企业剩余权力及其配置

企业是一种契约的组织形式，由于契约的不完全性产生了剩余权力，它包括剩余控制权和剩余索取权，它们共同构成了企业的所有权。剩余权力的合理配置对提高企业绩效有重要的意义，本文通过分析企业中各契约方的特征，说明了剩余控制权和剩余索取权的关系及其动态配置过程，并提出如何在经理人掌握剩余控制权的同时避免其侵害股东利益。     

财产所有权、企业所有权与企业财务主体

财产所有权按财产的不同形态可区分为资本怕有权和劳动所有权两种，企业所有权则是在财产所有权界定基础上对企业剩余索取权和剩余控制权的安排，而企业财务主体则是依存于企业所有权的不同安排，只有在企业剩余索取权和剩余控制权对称分配的企业所有权安排下，企业财务主体才是完整的财务主体。     

剩余索取权·会计契约·公司绩效

剩余索取权属于企业理论的重要研究范畴,本文在对剩余索取权内涵分析的基础上,系统归纳了经济学界目前存在的三种看法以及分析它们三者的优缺点,同时也展望了未来剩余索取权的发展趋势,在此基础上,本文从会计契约的角度出发,分析了企业剩余索取权的契约变迁,最后本文阐述了剩余索取权和企业绩效之间的关系,并在威廉逊模型的基础上对模型进行改进,探讨了公司绩效和剩余索取权分配的内在联系。     

剩余索取权·会计契约·公司绩效

剩余索取权属于企业理论的重要研究范畴，本文在对剩余索取权内涵分析的基础上，系统归纳了经济学界目前存在的三种看法以及分析它们三者的优缺点，同时也展望了未来剩余索取权的发展趋势，在此基础上，本文从会计契约的角度出发，分析了企业剩余索取权的契约变迁，最后本文阐述了剩余索取权和企业绩效之间的关系，并在威廉逊模型的基础上对模型进行改进，探讨了公司绩效和剩余索取权分配的内在联系。     

论证券公司的法人治理结构

广义上的公司法人治理结构是指：有关公司剩余索取权[对企业剩余(总收益减去固定合同支付)的要求权]和控制权[主要指选择和监督代理人(经理层)的权力]分配的一整套法规、文化和制度安排。狭义上的公司法人治理结构是指：公司董事会、监事会、股东大会以及经理层的功能、结构与权力分配等方面的制度安排。本文仅对狭义上的公司法人治理结构进行研究。     

论国有公司治理结构与其相关的财务问题

对公司治理结构的认识。所谓公司治理结构是指所有者对一个企业的经营管理和绩效进行监督和控制的一整套制度安排。公司治理结构产生的原因是由于所有权和控制权的分离，其实质是一种产权关系合同，其职能是对剩余控制权和剩余索取权的配置，根本目的是为了降低所有者与经营者之间的代理成本，实现股东价值最大化。     

中美上市公司治理模式剖析

从本质上讲，公司治理结构是有关公司控制权和剩余索取权分配的一整套法律、文化和制度性安排，涉及到所有者、董事会和高级执行人员即高级经理人员三者之间权力分配和制衡关系。表现为明确界定股东大会、董事会、监事会和经理人员职责和功能的一种企业组织结构。     

将“合伙人制”融入“合作制”的一项尝试——基于MGL合作社的案例解读与探讨

当前,合作社异化已成为阻碍合作社进一步发展的痛点,其中"合作制"下社员剩余索取权和控制权的丧失是矛盾核心,因而探求其改进方式对合作社长远发展、实现乡村振兴有重要意义。本文基于效率与公平衡量维度,通过对MGL合作社这一典型案例进行剖析发现,有效的合作社在治理结构和利益分配上具备"合伙人制"特征,并且基本契合不完全契约理论有关能够有效解决契约双方信息不对称以及剩余索取权、控制权被少数社员占有的论述。对此,应充分重视合伙人制在合作社发展中的内在有效性,弱化其是否具有规范的外在形式。     

我国商业银行公司治理模式选择

公司治理起因于产权的分离，治理的功能是权、责、利的分配，治理模式有效率的前提是剩余索取权与剩余控制权的对称分布。“股东至上主义”逻辑和利益相关者理论作为公司治理的思想源流，分别导致了两种不同的治理模式：股东单边治理模式和利益相关者共同治理模式。比较分析这两种模式，我国商业银行应当选择利益相关者共同治理模式。     

大股东控制、会计剩余控制权与会计信息质量

文章以2007-2012年沪深A股上市公司数据为样本,实证检验了会计剩余控制权对会计信息质量的影响,以及大股东控制对两者关系的影响。研究发现,会计剩余控制权对我国上市公司的会计信息质量产生了显著的负面影响,会计剩余控制权越大,会计信息质量越差。大股东控制在一定程度上加剧了会计剩余控制权对会计信息质量的负面影响,大股东控制程度越高,会计剩余控制权对会计信息质量的负面影响越大。本文实证研究了大股东控制、会计剩余控制权与会计信息质量之间的关系。结果显示,会计剩余控制权对我国上市公司的会计信息质量产生了显著的负面影响,会计剩余控制权越大,会计信息质量越差。     

Positive (Zero) NPV Projects and the Behavior of Residual Earnings

This paper analyzes the time‐series behavior of residual earnings as it relates to the existence of positive NPV opportunities (or 'rents'). The issue is of interest because many recent papers (e.g., Lo and Lys, 1999; and Holthausen and Watts, 2001) have commented on it in the context of the Ohlson (1995) model. The analysis shows that the Ohlson (1995) model allows for positive NPV opportunities, contrary to the frequently made claims.     

Residual momentum

Conventional momentum strategies exhibit substantial time-varying exposures to the Fama and French factors. We show that these exposures can be reduced by ranking stocks on residual stock returns instead of total returns. As a consequence, residual momentum earns risk-adjusted profits that are about twice as large as those associated with total return momentum; is more consistent over time; and less concentrated in the extremes of the cross-section of stocks. Our results are inconsistent with the notion that the momentum phenomenon can be attributed to a priced risk factor or market microstructure effects.     

表外披露性质解读及其启示:剩余控制权视角

本文从剩余控制权视角对表外披露进行解读:从信息生产和提供来看,经营者会计信息的剩余控制权更多地体现在表外披露信息上;从市场监管来看,表外披露规定体现了各国证券监管机构对证券市场的剩余监管权。这对理解现行财务报告模式及其发展有重要的意义。     

Residual Income and Value-Creation: The Missing Link

This paper extends the residual income literature to provide a framework for the use of residual income in performance measurement, applicable in value-based management. It shows that, under a simple initializing assumption, an accounting-free measure of excess value created over a multi-period interval can be written entirely in terms of (i) within-interval realized residual incomes and (ii) end-of-interval expected future residual incomes, both appropriately adjusted for the time value of money. It also shows that, when the simple initializing assumption is relaxed, excess value created can be expressed in terms of excess residual incomes, measured by comparison with expectations as at the beginning of the multiperiod interval.     

The disciplinary role of debt and equity contracts: Theory and tests

We study how equity and debt contracts commit investors to discipline managers. Our model shows that the optimal allocation of debt, equity, and control rights depends on which disciplinary action is more efficient. When the efficient action is managerial replacement, then control rights should be allocated to equity holders, and capital structure should consist of equity and long-term debt. When the efficient action is liquidation, then control rights can be allocated to the manager, and capital structure should consist of equity and short-term debt. We find empirical support to the model's predictions in a sample of leveraged buyout transactions.     

分配权能对应与会计行为异化

企业财务报告舞弊是企业会计行为异化的结果, 在自利需要、动机驱使与约束缺失的情况下, 会计行为异化就会发生。分配权力和分配能力的对应是扼制会计行为异化的有效制度安排, 这一制度安排与现代企业的“共同治理”模式相结合, 就产生了会计行为应当公平反映、计量各企业利益相关者的要素贡献与剩余索取权的基本要求。现实中各类利益相关者分配权力与分配能力之间的配对错位和冲突, 就会导致会计行为的异化和财务报告舞弊的发生。     

Efficiency and Organizational Structure: A Study of Reverse LBOs

This paper is a report on 72 firms which went public since 1983 but previously underwent a full or divisional LBO. Accounting measures of performance reveal significant improvements in profitability which resulted mainly from these firms' ability to reduce costs. Firms experience dramatic increases in leverage at the LBO, but the leverage ratios are gradually reduced. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the change in the governance structure of these firms towards more concentrated residual claims created a new organizational structure which is more efficient than its predecessor.     

我国农村剩余劳动力转移途径及对策选择

我国农村剩余劳动力转移是解决三农问题的重中之重.现行土地制度、户籍管理制度、城市化进程以及农村剩余劳动力素质是制约农村剩余劳动力转移的主要因素.农村剩余劳动力在第一产业内部的转移和劳动力向二、三产业的转移,是我国农村劳动力转移的基本途径.坚持走农业产业化道路、推进乡镇企业二次创业、完善农村金融体系、推进城市化进程、建立和完善社会保障体系等,是推动农村劳动力转移的必然选择.     

Good cop,bad cop: Complementarities between debt and equity in disciplining management

We demonstrate an inherent conflict between ex ante efficient monitoring and liquidation decisions by outside claimholders. We show it can be useful to commit to inefficient liquidation when monitors fail to produce information: this provides stronger incentives to monitor. The implication for firm capital structure is that more information is generated about firm prospects – and hence firm value increases – when a firm’s cash flow is split into a ‘safe’ claim (debt) and a ‘risky’ claim (equity) compared to when a single claim is sold. We also derive the optimal allocation of control rights between safe and risky claims. This partially resolves the Tirole (2001) puzzle as to why firms issue multiple securities that generate ex post conflicts of interest.