Downside Risk Management of a Defined Benefit Plan Considering Longevity Basis Risk

To control downside risk of a defined benefit pension plan arising from unexpected mortality improvements and severe market turbulence, this article proposes an optimization model by imposing two conditional value at risk constraints to control tail risks of pension funding status and total pension costs. With this setup, we further examine two longevity risk hedging strategies subject to basis risk. While the existing literature suggests that the excess-risk hedging strategy is more attractive than the ground-up hedging strategy as the latter is more capital intensive and expensive, our numerical examples show that the excess-risk hedging strategy is much more vulnerable to longevity basis risk, which limits its applications for pension longevity risk management. Hence, our findings provide important insight on the effect of basis risk on longevity hedging strategies.     

Iterated VaR or CTE measures: A false good idea?

The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we consider different risk measures in order to determine the solvency capital requirement of a pension fund. Secondly, we illustrate the impact of the time horizon of long-term guarantee products on these capital. We consider a financial market modelled by a common Black–Scholes–Merton model. We neglect the mortality and underwriting risks by assuming that the pension fund is fully hedged against these risks, which allows us to keep understandable and tractable formulæ (the longevity risk will be a part of future researches). A portfolio is built in this market according to different strategies and the pension fund offers a fixed guaranteed rate on a certain time horizon. We begin with well-known static risk measures (value at risk and conditional tail expectation measures) and then we consider their natural dynamic generalization. In order to be time consistent, we consider their iterated versions by a backward iterations scheme. Within the dynamic setting, we show that solvency capital can be expensive and that attention must be paid to the safety level considered.     

Quantifying mortality risk in small defined-benefit pension schemes

A risk of small defined-benefit pension schemes is that there are too few members to eliminate idiosyncratic mortality risk, that is, there are too few members to effectively pool mortality risk. This means that when there are few members in the scheme, there is an increased risk of the liability value deviating significantly from the expected liability value, as compared to a large scheme. We quantify this risk through examining the coefficient of variation of a scheme's liability value relative to its expected value. We examine how the coefficient of variation varies with the number of members and find that, even with a few hundred members in the scheme, idiosyncratic mortality risk may still be significant. Next we quantify the amount of the mortality risk concentrated in the executive section of the scheme, where the executives receive a benefit that is higher than the non-executive benefit. We use the Euler capital allocation principle to allocate the total standard deviation of the liability value between the executive and non-executive sections. The results suggest that the mortality risk of the scheme should be monitored and managed within the sections of a scheme and not only on a scheme-wide basis.     

风险分散与中国混合型基本养老保险制度改革研究

本文从参保人养老投资风险分散角度研究混合型基本养老保险制度设计。通过构建一个两期消费模型,综合考虑参保人所面临的人口结构、工资增长率、养老基金投资等风险因素,本文研究了混合型基本养老保险制度中现收现付制与基金积累制的最优比例,并利用中国数据进行了测算与敏感性分析。研究发现:引入小规模个人账户基金积累制可以分散人口老龄化给现收现付制所带来的风险,中国实行混合型基本养老保险制度有其合理性;但如果要维持40%～45%的养老金替代率水平,中国基本养老保险制度的财务可持续性会面临较大挑战。     

Do Managers of U.S. Defined Benefit Pension Plan Sponsors Use Regulatory Freedom Strategically?

We use historical particularities of pension funding law to investigate whether managers of U.S. corporate defined benefit pension plan sponsors strategically use regulatory freedom to lower the reported value of pension liabilities, and hence required cash contributions. For some years, pension plans were required to estimate two liabilities—one with mandated discount rates and mortality assumptions, and another where these could be chosen freely. Using a sample of 11,963 plans, we find that the regulated liability exceeds the unregulated measure by 10% and the difference further increases for underfunded pension plans. Underfunded plans tend to assume substantially higher discount rates and lower life expectancy. The effect persists both in the cross‐section of plans and over time and it serves to reduce cash contributions. We further show that plan sponsor managers use the freed‐up cash for corporate investment and that credit risk is unlikely to explain the finding.     

Do a firm's equity returns reflect the risk of its pension plan?

This paper examines the empirical question of whether systematic equity risk of US firms as measured by beta from the capital asset pricing model reflects the risk of their pension plans. There are a number of reasons to suspect that it might not. Chief among them is the opaque set of accounting rules used to report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and liabilities are off-balance sheet and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the firm, with its own trustees. Pension accounting rules are complicated. Furthermore, the role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation clouds the real relation between pension plan risk and firm equity risk. The empirical findings in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reflect the risk of the firm's pension plan despite arcane accounting rules for pensions. This finding is consistent with informational efficiency of the capital markets. It also has implications for corporate finance practice in the determination of the cost of capital for capital budgeting. Standard procedure uses de-leveraged equity return betas to infer the cost of capital for operating assets. But the de-leveraged betas are not adjusted for the risk of the pension assets and liabilities. Failure to make this adjustment typically biases upward estimates of the discount rate for capital budgeting. The magnitude of the bias is shown here to be large for a number of well-known US companies. This bias can result in positive net present value projects being rejected.     

Measuring Longevity Risk: An Application to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Pension Plan

An employer that sets up a defined benefit pension plan promises to periodically pay a certain sum to each participant starting at some future date and continuing until death. Although both the future beneficiary and the employer can be asked to finance the plan throughout the beneficiary's career, any shortcoming of funds in the future is often the employer's responsibility. It is therefore essential for the employer to be able to predict with a high degree of confidence the total amount that will be required to cover its future pension obligations. Applying mortality forecasting models to the case of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police pension plan, we illustrate the importance of mortality forecasting to value a pension fund's actuarial liabilities. As future survival rates are uncertain, pensioners may live longer than expected. We find that such longevity risk represents approximately 2.8 percent of the total liability ascribable to retired pensioners (as measured by the relative value at risk at the 95th percentile) and 2.5 percent of the total liabilities ascribable to current regular contributors. Longevity risk compounds the model risk associated with not knowing what is the true mortality model, and we estimate that model risk represents approximately 3.2 percent of total liabilities. The compounded longevity risk therefore represents almost 6 percent of the pension plan's total liabilities.     

Discretion in accounting for pensions under IAS 19: using the ‘magic telescope’?

We use a panel data set of UK-listed companies over the period 2005–2009 to analyse the actuarial assumptions used to value pension plan liabilities under IAS 19. The valuation process requires companies to make assumptions about financial and demographic variables, notably discount rate, price inflation, salary inflation and mortality/life expectancy of plan members/beneficiaries. We use regression analysis to analyse the relationships between these key assumptions (except mortality, where disclosures are limited) and company-specific factors such as the pension plan funding position and duration of pension liabilities. We find evidence of selective ‘management’ of the three assumptions investigated, although the nature of this appears to differ from the findings of US authors. We conclude that IAS 19 does not prevent the use of managerial discretion, particularly by companies whose pension plan funding positions are weak, thereby reducing the representational faithfulness of the reported pension figures. We also highlight that the degree of discretion used reflects the extent to which IAS 19 defines how the assumptions are to be determined. We therefore suggest that companies should be encouraged to justify more explicitly their choice of assumptions.     

“Author’s Reply: Critique of Mexico’s New Social Security Act”, Octavio Maupomé-Carvantes,July, 1999

Abstract

This paper considers the pension plan as part of the capital structure of the sponsoring employer. This enables lessons from financial theory concerning capital structure to be used to answer the question, “What assets should a pension fund hold?” The standard Modigliani-Miller framework is expanded on to consider the implications of corporate tax. This leads to the conclusion that bond investment for pension plans has tangible advantages over holding risky assets (e.g., equities). The paper considers a case study of the pension plan of the Boots Company, a U.K. pharmacy retailer with a pension fund of around £2.3 billion ($3.5 billion), where these ideas were put into practice. Finally, the paper discusses the value released to shareholders and the extra security members of the pension fund have derived from putting theory into practice.     

Human Survival at Older Ages and the Implications for Longevity Bond Pricing

Abstract

Governments are concerned about the future of pension plans, for which increasing longevity is judged to be an important risk to their future viability. We focus on human survival at age 65, the starting age point for many pension products. Using a simple model, we link basic measures of life expectancy to the shape of the human survival function and consider its various forms. The model is then used as the basis for investigating actual survival in England and Wales. We find that life expectancy is increasing at a faster rate than at any time in history, with no evidence of this trend slowing or any upper age limit. With interest growing in the use of longevity bonds as a way to transfer longevity risks from pension providers to the capital markets, we seek to understand how longevity drift affects pension liabilities based on mortality rates at the point of annuitization, versus what actually happens as a cohort ages. The main findings are that longevity bonds are an effective hedge against longevity risk; however, it is not only the oldest old that are driving risk, but also more 65-year-olds reaching less extreme ages such as 80. In addition, we find that the possibility of future inflation and interest rates could be as an important a risk to annuities as longevity itself.     

Allocating Shareholder Capital to Pension Plans

This article discusses the corporate challenge of providing retirement income to employees while limiting the costs and risks of pension plans to the companies themselves by addressing five main questions:

• ? What are the major issues and challenges surrounding pensions? Although the pension shortfalls have been the focus of attention, the author argues that the more serious concern is the risk stemming from the mismatch between pension assets and pension liabilities— that is, the funding of debt‐like liabilities with equity‐heavy asset portfolios.
• ? To what extent do the equity market and equity prices reflect the shortfall in value and the mismatch in risk? While the author describes some evidence of the market's ability to capture pension risk, analysts' P/E multiples and management's assessments of cost of capital may still be distorted by failure to take full account of the risks associated with pension assets.
• ? How should management analyze and formulate strategic solutions? Without offering specific solutions, the author presents a framework for analyzing the problem from a strategic perspective that can be used in formulating a company's pension policy. In particular, the article recommends that companies take an integrated perspective that views pension assets and liabilities as parts of the corporate balance sheet, and the pension asset allocation decision as a critical aspect of a corporate‐wide enterprise risk management program.
• ? If a company chooses to make a major change in its pension policy, such as a partial or complete immunization accomplished by substituting bonds for stocks, how would you communicate the new policy to the rating agencies and investors?
• ? What are the major issues to be thinking about when contemplating a change from a DB plan to a defined contribution, or DC, plan? The author argues that DC plans without some corporate oversight or responsibility for results are not a long‐term solution.

     

“De‐risking” Corporate Pension Plans: Options for CFOs

Until the stock market bubble burst in 2000–2002, most CFOs viewed their defined benefit pension plans as profit centers and relatively risk‐free sources of income. Since neither pension assets nor liabilities were reported on corporate balance sheets, and expected returns on pension stocks could be substituted for actual returns when reporting net income, the risks associated with DB plans were masked by GAAP accounting and thus assumed to have no bearing on corporate capital structure. But when stock prices and corporate profits fell together, the risks associated with conventional stock‐heavy pension plans showed up first in reduced pension surpluses (or, in many cases, deficits) and then later in higher required cash contributions and lower reported earnings. As a consequence, today's investors (and rating agencies) are viewing pension and other legacy liabilities as corporate debt, and demands for transparency and increased funding have triggered accounting changes and proposed legislative reforms that will further unmask the economics. This article aims to provide both private‐sector and public‐sector CFOs with suggestions for reducing and controlling the cost of providing for the retirement of their employees. Profitable, tax‐paying companies with DB plans should consider (1) funding any unfunded liabilities (if necessary, by issuing debt) and (2) reducing pension equity and interest rate exposures by shifting some (if not all) pension assets into bonds and defeasing the pension liability (achieving a tax arbitrage in the process). And in cases where the expected costs of maintaining DB plans outweigh the benefits, companies should consider freezing or terminating their plans and switching to a defined contribution (DC) or some form of hybrid plan. The authors also propose similar changes for public pension plans, where underfunding and mismatch problems are greater, less transparent, and in some ways less tractable than those of corporate DB plans.     

Risk Allocation in Retirement Plans: A Better Solution

The corporate world is reconsidering the cost‐effectiveness of defined benefit pension plans while contemplating a change to defined contribution plans. This article begins by examining the three primary risks faced by sponsors of most DB pension plans—investment risk, interest rate risk, and longevity risk—and shows how shifting these risks to employees through a DC plan would affect both the corporation and the individual. Although DC plans clearly help companies manage risks, they provide at best an incomplete solution for individual participants. This article describes an innovation in pension design—the Retirement Shares Plan (RSP)—that combines many of the best features of DB and DC plans. An RSP provides:

• ? predictable and stable cost to the plan sponsor, with little chance of unfunded liabilities;
• ? lifetime income, guaranteeing that retirees will never outlive their benefits;
• ? a benefit accrual pattern comparable to that of traditional pension plans that preserves value for older, long‐service employees; and
• ? potential inflation protection for retirees.

The RSP accomplishes this by allocating risk to sponsors and individuals differently than either a traditional DB plan or a DC plan. Unlike most DB plans, the RSP shifts investment and interest rate risks from plan sponsors to participants. Unlike DC plans, the RSP keeps longevity risk with the sponsor.     

The Poisson Log-Bilinear Lee-Carter Model

Abstract

Life insurance companies deal with two fundamental types of risks when issuing annuity contracts: financial risk and demographic risk. Recent work on the latter has focused on modeling the trend in mortality as a stochastic process. A popular method for modeling death rates is the Lee-Carter model. This methodology has become widely used, and various extensions and modifications have been proposed to obtain a broader interpretation and to capture the main features of the dynamics of mortality rates. In order to improve the measurement of uncertainty in survival probability estimates, in particular for older ages, the paper proposes an extension based on simulation procedures and on the bootstrap methodology. It aims to obtain more reliable and accurate mortality projections, based on the idea of obtaining an acceptable accuracy of the estimate by means of variance reducing techniques. In this way the forecasting procedure becomes more efficient. The longevity question constitutes a critical element in the solvency appraisal of pension annuities. The demographic models used for the cash flow distributions in a portfolio impact on the mathematical reserve and surplus calculations and affect the risk management choices for a pension plan. The paper extends the investigation of the impact of survival uncertainty for life annuity portfolios and for a guaranteed annuity option in the case where interest rates are stochastic. In a framework in which insurance companies need to use internal models for risk management purposes and for determining their solvency capital requirement, the authors consider the surplus value, calculated as the ratio between the market value of the projected assets to that of the liabilities, as a meaningful measure of the company’s financial position, expressing the degree to which the liabilities are covered by the assets.     

Managing Pension Risks: A Corporate Finance Perspective

Defined benefit (DB) pension plans of both U.S. and European companies are significantly underfunded because of the low interest rate environment and prior decisions to invest heavily in equities. Additional contributions and the recovery of stock markets since the end of the crisis have helped a bit but pension underfunding remains significant. Pension underfunding has substantial corporate finance implications. The authors show that companies with large pension deficits have historically delivered weaker share price performance than their peers and also trade at lower valuation multiples. Large deficits also reduce financial flexibility, increase financial risk, particularly in downside economic scenarios, and contribute to greater stock price volatility and a higher cost of capital. The authors argue that the optimal approach to managing DB pension risks relates to the risk tolerance of specific companies and their short and long‐term strategic and financial priorities. Financial executives should consider the follow pension strategies:

• Voluntary Pension Contributions: Funding the pension gap by issuing new debt or equity can provide valuation and capital structure benefits—and in many cases is both NPV‐positive and EPS‐accretive. The authors show that investors have reacted favorably to both debt‐ and equity‐financed contributions.
• Plan de‐risking: Shifting the pension plan's assets from equity to fixed income has become an increasingly popular approach. The primary purpose of pension assets is to fund pension liabilities while limiting risk to the operating company. The pension plan should not be viewed or run as a profit center.
• Plan Restructuring: Companies should also consider alternatives such as terminating and freezing plans, paying lump sums, and changing accounting reporting.

     

Pension de-risking choice and firm risk: Traditional versus innovative strategies

We examine the determinants of firms defined-benefit pension plan de-risking strategy choices and their impact on firm risk. We compile a hand-collected dataset for FTSE 350 firms for the period of 2009–2017. We find that hard freezing and pension buy-ins are more likely to be implemented when pension plans have longer investment horizons. In particular, pension plans that are exposed to higher investment risk are more likely to adopt pension buy-ins. Firms with larger capital expenditure and market capitalization are more likely to utilise innovative de-risking strategies (i.e. buy-in and longevity swap) in addition to traditional strategies (i.e. soft and hard freezing). Financially constrained firms are more likely to implement longevity swap over pension buy-ins. We also find that implementing pension de-risking strategies reduce firm risk. However, the effectiveness varies depending on the strategy with buy-ins having the largest impact in reducing risk.     

养老保险中的政府责任——基于风险管理的视角

从社会保障帮助人们处理生活风险的核心职能出发,审视政府在养老保险中的责任,政府应协调和利用各种力量实现养老保障目标,控制个人、企业等主体在养老决策中的风险因素。在多支柱养老保险体系中,政府的责任在于统筹利用不同的养老金类别在收入再分配、风险分担和处理、资本积累和金融深化等方面各自的优势。为实现养老保障目标,政府还应承担财政兜底责任,履行财政兜底责任,必须控制财政风险。     

Risk-Sharing and Benefit Smoothing in A Hybrid Pension Plan

Abstract

A hybrid pension plan with an explicit formula for sharing risk between the plan sponsor and the members is proposed. The performance of this plan is analyzed using a modified version of the model used by Dufresne (1988). Formulas for the variance of the contribution income and benefit outgo are derived, assuming investment returns are independent and identically distributed. The performance of the hybrid plan is compared with a defined contribution (DC) plan providing the same expected retirement benefit. It is shown that the hybrid plan is more efficient in the control of investment risk, and that this gain in efficiency is greater when “lifestyle” investment strategies are adopted in the DC plan. Modifications to the proposed hybrid benefit structure that might be required for a real plan are suggested.     

Kongruente Rückdeckung von Pensionszusagen durch Versicherungsprodukte

When a German employer establishes a defined benefit pension plan for his employees, it is common practice in Germany to purchase life insurance policies in order to finance the plan and transfer the risks from the plan to the insurer. A complete transfer of risk can only be obtained by purchasing a congruent insurance policy. The present paper develops a formal definition of congruence of an insurance policy to a pension plan. The definition is applied to a simple practical example. It becomes clear that it is almost impossible to obtain congruence of a traditional German life insurance product to an employer's defined benefit pension plan.     

Pension Funds and the U.K. Economy

Abstract

The paper considers the impact of U.K. defined benefit (DB) pension plan unding and investment on the U.K. economy. It suggests that many conventional theories are based on incomplete or inconsistent economics. In particular, the author suggests that:

? An economy cannot really gain competitive advantage from high returns on the domestic assets in which pension funds invest.

? DB liabilities are essentially similar for most schemes and can be closely matched with bonds.

? Funding pension liabilities has no primary impact on individuals’ consumption and saving or on firms’ capital investment.

? Pension funds are not natural investors in the equity of new ventures.

The conclusion of the paper is that the most significant impact of pension funds on the U.K. economy relates to the costs imposed by extreme mismatching between their financial assets and liabilities. The author argues that such risks can, in essence, “crowd out” entrepreneurial risk. He asserts that the U.K. economy would gain from greater focus on the matching of these assets and liabilities, and that the best way to stimulate enterprise is by eliminating the frictional costs in the economy arising from current practices.