终极控制人所有权特征与企业价值的关系研究——基于沪深A股2010～2011年度的实证研究

终极控制人与中小股东之间的利益冲突问题一直是公司治理研究中的热点,而衡量两者之间利益冲突的研究范式就是研究终极控制人的所有权特征与企业价值的关系。因此,本文首先对终极控制人的所有权特征与企业价值的相关研究进行综述。在此基础上,以2010至2011年深沪两市上市公司为研究对象进行回归分析。研究发现:终极所有权与控制权对企业价值有显著的负影响;两权分离程度与企业价值也有显著负相关关系;而且非国有企业比国有企业对于上述因素的影响更为敏感。     

不同市场竞争程度与相对绩效评价——基于2004-2012年沪深上市公司的实证检验

相对绩效评价(RPE)是委托代理框架下一种特殊的激励机制。本文利用2004-2012年沪深两市上市公司的数据,检验在不同市场环境以及不同所有权性质情况下,企业实施相对绩效评价的状况。研究结果表明,总体来看,相对绩效评价在上市公司中没有得到广泛应用;相对于竞争程度较低的行业,竞争程度较高行业中的企业使用相对绩效评价的可能性更大,同时,技术效率高的企业更可能采用相对绩效评价。在此基础上,本文进一步发现,私有企业在低市场集中度下使用相对绩效评的可能性更高,技术效率高的企业在低市场集中度下使用相对绩效评价的可能性更高。     

所有权、负债与大股东利益侵占——来自中国控制权转移公司的证据

负债的公司治理作用是公司财务研究的重要问题。已有文献探讨了负债在股权分散公司中的公司治理作用,而在股权集中公司中负债对大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题的影响,已有的经验证据相当有限。本文以我国国有控制权转移上市公司为样本,研究了负债在股权集中公司中的治理作用。研究发现,负债与大股东的利益侵占存在显著正相关关系;相对于国有控股公司来说,私有公司的负债水平更高,其原因在于私有大股东通过负债对中小股东利益的侵占程度高于国有大股东。本文提供了负债与大股东利益侵占之间关系的直接证据,揭示了大股东通过负债侵占中小股东利益的行为,以及所有权性质对大股东通过负债侵占小股东利益行为的影响。     

大股东控制、政府控制层级与公司价值创造

本文着眼于公司价值的边际增量——投资绩效,从相对更短的价值链,研究了大股东控制、政府控制层级在我国上市公司价值创造过程中的作用与效率,以深入探究所有权结构与公司价值关系的迷雾。基于我国上市公司的经验证据发现:不同的所有权结构在公司价值创造中的作用与效率和终极所有权性质密不可分,大股东追求控制权私有收益对市县级政府和非政府所属上市公司的投资收益产生了消极影响。具体而言:市县级政府控制和非政府控制上市公司的投资绩效受到堑壕效应的消极影响,但利益趋同效应仅在非政府控制上市公司中有所显现;股权制衡对市县级政府和非政府控制的上市公司投资绩效有一定的积极作用。     

最终控制人所有权和控制权对企业财务失败预警的影响--配对方法与嵌套模型的应用

本文通过在Taylor展开式基础上构建的嵌套logistic模型,研究最终控制人所有权、控制权、两权分离以及最终控制人类型等信息对企业财务失败预警的影响。基于采用配对方法选择的研究样本的实证结果显示嵌套模型具有更高的拟合优度、更好的预警功效以及更强的稳健性。更为重要的是,研究发现,传统上对财务比率与企业财务失败预警之间存在稳定关系的理解并不成立,两者间关系取决于企业最终控制人的所有权和控制权结构以及最终控制人的类型,而导致稳定关系发生变化的主要原因是最终控制人为实现利益输送而采取的盈余管理行为。研究结论为上市公司所有权改革,增强财务信息透明度和质量提供了新的经验证据。     

最终控制人股权质押损害公司价值么?

本文分析了2000～2006年间我国沪深股市上市公司的股权质押行为对公司价值的影响。论文从最终控制人的研究角度提出了股权质押行为影响公司价值的弱化激励效应和强化侵占效应假说。基于面板数据的嵌套模型实证研究结果表明最终控制人的股权质押行为存在明显的弱化激励效应和强化侵占效应,而且这些效应对于私人控股公司更为显著。     

我国上市公司终极控制人股权特征的经验研究

本文主要研究如下问题:第一大股东与终极控制人的所有权结构是否存在区别;终极控制人的现金流权与控制权的偏离程度;这种两权偏离在不同类型的终极控制人中是否存在差异;终极控制人的股     

“国家所有权”研究的民法学争点

国家所有权是民法学界近年研究的重要对象。研究焦点集中在国家所有权的主体、客体、性质、行使及自然资源国家所有权等方面。就国家所有权的主体,存在国家统一和唯一主体说、政府主体说、全民主体说、公法法人说等理论纷争;就国家所有权的客体,对专属于国家所有的客体范围、气候资源及无主物所有权的归属等问题进行了探讨;就国家所有权的性质,呈现出公法所有权说、公权力说、私权说、公共所有权说、特别私权说等不同观点;就国家所有权的行使,提出通过公产、公用物理论、国有财产区分行使原则及专设专门机构以规制国家所有权行使及保障全民利益实现的不同路径;具体就自然资源国家所有权而言,存有"双阶构造说"公权说"国家所有制说"三层结构说"及"权利层次说"等不同学说。梳理国家所有权研究的主要争点可揭示此领域正在及仍待深入研究的问题,明确该领域的未来研究方向,进而为国家所有权制度的建构提供理论根基。     

上市公司实际控制人、多元化经营与投资者保护

本文从上市公司实际控制人利用多元化经营侵占中小股东利益的视角，检验了其在上市公司中的控制权与现金流权分离度对多元化经营程度的影响。结果表明，控制权与现金流权分离度越高，多元化经营程度越高，且控制层级的增加会弱化控制权与现金流权分离度对多元化经营程度的影响，从而验证了我国民营上市公司的实际控制人存在利用多元化经营侵占中小股东利益的动机，并倾向于采用以较低控制层级实现较高控制权与现金流权分离度的方式实现对上市公司的控制。因此，如何保护投资者的合法权益，抑制上市公司实际控制人自利动机的多元化经营行为，成为应该关注的问题。     

政府角色、所有权性质与权益资本成本

基于我国各地市场化进程中政府对企业干预程度的差异,本文研究政府角色转变对不同所有权性质企业权益资本成本的影响。政府减少对企业的干预会产生两个效应:一方面,增强企业经营行为和经营环境的可预期性,从而降低权益资本成本,即"可预期效应";另一方面,会减少对企业的保护,增加企业的风险,提高权益资本成本,即"保护效应"。两个效应的强弱与企业所有权性质密切相关。我们的研究发现,最终控制人是地方政府的企业,"保护效应"比较强,抵消了"可预期效应"的作用,政府角色转变对权益资本成本没有显著影响;对非国有企业,政府保护比较弱,因此在"可预期效应"的作用下,权益资本成本随着政府对经济干预程度减小而降低。     

Large Shareholder Entrenchment and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Canada

Abstract:  Recent empirical evidence indicates that the largest publicly traded companies throughout the world have concentrated ownership. This is the case in Canada where voting rights are often concentrated in the hands of large shareholders, mostly wealthy families. Such concentrated ownership structures can generate specific agency problems, such as large shareholders expropriating wealth from minority shareholders. These costs are aggravated when large shareholders don't bear the full costs of their decisions because of the presence of mechanisms (dual class voting shares, pyramids) which lead to voting rights being greater than the cash flow rights (separation). We assess the impact of separation on various performance metrics while controlling for situations when the large shareholder has (1) the opportunity to expropriate (high free cash flows in the firm) and (2) the incentive to expropriate (low cash flow rights). We also control for when the large shareholder has the power to expropriate (high voting rights, outright control and insider management) and for the presence of family ownership. The results support our hypotheses and indicate that firm performance is lower when large shareholders have both the incentives and the opportunity to expropriate minority shareholders.     

The sources of shareholder wealth gains from going private transactions: The role of controlling shareholders

The present study investigates the sources of shareholder wealth gains – as measured by cumulative abnormal returns and premiums – from going private transactions (GPTs). Using data for 314 GPTs from 18 Western European countries, we find that the announcements of GPTs generate a cumulative average abnormal return of about 22% and that pre-transaction shareholders on average receive a raw premium of about 36%. We further find that these shareholder wealth gains increase with the degree of separation of cash-flow and control rights of the pre-transaction ultimate owner and decrease with its ownership interests and with the presence of a second large shareholder. Taken together, these findings support the view that GPTs are expected to mitigate the inefficiencies induced by pre-transaction agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders. Thus, shareholder wealth gains from GPTs reflect the potential additional value that will be created under private ownership.     

Do Shareholder Tender Agreements inform or expropriate shareholders?

By signing a Shareholder Tender Agreement (STA) a shareholder pre-commits to tender her shares to a particular bidder, forsaking the right to tender to any subsequent bidder. In a representative sample of tender offers between 1995 and 2010, 60% of the offers contain an STA. STA deals are associated with lower premiums, greater ownership concentration, greater management ownership, and greater information asymmetry. The results support the hypothesis that STAs certify value to uninformed shareholders, thereby increasing the efficiency of the tender offer process. The evidence does not support the view that STAs expropriate value from shareholders of target companies.     

终极产权性质、第一大股东对盈余质量的影响分析

以我国2006年底已经实施了股改的深沪两地A股上市公司2007～2008年的经验数据为样本,采用收益-盈余模型检验了终极产权性质、第一大股东与盈余质量之间的关系,研究发现:对于已经实施了股改的上市公司,股权仍然相对集中;当上市公司属于国家终极控制时,盈余质量会较高;第一大股东持股比例与盈余质量正相关;第一大股东对上市公司董事会的控制能力与盈余质量正相关;其他大股东对控股股东的制衡能力对盈余质量的影响不显著.     

Shareholder Rights,Insider Ownership and Earnings Management

This paper examines whether shareholder rights, which enable shareholders to replace managers, can constrain earnings management, and whether this effect is conditional on the level of insider ownership. Using the comprehensive shareholder rights measure constructed by Gompers et al. ( 2003 ), we find that firms with stronger shareholder rights are associated with fewer income‐increasing discretionary accruals, suggesting that stronger shareholder rights deter managers from reporting aggressive earnings. Moreover, if insider ownership introduces managerial entrenchment, managers with higher ownership would be insulated from shareholder discipline. Consistent with this entrenchment theory, we find that the association between shareholder rights and earnings management becomes insignificant in the presence of higher levels of insider ownership. Shareholder rights are negatively associated with earnings management only when insider ownership is low. Our results indicate that the disciplinary effect of shareholder rights can be attenuated by high levels of insider ownership.     

An international study of shareholder protection in freeze-out M&A transactions

Freeze-out M&A transactions are those initiated by controlling shareholders to acquire minority shareholders' ownership in the firm. We compare international freeze-out mergers in 35 countries in merger premium, choice of payment, and completion probability. We find greater merger premium and probability of cash payment but lower deal completion rates in countries with stronger minority shareholder protection. Using detailed minority shareholder protection indexes, we find some evidence that the ex-post anti-self-dealing law enforcement is more important than the ex-ante anti-self-dealing law regulation in protecting minority shareholder value. Our study provides new evidence of minority shareholder protection in the setting of conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders.     

Agency costs and tax planning when the government is a major Shareholder

In state owned enterprises (SOEs), taxes are a dividend to the controlling shareholder, the state, but a cost to other shareholders. We examine publicly traded firms in China and find significantly lower tax avoidance by SOEs relative to non-SOEs. The differences are pronounced for locally versus centrally-owned SOEs and during the year of SOE term performance evaluations. We link our results to managerial incentives through promotion tests, finding that higher SOE tax rates are associated with higher promotion frequencies of SOE managers. Our results suggest managerial incentives and tax reporting are conditional on the ownership structure of the firm.     

Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis

We use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the region's financial crisis. The crisis negatively impacted firms' investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors. Crisis period stock returns of firms in which managers have high levels of control rights, but have separated their control and cash flow ownership, are 10–20 percentage points lower than those of other firms. The evidence is consistent with the view that ownership structure plays an important role in determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders.     

Controlling shareholders and corporate value: Evidence from Thailand

This study investigates the effects of controlling shareholders on corporate performance. The empirical results, based on a unique database of Thai firms, do not support the hypothesis that controlling shareholders expropriate corporate assets. In fact, the presence of controlling shareholders is associated with higher performance, when measured by accounting measures such as the ROA and the sales–asset ratio. Since most of the firms do not implement control mechanisms to separate voting and cash flow rights, the controlling shareholders might be self-constrained not to extract private benefits. Otherwise, they would internalize higher costs of expropriation from holding high stakes. The controlling shareholders' involvement in the management, however, has a negative effect on the performance. The negative effect is more pronounced when the controlling shareholder-and-manager's ownership is at the 25–50%. The evidence also reveals that family-controlled firms display significantly higher performance. Foreign controlled firms as well as firms with more than one controlling shareholder also have higher ROA, relative to firms with no controlling shareholder.