中国实业部门金融化的异质性

本文基于实业和金融两类投资组合模型的构建,重点考察不同所有权性质和不同行业企业的金融化驱动机制是否具有异质性,并探究不同类别金融投资对应结果的差异性特征。实证结果与已有研究以及传统印象并不一致:我们发现,风险规避是中国非国有企业和制造业企业金融化的显著驱动因素,而国有企业和非制造业企业则不存在这一特征;同时,非制造业企业的金融投资主要由收益率差驱动,而在其他企业样本中均没有证据显示追逐利润是企业金融化的推动因素。不同企业样本的融资约束、杠杆率、成长性、流动性水平以及资产质量等因素对企业金融资产占比的影响也存在显著差异。进一步区分企业金融投资中货币和非货币类金融资产的不同特性并考虑企业的长期股权投资,结果表明货币类金融资产和非货币类金融资产的驱动机制存在明显差异:对于货币类金融资产投资,国有企业主要受资本逐利因素推动,其他企业则未体现这一特征;对于非货币类金融资产投资,非国有企业、制造业和非制造业企业均受到风险因素驱动,而国有企业则不受影响;将企业长期股权投资纳入金融资产后结果则未产生明显差异。     

Corporate hedging versus risk-shifting in financially constrained firms: The time-horizon matters!

The paper presents an intertemporal theory of the optimal risk policy in shareholder-managed firms, which face future financing constraints and act under moral hazard as well as limited liability. Our model provides an integrated framework that overcomes the dilemma of “conflicting motives” of risk-shifting (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) on the one hand and corporate hedging (Smith and Stulz, 1985) on the other hand by considering time-effects. Shareholders face a trade-off between a risk-shifting incentive if the investment horizon is short, and a hedging incentive that becomes dominant if the investment horizon is sufficiently long. Within an infinite-time investment horizon, Jensen and Meckling's risk incentive problem can be fully solved as permanent hedging is optimal except for firms in financial distress, which constantly opt for risk-shifting. We further show that the value of corporate hedging increases if financing constraints become more severe. Our results suggest that life-cycle features play a significant role in the firm's propensity to hedge. They also coincide with existing empirical evidence, which shows that only highly leveraged firms facing financial distress will primarily opt for risk-shifting.     

Hedging,financing, and investment decisions: Theory and empirical tests

In this paper we theoretically and empirically examine the interaction between hedging, financing, and investment decisions. A simple equilibrium model with costly financial distress suggests that as firms become more efficient at risky investments vis a vis low risk investments, they will borrow less, invest more in risky assets, and hedge more. The model also predicts a positive relationship between hedging and leverage – a result consistent with debt capacity arguments. We test the model empirically using a simultaneous equations framework to investigate the determinants of firm-level hedging, financing and investing decisions. The results strongly support the hypothesis that the hedging, financing and investment decisions are jointly determined. In addition, we find strong support for the central hypothesis that firms more efficient investing in risky technologies more aggressively hedge and use less debt financing in order to maximize their comparative advantage.     

Collateral and capital structure

We develop a dynamic model of investment, capital structure, leasing, and risk management based on firms' need to collateralize promises to pay with tangible assets. Both financing and risk management involve promises to pay subject to collateral constraints. Leasing is strongly collateralized costly financing and permits greater leverage. More constrained firms hedge less and lease more, both cross-sectionally and dynamically. Mature firms suffering adverse cash flow shocks may cut risk management and sell and lease back assets. Persistence of productivity reduces the benefits to hedging low cash flows and can lead firms not to hedge at all.     

Managerial conservatism and corporate policies

This paper investigates how conservative managers make corporate decisions. Motivated by psychology research, we use handwritten signatures (i.e., emotionally restraint disclosure styles) as a proxy for CEO conservatism. We find that firms with conservative CEOs engage more with safer investments (capital expenditures), engage less with risky policies (Research & Development expenses and debt financing), hold more cash, are less likely to pay cash dividends, and more likely to use stock repurchase schemes. We use the same proxy for CFO conservatism. We find that CFO conservatism is a better determinant than CEO conservatism for cash holding and financing policies, but the reverse is true for investment policies. Conservative CFOs prefer long-term debt to short-term debt.     

How do firms finance their investments?: The relative importance of equity issuance and debt contracting costs

This paper examines the financing decisions of firms in response to changes in investments and profits. We find that information frictions play important roles in firms' financing decisions. However, we find no evidence that asymmetric information about the value of a firm's assets causes equity to be used only as a last resort. Indeed equity is the predominant source of finance in situations, such as profit shortfalls, investment in intangible assets, and internally generated growth opportunities, where informational asymmetries and agency costs are likely to be high. We also find that firms respond asymmetrically to positive and negative profit shocks. In financing fixed assets, high asymmetric information firms use more short-term debt and less long-term debt, whereas firms with high potential agency problems use significantly more equity and less long-term debt and cash.     

The happy story of small business financing

We examine two data sets, one from the UK (n = 15,750) and one from the US (n = 3239), to show that SME financial behaviour demonstrates substantial financial contentment, or ‘happiness’. We find fewer than 10% of the UK firms seek significant growth and only 1.32% of US firms list a shortage of capital other than working capital as a problem. Financial performance indicators (growth, return on assets, profit margin) were not found to be determinants of SME financing activities, as might be expected in a ‘rational’ risk–return environment. Younger and less educated SME owners more actively use external financing – even though more education reduces the fear of loan denial – while older and more educated (‘wiser’) SME owners are found to be being less likely to seek or use external financing. The contentment hypothesis for SME financing also extends to high-growth firms in that we show that they participate more in the loan markets than low-growth firms. By way of contrast to the finance gap hypothesis, the contentment hypothesis observes the importance of social networks (connections) [for finance] and confirms the ‘connections – happiness’ linkage in the literature on happiness while doubting the theoretical suitability of Jensen and Meckling [Jensen, M., Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305–360.] base-case analysis for SMEs.     

Financing constraints, cash-flow risk, and corporate investment

Using an analytically tractable two-period model of a financially constrained firm, we derive an investment threshold that is U-shaped in cash holdings. We show analytically the relevant trade-offs leading to the U-shape: the firm balances financing costs for present and future investment, respectively. Our main argument is that financing costs today are more important than the risk of future financing costs. The empirically testable implications are that low-cash firms facing financing costs today are more reluctant to invest if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. On the other hand, cash-rich firms facing no financing costs today invest in less favorable projects (i.e., forgo their real option to wait) if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. The magnitude of these effects is amplified by the degree of market frictions that the firms are facing.     

Productivity and liquidity management under costly financing

We explore theoretically and empirically the relationship between firm productivity and liquidity management in the presence of financial frictions. We build a dynamic investment model and show that, counter to basic economic intuition, more productive firms could demand less capital assets and hold more liquid assets compared to less productive firms when financing costs are sufficiently high. We empirically test this prediction using a comprehensive dataset of Chinese manufacturers and find that more productive firms indeed hold less capital and more cash. We do not, however, observe this for US manufacturers. Our study suggests a larger capital misallocation problem in markets with significant financing frictions than previously documented.     

Severity of financing constraints and firms' investments

According to standard investment theory, the current investments of more financially constrained firms should be smaller than those of less constrained firms with similar investment opportunities. In this paper, I develop a dynamic investment model in which the project value and the severity of financing constraints can vary over time. My results contradict standard theory. To preempt further financing risk in the future, severely constrained firms may engage in more active investment behavior even if they face relatively high additional financing costs at the time. My numerical example demonstrates that a relatively low probability of future risk is sufficient to cause such preemptive behavior.     

The Effect of Venture Capital Financing on the Sensitivity to Cash Flow of Firm's Investments

This work studies the effect of venture capital (VC) financing on firms' investments in a longitudinal sample of 379 Italian unlisted new‐technology‐based firms (NTBFs) observed over the 10‐year period from 1994 to 2003. We distinguish the effects of VC financing according to the type of investor: independent VC (IVC) funds and corporate VC (CVC) investors. Previous studies argue that NTBFs are the firms most likely to be financially constrained. The technology‐intensive nature of their activity and their lack of a track record increase adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Moreover, most of their assets are firm‐specific or intangible and hence cannot be pledged as collateral. In accordance with this view, we show that the investment rate of NTBFs is strongly positively correlated with their current cash flows. We also find that after receiving VC financing, NTBFs increase their investment rate independently of the type of VC investor. However, the investments of CVC‐backed firms remain sensitive to shocks in cash flows, whereas IVC‐backed firms exhibit a low and statistically not significant investment–cash flow sensitivity that we interpret as a signal of the removal of financial constraints.     

How does the Funding Status of Defined Benefit Pension Plans Affect Investment Decisions of Firms in the United States?

We investigate whether the flexibility in making contributions towards defined benefit pension plans sponsored by firms in the United States allows managers to save cash and increase investments. Firms invest more at higher levels of pension deficit, defined as pension benefit obligations less pension assets, and scaled by total assets. At the median level (90^th percentile) of pension deficit, investments increase by 6.7 cents (9.4 cents) for every dollar increase in cash. As the pension deficit increases, firms deviate more from the predicted level of investment. These findings suggest that the incremental investments are more likely to represent overinvestment by managers. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and endogeneity concerns that may arise if investments are jointly determined with the funding policy of pension plans and the firm's target cash level. We repeat our main analysis for the United Kingdom and also find for that country that, at a fixed cash level, total investment increases as pension deficit increases.     

Corporate Control and the Choice of Investment Financing: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions

We test the proposition that corporate control considerations motivate the means of investment financing—cash (and debt) or stock. Corporate insiders who value control will prefer financing investments by cash or debt rather than by issuing new stock which dilutes their holdings and increases the risk of losing control. Our empirical results support this hypothesis: in corporate acquisitions, the larger the managerial ownership fraction of the acquiring firm the more likely the use of cash financing. Also, the previously observed negative bidders' abnormal returns associated with stock financing are mainly in acquisitions made by firms with low managerial ownership.     

CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS

There have been several cases in recent years—most notably, Chrysler—in which shareholders have objected to the level of companies' holdings of cash and other liquid assets. This paper describes the authors' study of the determinants of liquid asset holdings by publicly traded U.S. firms and how these holdings change over time. For those companies that appear to hold excess cash, the study also attempts to investigate whether such companies have a tendency to reduce value by "overinvesting"—a tendency described in the academic finance literature as the "free cash flow problem."
According to the study, the most important determinants of corporate cash holdings are size, risk, and the extent of the firm's investment opportunities, with smaller, riskier, and high-growth firms holding larger amounts of cash as a percentage of total (noncash) assets. These results are consistent with corporate decisions to hold liquid assets in order to preserve the firm's ability to make strategic investments when operating cash flow turns down and outside funds are expensive.
The authors also report that most companies with large amounts of excess cash tend to acquire it mainly by accumulating internally generated cash flows, and not by issuing securities. Perhaps surprising, the study also finds that spending on new projects and acquisitions is only slightly higher for firms with excess cash—and that such firms also tend to have higher payouts to shareholders in the form of dividends or stock repurchases. Thus, there is little evidence in this study of a free cash flow problem, as well as some indication that managers are aware of and attempt to address the problem.     

R&D sensitivity to asset sale proceeds: New evidence on financing constraints and intangible investment

We examine the intersection between corporate divestitures of tangible assets and investment in intangible capital (R&D) to provide new tests for the impact financing constraints have on real activity. A positive R&D sensitivity to asset sale proceeds indicates binding financing constraints since cash inflows from tangible asset sales are negatively correlated with productivity shocks and not otherwise connected to intangible investment via non-financial channels. Using a variety of estimation approaches, we document a strong, positive link between cash inflows from fixed asset sales and corporate R&D investment, but only among firms most likely facing binding financing constraints. These results offer robust evidence that financing frictions impact the increasingly important yet understudied intangible corporate investments that drive innovative activity, and they highlight a previously unexplored but potentially valuable use of proceeds from fixed asset divestitures.     

自由现金流量创造力与违约风险——来自A股公司的经验证据

本文基于我国A股上市公司数据,研究了企业自由现金流量创造力与违约风险之间的关系。研究发现:(1)企业自由现金流量创造力越强,其违约风险越低。经过一系列稳健性检验后,该结论依旧成立。(2)自由现金流量创造力越强的企业往往有更低的债务规模、更高的资产收益率和更低的股票波动,因而其违约风险更低。(3)自由现金流量创造力与违约风险的负相关关系,主要存在于货币政策紧缩时期以及外部信息环境较差的企业。本文发现意味着,监管部门和投资者应重视上市公司自由现金流量创造力不足所带来的潜在债务违约风险,通过不断提高公司自由现金流量创造力,助力我国宏观经济与微观企业高质量发展。     

财务战略驱动企业盈利模式——美国苹果公司轻资产模式案例研究

本文首先明确了企业现金流结构是连接企业价值与盈利模式的关键变量,架构了"企业价值→财务战略(现金流结构主导)→盈利模式(轻资产模式)→商业活动与资本行为→财务业绩"的财务战略驱动盈利模式的理论框架。文章以美国苹果公司为分析对象,选取该公司自2001年至2011年间的主要业务经营资料与关键财务数据,从财务战略驱动视角,透视苹果公司持续轻资产模式运营的基本要点,包括实施简化生产和标准化零配件、快速供应链、极短的存货周转期、高额现金储备和营运资本、小额固定资产投资、巨额研发与销售终端投资、并购技术性优势企业、内源融资主导等等,这些轻资产战略的基本特征的概括既丰富了财务战略的理论主张,也给企业战略管理实践提供了许多实操性的启示。     

The impact of cash flows and firm size on investment: The international evidence

This paper examines the degree to which cash flow availability influences firm investment in six OECD countries. In particular, we are interested in the extent to which the reliance on internal funds is affected by firm size, since there is general agreement that smaller firms have less access to external capital markets and, thus, should be more affected by the availability of internal funds. Earlier work has concluded that the documented positive relationship between cash flow and investment is evidence of the existence of financial constraints. We first examine all firms, regardless of size, in each country, and we find that the amount of corporate investment is affected by internal resources in all six countries; that is, internal financing affects firm investment. We then repeat the analysis segmenting the sample using three measures of firm size. Contrary to our a priori expectations, we find that the cash flow-investment sensitivity is generally highest in the large firm size group and smallest in the small firm size group. We deduce that the explanations for these findings are grounded in managerial agency considerations, and in the greater flexibility enjoyed by large firms in timing their investments. Thus, we conclude that the degree of sensitivity of a firm's investments to its cash flows cannot be interpreted as an accurate measure of its access to capital markets (as do Kaplan, S., Zingales, L., 1997. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 169–215), since small firms are known to have less access to external markets.     

RETURNS ON PROJECT-FINANCED INVESTMENTS: EVOLUTION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS

In the past, project finance was used primarily to fund relatively low-risk natural resource projects with highly predictable cash flows. Today project finance is used for a wide range of assets, such as satellite telecommunications systems, amusement parks, and microprocessor factories, and in developing as well as developed countries. The author explores how the evolution into riskier assets has changed expected returns on project-financed investments. Higher return variability and greater failure rates have caused project debt capacities to fall. What is notable about project-financed investments, however, is that the best returns are not very high. And because the nature of most projects limits the upside potential, a much higher fraction of project-financed investments must be successful for capital providers to earn acceptable returns on their investments.
The move into riskier assets has also led to increased emphasis on the risk management role of project finance; that is, through careful structure and design, a firm can use project finance to reduce the collateral damage caused by a failing investment and also to limit sovereign risks. But even so, the author suggests that the original structures were never designed to handle projects with significant asset risk. For this reason, in cases of riskier projects, single-asset project loans are likely to be replaced by either traditional corporate financing vehicles or hybrid structures involving elements of both project and corporate finance. One example of such hybrid financing is Calpine's revolving construction facilities that are used to finance portfolios of merchant power plants.     

The tax incentives and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment of an accelerated depreciation tax policy for fixed assets

Based on a quasi-natural experiment of an accelerated depreciation tax policy (ADP) for fixed assets in China, we examine the impact of the ADP on corporate cash holdings. Using a multiperiod difference-in-differences model with a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2008 to 2020, we document that firms subject to the ADP exhibit lower cash holdings compared to firms not affected by the policy. The effect is more pronounced for young firms, profitable firms, and firms with less R&D investment. According to our mechanism analysis, the ADP mitigates a firm's financing constraints and financialization and therefore, a firm does not need as much as cash holdings as they did before the implementation of the ADP. The mechanism test results suggest that the ADP lowers the precautionary and speculative demand for cash. The analysis of economic consequences shows that the reduction of cash holdings significantly enhances firm value. Our research results suggest that the ADP is a good policy for firms.