后"土地财政"时代地方财政收入行为风险研究——基于财政社会学的视角

在土地需求能力和供给成本的相互作用下,地方财政的土地出让金收入依赖于节节攀升的房价,土地性税收依赖于活跃的楼市交易.后土地财政时代地方政府财政收入行为中最具风险的行为是扩大拆迁规模、过度举债和滥用税收排斥,在维系租金型收入制度的同时.滥用公债型收入制度、损害税收型制度.应建立地方税体系缓解地方财政收入冲动.同时要限制城...     

政府管制、土地违法与土地财政

研究目的:分析政府管制、土地违法与土地财政之间的影响机理,为理解和应对土地财政问题提供重要参考。研究方法:面板数据联立方程组模型。研究结果:政府管制对土地违法、土地财政具有重要影响,土地财政与土地违法两者间存在显著的相互影响机制。研究结论:政府对农转非的产权管制本身并不直接产生土地财政,只是为地方政府获取土地财政提供了权利依据。政府对农转非、土地出让环节的价格管制,以及主导收益分配是形成土地财政的根源。为了追逐土地财政收入,地方政府有显著的土地违法冲动,但考虑土地违法查处的风险,土地违法并不必然带来土地财政收入的增加。     

Local interests or centralized targets? How China’s local government implements the farmland policy of Requisition–Compensation Balance

The Requisition–Compensation Balance of Farmland (RCBF) is a strict policy in China aimed at controlling farmland conversion and replenishing farmland loss caused by urban expansion through a set of top-down quotas. These conflict with local interests, since land conversion from agriculture to construction is a key tool by which local governments attract investment and raise fiscal revenue. How should local authorities respond to this centralized policy? This paper presents a framework “quantity–quality–productivity–environment” to investigate local governments’ coping strategy and the holistic performance of the RCBF. The empirical study indicated that local jurisdictions placed economic and financial growth first and continued expropriating farmland on a large-scale, including land of high quality, for development. However, impelled by compulsory quotas and supervision from governments at higher levels, local authorities would partly replenish the quantity loss through farmland exploitation, regardless of the quality of the new cropland and the possible environmental impact. Consequently, fast requisition and unqualified compensation undermined the capacity of regional agricultural output. We suggest that the RCBF is not capable of guaranteeing food security, whilst farmland supplementation threatens the local environment.     

Inter-state Competition,Land Conflicts and Resistance in India

Literature on fiscal federalism has long debated whether inter-jurisdictional competition between subnational units encourages a “race to the bottom”, with competition to attract mobile capital leading to lower taxation and expenditure, and, consequently, the under-provision of public goods. The principal concerns of this literature have been taxation and expenditure, but the ability of state governments to acquire land for industry is also critical in the context of subnational competition. In this article, the authors ask how Indian state governments resolve the tensions arising from their dual role as both wooer and regulator of capital, as they simultaneously facilitate land acquisition and engage with movements that challenge it. The authors demonstrate that there is no simple “race to the bottom”. Inter-state competition has not produced a simple equation in favour of capital and a side-lining of the concerns of those displaced. Subnational approaches to land acquisition must be understood within local political, social and economic contexts.     

中国县级土地财政收入问题研究

研究目的:分析县级土地财政收入存在的问题,并提出对策建议。研究方法:文献资料法、归纳分析法、比较分析法。研究结果:中国县级土地财政中存在过度刺激建设用地扩张、土地财政刺激房地产业超常发展从而助长房地产泡沫、土地收入分配不合理、土地税费体系不合理、财政收入过度倚重房地产业、土地财政推高县级财政金融风险、土地收益分配缺乏监管等问题。研究结论:应正确看待土地财政收入的必然性和阶段性规律,合理设定省县两级财权,调整土地出让方式并加强对县级土地出让金的收支管理和权利约束,加强持有环节税收建设、预算外收费清理工作、县级政府融资渠道建设,以增加县级政府多元化融资能力。     

土地财政区域差异研究综述

[目的]进一步揭示土地财政已存在的区域差异规律,为构建更为科学、切实可行的政策建议,推动"征地→批租"地方政府土地财政模式转型提供新的研究视角。[方法]文献资料方法和比较研究方法。[结果]现有研究证实了土地财政规模及依赖程度、财政收入激励下地方政府土地出让方式、土地财政推动经济增长、土地财政影响居民收入消费及公共品供给、土地财政与城市用地规模联动关系等方面,在全国范围内都存在东部、中部、西部的区域差异。国外保有环节的房地产税是地方政府持续的财政资金来源;同时,是促进房地产市场有序发展、抑制城市蔓延的有效政策工具。[结论]未来研究方向是以地市为单元,探明各类土地财政构成要素对于经济增长、居民收入与消费及产业服务化、城市公共品供给、城市各类用地规模增长的影响内在机理;构建区域差别化的保有环节房地产税征收管理政策方案。     

政府经营性土地储备供应决策——基于实物期权的理论模型

研究目的:探讨政府的经营性土地储备供应决策方法,以增加出让收入及抑制开发商囤地行为。研究方法:实物期权理论,案例研究法。研究结果:(1)将土地供应权视为基于房产的实物期权,推算出了最优供应时机和理论价值,研究发现市场不确定性将提高土地期权价值,并使最优供应时机延后;(2)案例比较分析发现,地块的实际出让时间越接近理论最优供应时机,出让收入越高,但实际上政府对地块并未做出准确的价值判断。研究结论:(1)依据实物期权模型做出的土地储备供应决策更能有效地把握市场形势波动的时机;(2)模型在中国的应用需要可监督的公共财政体系以及财政分成体制改革。     

Central versus local states: Which matters more in affecting China's urban growth?

To date, many geography studies have identified GDP, population, FDI, and transportation factors as key drivers of urban growth in China. The political science literature has demonstrated that China's urban growth is also driven by powerful economic and fiscal incentives for local governments, as well as by the political incentives of local leaders who control land use in their jurisdictions. These parallel but distinct research traditions limit a comprehensive understanding that can result in partial and potentially misleading conclusions of urbanization in China. This paper presents a spatially explicit study that incorporates both political science and geographic perspectives to understand the relative importance of hierarchal administrative governments in affecting urban growth. We use multi-level modeling approach to examine how socio-economic and policy factors – represented here by fiscal transfers – at different administrative levels affect growth in “urban hotspot counties” across three time periods (1995–2000, 2000–2005, and 2005–2008). Our results show that counties that are more dependent on fiscal transfers from the central government convert less cultivated land to urban use, controlling for other factors. We also find that local governments are becoming more powerful in shaping urban land development as a result of local economic, fiscal, and political incentives, as well as through the practical management and control of capital, land, and human resources. By incorporating fiscal transfers in our analysis, our study examines a factor in the urban development of China that had previously been neglected and provides an improved understanding of the underlying processes and pathways involved in urban growth in China.     

Spatio-temporal variances and risk evaluation of land finance in China at the provincial level from 1998 to 2017

Excessive dependence on land finance (hereafter LF) in China’s urbanisation process has generated various problems and compromised the interests of future generations, hence a transformation from “land urbanisation” to “population urbanisation” is now called for. Nevertheless, before turning towards a new urbanisation strategy, the spatio-temporal variances of LF and associated risks for regional sustainability deserve further investigation. This study developed a comprehensive evaluation indicator system from administrative, economic, social and ecological perspectives, to evaluate the LF risks at provincial scale in mainland China from 1998 to 2017, applying the combined AHP-Entropy method and Multi-Criteria analysis. The results indicated that land transfer dependence remained high across all provinces over the last two decades, and the LF risk increased accordingly. In 2015, economic, social, and total risks of China as a whole all reached a “high” risk level, ecological risk was at the level of “critical”, although administrative risk kept going down and was at a “low” risk level in recent years, thanks to the persistent nation-wide effort on cracking down on corruption. Spatially, total LF risk generally presented a declining gradient from east to west. Through analysing the tentative and plausible causes to above spatio-temporal variances, five policy suggestions were put forward: (1) reforming current cadre assessment and fiscal decentralisation systems; (2) transforming the residential housing supply structure; (3) establishing a comprehensive land ecological conservation system; (4) promoting a flexible leasehold mechanism in primary land market; and (5) restructuring the industrial layout to defuse differentiated LF risks across provinces. With empirical data and comprehensive risk evaluations, this study contributed to improve our knowledge on the spatio-temporal patterns of LF and its associated risks at provincial scale, helped to inform future urbanisation policy designs and ultimately to promote regional sustainability for China and beyond.     

中国土地出让制度改革对地方财政收入的影响分析

研究目的:分析土地出让制度改革中中国省级层面和江苏省地市级层面土地出让收入对地方财政收入的影响。研究方法:统计分析法。研究结果:各省土地出让收入占地方财政收入的比重总体呈上升趋势;江苏省地级市的土地出让收入占地方财政收入比重的平均值高于全国省级平均水平。研究结论:国家政策对地方政府的土地出让行为和土地出让收入产生较大影响;不同省份间财政收入对土地出让收入的依赖存在明显差异,有的省份存在明显的"土地财政"现象;"土地财政"现象在低一级地方政府财政收入中更为明显。     

Industrial land price and its impact on urban growth: A Chinese case study

China is experiencing rapid progress in industrialization, with its own rationale toward industrial land development based on a deliberate change from an extensive to intensive form of urban land use. One result has been concerted attempts by local government to attract foreign investment by a low industrial land price strategy, which has resulted in a disproportionally large amount of industrial land within the total urban land use structure at the expense of the urban sprawl of many cities. This paper first examines “Comparable Benchmark Price as Residential land use” (CBPR) as the theoretical basis of the low industrial land price phenomenon. Empirical findings are presented from a case study based on data from Jinyun County, China. These data are analyzed to reveal the rationale of industrial land price from 2000 to 2010 concerning the CBPR model. We then explore the causes of low industrial land prices in the form of a “Centipede Game Model”, involving two neighborhood regions as “major players” to make a set of moves (or strategies). When one of the players unilaterally reduces the land price to attract investment with the aim to maximize profits arising from the revenues generated from foreign investment and land premiums, a two-player price war begins in the form of a dynamic game, the effect of which is to produce a downward spiral of prices. In this context, the paradox of maximizing profits for each of the two players are not accomplished due to the inter-regional competition of attracted investment leading to a lose-lose situation for both sides’ in competing for land premium revenues. A short-term solution to the problem is offered involving the establishment of inter-regional cooperative partnerships. For the longer term, however, a comprehensive reform of the local financial system, more adroit regional planning and an improved means of evaluating government performance is needed to ensure the government's role in securing pubic goods is not abandoned in favor of one solely concerned with revenue generation.     

How imbalanced land development affects local fiscal condition? A case study of Hubei Province,China

Aiming at realizing the efficacy and fairness of spatial allocation of land resources, zoning is one of the most widespread tools adopted by governments around the world. However it also brings imbalanced land development which will lead to the "windfall-wipeout dilemma" of stakeholders. Local government regarded as the regional governor and economic driver, is an important part of stakeholders, and will fall into fiscal dilemma when the land development is restricted. In this paper, we discuss how imbalanced land development affects local fiscal condition based on the theory of farmland preservation externality and finance and taxation system. Taking Hubei Province as an example, the degree of imbalanced land development, and the relationship between local fiscal condition and imbalanced land development are quantified by employing a panel dataset of 88 local jurisdictions (counties or districts) from 2009 to 2014. The results show that: (1) The degree of imbalanced land development in Hubei Province is 0.260 with characteristics of temporal decrease and spatial increase from high urbanized eastern areas to middle, northern agricultural dominate areas to low urbanized western mountainous areas. (2) The imbalanced land development aggravates the local government fiscal difficulty, the higher degree of imbalanced land development, the more serious the fiscal condition is. Therefore, innovation of trans-regional fiscal payment on the basis of the degree of imbalanced land development can effectively address the local fiscal dilemmas and achieve regional coordinated development.     

地方政府土地财政风险评估及预警研究

研究目的:运用AHP-熵值法计算地方政府土地财政风险指标的综合权重,评估江西省土地财政风险状况;以地方政府土地财政风险指标综合指数作为网络输入,土地财政风险状态作为网络输出,构建RBF神经网络预警模型,并对江西省土地财政的风险状态进行学习模拟及预警分析。研究方法:AHP-熵值法;RBF神经网络模型。研究结果:(1)2005—2014年,江西省土地财政总体风险在中警状态波动。就风险子系统而言,江西省土地财政行政风险总体呈下降趋势;经济风险和社会风险在本研究时间段内基本处于中警状态;生态风险警度从2005年的轻警突升到2006年的重警,随后有所下降,但到2012年之后警度又回升至中警状态。(2)RBF神经网络模型拟合准确率高,稳定性强,模拟结果符合江西省实际,能够基本反映江西省土地财政风险的整体状态。研究结论:2017—2019年江西省的土地财政风险预测位于中警状态,亟需采取相应的防范措施规避和降低风险;RBF神经网络模型是预警地方政府土地财政风险的有效方法之一,可为防范和化解地方政府土地财政风险提供理论依据和决策参考。     

Land use dynamics driven by rural industrialization and land finance in the peri-urban areas of China: “The examples of Jiangyin and Shunde”

As China experienced rapid economic growth, non-agricultural land, particularly industrial land, expanded significantly within its peri-urban areas. This paper takes two typical peri-urban areas: Jiangyin in the Yangtze River Delta and Shunde in the Pearl River Delta, as cases, and applies landscape ecology indices to analyze land use dynamics through overlay of their land use maps from 2001 to 2010. This research reveals that local cadres such as township governments and village collectives utilize land finance as a strategy to contest the reshuffling of central-local power brought about by the 1994 tax-sharing scheme. Meanwhile, under the stringent land quota system, local cadres allocated most quotas to the industrial sector in order to encourage economic growth. However, the fragmented governance regime, including county/city, township to administrative village and natural village, led to land fragmentation, which had adverse impacts on sustainable development. In general, the research on land use of peri-urban areas requires a comprehensive perspective of social, economic and institutional aspects.     

地方政府农地非农化偏好方式选择的绩效评价

对一种制度的绩效进行量化评价是近年来经济学研究的热点问题之一。农地非农化作为城市土地的主要供给手段对城市和农村的兴衰和发展都有较大的影响．而许多地方政府在农地非农化的方式选择上却存在一定的盲目性．以致影响城乡的统筹发展。本文通过对征用和流转这两种农地非农化方式的绩效评价分析，归纳出地方政府农地非农化偏好方式选择的绩效评价标准，以土地结构效应、经济效应、公平效应为表现，制度经济学的方法为基础，初步提出了现行的地方政府农地非农化偏好方式选择的绩效评价指标体系，并进行了相应的理论分析，提出了一定的政策建议。     

地方政府农地非农化偏好方式选择的绩效评价理论模型

农地非农化作为城市土地的主要供给手段对城市和农村的兴衰及发展都有较大的影响,而许多地方政府在农地非农化的方式选择上却存在一定的盲目性,以致影响城乡的统筹发展.通过对征用和流转这两种农地非农化方式的绩效评价分析,归纳出地方政府农地非农化偏好方式选择的绩效评价标准,以土地结构效应、经济效应、公平效应为表现,制度经济学的方法为基础,初步提出了现行的地方政府农地非农化偏好方式选择的绩效评价指标体系,并进行了相应的理论分析,提出了相应的政策建议.     

基于地域差异的后土地财政时期有效过渡研究

研究目的：基于土地财政地域差异情况预判“后土地财政时期”负效应,构建有效过渡政策方案。研究方法：采用层次聚类分析、定性分析与逻辑演绎结合方法。研究结果：将31个省（自治区、直辖市）1999—2000年土地财政情况划分为4种集群类型：发展阶段、旺盛阶段、中期阶段、淡出阶段。从国家土地资源瓶颈约束、系列房地产市场调控政策导致的土地财政不可持续等方面阐释“后土地财政时期”具体涵义,这一时期各地域后续负效应包括：城市化进程中土地不能再持续提供资源与资金支持、由路径依赖导致的土地违法、对生态环境与资源承载力及粮食安全保障的破坏、以风险与破坏式行为获取财政增收。研究结论：各地域在实现城市化过程中还需在不同程度上继续发挥土地财政正向历史功效,针对不同地域土地财政所处的发展阶段及“后土地财政时期”负效应特征,提出过渡转型政策方案。     

基于生态安全视角的耕地生态补偿财政转移支付研究以湖北省为例

目的 基于生态安全视角，通过建立耕地生态安全状况与地方土地财政的定量关系，解决耕地生态保护资金来源问题，建立地方政府耕地生态保护行为激励模式。方法 文章利用耕地投入—产出的能值理论，从“压力—状态—响应”方面选取17个指标建立耕地生态安全评价体系，评价2017年湖北省103个县（市、区）的耕地生态状况，构建计量模型揭示耕地生态安全与地区土地财政之间的关系，划分生态补偿区域并建立耕地生态转移支付模型。结果 湖北省耕地利用能值结构偏不合理，农业机械、农药和化肥等投入量较大，耕地的产出—投入比偏低；湖北省耕地生态安全状况水平偏低，大部分粮棉油基地多属于耕地安全临界区及安全敏感区，且耕地生态安全水平差异显著，生态安全值最低地区为江汉区（0.301 1），最高为利川市（0.663 4）；通过新增建设用地建立两者之间的关系可得，耕地生态综合评分值每增长1个单位，新增建设用地对应减少2.809 hm²，地方政府土地财政收入减少283.203万元。计算得耕地生态支付区达46个，其中江汉区支付额最高（15 859.368万元），受偿区共22个，其中恩施市受偿额最高（7 645.695万元），各县（市、区）的财政转移支付额度占其当年财政总收入的比例在0.120%~3.861%，具有可操作性。结论 为实现耕地高效持续利用、建立地区政府耕地生态保护激励机制、创新生态补偿资金来源提供新视角。     

Local economic structure,regional competition and the formation of industrial land price in China: Combining evidence from process tracing with quantitative results

The price of industrial land in China has been found distorted and remarkably low. However, it is overlooked that industrial land price is relatively high in some regions. This local variation cannot be explained by classical theories on land price that focus on local economic level, population density, and location factors. We propose a theoretical framework incorporating local economic structure and governments’ behavior in regional competition, to interpret the formation of industrial land price in China. We first model local firms as foot-tight ones, whose relocation costs are enormous, and outside firms as foot-loose ones, whose relocation costs are negligible. Then we divide local governments as outside-capital-dependent governments (OCDGs) and non-outside-capital-dependent governments (NOCDGs) according to the role of outside capital in local economic structure. In such a setting, OCDGs are supposed to aggressively pursue outside firms and use industrial land as a critical endowment to engage in race-to-bottom competition, making the price extremely low. On the contrary, the optimal strategy for NOCDGs, who lack strong incentives in attracting outside investment, is to stay aside and let potential land users compete to determine the land price, resulting in a higher land price. Evidence from quantitative results and comparative case studies with process tracing based on Suzhou and Wenzhou together prove the validity of this theory. This paper advances the conventional understanding of industrial land price and concludes with implications on industrial land policies and sustainable development.     

Patterns of revenue distribution in rural residential land consolidation in contemporary China: The perspective of property rights delineation

Rural residential land consolidation (RRLC) in contemporary China refers to activities related to the replanning and reallocation of rural residential land to construct new rural residences, to increase land-use efficiency and to improve rural amenities in the context of rural revitalization. The objective of this study is to elucidate the patterns of revenue distribution in RRLC by addressing the following questions. Given incomplete and ambiguous formal rules in China, how can rural land property rights be delineated to distribute and coordinate interests among stakeholders in RRLC? Furthermore, what are the factors that determine the delineation of rural land property rights to distribute land revenue? A theoretical framework for the delineation of rural land property rights is developed from the perspectives of the institutional environment, governance and resource allocation. A comparative analysis of two typical cases of RRLC in contemporary China is conducted to support the research hypotheses. This study finds that bargaining power is the fundamental determinant of delineating rural land property rights to distribute revenue in RRLC. Furthermore, intergovernmental competition motivates the local government to fully deploy strong bargaining power, while concerns about social stability provide some constraints. A strong capability for collective action reinforces the bargaining power of rural households. This study provides new insights into the delineation of rural land property rights and subsequent revenue distribution based on distinctive institutional settings and RRLC in China, enriching the theoretical and empirical findings in the property rights school. Policy recommendations on revenue sharing of RRLC are proposed accordingly.