对“自然资源的民主分权:民众参与的制度化”一文的简评

对JesseC.Ribot“自然资源的民主分权:民众参与的制度化”一文进行了评论,认为分权管理是从制度层面保障民众真正参与自然资源管理的重要措施。结合我国分权管理的实践与探索,讨论了保障落实分权管理和构建分权配套办法的有关问题。     

林业部门的民主分权：非洲、亚洲和拉丁美洲的经验教训(续)

总结了约20个发展中国家林业部门分权管理的研究结果,并通过对在森林治理中起到主要作用的机构和参与者的分析,探讨了成功和失败的范例和主要的因素。研究表明,执行民主分权的案例并不多见,表现在:真正的决策权力、森林资源及其效益仍然是集权管理、选择处理的当地参与者往往不具有代表性或不负责任。现行政策有时伤害了当地的穷人。强调了全国性的对话和对公民社会特别是边缘群体的授权的重要性。研究结果证明,林业分权管理应当始于与当地民众一起工作,建立和完善他们已有的机制;具有代表性和负责任的地方政府将成为这一过程最适合的对话者。     

选择代表:自然资源管理分权管理的机构及其权力

论述了有效的分权管理的中心条件——代表制。代表性是分权管理公式的关键,将代表性分为反应性和问责性是非常有用的。分权管理的结果似乎是代表性的功能和管理动机。为了评价选择的地方机构是否能够形成有效的分权管理,关键的问题是选择的机构是否对他们管理范围内的人民负责。许多国家缺乏可持续的具有代表性的地方政府。不管有或没有代表性的地方政府,也不管是哪个权威掌握对环境的权力,问责性措施都可以培育政府一定程度的向下的责任。选举并不是达到这样的问责制的唯一形式。分权管理改革的安全性和可持续性,大部分取决于中央政府向其它实体转移权力时采用的方式。制度转移是最安全的也是最具可持续性的。分权管理的有效和公正的潜力取决于地方机构的代表性。但是在几种情况下,选择民主负责的地方机构然后赋予其民主权力。     

森林资源分权管理及其效应探讨——以大土村的森林资源分权管理为例

近 2 0年来 ,森林资源下放给当地社区管理已成为世界的趋势。我国从 1980年开始林业“三定”以来 ,为发展林业 ,鼓励造林 ,出台了许多林业政策 ,也产生了多种形式的森林资源分权管理模式。如何系统地探索森林资源分权管理的效果及其影响因素 ,以期为当地的森林资源管理提供有效的信息 ,成为人们关注的热点。本文首先就系统地探索森林资源分权管理及其效应的体系进行了论述 ,然后以大土村作为案例 ,就有关内容进行了探讨     

环境分权对水环境治理效果的影响——财政分权视角下的动态面板检验

选取2002—2015年我国30个省际面板数据,应用系统GMM估计方法,实证检验了环境分权的水环境治理效应。研究结果显示,环境分权与工业废水和生活污水排放、工业废水氨氮排放量及工业废水化学需氧量三类水污染指标呈现显著且稳定的正向关系,这意味着赋予地方政府过高的环境管理自主权将不利于改善水环境治理效果;财政分权对水环境治理效果产生负向效应,随着财政分权程度的提升,环境分权对水环境治理效果的不利影响得以强化。分组检验结果表明,中央政策干预和环境管理体制改革促使财政分权对水环境治理效果的负面作用逐渐趋于不明显,且有效削弱了财政分权对环境分权与水环境治理效果两者关系的调节效应;在东部沿海地区,环境分权可一定程度上降低水污染排放,其治理效应总体上优于中西部内陆地区,而财政分权对水环境治理效果的负向作用及其调节效应在中西部内陆地区更显著。     

森林可持续经营中分权管理的途径及缺陷:亚洲太平洋地区的经历

分权管理作为改进治理的民主进程和资源的公平分配或有效性的方法而受到广泛的讨论。分权管理的目标和主要原则(如辅助作用等)已是众所周知的,但付诸实施却总是不很成功。分权管理的途径有时从概念上设计得很好,但因各种原因并未按照设计去执行,从而出现了造成冲突和混乱的严重缺陷,导致目标未能实现。通过对亚太地区案例研究的正面和负面的经验进行了回顾,对森林经营和可持续性的影响给予了关注。成功的分权管理途径需要反映国家所关心的地理、文化和机构方面,以及相关的各种施政、市场和信息功能。分权管理有多种形式,其可以包含地域层次和联邦层次,也可以包括地方政府或不符合常规施政的地域。但所有的分权管理形式都必须做好准备工作,且分阶段实施非常必要。总结案例研究的教训为森林可持续经营提供了制定未来分权管理途径的基础和避免缺陷。     

改革开放以来集体林权制度改革的分权演化博弈分析

在维护国家生态安全和农户生计等方面,中国集体林发挥着不可或缺的重要作用。改革开放以来,中国政府启动了多轮集体林权制度改革,本文采用分权多中心决策主体演化博弈理论,研究了集体林权制度变迁的动态过程。分权多中心决策主体的观念改变是集体林权制度改革的前提,分权多中心决策主体采取功能、权力、自适应学习和同构等形式,开展了集体林权制度改革的重复演化博弈,中央政府为多轮集体林权制度改革的主要介入者,集体林权制度改革所呈现的间歇性均衡和多重均衡是分权多中心决策主体持续演化博弈的结果。     

联邦制森林治理:分权管理经验和潜在影响

80%以上的发展中国家和经济转轨国家正在进行着某种形式的分权试验。以11个国家(拥有全球森林总量60%以上)为例,简要描述了实施联邦制的主要林业国家当前的森林行政管理类型以及施政形式,认为分权后强化了跨部门联系的重要性,许多政府机构都介入了有关森林资源的各项决策;有效的森林治理取决于各种管理机构的能力;私营部门和民间组织在成功治理各种森林资源中也发挥着重要作用。从11国经验中分析了各种潜在优势、潜在危险,指出分权管理减少了中央政府的官僚和决策障碍,但会使全国性的政策协调、实施和监督变得困难。     

中国式财政分权与经济增长——基于全国省级面板数据的实证分析

文章通过分析我国1994-2013年的财政分权省级面板数据,并引入劳动力资源及人均投资量作为控制变量,构建多元线性回归模型,考察了我国财政分权对经济增长的影响。分析结果表明,我国省级财政分权对于经济增长的作用并不一致,且影响较小;同时存在东中西部的地区分化现象,东部地区财政分权对经济增长影响存在负面影响,而中西部地区为正面影响。     

联合国粮农组织在林业部门的分权管理经验

简要回顾了联合国粮农组织的分权管理经验。在粮农组织的技术支持下,布基纳法索和马里正在施行分权管理法律,因此这两个国家提供了范例。分析了政府的森林资源管理权下放所必备的专业知识、介入时机和介入策略。依据各种必备的条件和因素提出了相关对结论和建议。正是需要这些条件和因素才能确保森林资源分权管理更具可持续性,民众参与程度更高,政府责任心更强,且森林资源利益分配过程更为公平。文中还提供了如下信息:国际技术援助程序、如何帮助受援国将相关法律和法规转变为具体而新颖的制度安排,以及该领域中未来的工作要点等。     

Decentralization and the Limits to Poverty Reduction: Findings from Ghana

Decentralization has been widely implemented throughout the developing world. Its proponents, notably international donor agencies, claim that democratic local government is more responsive to local citizens' needs, inclusive of those of the majority poor, thus resulting in poverty reduction. Yet evidence remains far from conclusive and this paper challenges such claims. After reviewing recent surveys of the linkage between decentralization and poverty reduction, this paper undertakes a case study of Ghana. Findings from primary data indicate that the impact of the District Assembly system on local poverty has been limited, at best. In seeking to explain such limits to poverty reduction, attention is focused on the national context of decentralization where structural constraints are identified, which are largely intended to maintain central government control. Such obstacles challenge some of the assumptions and expectations of decentralization advocates. It is concluded that the notion of “decentralization from above” is paradoxical, with genuine devolution of power and local poverty reduction likely to require political struggles from below.     

Localizing Land Governance,Strengthening the State: Decentralization and Land Tenure Security in Uganda

Decentralization of land governance is expected to significantly improve land tenure security of small‐scale farmers in Africa, through ensuring better protection of their assets and reducing land‐related conflicts. This paper, however, cautions not to have too high expectations of transferring responsibilities for land administration and dispute resolution to local government bodies. Field research in Mbarara District in south‐western Uganda brings out how decentralization has limited impacts in terms of localizing land services provision. Nonetheless, local land governance has transformed in important ways, as decentralization adds to institutional multiplicity, and fuels competition among state and non‐state authorities, and about the rules they apply. Rather than strengthening local mechanisms for securing tenure, the reforms introduce new forms of tenure insecurity, fail to transform local conventions of dealing with land disputes and delegitimize local mechanisms for securing tenure. In practice, decentralization has had limited effects in securing tenure for the rural poor, yet reinforces the presence of the state at the local level in diverse ways.     

The meanings of forest governance in Esmeraldas,Ecuador

Participatory forestry has become the most accepted way of exploiting timber resources in tropical rain forests. This paper shows the links between participatory forestry, sustainable forest management and the continuing objective of reconciling conservation with commercial development in the province of Esmeraldas, one of the poorest and most rapidly deforested regions of South America. I describe and contextualize the evolving logging programme of a leading Ecuadorian wood-processing group to show that the decentralization of the development process, the recognition of local communities as legal entities in the management of natural resources, and the active involvement of profit-oriented firms in biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation all contribute to the emergence of new alliances between the Ecuadorian government, the logging companies, conservation and human rights organizations, and local Black and indigenous communities. My central argument is that devolution in this context leads to conflictive interpretations of regulation. I end with a discussion of the multi-scalar nature of “forest governance”, and highlight the contribution it makes to our understanding of control, regulation and management in new contexts of privatization and decentralization.     

The incentives of China's urban land finance

Land grant premiums and land tax revenues have become two major sources of fiscal revenue for city governments in China. This type of fiscal revenue strategy for city governments is generally referred to as “land finance”, and it has drawn increasing research attention in recent years. This paper explores the institutional causes of the “land finance” strategy of city governments in China. We first analyze the institutional foundation of “land finance” (including China's urban land use system and land expropriation system). We then propose two hypotheses about the institutional causes of “land finance”. The first hypothesis is that the current system of fiscal decentralization is a major reason city governments choose the “land finance” fiscal strategy. The second hypothesis is that under the current personnel control system, which uses local economic performance as the most important indicator for evaluating local government officials, the competition between city governments to promote local economic growth is another major reason city governments choose the “land finance” fiscal strategy. We test the hypotheses by estimating econometric models using data for 31 provincial-level regions for the period 1999–2008. The empirical results suggest that fiscal decentralization and competition between city governments to promote economic growth are two major causes of “land finance”.