Put-call parity and the informational efficiency of the German DAX-index options market

Using transaction data for options on the German stock index (DAX), we examine the informational efficiency of this relatively new options market. Because DAX options are European style and the underlying index is a performance index, we avoid problems due to dividend estimation and the assessment of the early-exercise effect, which are encountered in existing studies. Ex-post and ex-ante tests are carried out to simulate trading strategies for exploiting put-call parity violations. We find that ex-post profits diminish dramatically when the implementation of the arbitrage strategies is delayed and/or after transaction costs are accounted for. In general, however, arbitrage restrictions, which rely on short selling of the component stocks of the index, tend to be violated more severely than those relying on long positions in these stocks. Given the short-selling restrictions in Germany, these apparent arbitrage opportunities cannot be easily exploited in practice. Furthermore, the results for different subsamples suggest that traders were subject to a learning process in pricing these relatively new instruments.     

TESTING THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF EX-POST EFFICIENT PORTFOLIOS

Tested here is the hypothesis that portfolios selected from among ex-post efficient assets will attain better results ex-ante than by following the naive strategy of holding an equally weighted portfolio of all the assets. The tests are conducted using the returns of the one hundred mutual funds that were continuously in operation from 1959 to 1980. Ex-post efficient funds are identified using nine investment decision rules (Stochastic Dominance and Mean-Variance rules with and without riskless asset and the Geometric Mean rule). Ex-ante performance is assessed in terms of terminal wealth and expected utility. Results indicate that over the twenty-two years tested, significantly better performance could be attained ex-ante by investing in mutual funds selected by ex-post efficiency analysis using the distribution-free Second- and Third-Degree Stochastic Dominance tests with Riskless Asset as well as by the more traditional Mean-Variance test with Riskless Asset. Excess returns from using ex-post information exceed the substantial transaction costs incorporated in the analysis.     

Financial crises,unconventional monetary policy exit strategies,and agents׳ expectations

A central bank may purchase assets during a financial crisis and then exit from those purchases. Agents have rational expectations about financial crises as rare events, the probability the central bank purchases assets, and the exit strategy. Selling off assets quickly produces a double-dip recession while slowly unwinding generates a smooth recovery. Expectations about the exit strategy influence the initial effectiveness of purchases. Increasing the probability of purchases during crises distorts the pre-crisis economy and depends upon the exit strategy. The welfare benefits of unconventional policy may differ ex-ante versus ex-post, as can the preferred exit strategy.     

Switching to a poor business activity: optimal capital structure, agency costs and covenant rules

We address the issue of modeling and quantifying the asset substitution problem in a setting where equityholders decisions alter both the volatility and the return of the firm cash flows. Our results contrast with those obtained in models where the agency problem is reduced to a pure risk-shifting problem. We find larger agency costs and lower optimal leverages. We identify the bankruptcy trigger written in debt indenture, which maximizes ex-ante firm value, given that equityholders will ex-post be able to risk-shift. Our model highlights the tradeoff between ex-post inefficient behavior of equityholders and inefficient covenant restrictions.      

Spot asset carry cost rates and futures hedge ratios

Since the 1970s, futures hedge ratios have traditionally been calculated ex-post via economically structure-less statistical analyses. This paper proposes an ex-ante, more efficient, computationally simpler, general “carry cost rate” hedge ratio. The proposed hedge ratio is biased, but its bias is readily mitigatable via a stationary Bias Adjustment Multiplier (BAM). The 2-part intuition for the BAM and its stationarity is as follows. First, the paper reasons that the “traditional” hedge ratio should uncover the carry cost rate and shows that it does, albeit inefficiently. Then, since both the “traditional” and “carry cost rate” hedge ratios are driven by the carry cost rate, it may be that their ratio (for implementation in the same prior periods) is stationary and useful as an ex-ante BAM for the “carry cost rate” hedge ratio; the paper tests these conjectures and finds support for both. Specifically, the paper shows that the “bias-adjusted carry cost rate” hedge ratio, defined as the average product of the ex-post BAMs from prior periods and the current ex-ante “carry cost rate” hedge ratio, has higher hedge-effectiveness than that for either the “traditional” or “naive” benchmark hedge ratios in diverse real and simulated markets.

     

Corporate governance and the profitability of insider trading

This paper examines the influence of corporate governance systems on insiders' ability to profit from their information advantage and the ways through which corporate governance systems influence such ability. We find that corporate governance significantly reduces the profitability of insider sales but not that of insider purchases. Given that sales involve greater legal risk than purchases, the results suggest that well-governed firms restrict informed insider trading mainly to reduce legal risk. We also find that better-governed firms reduce the profitability of insider sales by increasing the likelihood of adopting ex-ante preventive measures (e.g., voluntary insider trading restriction policies), implementing such measures more effectively, and taking ex-post disciplinary actions more actively. These results highlight how better-governed firms are able to restrict insiders from exploiting private information.     

Foreign direct investment and forward hedging

This paper examines the behavior of a risk-averse multinational firm (MNF) making investment in a foreign country under exchange rate uncertainty. To hedge the exchange rate risk, the MNF has access to an unbiased currency forward market. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is irreversible and sequential in that the MNF can acquire additional capital after the exchange rate uncertainty is completely resolved. The MNF as such possesses a real (call) option that is rationally exercised whenever the foreign currency has been substantially appreciated relative to the domestic currency. We show that the MNF's optimal initial level of sequential FDI is always lower than that of lumpy FDI, while the expected optimal aggregate level of sequential FDI can be higher or lower than that of lumpy FDI. We further show that the presence of the currency forward market improves the MNF's incentives to make FDI, both ex-ante and ex-post.     

Does Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, Reputation, or Asymmetric Information Drive Securitization?

Banks can choose to keep loans on balance sheet as private debt or transform them into public debt via asset securitization. Securitization transfers credit and interest rate risk, increases liquidity, augments fee income, and improves capital ratios. Yet many lenders still retain a portion of their loans in portfolio. Do lenders exploit asymmetric information to sell riskier loans into the public markets or retain riskier loans in portfolio? If riskier loans are indeed retained in portfolio, is this motivated by regulatory capital incentives (regulatory capital arbitrage), or a concern for reputation? We examine these questions empirically and find that securitized mortgage loans have experienced lower ex-post defaults than those retained in portfolio, providing evidence consistent with either the capital arbitrage or reputation explanation for securitization.     

A key driver for the mixed relationship between loan risk premiums and collateral: Evidence from China

In spite of both ex-ante adverse selection and ex-post moral hazard theories supporting this mixed observable relationship between loan risk premiums and collateral, any plausible explanation for this mixed result still remains conspicuously absent in the literature. Based on a novel Chinese bank loan dataset, we show that collateral is negatively correlated with loan risk premiums, which is consistent with the ex-ante theory. However, after controlling for the purpose of the loan, mixed relationships between collateral and loan risk premiums for different types of collateral are obtained. The specific loan purpose plays an important role in determining loan risk premiums. We demonstrate that the mixed empirical results found in the existing literature to date may result from different economic characteristics of both collateral type and loan purpose, wherein particular liquidity may be of first-order importance in finally helping to demystify the mixed relationships.     

Pseudo Market Timing and the Long-Run Underperformance of IPOs

Numerous studies document long-run underperformance by firms following equity offerings. This paper shows that underperformance is very likely to be observed ex-post in an efficient market. The premise is that more firms issue equity at higher stock prices even though they cannot predict future returns. Ex-post , issuers seem to time the market because offerings cluster at market peaks. Simulations based on 1973 through 1997 data reveal that when ex-ante expected abnormal returns are zero, median ex-post underperformance for equity issuers will be significantly negative in event-time. Using calendar-time returns solves the problem.     

上市公司权益资本成本的测度与评价——基于我国证券市场的经验检验

权益资本成本(CofEC)是公司筹资和投资决策时需要考虑的重要问题。然而,如何测定公司的权益资本成本,目前尚未得出统一的结论。本文在现有研究的基础上,从事后和事前两个角度测度了我国上市公司的权益资本成本,并从经济和统计两个角度对不同的测度进行了评价。研究得出,不同方法得出的权益资本成本测度差异明显,最大差异达到了12.13%,这些差异对我国公司融资顺序(偏好)是否主要基于资本成本考虑的判断会造成重大影响。从经济角度看,事前权益资本成本测度要优于CAPM和Fama-French三因子模型下事后权益资本成本,在事前权益资本成本测度中,国内外文献中普遍运用的GLS模型下的CofEC表现不够理想,而PEG和MPEG模型下的CofEC能更好地捕捉各风险因素的影响,尽管其时间序列计量误差方差相对较大。     

反垄断监管与事前监管——互联网平台监管模式的二元建构

反垄断监管是一种典型的事后监管,表现为禁止性规范为主的立法模式、合理原则为主的分析模式和消极性义务为主的救济措施,应用于平台监管中存在滞后性、威慑效果不佳等不足,反垄断法内部变革举措的实际效果也较为有限。相较反垄断监管的事后属性,事前监管通过创设积极性法律义务,实现对垄断结构引致不可逆损害的风险预防。为避免“假阳性”错误,引入事前监管须证明细分市场存在高而持续性的进入壁垒、欠缺有效竞争的动态趋势、事前监管收益大于成本三个累积性标准。平台事前监管的总体目标是推动市场从封闭到开放的回归,监管主体上成立专门事前监管机构并且采取合作制监管架构,监管对象的选取遵循“相关市场分析+显著市场力量确定”的基本框架,监管措施包括服务互操作、开放特定数据、平等对待不同主体提供的服务等。与反垄断监管的衔接包括建立分工监管的机制和可反驳的违法推定规则。     

Arbitrage with hedging by forward contracts: exploited and exploitable profits

The theoretical conditions for covered interest arbitrage and exploitable profit opportunities out of simple and triangular arbitrage in the absence and presence of market imperfection are enunciated. A distinction is made between pure arbitrage profits and arbitrage-induced total profits attainable under the risk-free environment. Operational feasibility of iterative arbitrage is also examined.     

Interregional redistribution as a cure to the soft budget syndrome in federations

The soft budget syndrome is ubiquitous in federations. It emerges whenever a high tier in a fiscal system provides extra resources to a lower tier to prevent the latter from failing to reach a mutually agreeable predetermined target. Interregional income redistribution is also an endemic feature of most federations. We show that the center’s ability of making interregional transfers ex-ante and ex-post cures the soft budget syndrome whenever the center is perfectly informed ex post. Under these circumstances, the interregional transfer scheme makes it a dominant strategy for each regional government to truthfully reveal its privately held information ex-ante.      

Bequest motive,information transparency,and family firm value: A natural experiment

Motivated by Cao et al. (2015), we utilize China’s one-child policy reform as a unique and exogenous setting to examine the economic impact of a potential rise in bequest motives among family firms, which is driven by the prospect of family and clanship expansion after the reform. A bequest motive is the economic incentive to accumulate wealth presently for inheritance by heirs in the future. It causes short-term present economic decisions to be influenced by long-term future utility expectations. On the one hand, the reform may strengthen stewardship as a means to maximize firm value for present family wealth enhancement and future inter-generational succession. On the other hand, the reform may weaken innovation and competitiveness by inducing reluctance against takeovers or outsider succession. Consistent with a positive economic impact, we observe that family firms experience (i) favorable ex-ante market reactions to the news of the reform and (ii) ex-post decline in managerial expropriation through tunneling after the reform. These findings of ex-ante investor anticipation and ex-post real effect are both stronger among less transparent family firms where Type-II agency problems are likely to be more pronounced. Further analyses also provide supportive evidence of a post-reform rise in the long-term value, measured by Tobin’s Q, and a decline in stock-selling by controlling shareholders among family firms. Our combined findings imply that this reform could induce positive externality on family firm governance.     

A STUDY OF POSSIBLE GAINS FROM INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND THE STATIONARITY OF INTER-COUNTRY CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: A COMMENT

This comment discusses two previous papers in this journal by J. Watson. It is shown that a confusion between necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of the inter-country correlation structure, and inconclusive empirical results led Watson to some misleading conclusions. It is also demonstrated that even if inter-country correlation coefficients are stationary, ex-ante correlations cannot be estimated directly from ex-post data unless the underlying stochastic process is known. Alternative methods of examining the stability of the correlation structure indirectly are suggested. Furthermore it is argued that the choice of the base currency further limits Watson's findings.     

When knowledge is power: Evidence from the municipal bond market

I investigate whether access to fundamental information enhances retail investors’ bargaining power, reducing the premium that small municipal bond investors pay over large investors. I find a reduction in this small trade premium after the introduction of an online disclosure repository that lowers retail investors’ information acquisition costs. This finding is limited to issuers whose disclosures are disseminated through the repository. The finding is pronounced for issuers that impose high information acquisition costs on investors ex-ante and those that exhibit high disclosure quality ex-post. These results suggest that as investors’ information sets align, so does their bargaining power with dealers.     

Intra-Day Arbitrage Opportunities in Foreign Exchange and Eurocurrency Markets

We have two primary objectives in this study. First, we examine the frequency of attaining simultaneous equilibrium on spot and forward foreign exchange markets and on domestic and foreign securities markets. Second, we measure the profitability of covered interest arbitrage and one-way arbitrage. Our empirical analysis has been conducted using real-time quotations. The empirical results indicate that: (a) the markets are efficient in the sense that profit opportunities from traditional covered interest arbitrage are rarely available; and (b) the frequency of attaining simultaneous market equilibrium is surprisingly low, thus opening the door for one-way arbitrage.     

Too many to fail—An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies

While the too-big-to-fail guarantee is explicitly a part of bank regulation in many countries, this paper shows that bank closure policies also suffer from an implicit “too-many-to-fail” problem: when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks, whereas when the number of bank failures is small, failed banks can be acquired by the surviving banks. This gives banks incentives to herd and increases the risk that many banks may fail together. The ex-post optimal regulation may thus be time-inconsistent or sub-optimal from an ex-ante standpoint. In contrast to the too-big-to-fail problem which mainly affects large banks, we show that the too-many-to-fail problem affects small banks more by giving them stronger incentives to herd.     

Arbitrage risk and market efficiency

This article explores arbitràge risk and models a testable hypothesis for studies in the treasury bill futures market efficiency. The modern mean-variance theory applied to a hedged arbitrage portfolio is used for the analysis. For a given expected arbitrage profit, we derive minimum variance arbitrage (MVA) conditions. A minimum variance arbitrage line (MVAL) is then derived to show the risk-return tradeoff for arbitrage. Market efficiency conditions are discussed by taking into account arbitrage risk along with bid-ask spreads. The analysis in this study helps explain the puzzle of inefficiencies in the T-bill futures market. Because refinancing and variation margin (due to marking-to-market) are required for arbitrage using futures trading in general, our ex ante arbitrage model using the case of T-bill futures can be applied to other futures markets.