Audit Reporting of Big 4 Versus Non-Big 4 Auditors: The Case of Ex-Andersen Clients

This paper examines audit reporting of Big 4 auditors versus non-Big 4 auditors for ex-Andersen clients and other clients. It suggests that ex-Andersen clients are more risky than other clients and are able to exert more influence than other clients on non-Big 4 auditors because they are larger in size than other non-Big 4 auditees. In addition, Big 4 auditors are more risk-averse and able to withstand clients' pressure than non-Big 4 auditors. The results show that Big 4 auditors are more likely than non-Big 4 auditors to issue going-concern opinions to ex-Andersen clients or restrict the level of discretionary accruals of those clients compared with other clients. Further, ex-Andersen clients of Big 4 auditors would have had a lower likelihood of receiving going-concern opinions or higher levels of discretionary accruals had reporting practices for other clients been applied. Ex-Andersen clients of non-Big 4 auditors would have had a higher likelihood of going-concern opinions or lower levels of discretionary accruals. Hence, the suggestion to reduce the Big 4 concentration in the audit market by allowing non-Big 4 firms a larger market share should be viewed prudently. Overall, these results are consistent with the suggestion that litigation risk and client pressure are important factors in audit reporting.     

Strategic pricing by Big 4 audit firms in private client segments

We examine how Big 4 auditors compete for new private clients. We find evidence suggesting that Big 4 auditors offer fee discounts to attract non‐Big 4 private clients to experience attributes of their brand name audit services. We also find that to attract clients from competing Big 4 suppliers, Big 4 auditors target fee discounts at clients in industries where they are the market leader. Our results further indicate that the Big 4 industry leaders target fee discounts to fast‐growing clients and are able to charge these clients significant price fee increases in the second mandate period (after 3 years).     

Auditor Quality,IFRS Adoption,and Stock Price Crash Risk: Korean Evidence

This paper investigates the relationship among auditor quality, International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) adoption and stock price crash risk. Using 657 unique listed companies spanning 2002–2014 in Korea, this study finds that stock price crash risk decreases, especially for firms using Big 4 auditors, after IFRS adoption in Korea. Stock price crash risk decreases for a firm included in Big 4 auditors, while it does not increase for a firm excluded from Big 4 auditors after IFRS adoption. Finally, this study finds that Big 4 auditor decreases stock price crash risk only when the firm size is above-median.     

Auditor choice and accruals patterns of cross-listed firms

We examine the association between auditor choice and the accruals patterns of Chinese listed firms that cross-list in Hong Kong. Our evidence suggests that the clients of Big 4 auditors report lower unsigned discretionary accruals relative to the clients of non-Big 4 auditors. Further, we find that cross-listed firms with non-Big 4 auditors are more likely to understate their earnings and experience larger reversals of accruals in the future than cross-listed firms with Big 4 auditors. These findings suggest that Big 4 auditors play a meaningful role in improving earnings quality for cross-listed firms, which helps to explain why cross-listed firms have higher earnings quality than their domestic counterparts, as documented in the previous literature.     

Big Six auditors and audit quality: The Korean evidence

This study investigates the association between discretionary accruals and Big Six and non-Big Six auditors, and the direction of auditor change. We hypothesize that there is no significant difference in discretionary accruals between Big Six and non-Big Six clients when there is low incentive for auditors to provide high-quality audits, as in Korea.Upon examination of the discretionary accruals of firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange from 1994 to 1998, we find there is no significant difference between the discretionary accruals of firms with Big Six and non-Big Six auditors. This holds true for firms that switch from non-Big Six to Big Six auditors and vice versa. These resources imply that there may be no difference in audit quality between Big Six and non-Big Six auditors in Korea. This is consistent with other studies in Korea, while inconsistent with the findings of previous studies on audit quality in other countries.     

Client importance and non-Big 5 auditors’ reporting decisions

In this paper, we examine the effect of the trade-off between economic dependence and reputation protection on the link between client size and the audit reporting decisions of non-Big 5 auditors. We find that non-Big 5 auditors, like Big 5 auditors, do not allow their larger clients greater leeway to manage earnings. In fact, there is some evidence that non-Big 5 auditors treat their larger clients more strictly. In addition, non-Big 5 auditors, like Big 5 auditors, are at least as likely to issue a going-concern report to their potentially financially distressed larger clients as they are to their otherwise smaller clients.     

The Effect of Litigation Risk Increase on Big N Auditor Exits and Audit Quality in the Korean Savings Banking Industry

This study investigates whether an increase in litigation risk results in Big N auditors leaving the industry and examines the impact of this increase on audit quality. Using a sample of Korean savings banks from 2009 to 2015, the study finds that the proportion of Big N auditors sharply decreases after a savings bank crisis, suggesting that Big N auditors are likely to reject riskier clients, while audit quality is unchanged. The results provide new evidence that an increase in litigation risk does not necessarily increase audit quality. The findings have academic and practical implications, as they suggest that policies for improving audit quality should consider auditors’ strategies in response to litigation risk.     

Do supply shocks in the audit partner labor market affect auditor choice? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

We examine whether supply shocks in the audit partner labor market induce clients to switch audit partners. We argue that audit partners in their early careers (i.e., junior partners) charge low audit fees to attract clients, which induces client firms to switch from senior partners to junior partners when there are more junior partners available. Utilizing the Big4 localization policy, we find that Big4 clients are more likely to replace senior auditors with junior auditors to cut costs after the policy. Furthermore, the results are mainly driven by clients who are charged high fees. Our empirical evidence enriches the understanding of auditor choice determinants and informs the ongoing debates surrounding new regulations for Big4 firms in China.     

Auditor quality,audit fees,organizational structure,and risk taking in the US life insurance industry

Using a system of simultaneous equations, this study examines the relation among external audit monitoring, in the US life insurance industry. We find insurers with higher leverage risk and surplus risk are more likely to use Big‐4 auditors and to pay higher fees. In return, insurers hiring Big‐4 auditors and paying higher audit fees have lower leverage risk and surplus risk. Second, the results suggest that mutual life insurers have a higher leverage risk and surplus risk than stock life insurers. This evidence is in contrast to that for property–liability insurance companies. Third, we find insurers are less likely to hire Big‐4 auditors and to pay higher audit fees after implementation of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Finally, life insurers with Big‐4 auditors or paying higher audit fees are more likely to take lower risks after the implementation of SOX.     

Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions

Large clients create an economic dependence that may cause auditors to compromise their independence and report favorably to retain valuable clients. Economic dependence is measured as a client's size relative to the size of the office that contracts for the audit and issues the audit report. We find no evidence economic dependence causes Big Five auditors to report more favorably for larger clients in their offices. However, larger clients also pose greater litigation risk, and we do find that Big 5 auditors report more conservatively for larger clients, suggesting that reputation protection dominates auditor behavior.     

Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality?

In this paper, we examine audit quality for Big 4 and Second-tier auditors during 2003–2006. We utilize the auditor’s propensity to issue a going concern audit report for distressed clients as a measure of audit quality. In addition, since the purpose of an audit is to improve financial reporting quality, we utilize abnormal accruals as an observable proxy for audit quality. Further, we utilize the client- and year-specific ex ante equity risk premium as a proxy for audit quality as perceived by investors. We control for auditor self-selection bias using the matched-pairs sample approach discussed by Francis and Lennox (2008). We find weak evidence that the Big 4 have a higher propensity to issue going concern audit opinions for distressed companies. However, the level of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals for Big 4 and Second-tier audit firm clients appears to be similar. With respect to investor perceptions, we find the client-specific ex ante equity risk premium to be lower for Big 4 clients than for Second-tier audit firm clients. Overall, our findings suggest little difference in actual audit quality but a more pronounced difference in perceived audit quality. Collectively, the evidence we provide informs the current discourse on audit quality, auditor choice, and the viability of Second-tier auditors as an alternative to the Big 4.     

Is there a relation between audit fee cuts during the global financial crisis and banks’ financial reporting quality?

As a result of the global financial crisis (GFC), several audit clients were able to negotiate lower audit fees for the years 2008 and 2009. However, the PCAOB has expressed concern that lower audit fees might lead to lower audit effort and lower audit quality and financial reporting quality. This study examines the relation between audit fee cuts and banks’ financial reporting quality. Specifically, we focus on earnings management via loan loss provisions (LLP), the relation between current period LLP and future loan charge-offs, i.e., LLP validity, and the timely recognition of loan losses. For banks audited by Big 4 auditors, we find that income-increasing abnormal LLP are decreasing in audit fee cuts and LLP validity is increasing in audit fee cuts. For banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors, LLP validity is higher for banks that received a fee cut of more than 25% relative to other banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors. We do not observe an association between timely loan loss recognition and cuts in audit fees except for banks audited by non-Big 4 auditors and exempt from internal control audits where a fee cut of more than 25% is associated with less timely loan loss recognition. Overall, the findings suggest that Big 4 auditors constrained earnings management via LLP in banks that received cuts in audit fees. Our findings have important implications for regulators, investors, and others.     

Audit pricing and auditor industry specialization in an emerging market: Evidence from China

In this paper we examine the determinants of audit fees by focusing on auditor industry specialization and second tier auditors in the Chinese market. We find evidence of Big 4 premiums for brand name as well as industry specialization in both the statutory and supplementary market. Big 4 industry specialists earn additional premiums in the statutory market as compared to non-industry specialists. We also find that market expansion did not provide the second tier auditors any price advantage. These auditors increased their market share mainly in the mid- and small-sized clienteles. Moreover, industry experience developed by the second tier firms may have helped them gain economy of scale and reduce service fees. This may be their strategy to win future clients that seek low-priced audits.     

Barriers to entry to the big firm audit market: Evidence from market reaction to switches to second Tier audit firms in the post-sox period

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied concentration in the audit market and found that the Big 4 firms continue to dominate the market for clients with revenue of more than $500 million while non-Big 4 firms have gained market share among clients with revenue of $500 million or less (GAO, 2008). The US Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession has expressed concern about barriers to entry that might prevent a non-Big 4 firm from increasing its market share among large publicly-traded clients (Advisory Committee, 2008). One of these barriers may be the potential cost to shareholders if the stock market reacts negatively to the appointment of a non-Big 4 auditor (GAO, 2003). We examine whether the stock market reacts negatively when clients switch from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4, because a negative reaction might make such switching less likely to occur. We find that the market does not react more negatively when clients move from a Big 4 to a Second Tier auditing firm than when clients move from a Big 4 to another Big 4 firm. Our results suggest that a negative market reaction may not represent a significant barrier to entry among Second Tier auditing firms.     

An investigation of recent changes in going concern reporting decisions among Big N and non-Big N auditors

Corporate accounting failures and regulatory proceedings that led to the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 increased the scrutiny of auditors. We investigate whether these events resulted in a change in auditor behavior with respect to going concern reporting. Generally speaking, we find that non-Big N auditors became more conservative while Big N auditors became more accurate. Specifically, non-Big N auditors issued more going concern opinions to both failing and non-failing clients post-2001, reducing their Type II misclassifications at the expense of increased Type I misclassifications. However, Big N auditors decreased their Type I misclassifications with no corresponding increase in Type II misclassifications. Thus, our findings suggest that increased auditor scrutiny resulted in performance improvements in the area of going concern reporting primarily for larger auditors. For smaller auditors, improved going concern accuracy for subsequently bankrupt clients came at the cost of more going concern opinions being issued to subsequently non-failing clients.     

Client importance and audit partner independence

We use data from Taiwan where audit partners are required to sign audit reports to examine whether audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients. Uniquely, we include both listed and unlisted clients in audit partners’ client portfolios and separately study these clients for Big N and non-Big N auditors. We employ multiple proxies for auditor independence, including various abnormal accruals measures, the propensity of audit partners to issue modified audit opinions, and the probability that clients meet or just beat earnings targets. We fail to find evidence that Big N audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients; however, we find such evidence for non-Big N auditors. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses. While our inferences are limited to the Taiwanese capital market, our study may be of interest to market participants and regulators in other well developed capital markets.     

Auditor changes following big eight mergers with non-big eight audit firms

This paper examines the reaction of clients of “non-Big Eight” audit firms to mergers of their auditors with “Big Eight” firms. We postulate that a non-Big Eight audit firm's clients will retain a Big Eight acquirer following a merger if they benefit from the Big Eight firm's specialized services and/or reputation. Clients that do not have these economic incentives to retain the Big Eight firm are more likely to change to another non-Big Eight audit firm following the merger. Empirical tests of the characteristics of clients that remain with a Big Eight acquirer or change to another smaller auditor following an audit merger generally support our hypotheses.     

The Provision of Other Services by Auditors: Independence and Pricing Issues

This research has three objectives: to identify the extent and level of other services provided by incumbent auditors in the Australian business environment; to examine pricing issues by investigating the relationship between fees for other services and audit fees; and to address the question of independence by (a) identifying whether the incidence of audit qualification is related to the level of other services purchased and (b) investigating whether there is a relationship between audit tenure and the level of other services provided. Information on audit fees, fees for other services, size, audit qualifications, industry and auditor (Big 8(6)/Non-Big 8(6)) was obtained from publicly available information for the majority of the top 500 Australian companies listed on the Australian stock exchange between 1986–1990. This study provides evidence that an increasing number of clients are purchasing other services from their auditor. A significant positive relationship between fees paid for other services and audit fees was also identified. No relationship was identified between the level of other services and the type of audit report issued or audit tenure, supporting the view that audit independence is not compromised by provision of the other services.     

International evidence on economic policy uncertainty and asymmetric adjustment of audit pricing: Big 4 versus non‐big 4 auditors

By investigating the association between economic policy uncertainty and audit fees using data from eight countries, this study examines whether and how Big 4 auditors reinforce their advantages over non‐Big 4 auditors through audit pricing. We find that both Big 4 and non‐Big 4 auditors reduce their audit fees when economic policy uncertainty increases. However, while non‐Big 4 auditors adjust audit pricing asymmetrically as economic policy uncertainty changes, i.e., the magnitude of decline in audit fees when economic policy uncertainty increases exceeds the magnitude of rise when economic policy uncertainty decreases, Big 4 auditors regulate their audit pricing in a symmetric manner. Further analyses reveal that: (1) the asymmetric pricing of non‐Big 4 auditors mainly exists in countries where Big 4 auditors have dominant market share, (2) Big 4 auditors provide higher‐quality audits when economic policy uncertainty increases and (3) many firms in better financial condition turn to Big 4 auditors during uncertain years. Our findings suggest that the symmetric audit pricing helps Big 4 auditors maintain a favorable position in the audit market.     

Audit market concentration,audit fees,and audit quality: A cross-country analysis of complex audit clients

Regulators around the world are concerned about the potentially harmful effects of high audit market concentration on audit pricing and quality. However, results in the overall literature have failed to reach consensus on this issue. We contribute to this debate by arguing that the audit market is segmented and that concentration in the Big 4 segment of the market leads to higher audit pricing. Accordingly, our analyses use international data and focus on concentration within the Big 4 group of firms across countries. We find that audit fees are increasing in our concentration measure for clients where the barriers to entry by competing auditors are higher, as proxied by client size, international operations, and IFRS use. Finally, we find evidence that audit quality is decreasing in Big 4 market concentration for these types of engagements. This indicates a wealth transfer from shareholders to audit firms when auditor concentration is high because these complex clients are charged more, but receive audits that are of lower quality.