理财产品质押业务及法律风险防范

银行理财产品质押指的是理财产：品持有人将其根据与银行签订的理财合约而享有的全部权益出质，从而获得银行贷款的一种融资手段。这种融资方式可以在一定程度上缓解融资矛盾，满足客户短期融资需求。同时，银行理财产品质押业务的开展也为银行理财产品营销起到促进作用，创设银行新的产品和新的利润增长点。     

商业银行理财产品质押法律问题及对策

依据物权法定原则和《物权法》的规定，理财产品质押面临着法律依据不足、权利性质不清和公示方法不明等问题，导致其法律效力的不确定性。本文从分析理财产品质押的实质要件和法律障碍入手，指出了银行理财产品质押的法律问题和现实操作方式的不足，在此基础上探讨了理财产品质押法律问题的解决路径和效力风险缓释措施，以期为商业银行和投资者办理理财产品质押融资提供参考。     

商业银行理财产品质押贷款业务的法律风险防范

商业银行发行的理财产品,从某种程度上讲其收益性强于可以质押的定期存款,安全性高于可以质押的股票或基金,为充分发挥该类理财产品的价值,满足客户对于理财产品流动性的需求,扩大银行的融资担保品范围,提升银行信贷产品的市场竞争力,近年来,多家商业银行都陆续开展了银行理财产品质押贷款业务。但由于我国现行法律尚未对银行理财产品质押做出明确规定,理财产品质押     

理财产品质押贷款法律风险及防范

银行理财产品质押是一种新型的贷款担保方式,虽然立法未明确银行理财产品可纳入出质范围,但理财产品质押融资是市场竞争的产物,其存在和发展具有经济合理性。在目前理财产品质押法律性质不明朗的情况下,开展该项业务时可以通过类推适用应收账款质押、设置质物价值波动跟踪机制以及完善质押合同约定等手段来控制风险。     

银行理财产品质押中的法律关系

编者按:银行理财产品质押贷款作为一种新型的贷款担保方式,因具有质物便于监管、质权易于实现等特点,被一些商业银行认为是一项风险较低的贷款业务.但由于对银行理财产品质押的法律性质和相关法律问题的理解容易出现争议,实践中容易产生纠纷.     

银行理财产品质押授信业务的法律风险防范

各商业银行纷纷推出银行理财产品质押授信业务，为持有银行理财产品的投资者提供了资金融通的便利。但由于现行法律法规未明确银行理财产品可用于出质，当投资者的理财产品被采取司法强制措施时，银行以理财产品质权人的身份要求优先受偿的抗辩很可能得不到法律的支持，所以，降低银行理财产品质押授信业务的法律风险就十分重要     

商业银行的中小企业仓单质押贷款业务风险控制

仓单是保管人在收到仓储物时向存货人签发的表示收到仓储物的有价证券。仓单质押贷款是仓单持有人以所持有的仓单作质押,向银行等金融机构获得资金的一种贷款方式。仓单质押贷款可在一定程度上解决中小企业尤其是贸易类企业的融资问题。仓单质押贷款业务的一般流程为:(1)银行与     

论应收账款质押融资的风险与防范

应收账款质押的开展具有很大的社会经济意义,但由于国内银行对应收账款质押融资中的风险控制缺乏经验,且《物权法》对应收账款质押中的许多法律问题未予以明确规定,这也束缚了应收账款质押制度发挥其融资的功能,本文结合实践中开展应收账款融资业务中可能存在的商业风险和法律风险,就控制这些风险与其防范措施提出了自己的观点。     

理财产品质押贷款案件法律分析及启示

银行理财产品质押贷款因其具有质物便于监管、质权易于实现等优点,被商业银行认为系低风险业务而广泛推广。但是,司法实践中对理财产品质押的性质和效力颇具争议,其本身存在一定法律风险。同时,近年来银行理财产品质押贷款的贷款条件不断放宽、贷款流程愈加简化,在给客户带来便利的同时,也为不法分子诈骗客户资金提供了可乘之机,由此引发的纠纷日渐增多,法律风险更加凸显。     

银行信用与商业信用的桥接匹配：渤海“票据池”案例

银行承兑汇票等票据传统的融资变现渠道是分散型的零售交易模式。某银行设计应用票据池质押融资业务模式,将点状随机的市场交易纳入理性预期统筹的范围,通过“池化”市场存量票据,打包质押,开展信贷融资业务。这种新模式创造并利用了“集约担保”与“或有担保”的理念,灵活桥接了商业信用与银行信用,实现了信贷市场营销关系的渠道化创新。     

Share pledging,payout policy,and the value of cash holdings

Share pledging for insiders’ personal bank loans is associated with the agency problems of insider risk aversion and stock price crash risk. We examine the relation between insider share pledging and the value of cash holdings using the pledging data of listed firms in Taiwan. We find that the value of cash holdings is lower for pledging firms, especially for those that are relatively more risk averse. Pledging firms that repurchase shares have a higher marginal value of cash than those with other payout methods, likely due to the role of repurchases in reducing the stock price crash risk. Our results show how insiders’ personal financing incentives arising from share pledging would affect the value of cash holdings from the perspective of agency problems and payout policy.     

股权质押与公司估值:理论与实证

本文基于2000—2020年我国A股上市公司数据,探讨了控股股东股权质押对上市公司代理问题及其估值的非线性影响。研究发现,控股股东股权质押比例较低(高)时将会缓解(加剧)上市公司的代理问题,从而使其估值上升(下降)。进一步分析显示,随着控股股东股权质押比例的提高,上市公司的财务约束和财务困境水平先降后升,呈U形变化;与此同时,控股股东高股权质押比例降低了上市公司增量现金的边际价值,增加了其审计费用和违规频次。从企业异质性来看,国企子样本中上述关系大多不显著。本文研究对进一步理解股权质押的内在运行机制和经济后果有一定参考意义。     

Does insiders share pledging stifle innovation? Evidence from China

We examine the relation between insiders share pledging activities for personal loans and firm innovation. Firstly, we find a negative effect of both the existence of pledging and the intensity of pledging activities on firm innovation, measured by R&D and patent application. Pledging by insiders with decision rights is associated with a 4.6% decline in R&D activities and 0.5% decline in patent applications, respectively, which accounts for 4.0% and 10.6% of the mean of each variable. This result holds using a propensity-score matched sample. In addition, we instrument pledging activities by financing constraints faced by other firms controlled by the same controlling insiders who pledge shares. IV estimation yield similar results. Secondly, we find share pledge activities have more pronounced effect on firm innovations when firms are located in areas with strong property rights protection, when firms are non-SOEs, or when pledging insiders serve on corporate boards. Lastly, we also find a negative effect of share pledging of other firms with common shareholders on firm innovations of interest. Overall, our findings suggest that pledging shares by insiders stifle firm innovation because share pledging reduce insiders' preference for risk taking.     

Financing constraints and share pledges: Evidence from the share pledge reform in China

Financing constraints are important to triggering controlling shareholders' share pledges. However, the related literature faces two major challenges: the endogeneity problem and the lack of direct evidence of why and how individual share pledges can ease corporate financing constraints. Based on China's Share Pledge Reform (SPR) in Q4 2012 and the phenomenon that private firms face discrimination when obtaining bank loans, this paper studies the impact of financing constraints on share pledging behavior and its mechanisms by building a difference-in-differences (DID) model. The SPR makes it more convenient for shareholders to raise money through share pledges, and shareholders of private firms facing stronger financing constraints are more vulnerable to this reform than are state-owned enterprises (SOEs). After the SPR, the probability of share pledging by controlling shareholders of private firms is approximately 23.04% higher than that of controlling shareholders of SOEs, and the pledge ratio is approximately 16.53% higher. Further tests reveal that, after the SPR, controlling shareholders of private firms are more inclined than those of SOEs to provide loans to the company to alleviate its financing constraints. Heterogeneity tests further corroborate the finding that this effect is more significant in private firms that are smaller and do not have shareholders of banking and institutional firms among their top ten shareholders.     

The Debt Trap: Wealth Transfers and Debt‐Equity Choices of Junk‐Grade Firms

If outstanding debt is risky, issuing equity transfers wealth from equity holders to debt holders. If existing leverage is high and bankruptcy costs are small, this wealth transfer effect outweighs the gains to stockholders from optimizing firm value. Empirically, we find that for investment‐grade firms, higher leverage implies a greater likelihood of issuing equity, as expected in a standard tradeoff model. However, consistent with the impact of wealth transfer effects, for junk‐grade firms, higher leverage implies a greater likelihood of issuing debt. The analysis implies an additional route through which historical shocks determine firms’ financing choices.     

Investment-based financing constraints and debt renegotiation

We consider how equity holders’ bargaining power during financial distress influences the interactions between financing and investment decisions when the firm faces the upper limit of debt issuance. We obtain four results. First, weaker equity holders’ bargaining power is more likely that the firm is financially constrained. Second, the investment quantity is independent of equity holders’ bargaining power. Third, the constrained credit spreads are increasing with equity holders’ bargaining power, contrary to the unconstrained ones. Fourth, higher volatility and weaker equity holders’ bargaining power are likely that the firm prefers to issue debt with renegotiation, compared with debt without renegotiation.     

产权、所有权安排与融资偏好

成熟市场的企业,由于技术和信息不对称方面的原因,更偏好于债权融资,而不是股权融资.在中国资本市场存在严重信息不对称的情况下,我国企业仍十分偏好于股权融资.这种选择基本上是经营者基于保持控制权的自利性考虑.其根源在于国有产权主体的抽象化、由此导致的失控的所有权安排、股权投资主体控制权的丧失以及债权投资主体拥有的状态依存控制权的威慑.     

A NOTE ON THE MARGINAL COST OF DEBT CAPITAL

The firms marginal cost of debt capital was interpreted in this author's previous publications as the "full marginal cost of relaxing the money capital availability constraint' when the incremental money capital employed takes the form of debt capital. Account is thereby taken of the effects on financing costs of the increased risk exposure that debt financing implies for both debt and equity holders. The present paper clarifies a misconception in a recently published paper by Draper and Findlay, and exhibits the linkage between concepts relevant to the firm's fmancing decision and the general marginal analysis.     

企业创新效率研究——来自股权质押的影响

本文结合我国实施创新驱动发展战略及股权质押频繁的现实背景,利用2006—2015年A股上市公司的数据,探讨控股股东的股权质押行为是否以及如何对企业的创新效率产生影响。研究表明,控股股东的股权质押行为会显著降低企业的创新效率。进一步地研究发现:(1)当第二类代理问题越严重,或质押风险越大时,控股股东股权质押行为抑制企业创新效率的作用越明显,表明控股股东股权质押伴随的掏空效应及短视效应,是导致二者负向关系的重要原因;(2)掏空效应和短视效应在影响控股股东股权质押与企业创新效率的关系上存在显著的替代效应;(3)研发投入强度下降时,控股股东股权质押对企业创新效率产生的负面效应更强。本文的研究不仅丰富了企业创新效率影响因素及控股股东股权质押经济后果的相关文献,对于规范控股股东股权质押行为,提高企业创新能力,实现创新驱动发展战略,也具有重要的启示意义。     

企业融资结构理论与我国上市公司融资行为分析

企业融资理应以企业价值最大化为宗旨,这也是西方融资结构理论的立论根据.而我国上市公司特殊的股本结构导致真正的股东对公司失去控制.本文通过对国家股、法人股和中小股股东目标的分析发现,其股东目标的具体体现都不是公司价值最大化,这导致了我国上市公司融资决策与西方融资结构理论相悖.股权融资偏好是内部控制人自身成本收益分析的必然结果,因此,必须通过股权改革形成真正的产权主体,激活资本市场竞争机制,通过经理人优胜劣汰机制和激励机制的有效运转实现对经理人的激励.当公司价值最大化成为委托人和代理人的共同目标时,企业的融资行为必然回归理性.