The experience with rent control in Israel: From rental housing to condominiums

During the past decades, home ownership has replaced privately owned rental housing as the dominant form of tenure in Israel. An important factor in this transition has been rent control. This paper examines the development of the rent control system, surveys the other major housing policies, and considers the main effects of rent control on the housing market.The Israeli rent control system is characterized by far reaching security of tenure; rent ceilings that are a fraction of the free-market rent; legalized key money shared between owner and tenant; and decontrol after a tenant dies or the landlord repurchases the unit. Consequently, the construction of privately owned rental housing has ceased. The controlled sector is disappearing, and the remaining stock is badly undermaintained and deteriorating.     

The “Rent-To-Own” mortgage and prepayment risk

The most important risk factor in the mortgage and mortgage-backed security market has been prepayment risk. Various innovations have arisen to deal with it but none hedge it fully. The Rent-To-Own (RTO) mortgage discussed here is a mortgage instrument that reduces or even reverses prepayment risk. It does so by creating an incentive structure within the framework of the mortgage contract that penalizes prepayment when interest rates are low and rewards it when interest rates are high. This is the opposite of standard mortgages. The RTO incentive structure is based on a unique buyout feature. Borrowers who want to buy out the financial interest of the lender may do so whenever they want, but the buyout price is a negative function of the market interest rates prevailing currently, that is, at the time of the buyout. Hence the lower these rates, the higher the buyout price. Other advantages of the RTO mortgage are also described.     

The impact of settlement period on sales price

This study is an empirical investigation of the impact of settlement period on sales price while controlling for marketing period and standard explanatory variables. The hypothesized positive relationship between settlement period and sales price is confirmed by the results of this study. The estimated coefficient on settlement period is 0.0008 meaning that our market, on average, exacts a premium of 0.08 percent per day of settlement period beyond a norm of 60 days. The estimated coefficient on marketing period (a control variable) is –0.0003 meaning that our market, on average, requires a discount of 0.03 percent per day of marketing period. Our findings show the relative importance of settlement period in making real estate pricing decisions.     

Company Tax Structure and Company Tax Incidence

This paper reviews conflicting theories of company tax incidence impliedby the alternative new and traditional views of dividends andexamines their contrasting policy implications. Whereas, under thetraditional view, closer integration of the corporate and personalincome tax systems is suggested, an alternative policy orientationemphasizing the non-distorting features of the classical system is impliedby the new view. Even if the traditional view is accepted, theimplications for design and reform of the company tax vary widely underalternative specifications of domestic and international tax policy objectives. Schedular alternatives to global income taxation are alsoconsidered.     

“Investor sentiment” and the closed-end fund puzzle: A 7 percent solution

Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) argue that the irrational noise trader model of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) ... is consistent with the published evidence on closed-end fund prices. ... However, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler provide no indication of how much of the variability of a closed-end fund's discounts and premiums is due to such investor sentiment. Using the signal extraction technique of French and Roll (1986) to measure noise, this article estimates that on average only 7 percent of the variance of a standardized measure of weekly changes in discounts and premiums can be attributed to noise-trading activity. Investor sentiment, therefore, seems to account for very little of a closed-end fund's discount and premium variability over time.     

A New Approach to Group Structure, Burden Sharing, and the Equilibrium Provision of Public Goods

In the received model of the voluntary provision of a pure public good, the usual practice is to proceed from assumptions about the group characteristics to inferences about an implied outcome. The approach advocated in this paper reverses the traditional direction. Assuming a Nash equilibrium, we ask how to characterize the diverse set of group characteristics which will support it. Approaching the problem from this angle we define three crucial characteristics of a group-equilibrium: consumer's free rider inducing supply, zero contribution-inducing wealth and voluntary surplus tribute which is the amount by which a person's actual income exceeds his/her zero-contribution inducing wealth. Defining these indicators we show how they form the foundation of a complete mapping between the distribution of individual characteristics of a group, and equilibrium public good supply. Certain questions such as the interaction between size of the group and heterogeneity of incomes and tastes not yet adequately addressed are shown to yield easily to this approach.     

A General Theorem on the Comparative Statics of Changes in Risk

In this paper, the concept of absolutely riskier than is introduced to generalize Gollier's (Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 522–535) necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparative statics of a change in risk for risk averters. The restrictive assumption that the payoff function is monotonic in the risk is relaxed. The policymaker's choice problem, the newsboy problem, and a farmer's example are used to illustrate how easily the monotonicity assumption is violated. Finally, some important properties of the concept of absolutely riskier than, such as its relation with the concept of second-order stochastic dominance, are illustrated using the farmer's example.     

Measuring Potential GSE Funding Advantages

As the size of government sponsored enterprises (GSE) has grown, attention has focused on the relationship between the federal government and the GSEs, with particular attention focused on estimating the impact of this relationship on GSE debt costs. Quantifying the GSEs cost advantage is a controversial exercise with several competing methodologies providing divergent values. Thus, this paper reviews the methods that have been utilized in previous studies and recommends an alternative approach that overcomes many of the criticisms of previous work. By using offering yields on GSE debt, we find that the three housing GSEs enjoyed an average advantage of between 25 and 29 basis points over AA banking sector bonds, between 43 and 47 basis points over A rated bonds, and between 76 and 80 basis points over BBB rated banking issues. We find that our results are robust to both the basic approach taken as well as to model specification.     

Optimal Consumption Taxes and Social Security Under Tax Measurement Problems and Uncertainty

A representative individual lives for two periods; works when young and depends on savings and a government operated social security system when old—the returns on both sources of income, when old, are random. Due to administrative problems the returns to savings are observed with some measurement error. Two alternative consumption tax systems are considered; the Registered Asset Treatment (RAT) and the Non-Registered Asset Treatment (NRAT). The advantage of the RAT is that it can perform a social insurance role while the disadvantage is that it imposes measurement error risk. Correlation between the random return on saving and its measurement error can provide a risk-hedging role that can be further strengthened by the RAT version. The NRAT version neither provides social insurance nor imposes measurement error risk. Both tax systems hedge against the uncertainties in the social security system. The taxpayer engages in precautionary saving in response to future uncertainty.     

Conduit Entities: Implications of Indirect Tax-Efficient Financing Structures for Real Investment

As well known, companies shift income from high to low tax jurisdictions. Typically, profit shifting is achieved by direct financing structures whereby companies use debt finance in the high tax entity and equity finance in the low tax entity. However, certain tax policies can lead to indirect financing structures whereby a conduit entity provides an opportunity to achieve at least two deductions for interest expenses for an investment made in the host country. The effect of direct and indirect financing structures on real investment is compared.     

Government Deposit Insurance and the Diamond-Dybvig Model

The apparent banking market failure modeled by Diamond and Dybvig [1983] rests on their inconsistently applying their sequential servicing constraint to private banks but not to their government deposit insurance agency. Without this inconsistency, banks can provide optimal risk-sharing without tax-based deposit insurance, even when the number of type 1 agents is stochastic, by employing a contingent bonus contract. The threat of disintermediation noted by Jacklin [1987] in the nonstochastic case is still present but can be blocked by contractual trading restrictions. This article complements Wallace [1988], who considers an alternative resolution of this inconsistency.     

Bank lending ‘manias’ in theory and history

A popular view of banking crises sees them as consequences of prior bank lending manias. Such manias are supposed to be especially likely in legally unrestricted banking systems, where banks can issue notes and are not subject to statutory reserve requirements. Here it is argued that the bank lending mania hypothesis (1) exaggerates the role of subjective factors, including bankers' confidence or optimism, as a stimulus to bank lending, and (2) is not supported by evidence from past, legally unrestricted banking systems.     

Why Are Earnings Kinky? An Examination of the Earnings Management Explanation

Prior research has documented a kink in the earnings distribution: too few firms report small losses, too many firms report small profits. We investigate whether boosting of discretionary accruals to report a small profit is a reasonable explanation for this kink. Overall, we are unable to confirm that boosting of discretionary accruals is the key driver of the kink. We caution the use of the ratio of small profit firms to small loss firms as a measure of earnings management. We investigate and discuss a number of alternative explanations for the kink.     

On Transitory Earnings

The paper develops a concept of transitory earnings and contrasts this source of earnings to core (or recurring) earnings. It is shown that any two of the following three attributes of transitory earnings imply the third: (i) forecasting irrelevance with respect to next-period aggregate earnings, (ii) value irrelevance, and (iii) unpredictability. The paper makes the case that the current dirty surplus items make sense, especially if one expands the valuation perspective to also allow for agency considerations.     

Interest-only and principal-only mortgage strips as interest-rate contingent claims

Interest-only (IO) and principal-only (PO) mortgage strips are valued in a stochastic interest-rate environment. The prepayment rate of the underlying mortgages is affected by two considerations not present in the pure financially rational model: (1) The property owner's holding period is assumed to follow a Gamma distribution, resulting in the possibility of prepayment due to the sale of the property (i.e., prepayment that is too early based on market interest rates); and (2) borrowers are assumed to face heterogeneous transaction costs related to refinancing the existing mortgage, and delay refinancing when market conditions make it optimal to do so (refinancing too late). Properties of IO/PO strips are identified by the finite difference method.     

Dual VATs and Cross-Border Trade: Two Problems, One Solution?

In recent years, two distinct but related questions have been raised with respect to value-added taxes (VATs). Concern has been expressed over whether it is desirable or even possible for both national and subnational governments in federal countries such as India, Argentina, and Russia to impose VATs. One reason for thinking that such subnational VATs are unlikely to be workable on a destination basis is the problem of cross-border trade. Of course, this same problem also arises within the European Union, where there is no EU VAT. Drawing upon Canadian experience, we argue that not only is it possible to have two-tier or dual VATs on a destination basis in a single country but that the existence of dual VATs may help deal with some of the problems of cross-border trade.     

The Information Content of Bank Examinations

We identify three types of information from bank examinations—auditing information from verifying the honesty and accuracy of the bank's books, regulatory discipline information about the treatment of the bank by regulators, and private information about bank condition. We estimate these information effects by comparing the cumulative abnormal market returns associated with examinations in which the CAMEL rating remained unchanged, improved, and worsened. All three information effects are found to be greater for banks entering the examination process with unsatisfactory ratings from prior examinations. The only consistently strong effect found is that examination downgrades appear to reveal unfavorable private information about bank condition. The evidence also suggests that the information may reach the market in part through loan quality data released in quarterly financial statements.     

Heterogeneity in Financial Market Participation: Appraising its Implications for the C-CAPM

This paper presents empirical evidence that accounting for heterogeneity in financial market participation is important for evaluating the empirical performance of the Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (C-CAPM). Using the US Consumer Expenditure Survey as a common testing ground, I re-assess three well-known characterizations of the equity premium puzzle (i) the inconsistency of the representative agent's IMRS with Hansen and Jagannathan bounds; (ii) Mehra and Prescott's calibration of a large representative agent's risk aversion; (iii) Hansen and the Singleton's large structural estimates of the preference parameters based on aggregate data. In all three cases, the estimates of risk aversion conditional upon financial market participation are not as far from reasonable values as the corresponding unconditional ones. The differences suggest that part of the equity premium puzzle can be accounted for by the use of a representative agent assumption rather than a more appropriate "representative stockholding agent assumption.     

Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises

In a world of high capital mobility, the threat of speculative attack becomes a central issue of macroeconomicpolicy. While first-generation and second-generation models of speculative attacks both have considerablerelevance to particular financial crises of the 1990s, a third-generation model is needed to make sense of thenumber and nature of the emerging market crises of 1997-98. Most of the recent attempts to produce such amodel have argued that the core of the problem lies in the banking system. This paper sketches another candidatefor third-generation crisis modeling—one that emphasizes two facts that have been omitted from formal modelsto date: the role of companies' balance sheets in determining their ability to invest, and that of capital flows inaffecting the real exchange rate.     

Sound Money and Sound Financial Policy

Anna Schwartz has long promoted a policy of stable money. She also has advocated sound financial policy. The financial environment, according to her work, is strongly influenced by the degree of aggregate price stability. In this article historical evidence for the U.S. is presented that shows a strong association between aggregate price movements and measures of financial distress. Even in an environment of aggregate price stability in the face of shocks, however, a monetary authority should follow the financial policies of a lender of last resort as advocated over a century ago by Walter Bagehot—to promote adequate funds to allay the public's demand for means of payment in the face of a real financial crisis. Other circumstances involving asset market reversals that Schwartz calls pseudo crises should not be the subject of the monetary authorities' actions.