is the assumption that the nominal wage is a policy variable with no tendency to clear the labor market. As a consequence, disequilibrium unemployment arises which crucially alters the transmission of macroeconomic shocks. Solving the puzzle of low fiscal multipliers in conventional general equilibrium models, the effects of spending shocks become considerably more pronounced in the disequilibrium model because idle labor can be quickly utilized to accommodate aggregate demand without requiring households to increase their supply. In contrast to the standard model, technology and labor supply shocks are partly absorbed by unemployment and, hence, only moderately expansionary. Despite its simplicity and unlike the corresponding general equilibrium model, the disequilibrium model is able to generate shock responses which are broadly in line with empirical evidence.     

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,AWARENESS OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS,AND UNEMPLOYMENT*

We explore the significance of general equilibrium feedback effects for wage‐bargaining. We examine a two‐sector economy and show that if agents only consider labor demand effects low real wages and low unemployment are the consequences. With an intermediate view, i.e., when partial equilibrium effects within a sector are taken into account, high real wages and unemployment result. If all general equilibrium effects are perceived simultaneously, we once again obtain a situation with low wages and unemployment. The results may explain why unemployment is high in some European countries.     

Microeconomic uncertainty and macroeconomic indeterminacy

We propose a stylized intertemporal macroeconomic model wherein the combination of decentralized trading and microeconomic uncertainty (taking the form of privately observed and uninsured idiosyncratic shocks) creates an information problem between agents and generates indeterminacy of the macroeconomic equilibrium. For a given value of the economic fundamentals, the economy admits a continuum of equilibria that can be indexed by the sales expectations of firms at the time of investment. The Walrasian equilibrium is one of these possible equilibria but it is reached only if firms are optimistic enough. With a weaker degree of optimism, equilibrium output, employment and real wages will be lower than in the Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, the range of possible equilibria will depend positively on the wage elasticity of the labour supply and on the magnitude of the information problem between buyers and sellers (in our case, the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks).Stochastic simulations performed on a calibrated version of the model show that pure demand expectation shocks may generate business cycle statistics that are not inconsistent with the observed ones.     

Testing Equilibrium Models of Regional Disparities

The large and persistent regional disparities of most European economies have been explained as a disequilibrium phenomenon; convergence between backward and successful regions is slow because the equilibrating forces are weak. Recently, two models have emerged where regional disparities are seen as an equilibrium phenomenon; the amenity model, which assumes that high unemployment and low wages reflect favourable living conditions, and the matching model, which views high unemployment as the result of labour market congestion in declining regions. The paper derives some key empirical implications of the models and examines whether the regional pattern of migration, unemployment and wages in Norway conforms with these implications. The results are supportive of the matching model but not of the amenity model.     

Implementing the Mortensen rule in a frictional labor market

We show that, in settings where meetings can be multilateral, the allocation rule proposed by Mortensen (1982) can be relatively straightforward to implement: as a local auction conducted by sellers. The implications of using this mechanism in a simple model of the labor market are then explored. We characterize the equilibrium properties of this model, which include wage dispersion, and examine its implied Beveridge curve. A dynamic version of the model is calibrated to the US labor market, and we show that the model can account for observed vacancy rates, given parameters that are chosen to match the average wages and the natural rate of unemployment, although the implied wage dispersion is quite small. Finally, in the limit, as the time between offer rounds in the model approaches zero, the equilibrium approaches the Walrasian competitive equilibrium.     

Flexible and Committed Profit Sharing with Wage Bargaining: Implications for Equilibrium Unemployment

We analyze the relationship between profit sharing, employee effort, wage formation and unemployment under different relative timings of the wage and profit sharing decisions. The optimal profit share under commitment exceeds that under flexibility, because through a profit share commitment the firm can induce wage moderation. The negotiated profit sharing depends positively on the bargaining power of trade union and it has both effort-enhancing and wage-moderating effects. Higher profit sharing is shown to reduce equilibrium unemployment under ``sufficiently rigid' labor market institutions, but it can harm employment when labor market ``rigidities' are ``small enough'.     

Monopolistic Competition and Different Wage Setting Systems

In this paper, we present a disequilibrium unemployment model without labor market frictions and monopolistic competition in the goods market within an infinite horizon model of growth. We consider different wage setting systems and compare wages, the unemployment rate, and income per capita in the long‐run at firm, sector, and national (centralized) levels. The aim of this paper is to determine under which conditions, the inverted‐U hypothesis between unemployment and the degree of centralization of wage bargaining, reported by Calmfors and Driffill [Economic Policy, 6, 14–61, 1988], is confirmed. Our analysis shows that a high degree of market power normally produces the inverted‐U shape for unemployment. Moreover, we also illustrate that this inverted‐U shape can be reversed when the ability of trade unions to internalize the provision of social services is great enough at sector level.     

A disequilibrium model of real wages,employment and unemployment for the U.S.A. during 1930–1965

The well known Lucas-Rapping (1969, 1970) U.S. Labour market model has been estimated with a simple disequilibrium estimation method. Neither the wage rate nor the employment level are found to adjust to clear the labour market within the unit time period. The elasticity of labour supply in the short run is found to be high which is consistent with the recent theories of real business cycle. Adjustment in employment towards equilibrium is faster than the adjustment in the wages. The rate of unemployment is satisfactorily explained by the excess supply rate without the need for the lagged unemployment rate. Thus our unemployment equation is superior to the Lucas-Rapping equation based on the equilibrium framework.I am grateful Professors J. W. Nevile, V. K. Srivastava, the editor of this Journal, Professor Baldev Raj and two referees for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. I wish to thank Kris Corcoran for her excellent research assistance. The research contained in this paper is financed by a grant from the Faculty of Commerce and Economics.     

Wage Flexibility and Unemployment: The Keynesian Perspective Revisited

Keynes' main concern in the General Theory is about the capacity of an economy to return to full employment equilibrium when subject to a (negative) demand shock. He maintains that money wages cuts may not help reabsorb unemployment, as they do not necessarily imply a fall in real wages. On the contrary, wage rigidity may be necessary for avoiding that a cumulative process propels the economy far away the full employment equilibrium. Co‐ordination failures in the investment‐saving market are behind this conclusion. However, the analysis is carried out within a static equilibrium framework. This paper is an attempt to focus on the problems of intertemporal co‐ordination arising within the context of a sequential economy. Our analysis of the out‐of‐equilibrium process of adjustment stirred by a shock allows to generalize the original Keynesian intuition. Unemployment emerges as the result of a lack of co‐ordination due to irreversibly constrained choices, and not only nominal but also real wage flexibility does not necessarily help to restore equilibrium. As a matter of fact, it may even be harmful, by triggering processes that make the economy diverge from equilibrium. Our analysis has important analytical implications as regards the role of market imperfections and the interpretation of the effects of monetary policy.     

The labor market impact of immigration in Western Germany in the 1990s

In this article we estimate the wage and employment effects of recent immigration in Western Germany. Using administrative data for the period 1987-2001 and a labor-market equilibrium model, we find that the substantial immigration of the 1990s had very little adverse effects on native wages and on their employment levels. Instead, it had a sizeable adverse employment effect on previous immigrants as well as a small adverse effect on their wages. These asymmetric results are partly driven by a higher degree of substitution between old and new immigrants in the labor market and in part by the rigidity of wages in less than flexible labor markets. In a simple counter-factual experiment we show that in a world of perfect wage flexibility and no unemployment insurance the wage-bill loss of old immigrants would be much smaller.     

Shocks and rigidities as determinants of CEE labour markets’ performance

In this article, the impact of real wage, productivity, labour demand and supply shocks on eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies from 1996–2007 is analysed with a panel structural vector error correction model. A set of long‐run restrictions derived from the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is used to identify structural shocks, and fluctuations in foreign demand are controlled for. We find that the propagation of shocks on CEE labour markets resembles that found for OECD countries. Labour demand shocks emerge as the main determinant of employment and unemployment variability in the short‐to‐medium run, but wage rigidities were equally important for observed labour market performance, especially in Poland, Czech Republic and Lithuania. We associate these rigidities with collective bargaining, minimum wage, active labour market policies and employment protection legislation.     

Exploring different measures of wage flexibility in a developing economy context: the case for Turkey

In this paper we use Turkish household labor force data to address a number of conceptual issues pertaining to the wage curve, an empirically derived negative relationship between the real wage level and the local unemployment rate. First, we show that in developing economies where labor markets are prone to high degree of segmentation by skill level, local unemployment rates disaggregated by education provide more accurate measures of the degree of group-specific wage competition and hence yield more robust results of the wage curve analyses. Second, we estimate the wage curve using various definitions of the unemployment rate, including discouraged and marginally attached workers, and the long-term unemployment rate to explore the most relevant measure of local labor market tension in the wage setting process. We find that broader definitions of unemployment serve as a more effective reference point in measuring wage flexibility for women, whose attachment to the labor market is substantially weak in the Turkish context; while for men the official and long-term unemployment rates perform well. Finally, using quantile regression we show that wage responsiveness to unemployment cannot be assumed to be constant along the wage distribution. In the Turkish case, we find a higher unemployment elasticity of wages around the median segment of wage distribution. This effect is more pronounced for women.     

Excess supply equilibria

This paper addresses a fundamental problem in economic theory: How can there be equilibria of the economic system where some commodity is in excess supply, yet that commodity's relative price shows no tendency to fall? Of course, the principal example of such a phenomenon is an economy experiencing a prolonged period of involuntary unemployment of the labor force during which there is no significant change in the real wage.In the following pages, I shall describe a two-commodity, general equilibrium model that has a continuum of unemployment equilibria, one for any given unemployment rate. The important feature of this model is that workers establish their wage rates in an attempt to maximize expected utility. The information upon which these wage setting decisions are based is provided by actual labor market transactions.Despite the voluntary nature of the wage setting decision, I shall argue that each equilibrium of this economy exhibits involuntary unemployment in the Keynesian sense. For there will always be another equilibrium with a lower real wage, a higher level of employment, and at which (at least when workers are risk neutral) each worker achieves a higher level of expected utility.     

A pre-estimation sample separation method for a labor market in disepuilibrium

The paper presents a method for separating the sample on wage rate and labor input for a labor market in disequilibrium prior to the estimation stage. It is shown how the method's economic rationale stems from the existence of Keynesian unemployment, which implies a combination of real wage and labor input off the notional labor demand and supply curves. The potential usefulness of the method for generating unbiased estimates of wage elasticities of labor demand and labor supply is demonstrated on annual U.S. data.     

Involuntary unemployment,macroeconomic policy,and a behavioral model of the firm: Why high real wages need not cause high unemployment

The perspective of modern macroeconomic theory, be it new classical or old and new Keynesian, is that unemployment can be reduced only if real wages are cut. The modern Keynesians, basing themselves upon the microfoundations of efficiency wage theory, argue that real wages cannot and will not be cut by firms for efficiency wage reasons. This generates involuntary unemployment based on a market coordination problem. A behavioral model that contrasts with efficiency wage theory is presented here which suggests that reducing real wages need not affect the marginal cost of labor and, therefore, the number of individuals employed. In the behavioral model, wherein there exists some linearity in the relationship between real wages and working conditions and labor productivity, a lower real wage rate is not a necessary condition for reducing the unemployment rate nor is a higher real wage an obstacle to reducing it. In this scenario, unemployment, to the extent that it is demand-side induced, is not related to movements in real wages. Therefore, restoring full employment after a negative demand shock becomes a matter for demand management, not demand management that must be coordinated with measures designed to reduce real wages.     

Conflict in the labor market: Seniority rules and unemployment

This paper examines the macroeconomic implications of two labor-market institutions that play an important role in worker-management interactions: seniority-based layoffs and majority voting on wage proposals. Together, these make the median worker, rather than the marginal worker, the important decision maker for wage and employment outcomes. Since he is risk-averse, he will trade off higher wages for greater security of employment; therefore, the equilibrium level of unemployment will be much less than 50%, but higher than the conventional natural rate of unemployment. Median-worker behavior helps to explain both the greater frequency of excess supply than excess demand (59.4% versus 40.6% of the time since 1890) and the wage concessions of 1981–1983. A new Phillips curve is derived which incorporates systematic influences of the size of the labor force (to correct for the inappropriate measure of excess supply) and Tobin's “q” variable (to measure the risk of unemployment for the median worker). With U.S. data for 1957–1983, this new Phillips curve has a higher explanatory power than the traditional one. Additional forces that influence wages and employment in this setting are identified: firms have an incentive to bargain actively over wages rather than accept union demands passively and senior workers have a “social contract” with junior workers that reduces the extent to which the former exploit the latter.     

The Choice of Technology and Equilibrium Wage Rigidity

In this general equilibrium model, firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose increasing returns technologies to maximize profits. Capital and labor are the two factors of production. The existence of efficiency wages leads to unemployment. The model is able to explain some interesting observations of the labor market. First, even though there is neither long-term labor contract nor costs of wage adjustment, wage rigidity is an equilibrium phenomenon: an increase in the exogenous job separation rate, the size of the population, the cost of exerting effort, and the probability that shirking is detected will not change the equilibrium wage rate. Second, the equilibrium wage rate increases with the level of capital stock. Third, a higher level of capital stock does not necessarily reduce the unemployment rate. That is, there is no monotonic relationship between capital accumulation and the unemployment rate.