Geographic dissemination of information

Urban companies are located near millions more potential investors and sophisticated money managers than non-urban companies. More investors are familiar with urban companies and have access to informal information about them. The stock of urban companies is also more liquid than the stock of non-urban companies. We hypothesize that these factors lead information to be spread from urban companies to other companies. Urban stock returns lead rural/small city stock returns even controlling for size, industry, and analyst coverage. Closer examination of the lead–lag relation reveals that urgent trades, which are likely to reflect short-lived information, are much more common for urban firms. Information appears to be uncovered through informal means more easily available to people physically near a company. We discuss the corporate finance implications of our findings.     

Institutional stock trading on loan market information

One of the most important developments in the corporate loan market over the past decade has been the growing participation of institutional investors. As lenders, institutional investors routinely receive private information about borrowers. However, most of these investors also trade in public securities. This leads to a controversial question: Do institutional investors use private information acquired in the loan market to trade in public securities? This paper examines the stock trading of institutional investors whose portfolios also hold loans. Using the Securities and Exchange Commission filings of loan amendments, we identify institutional investors with access to private information disclosed during loan amendments. We then look at abnormal returns on subsequent stock trades. We find that institutional participants in loan renegotiations subsequently trade in the stock of the same company and outperform trades by other managers and trades in other stocks by approximately 5.4% in annualized terms.     

How Much Is Too Much: Are Merger Premiums Too High?

Is it too much to pay target firm shareholders a 50% premium on top of market price? Or is it too much to pay a 100% premium when pursuing mergers and acquisitions? How much is too much? In this paper, we examine how the extent of merger premiums paid impacts both the long‐run and announcement period stock returns of acquiring firms. We find no evidence that acquirers paying high premiums underperform those paying relatively low premiums in three years following mergers, and the result is robust after controlling for a variety of firm and deal characteristics. Short term cumulative abnormal returns are moreover positively correlated to the level of the premium paid by acquirers. Our evidence therefore suggests that high merger premiums paid are unlikely to be responsible for acquirers' long‐run post merger underperformance.     

Local institutional investors,information asymmetries,and equity returns

We examine the informational role of geographically proximate institutions in stock markets. We find that both the level of and change in local institutional ownership predict future stock returns, particularly for firms with high information asymmetry; in contrast, such predictive abilities are relatively weak for nonlocal institutional ownership. The local advantage is especially evident for local investment advisors, high local ownership institutions, and high local turnover institutions. We also find that the stocks that local institutional investors hold (trade) earn higher excess returns around future earnings announcements than those that nonlocal institutional investors hold (trade).     

Financial Reporting Quality,Structural Problems and the Informativeness of Mandated Disclosures on Internal Controls

Even before firms report internal control weaknesses under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), they are characterized by structural problems, are prone to internal control weaknesses, and have low financial reporting quality. If the stock market incorporates much of this information during the pre‐disclosure years, investors are less surprised when firms subsequently report internal control weaknesses under SOX. We find that for the pre‐disclosure period, firms reporting internal control weaknesses under SOX, (1) had structural problems, (2) were prone to internal control problems, and (3) had low financial reporting quality. Further, we provide direct evidence that stock prices during pre‐disclosure years incorporate much of the information about structural problems, the likelihood of internal control weaknesses, and low reporting quality. Finally, we find that many of these value‐relevant factors are not related to announcement period returns when firms eventually disclose such problems under SOX and that limited new information about structural problems is generated around this date. Our results provide a compelling explanation for the muted stock price reaction around the mandatory disclosure date.     

The impact of institutional ownership on corporate operating performance

This paper examines the relation between institutional investor involvement in and the operating performance of large firms. We find a significant relation between a firm’s operating cash flow returns and both the percent of institutional stock ownership and the number of institutional stockholders. However, this relation is found only for a subset of institutional investors: those less likely to have a business relationship with the firm. These results suggest that institutional investors with potential business relations with the firms in which they invest are compromised as monitors of the firm.     

Intra-Industry Reactions to Stock Split Announcements

We examine whether favorable information conveyed by stock split announcements transfers to nonsplitting firms within the same industry. On average, nonsplitting firms' shareholders experience positive and significant abnormal returns at the stock split announcements of their industry counterparts. In addition, industrywide and firm-specific characteristics are important determinants in explaining nonsplitting firms' stock returns. These firms' earnings increase significantly, and the earnings changes are positively related to the stock price reactions. Finally, we find no evidence that investors revise the value of nonsplitting firms because they anticipate a decline in earnings volatility.     

Are publicly held firms less efficient? Evidence from the US property-liability insurance industry

This paper studies the performance of publicly held firms in the US property-liability insurance industry by analyzing companies that issued initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1994 to 2005, using private firms as the benchmark. I investigate ex ante determinants and ex post effects of IPOs on firm efficiency, operating performance, and other financials. I also analyze stock returns and follow-on SEO and acquisition activities to provide further information on IPO motivation. The paper finds that the likelihood of an IPO significantly increases with firm size and premium growth. IPO firms experience no post-issue underperformance in efficiency, operations, or stock returns; register improvement in allocative and cost efficiency; and reduce financial leverage and reinsurance usage. Moreover, IPO firms are active in follow-on SEO issues and acquisition activities. The findings are mostly consistent with the theory that firms go public for easier access to capital and to ease capital constraints.     

The cost of overconfidence in public information

We investigate the effects of investor overconfidence in public information on cross-sectional asset returns. The results show that investors in the US equity market are overconfident about public signals for mature firms that are relatively easy to price—old, large, and dividend-paying firms, value firms, and firms with a higher proportion of tangible assets, little external financing, and low sales growth. However, the effects of the overconfidence on cross-sectional stock returns are reversed quickly and comprise more than half of the short-term return reversals. The risk-adjusted cost of being overconfident about the noisy public signals, measured by return reversals of hedge portfolios formed on unexpected responses, is over 1.1% per month in the first month after portfolio formation, and is still significant despite the active arbitrage trading in the 2000s.     

Citicorp–Travelers Group merger: Challenging barriers between banking and insurance

The Citicorp–Travelers Group merger increased the prospects for new legislation to remove the barriers between banking and insurance, resulting in a positive wealth effect for institutions most likely to gain from deregulation. Analysis of abnormal returns surrounding the merger show that life insurance companies and large banks (excluding Citicorp and Travelers Group) have significant stock price increases, while the returns of small banks, health insurers, and property/casualty insurers are insignificantly different from 0. This analysis provides evidence that investors expect large banks and insurance companies to receive significant benefits from recent congressional legislation removing barriers to bancassurance.     

Merger Announcements and Insider Trading Activity: An Empirical Investigation

This paper provides evidence of excess returns earned by investors in acquired firms prior to the first public announcement of planned mergers. The study is distinguished from earlier merger studies in its use of daily holding period returns for the 194 firms sampled. The results confirm statistically what most traders already know. Impending merger announcements are poorly held secrets, and trading on this nonpublic information abounds. Specifically, leakage of inside information is a pervasive problem occurring at a significant level up to 12 trading days prior to the first public announcement of a proposed merger.     

Private Equity,the Rise of Unicorns,and the Reincarnation of Control‐based Accounting

This article discusses the rise of intangibles‐intensive companies and private equity (PE) since the late 1970s, and the role of both in bringing about the creation of a streamlined, more flexible set of accounting rules that, since their approval by the IASB and FASB in 2009, have been used by private companies and their investors. The PE industry comprises both venture capital (VC) firms that fund high‐growth enterprises and leveraged buyout (LBO) firms that fund more traditional, cash‐generating operations. Mainly because of the greater risks associated with both VC‐backed firms and LBOs—risks that make them ill‐suited for most public investors—such companies tend to require the more direct and active oversight provided by PE investors. And as the author goes on to argue, the more direct and active ownership of PE investors, as compared to the governance provided by most public‐company boards, suggests that financial accounting and reporting play a fundamentally different role in private than in public companies. Whereas the primary role of public‐company GAAP has increasingly (since the creation of the SEC in 1933) been to provide information for outside investors when valuing companies, the most important function of accounting reports in private companies is internal control—more specifically, ensuring that the interests of the managers of their portfolio companies are aligned with those of all the providers of capital. And recognizing this difference in the role of accounting, both the IASB and FASB responded to the requests of various parties (including private companies) by approving in 2009 the use by private companies of a streamlined and more flexible set of accounting standards. To the extent that the workings of PE markets continue to reduce the numbers of U.S. public companies, the author predicts that the resulting increase in the use of private‐company GAAP will continue to shift the primary role of accounting away from valuation and back toward its traditional roots in internal control and corporate governance.     

The economics of PIPEs

Private investments in public equities (PIPEs) are an important source of finance for public corporations. PIPE investor returns decline with holding periods, while time to exit depends on the issue's registration status and underlying liquidity. We estimate PIPE investor returns adjusting for these factors. Our analysis, which is the first to estimate returns to investors rather than issuers, indicates that the average PIPE investor holds the stock for 384 days and earns an abnormal return of 19.7%. More constrained firms tend to issue PIPEs to hedge funds and private equity funds in offerings that have higher expected returns and higher volatility. PIPE investors’ abnormal returns appear to reflect compensation for providing capital to financially constrained firms.     

I Feel Your Pain: The Effect of Regulator as a Minority Shareholder on Merger and Acquisition Performance

We examine the effect of a regulator-led advocate for minority shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A) performance in China. In recent years, the China Securities Regulatory Commission established the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), which began its ownership of 100 shares of public firms in 2016. The CSISC advocates for the interests of minority shareholders proactively. Focusing on abnormal stock returns in M&A announcements, we find that acquirers that have the CSISC as a shareholder (CSISC acquirers) exhibit higher positive abnormal stock returns than non-CSISC acquirers. Cross-sectional analysis suggests that the core results are mainly driven by firms with severe agency problems and weak external/internal monitoring, and those not controlled by the state. In addition, we find that CSISC acquirers have better long-term performance and encounter more M&A failures than non-CSISC acquirers. Our findings indicate that although the CSISC only holds 100 shares of listed companies, it plays an effective role in monitoring and driving firms to make appropriate M&A decisions.     

Does local political support influence financial markets? A study on the impact of job approval ratings of political representatives on local stock returns

Using data on job approval ratings of governors, U.S. senators, and the president, we find that firms located in states with high approval ratings outperform firms located in states with low approval ratings by .64% per month. Furthermore, this relationship is stronger when investors are actively involved in politics, when local politicians are closer to the center of political power, for small firms that have a larger proportion of local investors, and for financially strong areas where investors are ready to execute investments in local stocks. Overall, our study shows that investors’ political sentiment is important in determining stock returns.     

Cross-ownership,returns, and voting in mergers

We show that institutional shareholders of acquiring companies on average do not lose money around public merger announcements, because they hold substantial stakes in the targets and make up for the losses from the acquirers with the gains from the targets. Depending on their holdings in the target, acquirer shareholders generally realize different returns from the same merger, some losing money and others gaining. This conflict of interest is reflected in the mutual fund voting behavior: In mergers with negative acquirer announcement returns, cross-owners are significantly more likely to vote for the merger.     

An Ex Post Assessment of Investor Response to Catastrophes

A large body of research has examined abnormal stock returns for insurance companies in the wake of major catastrophes. Most of these studies have investigated the ex ante factors that investors may consider when generating expectations of future profits, represented by postcatastrophe stock returns. We instead ask whether these expectations were ultimately correct by investigating the relationship between returns and the disaster’s effect on future earnings. We find that returns immediately following a disaster are not associated with future earnings. Approximately six days following a catastrophe, however, returns begin to show a significant positive relationship with future earnings. This relationship becomes stronger in subsequent days. We conclude that investors are unable to correctly predict a disaster’s net impact on profits immediately after a disaster because existing public information is insufficient or misunderstood. Only once insurers begin disclosing their estimated losses can investors make accurate predictions about a disaster’s effect on earnings. Our study shows that the investor expectations inferred in much of the existing literature are not predictive of future profits. Our findings are consistent with semistrong-form market efficiency in the wake of a major disaster.     

Equity Markets Do Not Fit All: an Analysis of Public‐to‐Private Deals in Continental Europe

Concentration of family‐based ownership and recent development of private equity companies in Continental Europe suggest that the motivations and results of public‐to‐private (PTP) deals may differ from well‐studied cases in the USA and the UK. We overview the PTP market and measure the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 106 PTP deals concluded in Continental Europe from 2000 to 2005, introducing a model to explain the abnormal returns. Our results partially confirm findings of previous studies, namely, that undervalued and smaller firms register higher CARs. We additionally find that deals promoted by family owners register higher abnormal returns, whereas financial investors and private operating firms show no impact.     

重大突发公共卫生事件下的金融市场反应

本文旨在评估金融市场对重大突发公共卫生事件的反应,尤其是上市公司所在地的公共治理能力是否会影响上市公司股票收益率。其中,城市公共治理能力以基于实时数据计算的防疫能力和复工复产能力指标来刻画。主要发现如下:第一,防疫能力会影响投资者情绪,但不会直接影响股票收益率;第二,所在地复工复产能力对股票收益率存在正向影响;第三,机制分析表明,经营基本面更容易受疫情影响的企业,如小企业、成长型企业、所在地数字金融基础设施较差的企业,其股票收益率对当地复工复产能力的反应更敏感。本文结论表明,在全国一盘棋的抗疫努力下,投资者对于战胜疫情有信心,短期内复工复产能力对金融市场更重要。从应对措施来看,短期内可对比较脆弱的企业实施精准果断的帮扶,长期内可考虑加强地区防疫能力建设和数字基础设施建设。     

Dividend Omissions and Intraindustry Information Transfers

We examine potential information transfers from companies that announce dividend omissions to their industry rivals. Specifically, we examine the abnormal stock returns and abnormal earnings forecast revisions of rivals after a company makes a dividend‐omission announcement. Our results show negative and significant abnormal stock returns and negative and significant abnormal forecast revisions for rival companies in response to the announcement, and a significant and positive relation between the two. We conclude that a dividend‐omission announcement transmits unfavorable information across the announcing company's industry that affects cash flow expectations and ultimately stock prices.