公司治理的我国上市公司资本结构研究

企业的生存和发展离不开资本，资本筹集是企业生产经营正常运行的关键环节。资本的筹集不仅满足了企业生存和发展的需要，它还体现了资本所有者与企业经营者之间、资本所有者与企业之间以及不同资本所有者之间的关系。这种关系直接构成了公司治理的核心内容，即企业的资本筹集与公司治理之间有着天然的联系。不同的融资结构决定了不同的公司治理模式及其效率，融资结构的变化会直接导致公司治理的变化。本文仅从融资结构的一部分——资本结构与公司治理之间的关联性入手，分析我国上市公司资本结构的现状，并自此基础上提出相应的对策。     

我国上市公司资本结构影响股权代理成本的实证分析

公司资本结构是公司治理结构的重要方面,它对公司代理成本有着直接的影响。本文对1990—2003年上市公司资本结构影响股权代理成本的实证分析表明,经营者持股比例与股权代理成本呈显著负相关;负债融资比例、法人股比例和第一大股东持股比例与股权代理成本呈不显著负相关;国家股比例和流通股比例与股权代理成本呈较显著正相关。这些研究结论表明,资本结构对股东、经营者和债权人之间的契约关系有着直接的影响,完善资本结构是完善我国上市公司治理结构从而降低代理成本的重要途径之一。     

优化资本结构发挥债务融资在公司治理中的效应

资本结构是公司长期债务资本和权益资本的构成比例。公司治理是处理公司股东、债权人、管理者等不同利益关系人之间关系，以实现经济目标的一整套制度安排。在公司治理方面，债权和股权不仅被看作是融资工具．还被认为是不同的治理结构，他们均对公司形成控制权，共同构成公司治理结构的基本内容。我国上市公司的资本结构中债务资本比例偏低．且对公司治理的作用有限。本文从优化资本结构出发。探讨债务融资在公司治理中的效应。     

上市公司资本结构、股利分配及管理股权比例相互作用机制研究

本文认为，上市公司资本结构、股利分配及管理股权比例三者之间存在着显著的相互作用关系。现有文献往往将资本结构和股利分配作为被解释变量，资本结构与股利分配互为解释变量，管理股权比例仅被视为解释变量，采用单方程模型方法进行独立研究，参数估计难免有偏和不一致。基于此，本文通过建立资本结构、股利分配及管理股权比例之间关系的结构方程模型扩展了以往研究结果。实证结果表明，资本结构、股利分配及管理股权比例三者之间存在相互作用关系，管理股权比例是影响公司的资本结构政策和股利分配政策的重要因素；处于成长阶段、资产规模逐渐扩大的绩优公司善于发挥财务杠杆效应，以降低权益代理成本，资产负债率与公司绩效正相关；盈利能力和公司股本规模是影响公司股利分配政策的共同因素，这与本人有关股利政策的以往研究结果一致。     

简论融资结构与公司治理的关系

本文在对有关融资结构与公司治理的关系的研究文献进行综述的基础上,从对美日融资结构、公司治理模式进行比较和融资结构对公司治理中的委托代理关系、控制权的影响的角度分析了融资结构与公司治理的关系,并简单探讨了我国国有企业融资结构与公司治理问题。     

资本结构、公司治理与投资者保护——基于委托代理理论的分析

公司治理与资本结构在投资者保护中起着重要作用:科学完善的公司治理机制是投资者利益得以保护的前提,合理的资本结构是保护投资者利益的有效手段;而公司治理缺陷则可能诱发经营者和股东侵害投资者利益的行为。本文在对公司治理、资本结构与投资者保护之间的关系进行理论分析的基础上,对我国上市公司当前资本结构和公司治理中的主要问题进行了分析,进而提出了完善我国投资者保护制度的政策建议。     

融资模式与国有企业公司治理结构的改革

本文从融资模式、银企关系与公司治理结构之间的内在联系出发,分析几种典型的融资模式和公司治理结构之间的对应关系,以及其对内部人控制问题的处理方式,结合我国国有企业融资结构与企业治理结构的现状,提出现阶段我国国有企业融资模式的现实选择以及相应的公司治理结构的改革。     

我国上市公司股权融资偏好探析

我国上市公司的资本结构严重违背了西方“融资优序理论”,表现出不同的特点,即资产负债比率严重偏低,上市公司偏好股权融资。本文分析了股权融资偏好的现状特征和缺陷,从融资成本、公司股权治理结构和政策体制方面分析了我国上市公司股权融资偏好的原因,并根据分析提出了改善股权融资偏好的建议。     

我国上市公司的资本结构与代理成本问题分析

本文分析了我国上市公司股东与经理、股东与债权人之间利益冲突的特点 ,提出了代理成本的资本结构解决方案 :扩大债务融资比重 ,控制配股融资比重 ,建立我国企业债券市场体系 ,完善公司治理机制     

税收视角下资本结构对公司治理的影响研究

税法对股息和利息的不同税务处理原则,对公司的资本结构决策产生了影响;而股权融资和债权融资作为公司融资的两种手段,又形成了股权治理和债权治理这两种公司治理的主要形式.由此,税收影响资本结构的运行机理为:税收→资本结构→公司治理结构安排.考虑政府课税,股权治理着重解决政府和公司之间以及股东和经营者之间的利益冲突;债权治理着重解决政府和公司之间以及股东和债权人之间的利益冲突.虽然股权治理和债权治理的侧重点有别,但两者在公司治理体系中相辅相成、缺一不可.     

中国上市企业投资的资本成本敏感性估计

企业投资对资本成本的敏感性是识别货币政策利率传导渠道是否畅通以及IS曲线斜率的重要参数。本文基于新古典投资模型框架,使用2004-2017年中国上市公司非平衡面板数据,估计了中国上市企业投资的资本成本敏感性,并侧重检验了融资约束对企业投资资本成本敏感性的影响。估计结果显示:(1)上市企业投资的加权资本成本弹性显著为负,且已具有较强敏感性(长期弹性系数为-0.16～-0.27),价格型货币政策工具的传导条件在上市公司投资环节正逐渐具备 ;(2)对加权资本成本的结构性估计显示,企业投资主要对债务资本成本的变动较为敏感且系数显著为负,而对股权资本成本的变动敏感程度较低且不稳定;(3)与传统观点相反的是,非国有控股上市企业投资的资本成本敏感性显著低于国有控股上市企业;较强的融资约束是导致非国有控股上市企业投资的资本成本敏感性较低的重要原因,应重视民营经济面临较强的融资约束对价格型货币政策工具传导机制的负面影响。本文的研究为中国货币政策框架的转型以及价格型货币政策传导机制的有效性提供了微观经验证据的支持。     

Multiple corporate governance attributes and the cost of capital – Evidence from Germany

This paper investigates the extent to which corporate governance affects the cost of debt and equity capital of German exchange-listed companies. I examine corporate governance along three dimensions: financial information quality, ownership structure and board structure. The results suggest that firms with high levels of financial transparency and bonus compensations face lower cost of equity. In addition, block ownership is negatively related to firms' cost of equity when the blockholders are other firms, managers or founding-family members. Consistent with the conjecture that agency costs increase with firm size, I find significant cost of debt effects only in the largest German companies. Here, the creditors demand lower cost of debt from firms with block ownerships held by corporations or banks. My findings demonstrate that a uniform set of governance attributes is unlikely to satisfy suppliers of debt and equity capital equally.     

Financial development,corporate governance and cost of equity capital

Existing research suggests that external governance is more relevant than internal governance in affecting a firm’s value. We contribute to the literature by explicitly examining the interactive role played by country-level financial development and legal institutions in influencing the impact of firm-level governance on the cost of equity capital. Using a comprehensive sample of 7380 firm years drawn from 22 developed countries, we show that firm-level corporate governance attributes affect the cost of equity capital primarily in the Common Law countries with high levels of financial development. Our study is the first to highlight the complementary effects of legal origin, financial development and firm-level governance attributes in influencing the cost of equity capital.     

Corporate governance,SFAS 157 and cost of equity capital: evidence from US financial institutions

This study examines the association between fair value measurements and the cost of equity capital under different fair value valuation methods, and assesses the impact of corporate governance on this relationship for US financial firms. We find that firms’ cost of equity capital is negatively associated with more verifiable fair value assets and positively related to less verifiable fair value assets. Furthermore, the positive association between less verifiable fair value assets and the cost of equity capital is mitigated under better corporate governance. The differential impact between more and less verifiable assets becomes smaller for firms with stronger governance. Our findings contribute to the ongoing debate on fair value regulation by investigating the economic consequences of adopting Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements (SFAS 157) and the importance of audit committee financial expertise on fair value reporting. We also provide evidence on the importance of board independence, internal control strength, auditor industry specialists, and audit committee financial experts in fair value reporting.     

高管团队内部治理与企业资本结构调整——基于非CEO高管独立性的视角

本文以2001-2017年A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了高管团队内部治理对企业资本结构的影响。研究发现:当企业负债不足时,高管团队内部治理效应能够显著提高企业(尤其是非国有企业)的负债水平,降低企业实际资本结构与目标资本结构的偏离程度。这种高管团队内部治理效应在第一类委托代理问题比较严重以及非CEO高管监督动机较强的企业中更加显著。作用机制分析表明,高管团队内部治理效应能够通过降低第一类代理成本来降低企业资本结构与目标资本结构的偏离程度。本文的研究结论为改善我国上市公司治理提供了新的思路,对于优化企业融资结构、深化金融供给侧结构性改革具有一定的启示意义。     

Bank Capital Ratios Across Countries: Why Do They Vary?

This paper extends the literature on bank capital structure by modeling capital structure as a function of important public policy and bank regulatory characteristics of the home country, as well as of bank specific variables, country macro-economic conditions and country level financial characteristics. The model is estimated with annual data for an unbalanced panel of the 78 largest private banks in the world headquartered in 12 industrial countries over the period between 1992 and 2005. The results indicate that bank capital ratios are significantly affected in the hypothesized directions by most of the bank-specific variables. Several of the country characteristic and policy variables are also significant with the predicted sign: banks maintain higher capital ratios in home countries in which the bank sector is relatively smaller and in countries that practice prompt corrective actions more actively, have more stringent capital requirements, and have more effective corporate governance structures.     

Determinants of Capital Structure in Emerging European Economies: Evidence from Slovenian Firms

Although empirical research has shown that some capital structure differences can be explained by modern capital structure theory in mature market economies, the forces behind capital structure decisions in emerging European economies remain a puzzle. We assume that, in these countries, the change in economic system, and therefore corporate governance, has been only gradual; other forces must be at work when firms decide on their capital structures compared to those of mature market economies. After identifying possible relevant factors in Slovenian firms, we show that throughout the period from 1999 to 2006, these factors explained the greatest part of capital structure differences. However, the explanatory power of the proposed factors is changing, which implies changing corporate governance and financial behavior of Slovenian firms during transition.     

Quality of Corporate Governance and Cost of Equity in Brazil

Common sense suggests that the adoption of better corporate governance practices, which enable greater transparency, more protection against capital expropriation, and greater rights for investors, should have the effect of reducing the risk perceived by shareholders and so lead to lower required returns. This article investigates the existence of an inverse relationship between the quality of corporate governance and the cost of equity capital for Brazilian companies. The authors begin by constructing a broad index of corporate governance quality that combines four key aspects of corporate governance: (1) transparency and disclosure; (2) structure of the board of directors; (3) ownership and control structure; and (4) shareholder rights. To estimate the cost of equity, the CAPM was applied by using ex ante market premiums calculated with a simple discounted‐dividend method. On the basis of a sample of 67 Brazilian companies traded at the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) during the period 1998–2008, the study concludes that there is a significant inverse relationship between the cost of equity and a number of proxies for effective governance, particularly those representing transparency and disclosure. Closer inspection of the reductions in cost of capital associated with improvements in the specific governance quality index components suggests that companies would benefit the most from prompt submission of information to regulators and full disclosure of executive pay.     

公司治理与绩效关系研究最新进展

公司治理的重要性已经得到理论界和实务界的认可。本文从两个方面论述了好的公司治理能够带来的影响，一方面好的公司治理能够提高管理效率，降低代理成本，进而提升财务绩效；另一方面，好的业绩使公司在资本市场上有更好的表现，即市场绩效，体现为公司治理溢价的存在。     

Consequences of local social norms: A review of the literature in accounting,finance, and corporate governance

We synthesise the empirical archival research on the consequences of local social norms on accounting, finance, and corporate governance outcomes in an international setting. The literature reviewed is premised on the theory that corporations do not make decisions, but managers do, and managers are likely to be influenced by the socioeconomic environment of the region in which they operate and/or by the people with whom they interact. To provide a structure to our review, we identify social capital, religiosity, gambling norms, and corruption culture, as four constructs of local social norms and link these with financial reporting and external auditing, financial, investment, and dividend decisions, capital market consequences and finally, corporate governance and corporate social responsibility behaviour of firms. We highlight some limitations of the existing research and offer some suggestions for future research.