Dividend Payouts and Corporate Governance Quality: An Empirical Investigation

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate how a firm's overall quality of corporate governance affects its dividend policy. Using a large sample of firms with governance data from The Institutional Shareholder Services, we find that firms with stronger governance exhibit a higher propensity to pay dividends, and, similarly, dividend payers tend to pay larger dividends. The results are consistent with the notion that shareholders of firms with better governance quality are able to force managers to disgorge more cash through dividends, thereby reducing what is left for expropriation by opportunistic managers. We employ the two‐stage least squares approach to cope with possible endogeneity and still obtain consistent results. Our results are important as they show that corporate governance quality does have a palpable impact on critical corporate decisions such as dividend policy.     

The role of cross-listing,foreign ownership and state ownership in dividend policy in an emerging market

In this paper, we investigate if dividend policy is influenced by ownership type. Within the dividend literature, dividends have a signaling role regarding agency costs, such that dividends may diminish insider conflicts (reduce free cash flow) or may be used to extract cash from firms (tunneling effect) – which could be predominant in emerging markets. We expect firms with foreign ownership and those that are listed in overseas markets to have different dividend policies and practices than those that are not, and firms with more state ownership and less individual ownership to be more likely to pay cash dividends and less likely to pay stock dividends. Using firms from an emerging economy (China), we examine whether these effects exist in corporate dividend policy and practice. We find that both foreign ownership and cross-listing have significant negative effects on cash dividends, consistent with the signaling effect and the notion of reduced tunneling activities for firms with the ability to raise capital from outside of China. Consistent with the tunneling effect, we find that firms with higher state ownership tend to pay higher cash dividends and lower stock dividends, while the opposite is true for public (individual) ownership. Further analysis shows that foreign ownership mediates the effect of state ownership on dividend policy. Our results have significant implications for researchers, investors, policy makers and regulators in emerging markets.     

Family control,institutional environment and cash dividend policy: Evidence from China

Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004–2008, this study empirically tests the impact of family control, institutional environment and their interaction on the cash dividend policy of listed companies. Our results indicate that (1) family firms have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends than non-family firms; (2) a favorable regional institutional environment has a significant positive impact on the cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends of listed companies; and (3) the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family firms than in non-family firms. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that controlling family shareholders in China may intensify Agency Problem I (the owner–manager conflict) rather than Agency Problem II (the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder conflict), and thus have a significant negative impact on cash dividend policy. In contrast, a favorable regional institutional environment plays a positive corporate governance role in mitigating Agency Problem I and encouraging family firms to pay cash dividends.     

Reappearing Dividends

During the last two decades of the 20th century, the propensity of U.S. companies to pay cash dividends declined significantly. The trend away from dividends accelerated during the late 1990s, leading some economists to conclude that dividend policy was shifting in a very fundamental way. But there was a sharp reversal in this trend starting in 2000.
This article investigates five possible explanations why dividends are reappearing. Given the explosion of new companies during the 1990s, the authors find that part of this rebound can be explained by the "maturity hypothesis"– by the need for such companies to pay out their excess "free cash fiow" to reassure investors that it will not be wasted on value-destroying investments. The authors also report evidence that some companies have chosen to use dividends in part to restore investor confidence about the "quality" of corporate earnings in the wake of concerns over corporate governance. Third, the authors' findings suggest that U.S. companies have responded to the recent dividend tax cut, as one might expect, although the rebound in dividends started well before tax reform became a widely discussed possibility. Finally, the study finds little support for behavioralist explanations in which managers "cater" to irrational investor preferences for dividends. Although the authors hesitate to read too much into the recent rebound, their evidence is consistent with the idea that corporate payout policy has shifted back in favor of conventional cash dividends.     

Nonnegotiable shares, controlling shareholders, and dividend payments in China

China has some unique institutional features. For example, the shares of listed firms are segmented into negotiable and nonnegotiable ones. The controlling shareholders, usually connected to the government, hold nonnegotiable shares. We examine how these institutional features affected cash dividend payments in China during the period 1994-2006. We find that dividend payments are positively associated with the proportion of nonnegotiable shares in a firm and the proportion of nonnegotiable shares held by the controlling shareholder; moreover, the 2001 China Securities Regulatory Commission stipulation requiring cash dividend payments does not benefit negotiable shareholders. However, we also find that dividend payments are downside flexible, and controlling shareholders cannot force firms to pay or to pay more dividends when firms' earnings decline significantly. The conventional factors, especially profitability or the capability to pay, still play an important role in determining the dividend policy. The propensity to pay and the payout ratio in China are not high compared to those of other countries.     

Payout policy in the 21st century

We survey 384 financial executives and conduct in-depth interviews with an additional 23 to determine the factors that drive dividend and share repurchase decisions. Our findings indicate that maintaining the dividend level is on par with investment decisions, while repurchases are made out of the residual cash flow after investment spending. Perceived stability of future earnings still affects dividend policy as in Lintner (1956. American Economic Review 46, 97–113). However, 50 years later, we find that the link between dividends and earnings has weakened. Many managers now favor repurchases because they are viewed as being more flexible than dividends and can be used in an attempt to time the equity market or to increase earnings per share. Executives believe that institutions are indifferent between dividends and repurchases and that payout policies have little impact on their investor clientele. In general, management views provide little support for agency, signaling, and clientele hypotheses of payout policy. Tax considerations play a secondary role.     

The effects of ownership structure on dividend policy: Evidence from seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)

This paper examines the effects of ownership structure on dividend policy, specifically the role of controlling shareholders in shaping dividend policy in a sample of firms that pay dividends and issue new equity simultaneously. The results show that managers in weakly governed firms are more likely to initiate customized dividends to meet outside large shareholders' needs while simultaneously using costly external capital to finance new investment projects. This paper contributes to the existing literature on agency problems by explaining why firms engage in this suboptimal dividend policy: it allows large shareholders to extract private benefits.     

现金股利研究的新视角:基于企业生命周期理论

论文选取2000～2006年A股非金融行业上市公司为样本,首先采用专门方法来区分企业所处的生命周期阶段,然后采用多元回归、参数检验、非参数检验来检验上市公司是否会根据企业所处的生命周期阶段调整其现金股利政策,不同生命周期阶段的企业在现金股利支付意向及现金股利支付率是否存在显著差异.结果表明,我国上市公司的确会基于不同的生命周期采取不同的股利政策,但会受到证监会配股增发政策的影响.     

Agency problems,product market competition and dividend policies in Japan

This study investigates whether product market competition reduces agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in Japan. In particular, we examine firms’ dividend policies in competitive versus concentrated industries. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that firms in more competitive industries pay more dividends, are more likely to increase dividends and are less likely to omit dividends. Furthermore, the impact of firm‐level agency problems on dividend payouts is weaker in highly competitive industries. The results suggest that product market competition can be an effective industry‐level governance mechanism that can force managers to disgorge cash to outside investors.     

Local Dividend Clienteles

We exploit demographic variation to identify the effect of dividend demand on corporate payout policy. Retail investors tend to hold local stocks and older investors prefer dividend‐paying stocks. Together, these tendencies generate geographically varying demand for dividends. Firms headquartered in areas in which seniors constitute a large fraction of the population are more likely to pay dividends, initiate dividends, and have higher dividend yields. We also provide indirect evidence as to why managers may respond to the demand for dividends from local seniors. Overall, these results are consistent with the notion that the investor base affects corporate policy choices.     

Managerial entrenchment and payout policy: A catering effect

Agency theory suggests that entrenched managers are less likely to pay dividends. However, according to the catering theory, external pressures from investors can force managers to increase dividend payments. Hence, we test whether entrenched managers respond to investor demand for dividends and share repurchases. Using a large sample of 9677 US firms over the period 1990–2016 (i.e. a total of 80,478 firm-year observations), we test and find evidence that managerial entrenchment negatively impacts dividend payments. Our findings suggest that catering effects weaken the negative impact of managerial entrenchment on payout policy and that in firms with entrenched managers an increase in the propensity to pay dividends is conspicuous only when there is external investor demand for dividends. Our results indicate that while insiders and institutional owners might not necessarily favour dividend payments, firms respond to catering incentives when dominated by insiders but not institutional owners. Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that dividend payments are a result of external pressures to reduce agency problems associated with firms run by entrenched managers.     

The effect of financial reporting quality on corporate dividend policy

This study examines how financial reporting quality affects corporate dividend policy. We find that higher quality reporting is associated with higher dividends. This positive association is more pronounced among firms with more severe free cash flow problems and among firms with higher ownership by monitoring-type institutional investors. Further analysis of the relation between reporting quality and under?/over-payment of dividends suggests that reporting quality largely mitigates underpayment of dividends. Additionally, both a granger causality test and a difference-in-difference analysis of dividend changes around a quasi-exogenous reporting event yield evidence consistent with the direction of causality going from financial reporting to dividends. Overall, these findings are consistent with financial reporting quality acting as a governance mechanism that induces managers to pay dividends by disciplining free cash flow problems. Our findings support the view that dividends are the result of enhanced monitoring (Jensen 1986; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 2000).     

Why companies do not pay cash dividends: The Turkish experience

This study uses a survey approach to examine the views of corporate managers of non-dividend-paying firms listed on the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) in order to identify the factors leading to the decision not to pay cash dividends in Turkey. Our survey results show that cash constraints, growth opportunities, low profitability and earnings, and the cost of raising external funds (debt) are the major reasons inducing BIST firms not to pay dividends. Additionally, non-dividend-paying firms consider their shareholder preferences when setting a policy of paying no cash dividends. Yet, they neither view taxes as an important factor for paying no dividends nor perceive that stock repurchases are substitutes for cash dividends. Statistical analysis using secondary data of publicly-traded BIST firms reveals whether the actual corporate actions are consistent with the managerial views revealed by our survey research. These tests show that growth opportunities and debt level have a negative effect on the dividend payment decisions of BIST firms. Also, large blockholders and the existence of multiple large shareholders reduce the likelihood and intensity of paying a cash dividend in the Turkish market. Overall, the evidence suggests that non-dividend-paying companies are likely to be smaller in size, relatively younger (in the earlier stage of their life cycle) with high-growth opportunities or with a low level of profitability (or even loss) and small (negative) earnings. By contrast, highly-profitable, mature and large-size corporations are more likely to pay cash dividends.     

Corporate payout policy in dual-class firms

We examine corporate payout policy in dual-class firms. The expropriation hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out less to shareholders because entrenched managers want to maximize the value of assets under control and the associated private benefits. The pre-commitment hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out more to shareholders because firms use corporate payouts as a pre-commitment device to mitigate agency costs. Our results support the pre-commitment hypothesis. Dual-class firms have higher cash dividend payments and total payouts, and they use more regular cash dividends rather than special dividends or repurchases, compared to their propensity-matched single-class firms. Dual-class firms with severe free cash flow-related agency problems and few growth opportunities rely even more on corporate payouts as a pre-commitment mechanism. We also rule out the alternative explanation that dual-class firms pay out more because super-voting shareholders lack the ability to generate home-made dividends by selling shares since super-voting shares are often non-tradable or very illiquid.     

上市公司的股利政策究竟迎合了谁的需要——来自中国上市公司的经验数据

上市公司为什么要支付股利?传统的税收理论、信号模型以及代理假说等公司股利政策理论实际上都没最终完整地解释清楚这个"股利之谜"。最近美国学者Baker和Wurgler从行为公司财务角度出发提出了股利迎合理论,该理论认为公司支付股利的主要原因在于,管理者为了提高股价理性地迎合了股东对股利不断变化的偏好。本文认为,Baker和Wurgler提出的股利迎合理论忽略了上市公司股权结构的特征。在股权高度集中的上市公司里,管理者制订股利政策主要是为了迎合大股东的需求,广大中小投资者的股利偏好往往被忽视。本文以1994年至2005年间我国的上市公司为样本进行检验,研究结果支持了我们所提出的理论观点。     

Dividend Payouts and Information Shocks

We examine changes in firms’ dividend payouts following an exogenous shock to the information asymmetry problem between managers and investors. Agency theories predict a decrease in dividend payments to the extent that improved public information lowers managers’ need to convey their commitment to avoid overinvestment via costly dividend payouts. Conversely, dividends could increase if minority investors are in a better position to extract cash dividends. We test these predictions by analyzing the dividend payment behavior of a global sample of firms around the mandatory adoption of IFRS and the initial enforcement of new insider trading laws. Both events serve as proxies for a general improvement of the information environment and, hence, the corporate governance structure in the economy. We find that, following the two events, firms are less likely to pay (increase) dividends, but more likely to cut (stop) such payments. The changes occur around the time of the informational shock, and only in countries and for firms subject to the regulatory change. They are more pronounced when the inherent agency issues or the informational shocks are stronger. We further find that the information content of dividends decreases after the events. The results highlight the importance of the agency costs of free cash flows (and changes therein) for shaping firms’ payout policies.     

Impact of financial and multinational operations on manager perceptions of dividends

We survey managers of firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange about their views on dividends. We find the perceptions of factors that influence dividend policy differ between managers of financial and non-financial firms. Industry classification also affects how managers view statements about the dividend pattern, dividend setting process, dividend policy and firm value, residual dividend theory, and explanations for paying dividends. However, we find weak, if any, multinational operations effect on manager perception of dividends. We conclude that researchers investigating dividends should partition the data by industry type and perhaps other firm characteristics to better understand the dividend puzzle.     

Do firms use dividend changes to signal future profitability? A simultaneous equation analysis

This paper retests the signaling hypothesis of dividends by examining whether managers change dividends to signal their expectation of earnings prospects using a simultaneous-equation approach. This approach allows us to more clearly test the earnings prospects signaling hypothesis and facilitates the control of several alternative motives that managers may have for changing dividends. We also examine the information content of dividend changes with respect to future earnings changes in the same model system. Our results show that managers change dividends to signal equity-scaled rather than asset-scaled earnings prospects. In addition, we find evidence that managers also change dividends for signaling previous earnings changes and for catering to dividend clienteles. As for the information content of dividend changes, we find that dividend changes have significant and negative impact on ROA changes. The findings suggest that if investors consistently cannot recognize the signaling purpose and find that dividend increases (decreases) are not useful in predicting favorable (unfavorable) future earnings, managers may someday give up using dividend changes to signal the earnings prospects of their firms because they cannot obtain the expected market benefits anymore.     

New Evidence That Taxes Affect the Valuation of Dividends

This paper uses British data to examine the effects of dividend taxes on investors' relative valuation of dividends and capital gains. British data offer great potential to illuminate the dividends and taxes question, since there have been two radical changes and several minor reforms in British dividend tax policy during the last 30 years. Studying the relationship between dividends and stock price movements during different tax regimes offers an ideal controlled experiment for assessing the effects of taxes on investors' valuation of dividends. Using daily data on a small sample of firms, and monthly data on a much broader sample, we find clear evidence that taxes affect the equilibrium relationship between dividend yields and market returns. These findings suggest that taxes are important determinants of security market equilibrium and deepen the puzzle of why firms pay dividends.     

Dividend payout strategies and bank survival likelihood: A cross-country analysis

In this cross-country study, we examine whether dividend payout decisions affect the survival likelihood of banks. Using unique international banking data from 11 countries from 2010 to 2019, we find that higher levels of cash dividend payouts increase a bank's survival likelihood, as paying dividends lowers agency problems and cost of debt and facilitates greater public monitoring. Our extended analysis shows an inverted U-shaped relation between large dividends and survival likelihood. At higher levels, payout is related to a safer position of banks in terms of default; however, at very high levels of dividends, when the levels of payouts exceed a threshold, such payout lowers the likelihood of survival. We additionally investigate the effect of the bank type to assess whether differential effects could be realised under the constrained dividend model of Islamic banks compared to the conventional banking model. Our results, interestingly, show that the positive effect of dividend payouts on bank survival is more pronounced in conventional than Islamic banks. This finding is explained by the dominant liquidity management challenges pertaining to the Islamic banking business model in which banks retain more cash and pay lower dividends. Our findings offer important insights and policy implications for regulators, bankers and a broad set of stakeholders engaging with both banking sectors.