对完善上市公司监督机制的探讨

独立董事制度源于英美国家,是在“一元制”模式下建立的独立董事制度。我国虽然导入了独立董事制度,但目前采取的是“二元制”公司治理结构。如何协调和处理“一元制”和“二元制”二者间的关系,是当前我国独立董事制度需要完善和解决的问题。本文针对如何建全上市公司监督机制,对我国上市公司内部监督制度现状和缺失原因进行分析,提出支持独立董事制度的观点,着重对监事会与独立董事的冲突协调和独立董事制度改造以及对监事会制度的完善对策。     

金融企业内部监督机制有效性度量指标体系构建

为了满足准确评价我国金融企业内部监督机制有效性的现实和理论需求,构建了内部监督机制有效性度量指标体系。该指标体系将内部监督机制有效性可分解为股东监督机制有效性与董事会监督机制有效性。其中,股东大会次数、股东大会出席股份比率、第一大非国有股比率能够有效度量股东监督机制有效性;独立董事比率、持股关联董事比率、次级委员会设置能有效度量董事会监督机制有效性。     

浅论我国上市公司独立董事制度存在的问题及完善对策

独立董事制度兴起于美国,应用于董事会的内部监督。随着其在美国的发展,我国上市公司也逐渐开始采用了独立董事制度。但是,自从我国实施以来,效果不尽如人意。独立董事制度作为我国上市公司的一个新生事物,无论是理论方面还是实践方面都尚不完善,想让独立董事制度在我国上市公司发挥其积极的作用,还有很多问题尚待解决。因此,本文主要表述了我国上市公司独立董事制度存在的一些问题以及一些相应的应对措施。     

完善我国上市公司独立董事制度的思考

独立董事制度作为有效的内部监督机制之一，是改善公司治理机制的一项重要措施。完善我国上市公司独立董事制度，须对独立董事的法律地位有一个清晰的界定，包括制定严格的任职资格标准、明确的选任程序、适当的权利和义务范围以及合理的激励机制。     

独立董事制度的有效性:基于盈余管理视角

本文从盈余管理的视角研究我国独立董事制度的有效性,为我国独立董事制度的完善提供实证支持.结果发现,具有会计专业能力的上市公司独立董事人数越多,盈余管理程度越低;独立董事薪酬越高,上市公司盈余管理程度越高.但没有发现独立董事比例、履职环境与其盈余管理程度具有显著的相关关系.     

试论我国上市公司的内部监督制度

我国上市公司监事会监督不力是一个极其突出的问题,在很多情况下,公司经营管理层视其“不存在”,而监事会也从未真正意识到自己的“存在”。本文通过对我国上市公司内部监督制度的现状分析,提出我国上市公司的监事会制度应考虑借鉴英美公司法的独立董事制度,设立独立监事,并通过立法对监事会以及监事的产生及其权力与义务进行完善,以加强对上市公司经营管理层的监督。     

“监督机制”还是“掏空行为”：超额聘任独立董事与企业环保投资

以2007—2021年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,深入探究超额聘任独立董事对企业环保投资的影响效应及作用机制。研究发现：超额聘任独立董事对企业环保投资具有显著的促进作用,验证了超额聘任独立董事属于一种“监督机制”;超额聘任独立董事通过抑制管理层短视和大股东掏空行为来促进企业进行环保投资;在重污染行业、两职合一以及独立董事薪酬较低的企业中,超额聘任独立董事对企业环保投资的促进作用更显著。     

独立董事制度任重道远

2001年是我国证券市场的"监管年",独立董事制度的出台成为最重要的监管措施之一。这种制度首先在上市公司推行,随后逐步在基金公司、股份制商业银行施行。据不完全统计,到2001年底,在我国证券市场上已有204家境内上市公司设立独立董事,合计314名。然而,独立董事制度的推行存在以下三大矛盾:1.证券市场各主体对独立董事制度设立的目的以及独立董事的职责认识不统一的矛盾。上市公司引入独立董事的目的主要是给上市公司引入相对的监督机制,使上市公司、董事会的行为更加规范,保护中小投资者的利益。而上市公司和一些待上市公司考虑更多的是利用独立董事的专家、学者的知名度和信誉来扩大企业的影响力,增强投资者对企业的信心,获得一种"示范效应"和"公众效应"。因此他们在选取独立董事时更多的考虑其名气,而不是实用性。而一些专家、学者想成为     

董事高管责任保险对公司负债能力影响研究

本文运用沪深A股上市公司财务数据,实证检验董事高管责任保险的购买与上市公司负债能力之间的关系。研究结果显示,公司的负债水平与上市公司的董事高管责任保险的购买之间呈现显著正相关关系,同时上市公司负债的期限,不管是期限结构还是期限水平也都与董事高管责任保险购买正相关。随后本文对比国有上市公司和非国有上市公司购买董事高管责任保险的效用,结果显示董事高管责任保险的购买对国有上市公司负债能力的作用显著大于非国有上市公司。最后总结并提出包括完善我国董事高管责任保险制度、加强公司的内部监督、完善购买董事高管责任保险的信息披露等建议。     

中小银行机构公司治理机制的替代效应

本文利用对山东省中小商业银行机构的调查数据,考察了金融机构各种监督机制之间的替代效应.笔者分别通过构建一个线性模型和一个Probit模型来对外部董事、管理层持股、董事长/总经理两职分离、大股东和监管机构这五种监督机制的替代效应进行研究,并对这些变量作了统计分析.通过回归结果,笔者发现在两种外部监督机制之间存在显著的替代效应,内部监督机制中的外部董事比例与外部监督机制之间也存在替代效应,但是其他两个内部监督机制并没有表现出这种效应,而内部监督机制之间则存在显著的互补效应.     

Gender-diverse boards and audit fees: What difference does gender quota legislation make?

We investigate the effect of board (audit committee) gender diversity on audit fees in the French context. We also examine whether the relationship between the proportion of female directors and audit fees is moderated by the enactment of the gender quota law in 2011. We use the system GMM estimation approach on a matched sample of French firms listed in the SBF 120 index between 2002 and 2017. Consistent with the supply-side perspective, we contend that female independent directors and female audit committee members, by improving board monitoring effectiveness, affect the auditor's assessment of audit risk, resulting in lower audit fees. Our findings also document that, by breaking the glass ceiling, the effectiveness of the gender quota law lies not in increasing the proportion of female insider directors, but in boosting the appointment of female independent directors and female audit committee members. Using the difference-in-difference approach, our results reveal that female independent directors and female audit committee members are more willing to assert their monitoring skills after the quota law, leading to lower audit fees. Moving beyond tokenism, we show that, after the quota law, the negative impact on non-audit fees is strengthened only for female independent directors.     

Board independence,internal information environment and voluntary disclosure of auditors’ reports on internal controls

When there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers, independent directors do not have enough information to perform their functions. Only when faced with a good internal information environment can such directors acquire enough information to provide advice and monitor managers, and only under these conditions can increasing their proportion on the board effectively reduce agency problems, such as driving managers to disclose information to investors. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms that voluntarily disclose their auditors’ reports on internal controls from 2007 to 2009, this study explores how the information acquisition costs of independent directors affect their monitoring effectiveness by investigating the disclosure decisions of their internal control audits. We find that when the information asymmetry between insiders and outside directors is low and the proportion of independent directors on a board is high, a firm is more likely to voluntarily disclose its internal control audit report.     

基于盈余管理视角的独立董事有效性研究

从上市公司盈余管理的角度出发,将2002~2008年度的非操纵性应计利润截面数据分为小于0和大于0的两种基本情况,实证分析了公司独立董事制度的有效性问题。研究结果表明:独立董事能有效的发挥作用。     

Independent director cash compensation and earnings management

This study examines the impact of independent directors’ cash compensation on firms’ financial reporting quality using a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2002 to 2008. Unlike in the U.S. where most listed firms provide stock-related compensations to outside directors, Chinese listed companies compensate independent directors with cash only. This context offers a cleaner setting for examining the effects of independent director cash pay on earnings management. Our study documents a positive association between independent director cash compensation and the magnitude of earnings management. This suggests that compensating independent directors with higher cash pay compromises their independence and reduces their effectiveness in financial reporting oversight. Our results are robust to an array of sensitivity checks. These findings have important implications for both investors and policy makers by showing that independent directors’ cash compensation is also a significant determinant of financial reporting quality.     

Does the reputation mechanism apply to independent directors in emerging markets? Evidence from China

We examine whether reputable independent directors improve firm performance and governance quality in emerging markets, using data from China. Firms with such directors, measured as the number of directorships in other listed firms, have higher profitability, operating efficiency and productivity. They suffer from fewer agency problems, pay more cash dividends and have lower likelihoods of receiving modified audit opinions and participating in financial disclosure-related irregularities than their counterparts. In China’s unique institutional context, the reputation mechanism for independent directors applies to firms in regions with weak marketization environments, non-state-owned enterprises and firms without political connections; it also applies when external governance is weak. Overall, reputable independent directors appear to occupy valuable advising and monitoring roles and compensate for weak institutions and governance in China.     

The Role of the Independent Director: Evidence from a Survey of Independent Directors in Australia

The purpose of this paper is to report the results of a survey of independent directors on a range of issues relating to the execution of their role including the independent directors' perceptions relating to board effectiveness, board interactions, information sources, and performance and evaluation. A survey was forwarded to independent directors of the top 200 Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed companies. The paper aims to provide the perceptions of independent directors themselves and so contribute to the literature through a better understanding of the nature of the work performed by Australian company independent directors and the environment in which it occurs. Findings suggest that the fundamental role of the independent director has not changed as a result of the corporate governance reforms.     

External regulation,independent director attendance,and governance effects

In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’ behavior, and consider the governance effect of such regulations. This examination exploits the differences between the requirements for director attendance at board meetings enacted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Using a difference-in-differences model with a sample of A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2017, we document that the rate of meeting attendance by independent directors who serve with firms listed on the SHSE (SHIDs) has increased significantly since the exchange’s enforcement of the regulation on attendance. This positive effect has been more pronounced for independent directors with legal backgrounds. Further investigations find that the regulation of attendance plays a corporate governance role through the mechanism of enhanced monitoring. The attendance regulation increases the SHIDs likelihood of casting dissenting votes, and it leads to both better accounting performance and higher firm value. In addition, SHIDs are more likely to depart from firms listed on the SHSE, and to transfer their directorships to firms listed on the SZSE, which has a less constraining attendance requirement. Our findings provide evidence of how external regulation shapes director attendance and voting behavior in emerging markets.     

The effect of independent directors’ characteristics on firm performance: Tenure and multiple directorships

In this paper, we analyze how the tenure and the number of directorships of independent directors may influence the relationship between board independence and firm performance. Our sample is composed of US listed firms for the period 2008–2012. Several robustness checks and sensitivity analyses are performed and we confirm that the board’s independence positively influences the firm’s performance. Nevertheless, this relationship exists only under certain values of directors’ tenure and external directorships. Our findings show that these variables determine the effectiveness of independent directors. Therefore, this paper highlights the need for a more specific approach, based on the personal characteristics of independent directors, in order to study their influence on corporate decisions, strategy and outcomes. Furthermore, our evidence has direct implications for companies in the selection of board members.     

The monitoring role of independent directors in CEO pay–performance relationship: the case of Malaysian government linked companies

This study looks into the pay-performance and monitoring issues in Malaysian government linked companies (GLCs). Our study utilizes 21 Malaysian public listed GLCs data from financial year 2001 until 2006. We adopt panel regression to study pay–performance relationship while the internal monitoring mechanism is measured by board independence. In our analysis, chief executive officer (CEO pay is regressed to individual performance as well as benchmarked against industry average. Generally, we document that the pay–performance relationship in Malaysian GLCs is sporadically significant, implying that CEO pay is not properly aligned to performance. However, pay-earning-sensitivity (EPS) is high and statistically significant when individual performances are benchmarked against industry average in GLCs with more than 50% independent directors (majority board). This implies that for Malaysian GLCs, a majority independent board is required to ensure effective monitoring on CEOs' performance.