Peer effect in the initial recognition of goodwill

This study investigates the peer effect in the initial recognition of goodwill. We find that firms imitate their peers in the initial recognition of goodwill. The higher the tendency for imitation, the higher the proportion of goodwill recognized. Imitation behavior in the initial recognition of goodwill cannot be explained by information acquisition or rivalry motivations. Instead, we find evidence that managers’ opportunistic motivations explain the peer effect in the initial recognition of goodwill and the overestimation of goodwill arising from imitation tendencies. Executive overconfidence weakens the peer effect but exacerbates the overestimation of goodwill caused by imitation tendencies. Finally, the higher the imitation tendency, the greater the probability and amount of goodwill impairment in the future. This further confirms that the peer effect leads to overestimation of goodwill. The findings of this study enrich the literature on goodwill and provide insightful empirical evidence for regulating goodwill accounting. The results show that the conservatism principle should be reinforced in the initial recognition of goodwill.     

Political corruption and accounting choices

We examine how political corruption affects firms’ accounting choices. We hypothesize and find that firms headquartered in corrupt districts manipulate earnings downwards, relative to firms headquartered elsewhere. Our finding is robust to alternative corruption measures, alternative discretionary accrual measures, alternative model specifications, the instrumental variable approach and difference-in-differences analyses based on firm relocation and high profile cases. We find that firms headquartered in corrupt districts prefer income-decreasing accounting choices and exhibit higher conservatism. Finally, we find that the effect of corruption on earnings management is more pronounced for geographically concentrated firms, for firms without political connections, for firms in politically sensitive industries, for firms with lower transient institutional investor ownership and for firms with less analyst coverage. In sum, our findings suggest that firms respond to corruption by lowering their accounting earnings.     

Financial misreporting and peer firms' operational efficiency

We investigate the impact of financial misreporting on peer firms’ operational efficiency, defined as a firm’s efficiency in converting investments into revenues. We find that, on average, peers’ operational efficiency declines after rival firms misstate their financial performance. However, we also find that the impact of financial misreporting is not homogeneous across peer firms. The negative effect is mainly driven by non‐misstating firms that had high performance. For firms that had lower past performance, the negative effect is significantly weaker, suggesting that the perceived competition induced by misreporting has a more positive effect. In addition, we document that the effect of misreporting is influenced by peer firms’ external financing need, industry leadership status and information environment.     

Institutional ownership composition and accounting conservatism

This study empirically investigates the association between institutional ownership composition and accounting conservatism. Transient (dedicated) institutional investors, holding diversified (concentrated) portfolios with high (low) portfolio turnover, focus on portfolio firms’ short-term (long-term) perspectives and trade heavily (generally do not trade) on current earnings news. Thus, I predict that as transient (dedicated) institutional ownership increases, firms will exhibit a lower (higher) degree of accounting conservatism. Consistent with my predictions, in the context of asymmetric timeliness of earnings, I document that as the level of transient (dedicated) institutional ownership increases, earnings become less (more) asymmetrically timely in recognizing bad news.     

Corporate Lobbying,Visibility and Accounting Conservatism

In this study, we examine the relationship between a firm's lobbying activities and financial reporting quality using a US setting where public scrutiny of corporate political activities is high. More importantly, we examine whether and how a firm's visibility shapes the relationship between its corporate lobbying activities and accounting conservatism. Adopting annual lobbying expenditure data to measure firms’ lobbying activities, and using a propensity‐score‐matching methodology to control for differences in firm characteristics between lobbying and non‐lobbying firms, we find a positive relationship between a firm's lobbying intensity and the degree of accounting conservatism in its financial reporting. We further find this positive relationship to be more pronounced in lobbying firms with a higher level of visibility. These results are robust after controlling for a firm's political connections, across various conditional conservatism measures, and across a number of visibility measures including firm size, the number of analysts following the firm, the age of the firm, the number of foreign stock exchanges that the firm is cross‐listed in, and the level of the firm's media coverage. Together, our findings add to the literature on how firms’ political activities shape their accounting practices in general, and accounting conservatism in particular. More importantly, our findings suggest that the heightened public attention paid to political activities in the US yields incentives for firms to be more conservative in their accounting practices.     

Debtholders’ Demand for Conservatism: Evidence from Changes in Directors’ Fiduciary Duties

Debtholders’ demand has been widely discussed as a key determinant of conservatism but clear causal evidence is not yet established. Using a natural experiment setting, wherein a Delaware court ruled that the fiduciary duties of directors in near insolvent Delaware companies extend to creditors, we predict and find that firms subject to the ruling significantly increased their accounting conservatism. In addition, our results suggest that the increase in conservatism is more pronounced in near insolvent Delaware firms with stronger boards, confirming that the court ruling takes effect through the channel of the board of directors. Our results are robust to using alternative measures of conservatism and near insolvency status, and controlling for potential confounding factors and other stakeholders’ demand for conservatism. Overall, our study provides empirical evidence to support the causal relation between debtholders’ demand and accounting conservatism previously suggested in the literature, and offers some insights into the role of the board of directors in financial reporting.     

How do institutional investors influence accounting conservatism in China?

Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2015, we find that domestic mutual funds have negative effects while qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) have positive effects on firm accounting conservatism. These effects become stronger when their ownerships are closer to that of the controlling shareholder, respectively. Furthermore, these results are more pronounced when institutional investors are more able to monitor managers and compete with controlling shareholders. Our findings suggest that the influence of institutional investors on accounting conservatism in China is subject to their identities as well as the control contestability against the controlling shareholders.     

The role of accounting conservatism in management forecast bias

We investigate whether management earnings forecasts fully incorporate information in historical accounting conservatism. We find that management earnings forecasts are more optimistic for firms with greater accounting conservatism in the previous year. We further examine whether this conservatism-related optimistic bias in management earnings forecasts varies with managers’ difficulty predicting earnings accurately, managers’ opportunistic incentives, and the firms’ litigation risk. We find that the negative association between management forecast errors and conservatism increases, to various extent, with the firms’ operating cycles, earnings volatility, and the width of forecast range but does not change with proxies for opportunistic incentives or litigation risk. These results suggest that forecast difficulty is the primary reason for managers’ failure to incorporate conservatism fully in their earnings forecasts.     

Making honest men of them: Institutional investors,financial reporting,and the appointment of female directors to all-male boards

In this paper, we theorize that dedicated institutional investors are more likely than transient institutional investors to appoint female directors to investee firms with all-male boards, particularly those with high opacity. We conjecture that dedicated investors appoint female directors as a governance mechanism to improve the financial reporting quality of these investee firms. Specifically, we find that through the appointment of female directors, dedicated institutional investors trigger the release of stockpiled negative accounting information, thereby increasing the likelihood of a stock price crash risk. We also show that dedicated investors, through the appointment of female directors, improve investee firms' corporate disclosure environment by decreasing earnings management. Finally, we find that through continued service on investee firms' boards, female directors reduce the future likelihood of a stock price crash.     

Conservatism,SEC investigation,and fraud

We present evidence on the relationship between firms that have engaged in fraudulent financial reporting and accounting conservatism. We empirically investigate the extent to which US firms identified by the SEC in their Enforcement Releases demonstrate higher levels of conditional conservatism in order to mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems. Specifically, by assessing the timing of changes in the litigation risk environment for fraud firms, we document how differences in heightened legal liability guide changes in conservative accounting behavior. Compared to a matched non-fraud control sample, we document that fraud firms have significantly lower levels of accounting conservatism in the pre-fraud period. Consistent with changes in potential legal liability, we find an increase in accounting conservatism for fraud firms during the SEC investigation period. Subsequently, during the public discovery of fraud, any increases in accounting conservatism are marginal and appear to converge back to lower levels compared to the SEC investigation period. Overall, our findings suggest more temporary changes in conservative reporting in the short-term for fraud firms. We also document that increased levels of accounting conservatism for fraud firms are not due solely to the passage of the SOX Act. Our findings aid in explaining fraud firms’ incentives and opportunities for accounting conservatism and lend support for why standard setters, regulators and auditors should continue to monitor and re-evaluate conservatism’s short-term effects that are conditioned on changes in a firm’s risk environment.     

Accounting comparability and relative performance evaluation in CEO compensation

We investigate whether accounting comparability is associated with the likelihood that CEO compensation is tied to relative accounting performance (e.g., return on assets). We predict that higher accounting comparability increases the risk-sharing benefit of accounting-based RPE because peer firm performance better controls for common risk in RPE firm performance. Thus, firms that have higher accounting comparability with potential performance peers will be more likely to include accounting-based RPE as a component of the total CEO compensation contract. We find support for this prediction using (1) an explicit test design that relies on the ex ante terms of CEO compensation contracts obtained from proxy disclosures, and (2) an implicit design that relies on the actual realizations of CEO compensation. To provide further evidence, we examine the association between accounting comparability and the selection of performance peers when the CEO compensation contract includes an accounting-based RPE component. We find that higher comparability between the RPE firm and a potential peer firm increases (decreases) the potential peer firm’s likelihood of being selected into (dropped from) the peer group. Cross-sectional analyses show that this association is less pronounced, or not present, when the relative performance measure is price-based (as opposed to accounting-based), indicating that these results do not merely reflect a more general role of comparability in all RPE contracts.     

Debt Maturity Structure and Accounting Conservatism

This study examines the association between debt maturity structure and accounting conservatism. Short‐maturity debt can mitigate agency costs of debt arising from information asymmetry and suboptimal investment problems inherent in debt financing. As such, debt‐contracting demand for accounting conservatism is expected to be lower in the presence of more short‐maturity debt. We find that short‐maturity debt is negatively associated with accounting conservatism. As firms could commit to more accounting conservatism to gain access to long‐maturity debt, we conduct lead‐lag tests of the direction of causality, and the results suggest that more short‐maturity debt leads to less conservative reporting, rather than the reverse. We also find the negative relation between short‐maturity debt and accounting conservatism is more pronounced among financially distressed firms, where ex ante severity of agency costs of debt are higher. Collectively, our results contribute to our understanding of the role of accounting conservatism in debt contracting and show how debt maturity, a key and pervasive feature of creditor protection in debt contracting, affects accounting conservatism.     

Is conservative reporting attractive to foreign institutional investors? Evidence from an emerging market

This study investigates the relation between conservative reporting and foreign institutional ownership using a unique dataset of firms in Turkey. In doing so, we distinguish between foreign funds and corporations. Contrary to prior findings, our analysis shows that conservative reporting is not necessarily a desirable accounting feature for foreign institutional investors. We also find that the interplay between conservative reporting and ownership is significantly different between foreign funds and corporations. The estimated negative relation holds only for foreign funds. Further analysis reveals that foreign funds do not find conservative reporting desirable in low-asymmetric information firms and reduce ownership with greater accounting conservatism in such firms. The analysis sheds significant lights on the relevance of conservative reporting in alleviating the negative consequences of asymmetric information.     

Director–Liability–Reduction Laws and Conditional Conservatism

We study nonofficer directors’ influence on the accounting conservatism of U.S. public firms. Between 1986 and 2002, all 50 U.S. states enacted laws that limited nonofficer directors’ litigation risk but often left officer directors’ litigation risk unchanged. We find that conditional conservatism decreased after the staggered enactments of the laws, which we attribute to less nonofficer director monitoring of financial reporting in affected firms. Conservatism fell less when shareholder or debtholder power was high, consistent with major stakeholders moderating the influence of nonofficer directors. We verify that our results stem from reductions in the asymmetric timeliness of accruals and, specifically, its current assets components. We also show that affected firms switched away from Big N auditors more often, which reduced these firms’ commitment to conservative financial reports.     

Managerial Overconfidence and Accounting Conservatism

Overconfident managers overestimate future returns from their firms’ investments. Thus, we predict that overconfident managers will tend to delay loss recognition and generally use less conservative accounting. Furthermore, we test whether external monitoring helps to mitigate this effect. Using measures of both conditional and unconditional conservatism respectively, we find robust evidence of a negative relation between CEO overconfidence and accounting conservatism. We further find that external monitoring does not appear to mitigate this effect. Our findings add to the growing literature on overconfidence and complement the findings by Schrand and Zechman [2011] that overconfidence affects financial reporting behavior.     

Effects of air pollution on accounting conservatism

We examine the impact of air pollution on a firm's accounting policy conservatism. We hypothesize that, in response to risks associated with increased air pollution, firms apply more conservative accounting practices and utilize more conservative estimates in their reporting. Using a sample of Chinese firms, accounting conservatism measures, and a satellite-based air pollution metric, we confirm the validity of our hypothesis. Additional analysis suggests that the impact of air pollution on accounting policy conservatism is more salient for firms in high-pollution industries, firms under severe financial constraint, firms with higher environmental risk, and firms that receive high media coverage. Further, we document that air pollution does not significantly affect a firm's return on assets, year-on-year sales growth, or Tobin's Q measure. Hence, it is management's risk perception, not objective performance concern, that is driving accounting conservatism. Finally, specifically investigating accounting conservatism, we discover that, for firms with higher pollution levels, selling general and administrative expenses, liabilities provision, accrued expenses, and asset impairment loss are significantly higher.     

Peer choice in CEO compensation

Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self serving behavior. We propose an alternative explanation: the choice of highly paid peers represents a reward for unobserved CEO talent. We test this hypothesis by decomposing the effect of peer selection into talent and self serving components. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the association between a firm's selection of highly paid peers and CEO pay mostly represents compensation for CEO talent.     

Performance peer groups in CEO compensation contracts

How do firms choose performance peer groups used in chief executive officer (CEO) relative performance evaluation contracts? We find that while firms, for the most part, choose performance peers to better identify their CEOs’ impact on firm performance, they also tend to select underperforming peers. Dynamically, we find that peers that are added and retained every year are weaker than ones that were not chosen. These findings suggest managers may have some influence on the choice of performance peers. Finally, using a quasi-natural experiment, we find that enhanced disclosure did not affect the tendency of firms to select underperforming peers.     

Political connections and the cost of equity capital

Motivated by recent research on the costs and benefits of political connection, we examine the cost of equity capital of politically connected firms. Using propensity score matching models, we find that politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital than their non-connected peers. We find further that political connections are more valuable for firms with stronger ties to political power. In additional analyses, we find that the effect of political connection on firms' equity financing costs is influenced by the prevailing country-level institutional and political environment, and by firm characteristics. Taken together, our findings provide strong evidence that investors require a lower cost of capital for politically connected firms, which suggests that politically connected firms are generally considered less risky than non-connected firms.