论公司债债权人对公司治理的参与

现代公司法理论在公司治理中引入了债权人参与机制。公司债债权人作为一种证券投资者,数量众多,力量分散,决定了其参与公司治理的途径不同于一般债权人对公司治理的参与。公司债债权人参与公司治理的制度设计有:公司债债权人会议是参与公司治理的主体,债券受托人董事、监事制度,公司债债权人派生诉讼制度。     

债权人与公司治理

在公司治理的研究中有一个共同点，就是往往忽视了债权人在公司治理中的作用。事实上，由于诸多因素的影响，债权人的角色正在发生实质性的变化，债权人不可避免地参与了公司治理，越来越成为未来公司治理结构的核心。     

论金融机构介入公司治理机制的探讨

金融机构作为企业的主要债权人,应参与公司治理来降低贷款风险.本文根据我国具体情况,结合国外的经验,提出了金融机构介入公司治理的设想和建议.     

我国债券融资与公司治理关系探讨

文章探讨了债权人参与公司治理的理论基础和债券融资对公司治理的影响机制,在此基础上对我国债券融资在公司治理中的作用进行分析,发现债券融资在我国公司治理中的作用尚未得到足够重视,不能有效发挥。主要是由于企业债券市场发展的滞后以及企业和商业银行的治理结构缺陷造成的企业对股权融资和银行贷款的偏好所致。针对这些存在的问题,笔者提出了相应的对策建议。     

债权人诉讼与企业投资效率:机制与路径

本文以债权人诉讼为视角,检验了诉讼之后上市公司投资效率的变化情况。实证结果发现,债权人诉讼能够有效提高上市公司的投资效率,并且在一定程度上对过度投资和投资不足行为都存在显著的影响。进一步的研究表明,不同债权人类型和不同企业性质治理的效果存在一定差异,具体来讲,在银行类金融机构债权人和非国有上市公司中,债务诉讼的治理作用更加显著。在诉讼的治理路径研究中发现,涉诉公司通过变更管理层来发挥债权治理作用。     

后金融危机时代的银行参与公司治理法律机制

在公司的内外部治理机制中,银行始终占有重要地位。随着利益相关者理论的兴起,银行作为债权人参与公司治理的观念深入人心。尤其在全球经济已然进入后金融危机时代的现今,无论旨在维护自身利益抑或为保障公众利益,银行参与公司治理均深具必要性。银行参与公司治理的法制模式主要包括美国的择机治理机制、德国的全能银行治理机制以及日本的主银行机制,它们各有优势和缺陷。影响上述机制产生的因素有许多,它们共同的发展趋势是支持银行参与治理并深化治理程度。借鉴此次金融危机的教训,我国目前有必要继受大陆法系相关制度,构建真正意义上的银行参与公司治理法律机制。     

金融机构介入公司治理机制的可行性及相关问题研究

公司治理机制不仅在于实现股东权益的最大化,而且还应当保护利益相关者的合法权益。银行及其他金融机构作为企业融资的主要来源,应当有权以债权人的身份参与到公司治理中,以降解潜在的金融风险,优化公司治理机制。本文介绍并借鉴了国外在这方面的实践经验,并根据我国具体情况,针对不同资产负债类型的公司的金融机构介入治理机制方式提出了相应的设想和建议。     

我国上市公司债权人治理弱化及其对策

我国公司治理准则的指导思想是利益相关者共同治理,它涉及股东、债权人、顾客、供应两等共同治理。但我国债权人作为公司外部治理的主要力量并没有发挥其应有的作用,特别是银行在公司治理中的作用非常有限。为此,重点研究我国上市公司债权人治理的现状,以及治理弱化的原因,并对完善上市公司债权人治理提出若干建议。     

相互制保险公司治理的逻辑与价值

相互制保险公司与股份制保险公司作为两种有效的保险组织形式,具有各自的制度优势。相互制保险公司以保单持有人作为公司的治理主体,将公司所有权人与公司客户或债权人合二为一,形成了有别于股份制公司的治理模式,具有化解利益冲突、降低道德风险、解决逆向选择、处理不完全合同等机制。互助是保单持有人参与公司治理的行动基础,分红是保单持有人参与公司治理的行动激励。有效率的保险市场应当是相互制与股份制共存的均衡市场。     

金融机构介入公司治理机制的可行性及相关问题研究

公司治理机制不仅在于实现股东权益的最大化,而且还应当保护利益相关者的合法权益.银行及其他金融机构作为企业融资的主要来源,应当有权以债权人的身份参与到公司治理中,以降解潜在的金融风险,优化公司治理机制.本文介绍并借鉴了国外在这方面的实践经验,并根据我国具体情况,针对不同资产负债类型的公司的金融机构介入治理机制方式提出了相应的设想和建议.     

Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the U.S. and Germany

This article provides a comparative study of four major dimensions of corporate governance in the U.S. and Germany: (1) the laws affecting corporate governance, particularly those designed to protect minority shareholders; (2) the prescribed role and actual conduct of corporate boards; (3) the market for corporate control (including hostile takeovers); and (4) incentive compensation. The authors pose the question: If the primary purpose of the corporate governance system is to serve the interests of minority shareholders, how do the U.S. and German governance systems rank on each of these four dimensions ? Their conclusion is that although the U.S. system is more shareholder friendly in many respects than the German, both systems have major shortcomings, particularly in the market for corporate control. The authors conclude with a list of proposed changes to both systems that would amount to “taking shareholders seriously.”     

公司治理和融资政策的关系研究综述

公司治理在融资政策选择中起着重要作用。公司治理作为减少代理成本的激励机制，能抑制内部人机会主义行为，使其不能按自身利益调整公司融资政策。同时，公司治理通过减低信息不对称水平、减少小股东受掠夺的风险进而降低资本成本。本文对国内外公司治理与融资政策之间关系的研究进行了全面、系统的回顾，评价了现有文献存在的问题和不足之处，为中国上市公司治理结构和公司融资问题的研究提供了依据。具体而言，本文回顾了公司治理和资本结构、公司治理和债务期限结构、公司治理和资本成本之间的关系。     

公司治理与银行借款融资

本文以中国深沪两市A股上市公司为样本,检验了公司治理在银行信贷决策中的作用。通过检验公司治理水平对企业银行借款融资能力和融资成本的影响,我们发现,企业银行借款融资能力方面,无论长期借款还是短期借款,公司治理因素对企业银行借款融资能力均没有影响,银行更看重企业的经营状况。企业银行借款融资成本方面,我们发现公司治理机制中只有监事会特征和股权集中度对企业银行借款融资成本有显著影响。具体地,监事会规模越大,融资成本越低;股权集中度越高,融资成本越高。本文结果说明公司治理因素在我国银行放贷决策中的作用有限。     

Corporate Governance and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from Australian Companies

The authors examine a sample of large Australian companies over a 10‐year period with the aim of analyzing the role that firm‐level corporate governance mechanisms such as insider ownership and independent boards play in explaining a company's cost of capital. The Australian corporate system offers a unique environment for assessing the impact of corporate governance mechanisms. Australian companies have board structures and mechanisms that are similar in design to Anglo‐Saxon boards while offering a striking contrast to those of German and Japanese boards. At the same time, however, the Australian market for corporate control is much less active as a corrective mechanism against management entrenchment than its U.S. and U.K. counterparts, making the role of internal governance mechanisms potentially more important in Australia than elsewhere. The authors report that greater insider ownership, the presence of institutional blockholders, and independent boards are all associated with reductions in the perceived risk of a firm, thereby leading investors to demand lower rates of return on capital. In so doing, the study provides evidence of the important role of corporate governance in increasing corporate values.     

The role of corporate governance in shaping accruals manipulation prior to acquisitions

Based on stock swap transactions involving public acquirers originating from the UK between 1998 and 2011, this paper investigates the role of corporate governance in shaping accruals manipulation prior to stock swap deals. In contrast to common claims that strong corporate governance constrains accruals manipulation, my results show that well-governed acquirers engage more aggressively in income-increasing accruals manipulation than those with weak governance. This finding is consistent with a role of corporate governance that incentivises managerial actions in the interests of firms’ shareholders. Overall, this finding highlights the setting-specific nature of the earnings management and corporate governance relation. My results are robust to different discretionary accrual models, differences in the firm's growth structure, merger and acquisition control variables, a control group of 100% cash acquirers, an analysis of buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and potential sample selection problems.     

企业财权安排的几个基本理论问题:基于利益相关者理论研究

长期以来,人们研究企业所有权安排的基本思路是"股东至上"逻辑。然而,在现代市场经济条件下,随着企业对人力资本和外部资源的日益重视以及世界各国对企业的社会责任和各利益相关者在企业治理中的作用越来越关注,"股东至上"逻辑受到了愈益强烈的挑战,利益相关者理论已成为企业治理理论的重要组成部分。本文着重运用利益相关者理论对企业财权安排的基本前提、客观基础、主要特征和实现机制等基础性问题进行了研究,以期拓展企业治理理论的研究领域和应用价值。     

Predicting corporate governance in emerging markets

This paper investigates what predicts corporate governance in emerging markets. Specifically, we examine what predicts governance changes and the level of governance itself. To conduct this study, we utilize a unique dataset from AllianceBernstein that consists of monthly firm-level corporate governance ratings for 24 emerging market countries for almost seven years. Since the AllianceBernstein ratings are time-series data, they allow us to determine the direction of change in a firm’s corporate governance, and the timing of these changes. Using these data, we find two main results. First, as firms grow they are more likely to improve their governance. Second, the level of political risk where the firm resides is negatively and significantly related to the level of firm governance but positively and significantly related to changes in firm governance. Hence, firm governance is better in countries with lower political risk but firms are more likely to improve their governance in countries with higher political risk.     

商业银行公司治理：进展及改革着力点

随着我国金融业的全面对外开放,银行面临更多更大的挑战。如何有效应对?银行公司治理是个关键。巴塞尔原则和我国有关的法规制度,对银行公司治理有积极作用。但是,公司治理是否有效,还需通过银行的商业实践来验证。优化董事会结构、加强内部控制建设并重视利益相关者的作用,是银行公司治理的重要内容;提高创新能力、服务能力和抗风险能力,是银行保持长久竞争力和实现利润最大化的基础和前提。     

Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors

We examine whether institutional investors affect corporate governance by analyzing portfolio holdings of institutions in companies from 23 countries during the period 2003–2008. We find that firm-level governance is positively associated with international institutional investment. Changes in institutional ownership over time positively affect subsequent changes in firm-level governance, but the opposite is not true. Foreign institutions and institutions from countries with strong shareholder protection play a role in promoting governance improvements outside of the U.S. Institutional investors affect not only which corporate governance mechanisms are in place, but also outcomes. Firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly performing Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and exhibit improvements in valuation over time. Our results suggest that international portfolio investment by institutional investors promotes good corporate governance practices around the world.     

Retail investor attention and corporate innovation in the big data era

This paper explores the corporate governance role of retail investor attention from the perspective of corporate innovation. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2011 to 2019, we find that retail investor attention significantly promotes corporate innovation. Thisresult ise robust to a series of robustness checks to address potential endogeneity concerns. I further conclude that the impact of retail investor attention on corporate innovation is mainly through alleviating a firm's financial constraints and deterring agency costs. In addition, such effects are more pronounced in firms with higher media and analyst coverage as well as those with more overconfident CEOs. The results provide empirical evidence of the corporate governance function of individual investors in the current digital era.