The effect of banking crisis on bank-dependent borrowers

We provide causal evidence that adverse capital shocks to banks affect their borrowers’ performance negatively. We use an exogenous shock to the U.S. banking system during the Russian crisis of Fall 1998 to separate the effect of borrowers’ demand of credit from the supply of credit by the banks. Firms that primarily relied on banks for capital suffered larger valuation losses during this period and subsequently experienced a higher decline in their capital expenditure and profitability as compared to firms that had access to the public-debt market. Consistent with an adverse shock to the supply of credit, crisis-affected banks decreased the quantity of their lending and increased loan interest rates in the post-crisis period significantly more than the unaffected banks. Our results suggest that the global integration of the financial sector can contribute to the propagation of financial shocks from one economy to another through the banking channel.     

以创新带动传统信贷业务市场拓展

本文通过分析当前国内金融市场现状并借鉴国外金融市场发展经验,认为银行传统信贷业务仍然具有良好的发展前景,在未来一定时期内仍将是企业融资的主渠道,是银行开展其他金融服务的基础和平台,并且结构将适应经济结构变化不断优化.针对近年来银行传统信贷发展面临的资本约束、金融脱媒和利率市场化等冲击,提出了以创新手段带动银行传统信贷业务和市场拓展的观点,即以理念创新重新定位传统信贷业务市场,以价格创新应对资本约束和利率市场化,以科技创新优化传统信贷发展模式,以产品创新和流程创新解决传统信贷难点,以营销创新推动信贷市场拓展,以手段创新加强信贷风险管理.     

以创新带动传统信贷业务市场拓展

本文通过分析当前国内金融市场现状并借鉴国外金融市场发展经验，认为银行传统信贷业务仍然具有良好的发展前景，在未来一定时期内仍将是企业融资的主渠道，是银行开展其他金融服务的基础和平台，并且结构将适应经济结构变化不断优化。针对近年来银行传统信贷发展面临的资本约束、金融脱媒和利率市场化等冲击，提出了以创新手段带动银行传统信贷业务和市场拓展的观点，即以理念创新重新定位传统信贷业务市场，以价格创新应对资本约束和利率市场化，以科技创新优化传统信贷发展模式，以产品创新和流程创新解决传统信贷难点，以营销创新推动信贷市场拓展，以手段创新加强信贷风险管理。     

The Basel Committee proposals for a new capital accord: implications for Italian banks

Following a few general considerations on the recently proposed revision of the Basel Agreement on capital adequacy, this paper focuses on the first pillar of the Basel Committee proposals, the handling of capital requirements for credit risk in the banking book. The Basel Committee envisages an approach alternatively based on external ratings or on internal rating systems for the determination of the minimum capital requirement related to bank loan portfolios. This approach supports a system of capital requirements that is more sensitive to credit risk. On the basis of specific assumptions, these requirements provide a measure of the value at risk (VaR) produced by models used by major international banks. We first address the impact of the standardised and (internal ratings-based) IRB foundation approach using general data on Italian banks loans' portfolios default rates. We then simulate the impact of the proposed new rules on the corporate loan portfolios of Italian banks, using the unique data set of mortality rates recently published by the Bank of Italy. Three main conclusions emerge from the analysis: (i) the standardised approach implicitly penalizes Italian banks in their interbank funding as their rating is generally below AA/Aa, (ii) the average default rate experienced by Italian banks is higher than the one implied in the benchmark risk weight (BRW) proposed by the Basel Committee for the IRB foundation approach, thereby potentially leading to an increase in the regulatory risk weights, and (iii) the risk-weight is based on an average asset correlation that is significantly higher than the one historically recorded within the Italian banks' corporate borrowers. These findings support the need for a significant revision of the basic inputs and assumptions of the Basel proposals. Finally, in relation to the conditions that allow the capital market to effectively discipline banks, we comment on the proposals advanced in relation to the third pillar of the new capital adequacy scheme.     

Credit market equilibrium with bank monitoring and moral hazard

We characterize a credit market equilibrium in which banks coexistwith capital markets and firms obtain funding from both sources.An incentive problem exists between the firm's insiders andoutside providers of capital. Banks can provide not only creditbut also monitoring services. We show that when banks cannotprecommit to a particular level of monitoring there is a uniquecredit market equilibrium with firms being financed with a combinationof bank credit and external capital. In this equilibrium, amarginal substitution of bank credit for capital market financingwould raise the firm's stock price.     

银行信用风险评估模型的选择及应用策略分析

相比于巴塞尔新资本协议的现代化管理要求,我国银行在信用风险管理方面的能力,基础相对薄弱,无法全面适应银行业未来经营发展、市场竞争、业务持续发展等需求.为此,文章将通过银行信用风险评估模型的构建,从中提出强化信用风险管理体系的方法,进而为银行信用风险管理水平的提高,提供有效的依据.     

借助资本市场发展我国商业银行的策略探讨

商业银行与资本市场之间存在一种既竞争又融合的关系.本文首先分析了当前我国资本市场的发展现状,在此基础上重点讨论了资本市场的发展对商业银行构成的挑战和机遇:资本市场的发展分流了商业银行信贷客户和存款资金,使商业银行面临更大的经营风险和竞争压力;同时,资本市场的发展有利于商业银行负债业务、资产业务和表外业务的拓展、资产质量的改善和资产结构优化.作者最后提出了借助资本市场发展商业银行的具体策略,包括负债业务证券化、积极争取同业存款、创新信贷业务品种、大力拓展表外业务、信贷资产证券化、银行资本证券化、完善信息技术系统建议、加快人才培养和创新市场营销等.     

Potential Competitive Effects of Basel II on Banks in SME Credit Markets in the United States

We examine the likely competitive effects of implementation of Basel II capital requirements on banks in the market for credit to SMEs in the U.S. Similar competitive effects from Basel II may occur for other credits and financial instruments in the U.S. and other nations. We address whether reduced risk weights for SME credits extended by large banking organizations that adopt the Advanced Internal Ratings-Based (A-IRB) approach of Basel II might significantly adversely affect the competitive positions of other organizations. The analyses suggest only relatively minor competitive effects on most community banks because the large A-IRB adopters tend to make very different types of SME loans to different types of borrowers than community banks. However, there may be significant adverse effects on the competitive positions of large non-A-IRB banking organizations because the data do not suggest any strong segmentation in SME credit markets among large organizations. JEL classification: G21, G28, G38, L51     

有效信贷需求不足与商业银行经营战略选择

近年来,我国商业银行面临有效信贷需求不足的经营困境,本文从金融系统风险配置角度对有效信贷需求不足的原因进行了分析,认为金融风险的非均衡配置及商业银行关系型信贷技术的缺失是出现有效信贷需求不足的重要原因。本文还相应提出了商业银行的经营战略选择,包括实施混业经营战略,努力提高银行信贷资金运用的主动性;将支持中小企业作为新的信贷增长点,稳步实施中小企业贷款战略;构建我国私人银行业务体系,积极开拓消费信贷市场等。     

Ethics,capital and talent competition in banking

We model optimal ethical standards, capital requirements and talent allocation in banking. Banks with varying safety-net protections, including depositories and shadow banks, innovate products and compete for talent. Managers dislike unethical behavior, but banks heed it only because detection imposes costs. We find: (i) higher capital induces higher ethical standards, but socially optimal capital requirements may tolerate some unethical behavior; (ii) managerial ethics fails to raise banks’ ethical standards; (iii) banks with lower ethical standards attract better talent and innovate more; and (iv) it is socially optimal to allocate better talent to shadow banks instead of depositories, and this allocation results in higher capital requirements and ethical standards for depositories. Consequently, with capital capacity constraints, the shadow banking sector is larger than the depository sector; talent competition induces a race to the bottom in ethical standards, and the regulator responds by setting capital requirements to magnify this size difference.     

Bank credit risk and macro-prudential policies: Role of counter-cyclical capital buffer

This paper investigates the impact of macro-prudential policy (proxied by the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB)) on bank credit risk during uncertain times, as banking sector stability is crucial in promoting financial intermediation. Using a unique daily data set consisting of 4939 credit default swaps (CDS) of 70 banks from 25 countries over the period 2010–2019, we find that CCyB tightening decreases bank-level CDS spreads, while CCyB loosening increases CDS spreads. This heterogeneous effect of CCyB arises due to its asymmetric effect on the capital ratio (i.e., the equity-to-total assets ratio) of banks. Tightening CCyB significantly increases capital, whereas loosening CCyB does not impact capital. Thus, the risks that emanate from the banking sector during periods of heightened uncertainty and financial distress can be significantly dampened when CCyB regulation is enabled. Consequently, macro-prudential policies for banks to hold higher levels of capital during good times are justified to contain financial market risks during downturns.     

Capital regulation,heterogeneous monitoring costs,and aggregate loan quality

This paper develops a banking-sector framework with heterogeneous loan monitoring costs. Banks are exposed to the moral hazard behavior of borrowers and endogenously choose whether to monitor their loans to eliminate this exposure. After analyzing an unregulated banking system, we examine several cases in which regulatory capital requirements bind the notional loan supplies of various subsets of banks. To gauge the impact of capital requirements, we define loan ‘quality’ in terms of either the ratio of monitored to total loans or the ratio of monitoring banks to total bank population. Under the assumption of a specific cross-sectional distribution of banks, our simulations show that the imposition of binding capital requirements on a previously unregulated banking system unambiguously increases the market loan rate and reduces aggregate lending, but has an ambiguous effect on loan ‘quality’. Nevertheless, once capital requirements are in place, the simulations indicate that regulators can contribute to higher overall loan ‘quality’ by toughening capital requirements.     

Capital requirements and bank behavior in the UK: Are there lessons for international capital standards?

The financial crisis prompted widespread interest in developing a better understanding of how capital regulation drives bank behavior. This paper uses a unique, comprehensive database of regulatory capital requirements on all UK banks to examine their effects on capital, lending and balance sheet management behavior. We find that capital requirements that include firm-specific, time-varying add-ons set by supervisors affect banks’ desired capital ratios and that resulting adjustments to capital and lending depend on the gap between actual and target ratios. We use these results to measure the effects of a capital regime that includes features similar to those embedded in the UK framework. Our results suggest that countercyclical capital requirements may be less effective in slowing credit activity when banks can readily satisfy them with lower-quality (lower-costing) capital elements versus higher-quality common equity. Given the size of the UK banking sector and the global nature of many of the largest institutions in the UK banking sector, the results have implications for the ongoing debate surrounding the design and calibration of international capital standards.     

COVID-19 as a stress test: Assessing the bank regulatory framework

The broad economic damage of the COVID-19 pandemic poses the first major test of the bank regulatory reforms put in place after the Global Financial Crisis. Our study assesses the U.S. regulatory framework, with an emphasis on capital and liquidity requirements. Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, banks were well capitalized and held ample liquid assets, which partly reflects enhanced requirements. The overall robust capital and liquidity levels resulted in a resilient banking system, which maintained lending and market making through the early stages of the pandemic. Trading activity was a source of strength for banks, reflecting in part a prudent regulatory approach. That said, leverage requirements are associated with more repo position netting by banks, with potential implications for market making.     

Credit derivatives, capital requirements and opaque OTC markets

In this paper we study the optimal design of credit derivative contracts when banks have private information about their ability in the loan market and are subject to capital requirements. First, we prove that when banks are subject to a maximum loss capital requirement the optimal signaling contract is a binary credit default basket. Second, we show that if credit derivative markets are opaque then banks cannot commit to terminal-date risk exposure, and therefore the optimal signaling contract is more costly. The above results allow us to discuss the potential implications of different capital adequacy rules for the credit derivative markets.     

Credit supply and capital structure adjustments

Using the staggered deregulation of the U.S. banking industry as a series of exogenous shocks, I study the effect of the credit supply on the speed of capital structure adjustment. I find robust evidence that interstate and intrastate banking deregulation are positively associated with leverage adjustments. Specifically, the speeds of adjustment to target leverage are faster in the postderegulation periods. I also find that the positive effect is driven by firms that are financially constrained, are financially dependent on banks, and have less access to the public debt market and by deregulated banks’ ability to geographically diversify the credit risk.     

银行业改革、市场化与信贷资源的配置

鉴于我国资本市场弱法律风险和股权高度集中的基本特征,本文提出了一个分析我国银行信贷业务预期违约风险的基本框架。以此为基础,本文考察了我国的银行业改革以及市场化进程对银行信贷资源配置行为的影响。研究发现,银行配置信贷资源时,会认真考虑贷款企业的历史财务绩效和代理成本。并且,银行业改革和地区市场化进程都成功促进了银行信贷资源配置行为的商业化。本文的研究为评价银行业改革的历史进程提供了经验证据,也为进一步的努力方向提供了一些有益的线索。一方面,银行在配置其信贷资源时不仅要进一步关注贷款企业的财务绩效;另一方面,也应当致力于促使银行在确立必要报酬率时进一步关注贷款企业的代理成本。     

Dwarf banks

This study examines the business model and the viability of very small commercial banks in emerging market context. Using a unique sample of 141 Russian banks with less than a $10 million in assets, I trace performance, survival, recapitalization and growth patterns of these dwarf banks in response to the sharp increase in the minimum capital requirements. I find that dwarf banks are, on average, low-risk financial intermediaries that perform simple operations and have significantly higher survival rates in local markets with poor economic and banking services outreach characteristics. I also find that the average dwarf banks withstand the regulatory capital shock surprisingly well by securing fresh capital injection followed by a twofold asset size increase. The results of this study contribute to the literature on the relationship between the small bank business model, local banking markets characteristics and long-term viability. They also provide new evidence on the expected and unexpected outcomes of the “too small to survive” regulatory intervention into the banking market size structures.     

The credit quality channel: Modeling contagion in the interbank market

We propose an algorithm to model contagion in the interbank market via what we term the “credit quality channel”. In existing models on contagion via interbank credit, external shocks to banks often spread to other banks only in case of a default. In contrast, shocks are transmitted also via asset devaluations and deteriorations in the credit quality in our algorithm. First, the probability of default (PD) of those banks directly affected by some shock increases. This increases the expected loss of the credit portfolios of the initially affected banks’ counterparties, thereby reducing the counterparties’ regulatory capital ratio. From a logistic regression we estimate the increase in the counterparties’ PD due to a reduced capital ratio. Their increased PDs in turn affect the counterparties’ counterparties, and so on. This coherent and flexible framework is applied to the bilateral interbank credit exposure of the entire German banking system in order to examine policy questions. For that purpose, we propose to measure the potential cost of contagion of a given shock scenario by the aggregated regulatory capital loss computed in our algorithm.     

我国国有商业银行信贷的认识论和发展观

随着金融制度改革的深入,国有商业银行信贷业务的利润贡献占比逐步下降,非信贷业务收入占比不断提高。在金融市场变化加剧、市场竞争日益激烈、金融创新层出不穷的新形势下,正确认识银行信贷的一般规律及在未来商业银行经营发展中的地位、作用及发展方向,将直接关系到我国银行业改革与发展的战略和策略。本文通过对国有商业银行信贷管理制度的历史考察,及对不良贷款和信贷发展的认识,运用科学发展观,提出银行信贷在一段相当长的时期内仍是企业融资的主渠道,应逐步实现信贷业务调整,更有效地发挥好信贷在银行经营及社会融资中的主导作用,在发展中实现信贷的新跨越。