Liquidity risk in securities settlement

This paper studies the potential impact on securities settlement systems (SSSs) of a major market disruption, caused by the default of the largest player. A multi-period, multi-security model with intraday credit is used to simulate direct and second-round settlement failures triggered by the default, as well as the dynamics of settlement failures, arising from a lag in settlement relative to the date of trades. The effects of the defaulter’s net trade position, the numbers of securities and participants in the market, and participants’ trading behavior are also analyzed.We show that in SSSs – contrary to payment systems – large and persistent settlement failures are possible even when ample liquidity is provided. Central bank liquidity support to SSSs thus cannot eliminate settlement failures due to major market disruptions. This is due to the fact that securities transactions involve a cash leg and a securities leg, and liquidity can affect only the cash side of a transaction. Whereas a broad program of securities borrowing and lending might help, it is precisely during periods of market disruption that participants will be least willing to lend securities.Settlement failures can continue to occur beyond the period corresponding to the lag in settlement. This is due to the fact that, upon observation of a default, market participants must form expectations about the impact of the default, and these expectations affect current trading behavior. If, ex post, fewer of the previous trades settle than expected, new settlement failures will occur. This result has interesting implications for financial stability. On the one hand, conservative reactions by market participants to a default – for example by limiting the volume of trades – can result in a more rapid return of the settlement system to a normal level of efficiency. On the other hand, limitation of trading by market participants can reduce market liquidity, which may have a negative impact on financial stability.     

The relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in banks

This paper investigates the relationship between the two major sources of bank default risk: liquidity risk and credit risk. We use a sample of virtually all US commercial banks during the period 1998–2010 to analyze the relationship between these two risk sources on the bank institutional-level and how this relationship influences banks’ probabilities of default (PD). Our results show that both risk categories do not have an economically meaningful reciprocal contemporaneous or time-lagged relationship. However, they do influence banks’ probability of default. This effect is twofold: whereas both risks separately increase the PD, the influence of their interaction depends on the overall level of bank risk and can either aggravate or mitigate default risk. These results provide new insights into the understanding of bank risk and serve as an underpinning for recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening banks (joint) risk management of liquidity and credit risks.     

货币政策对流动性风险的影响——基于银行信贷行为视角

本文基于我国现实背景和《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》,利用2008年至2017年间194家商业银行的相关数据,对我国银行净稳定资金率进行了度量,并在此基础上,检验了货币政策对我国商业银行流动性风险的影响,探究了其影响机理和传导渠道。研究表明:扩张型货币政策会提高商业银行的流动性风险;不同经济环境下,货币政策对流动性风险的影响存在差异但不具备异质性;不同类型的商业银行中,货币政策对流动性风险的影响不具有异质性;在货币政策对流动性风险的影响中,银行信贷行为是重要的传导渠道。因此,央行可基于货币政策对流动性风险的影响差异进行相机抉择;商业银行则要加强信贷规模和质量的管理,优化资产结构,通过弱化信贷渠道作用来降低货币政策对银行流动性风险的不良影响。     

论中央银行视角下的微观流动性管理

随着金融市场的快速发展,中央银行的流动性管理越来越多地通过金融市场的平台来进行。金融机构作为金融市场的主要参与者,其流动性管理模式应当纳入中央银行的考察视野。为此,本文从宏观与微观流动性的基本定义出发,分析了中央银行宏观流动性管理与金融机构微观流动性管理的内涵与联系,以及中央银行关注微观流动性管理的必要性。最后,本文就如何关注微观流动性管理问题提出了几点建议。     

What drives the liquidity of sovereign bonds when markets are under stress? An assessment of the new Basel 3 rules on bank liquid assets

The new rules on bank liquidity set by the Basel Committee require banks to hold high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs) against future cash outflows in periods of market stress. Domestic government bonds are considered to be HQLAs. To assess the appropriateness of this rule, we investigate the liquidity of European government bonds in ordinary times and in periods of market turmoil. We find that the effect of adverse market conditions on liquidity strongly depends on individual bond’s characteristics. Our evidence argues for rules on HQLAs that should constrain the eligibility of government bonds depending on their characteristics (primarily, duration and rating).     

银行体系流动性发展趋势分析

银行体系流动性过剩是近年来我国经济发展中凸现出来的经济现象。在基于国际收支、金融脱媒、货币流通速度三个角度基础上,本文对我国银行体系流动性发展趋势做了分析。由于国际收支“双顺差”持续,经济发展中的资金融通仍主要通过银行体系来进行,货币流通速度加快,银行体系流动性过剩在未来一段时间成为我国经济发展中的常态。     

How investor demands for safety influence bank capital and liquidity trade-offs

We construct a model of a bank’s optimal funding choice, where the bank negotiates with both safety-driven short-term bondholders and (mostly) risk-taking long-term bondholders. We establish that investor demands for safety create a negative relationship between the bank’s capital choices and short-term funding, as well as negative relationships between capital and common measures of bank liquidity. Short-term investors’ demands for safety force the bank to hold more collateral, which diminishes the demands by long-term bondholders for higher holdings of bank capital. Consistent with our model, our bank-level empirical analysis of these capital–liquidity trade-offs shows that bank liquidity measures have a strong and negative relationship to the capital ratio. Furthermore, we show that this trade-off does not appear to be regulation related and has diminished in size over time.     

Liquidity-saving mechanisms in collateral-based RTGS payment systems

This paper studies banks’ incentives regarding the timing of payment submissions in a collateral-based RTGS payment system and how these incentives change with the introduction of a liquidity-saving mechanism (LSM). We show that an LSM allows banks to economise on collateral while also providing incentives to submit payments earlier. This is because in our model an LSM allows payments to be matched and offset in real time without any or very minimal funds. Under a collateral-based RTGS payment system, introduction of the LSM always improves welfare. The result contrasts with earlier work, which shows that under a fee-based RTGS system, the introduction of an LSM in some circumstances may reduce welfare.     

银行资产配置趋势与中央银行流动性管理——基于动力系统模型的模拟分析

近年来,我国宏观流动性投放逐步由以前的被动投放(外汇占款)向主动投放转变,银行业资产配置结构更趋多元化,金融创新更加活跃,这些都在一定程度上改变了金融体系流动性传导的渠道和机制,迫使我们重新审视流动性在金融体系中消长、转移的内在逻辑,探讨新形势下流动性管理的合理方式和路径。本文运用动力系统模型来分析和论证银行资产配置结构变化对市场流动性状况的影响机制,以及中央银行流动性管理工具的有效性。研究表明,银行资产配置趋势的同质化容易导致市场流动性状况的恶化;中央银行需要进一步完善利率传导机制,强化货币政策与宏观审慎评估政策的协同配合,以提升流动性管理的有效性。     

Aggregate Risk and the Choice between Cash and Lines of Credit

Banks can create liquidity for firms by pooling their idiosyncratic risks. As a result, bank lines of credit to firms with greater aggregate risk should be costlier and such firms opt for cash in spite of the incurred liquidity premium. We find empirical support for this novel theoretical insight. Firms with higher beta have a higher ratio of cash to credit lines and face greater costs on their lines. In times of heightened aggregate volatility, banks exposed to undrawn credit lines become riskier; bank credit lines feature fewer initiations, higher spreads, and shorter maturity; and, firms’ cash reserves rise.     

Optimal investment with fixed financing costs

Models with a premium on external finance produce counterfactual predictions about liquidity management. We address this shortcoming by introducing a fixed cost of increasing external finance into an otherwise standard investment/financing problem. This additional financial friction is well-motivated by case studies and our analysis shows that it generates more realistic predictions about liquidity management: firms hold external finance and idle cash simultaneously, and may invest an additional dollar of cash flow in liquidity rather than repaying external funds or investing in productive capital. In addition to better fitting the stylized facts about the time-series and cross-sectional pattern of liquidity holding, these results may help shed light on the fragility of estimates of investment–cash flow sensitivities.     

Liquidity and bank capital structure

Bank capital requirements reduce the probability of bank failure and help mitigate taxpayers’ sharing in the losses that result from bank failures. Under Basel III, direct capital requirements are supplemented with liquidity requirements. Our results suggest that liquidity provisions of banks are connected to bank capital and that changes in liquidity indirectly affect the capital structure of financial institutions. Liquidity appears to be another instrument for adjusting bank capital structure beyond just capital requirements. Consistent with Diamond and Rajan (2005), we find that liquidity and capital should be considered jointly for promoting financial stability.     

现阶段我国商业银行流动性过剩问题及对策研究

流动性管理是商业银行的生命线。上个世纪末国内商业银行出现了持续性的流动性过剩,引起了理论界、实务界的普遍关注。本文考察了商业银行流动性管理理论的发展,分析了我国商业银行流动性问题发展阶段、特点,提出了商业银行改善流动性管理的政策建议。     

移动支付对中国家庭储蓄率的影响

中国的高储蓄问题由来已久,降低家庭储蓄率、提高消费有助于形成以国内大循环为主体、国内国际双循环相互促进的新发展格局。本文基于2017年和2019年中国家庭金融调查(CHFS)数据,实证研究了移动支付对中国家庭储蓄率的影响。结果表明,移动支付显著降低了家庭储蓄率。进一步研究发现,缓解流动性约束、信贷约束和扩大社会网络是移动支付降低家庭储蓄率的主要途径。此外,移动支付显著降低家庭为应对健康风险、医疗风险、失业风险、收入风险等不确定性而进行的预防性储蓄。地区异质性分析显示,移动支付对家庭储蓄率的影响在西部地区、四五线城市、农村地区更大。家庭特征异质性分析显示,移动支付对家庭储蓄率的影响在农业户口家庭、中低收入家庭、低受教育水平家庭中效果更加突出。本文研究为理解中国高储蓄问题提供了新的视角,可为制定相关政策提供参考依据。     

Information Asymmetry and Corporate Liquidity Management: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

We examine the impact of information asymmetry on a firm??s choice between cash and credit lines for corporate liquidity management using a panel data set from real estate investment trusts (REITs). Information asymmetry, as measured by analyst forecast error and dispersion, is negatively related to the use of lines of credit. Specifically, firms with more severe information asymmetry are less likely to have access to bank credit lines. Concurrently, more transparent firms are more likely to utilize bank credit lines as opposed to cash for liquidity management. The results are robust to alternative information asymmetry proxies and specifications. These findings suggest that information asymmetry plays an important role in corporate liquidity management.     

商业银行流动性压力测试应用与实证分析

银监会自2007年年底加大了对商业银行的流动性风险管理力度,并于2008年年初下发了《商业银行压力测试指引》,要求各商业银行开展流动性压力测试。流动性压力测试有助于商业银行预测在市场最严酷的情况下自身的流动性风险承受能力,并通过主动改变管理策略防范流动性风险。本文系统介绍了流动性风险管理与压力测试及两者间的关系,并以某商业银行为对象进行了流动性压力测试的实证分析,最后对流动性压力测试的推广运用提出了一些政策建议。     

购房借贷约束与缴存家庭消费——基于公积金运营流动性视角的分析

研究制约住房公积金制度效率的因素及作用机制,对保障国民安居、推动经济高质量发展具有重要的现实意义。鉴于此,本文首先通过构建理论模型,阐述了流动性压力下,公积金对缴存家庭贷款决策与消费的影响及作用机制,并使用中国家庭金融调查数据(CHFS)对理论假说进行实证检验。研究结果表明:借贷约束会显著降低缴存家庭使用公积金贷款的概率;流动性压力是公积金管理机构提高贷款门槛,从而降低借贷受约束家庭使用公积金贷款概率的重要原因;未获得公积金贷款支持的缴存家庭因购房成本的增加,家庭的非耐用品消费受到显著抑制。本文进一步通过倾向得分匹配方法和两阶段最小二乘法处理内生性问题,识别结果显示上述结论稳健可靠。本文研究表明:改善运营资金流动性不仅有助于提高公积金制度的运行效率,完善我国的住房保障体系,还有助于促进居民消费,提振内需,并为企业减费降负提供有效支持。     

Getting the Right Mix of Capital and Cash Requirements in Prudential Bank Regulation*

Cash reserve requirements are useful as a broadly conceived prudential tool, not just as a narrowly focused means of limiting the risks associated with illiquidity. Indeed, illiquidity risk is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for establishing bank liquidity requirements. The primary means of mitigating the systemic costs of bank illiquidity risk is the creation of an effective lender of last resort (LOLR). But instead of focusing narrowly on bank funding risks when designing liquidity requirements, regulators should consider tradeoffs among capital requirements, liquidity requirements, and LOLR policies for achieving the broader prudential goal of limiting bank default risk. When considering the optimal tradeoff between capital ratios and cash ratios as prudential requirements, five “frictions” are identified that favor the use of one or the other: (1) the adverse‐selection costs of raising equity (which favors the use of cash); (2) the opportunity cost of forgone abnormal profits (or “quasi rents”) from lending (which favors the use of capital); (3) the limited verifiability of loan outcomes (which favors the use of cash); (4) the moral hazard that results from costly or postponed loss recognition, given the incentive for risk shifting in bad states (which favors the use of cash); and (5) the prospect of changes in the risk environment (which favors cash since it creates greater option value for maintaining targeted default risk with lower adjustment costs in the face of changing loan risk or illiquidity risk). When viewed from the perspective of achieving the main prudential goal of controlling default risk at a minimum social cost, capital requirements have some limitations that favor liquidity requirements, and vice versa. And thus the optimal regulatory policy will combine liquidity and capital requirements.     

The dark side of liquidity regulation: Bank opacity and funding liquidity risk

We evaluate how the liquidity coverage rule affects US banks’ opacity and funding liquidity risk. Banks subject to the rule become significantly more opaque and funding liquidity risk increases by $245 million per quarter. Higher funding liquidity risk is more pronounced among banks that are subject to the rule’s more stringent liquidity buffers, and systemically riskier banks. Rising opacity reflects an increase in banks’ holdings of complex assets whose value is difficult to communicate to investors. The evidence highlights the unintended consequences of liquidity regulation and is consistent with theoretical models’ predictions of a trade-off between liquidity buffers and bank opacity that exacerbates funding liquidity risk.     

流动性、银行间市场摩擦与借贷便利类货币政策工具

通过内生引入流动性短缺银行(拆入行)对流动性盈余银行(拆出行)的流动性需求机制,本文构建了一个包含银行间市场的DSGE模型,对借贷便利类货币政策工具的传导机制和传导效果进行了理论和实证研究。研究表明:(1)负向冲击会同时增加拆入行和拆出行对流动性的预防性需求,在经济形势不确定的情形下,拆出行不会很快恢复对拆入行的流动性供给,引起银行间市场流动性缺口放大和市场失灵。(2)由于仅依赖银行间市场自发回归稳态的过程太过缓慢,需要央行进行流动性干预。借贷便利类工具可以通过引导贷款市场定价和流动性效应这两个渠道来影响银行融资可得性,进而降低银行间市场流动性风险对宏观经济的负面影响。(3)借贷便利类货币政策工具的影响效果边际递减,央行可根据借贷便利操作的收益和成本,制定最佳的反应程度参数。