The relationship between rents and prices of owner-occupied housing in Taiwan

This article analyzes the changes of equilibrium rent and equilibrium price of owner-occupied housing in Taiwan, and also computes the rent multiplier and its trend in the past ten years in Taiwan to show how the housing consumption and housing investment change. A hedonic rent equation and a hedonic housing price equation are built first. Then, we apply the Housing Survey Report data from 1979 to 1989, and employ ordinary-least squares method to estimate the two equations. Using estimated coefficients of the two equations, we compute the market rents for owner-occupied housing and the market prices for rental housing. Finally, the rent multipliers are calculated from the market rents and market prices. The article finds that (1) changes of housing prices in Taipei lead to price changes in Kaoshung, and the latter leads Taiwan province; (2) changes of rent are much smaller than the changes of housing price; and (3) housing prices in Taiwan increased drastically. We also find: (1) at the peak of the housing market cycle, the rent multiplier is extremely high; (2) the rent multiplier drops in the year after the peak year because the rent catches up; (3) the rent multiplier in Taipei is greater than that of Kaoshung, and the multiplier in Kaoshung is greater than that of Taiwan province; and (4) overall, the rent multiplier in Taiwan is much greater than that of the United States.     

The experience with rent control in Israel: From rental housing to condominiums

During the past decades, home ownership has replaced privately owned rental housing as the dominant form of tenure in Israel. An important factor in this transition has been rent control. This paper examines the development of the rent control system, surveys the other major housing policies, and considers the main effects of rent control on the housing market.The Israeli rent control system is characterized by far reaching security of tenure; rent ceilings that are a fraction of the free-market rent; legalized key money shared between owner and tenant; and decontrol after a tenant dies or the landlord repurchases the unit. Consequently, the construction of privately owned rental housing has ceased. The controlled sector is disappearing, and the remaining stock is badly undermaintained and deteriorating.     

Pricing Upward-Only Adjusting Leases

This paper presents a stochastic pricing model of a unique, path-dependent lease instrument common in the United Kingdom and numerous commonwealth countries, the upward-only adjusting lease. In this lease, the rental rate is fixed at lease commencement but will be reset to the market rate at predetermined intervals (usually every five years) if it exceeds the contract rent. We derive a closed form expression for the market rent of a lease with upward-only adjustments. Results indicate what the initial coupon rate on a 10-year lease with one reset should be relative to that on a symmetric up-and-downward adjusting variable rate lease under various economic conditions (level of real interest rates and expected drift and volatility of the underlying rental service flow). We also consider the calculation of effective rents when free rent periods are given.     

Japanese Housing Tenure Choice and Welfare Implications after the Revision of the Tenant Protection Law

A new mode of housing tenure in Japan, rental housing with fixed rental terms, was introduced in March 2000 with the revision of the Japanese Tenant Protection Law. This paper examines the implications of this new system by analyzing the determinants of the choices by households among the three types of housing tenure in Japan: owned housing, general rental housing, and rental housing with fixed rental terms, and calculates the estimated compensating variation. Our micro-data is based on the three waves of Japanese household longitudinal data (Keio Household Panel Survey, KHPS) covering all of Japan. The difference between general rental housing and rental housing with fixed rental terms is reflected in the length of the contract term and the level of rent. We carefully eliminate potential sample selection bias introduced to the conditional logit housing tenure choice model through the estimation of the hedonic price regression of each housing tenure alternative. We find that households with a smaller number of family members, those who moved from outside the local housing market, those headed by an unmarried household head, and those with plans to own a house in the near future tend to select rental housing with fixed rental terms. The estimated mean compensating variation by introducing rental housing with fixed rental terms for all households selecting that tenure is 1,205 JPY per month or 1.96% of their monthly rent. Moreover, younger and/or lower income households derived the greatest benefit from the revised law in the form of lower rents.

What Drives the Owner‐Occupied and Rental Housing Markets? Evidence from an Estimated DSGE Model

Most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with a housing market do not explicitly include a rental market and assume a tight mapping between house prices and rents over the business cycle. However, rents are much smoother than house prices in the data. We match this feature of the data by adding both an owner‐occupied housing market and a rental market in a standard DSGE model. The intertemporal preference shock accounts for more than half of the variation in house prices and contributes to residential investment fluctuations through the liquidity constraint, and nominal rigidity in rental contracts captures the variation in the price‐rent ratio.     

Vacancies and Rent Dispersion in a Stochastic Search Model with Generalized Tenant Demand

I model imperfect information, derive a downward sloping market demand curve, and explain vacancies in a partial equilibrium model of a rental housing market. Tenants can be completely described by an exogenous demand curve, perhaps arising from differences in income, preferred location, or tastes, and view vacant units based on a stochastic arrival of rental information. Free entry of these landlords induces excess rental housing capacity (equilibrium vacancies). I determine the equilibrium distribution of rents for vacant units, show that this rent distribution may be discontinuous, and explore the equilibrium vacancy rate to changes in exogenous parameters. The resulting characterization of equilibrium distributions of rents may be amenable to econometric modeling exploring the relationship between market rents and vacancies.     

证劵发行管制下的地方“护租”与上市公司财务困境风险化解

通过分析证券发行管制下的地方"护租"行为研究了地方政府参与辖内上市公司财务困境风险化解机制:中央政府证券发行管制形成垄断租金,地方政府围绕证券发行机会的竞争使得垄断租金转化成为可占用性准租,为了辖内公司获得未来发行证券机会,避免租值转移,地方政府积极参与辖内上市公司财务困境风险化解。上述理论分析得到了经验证据的支持。以2005—2009年处于财务困境上市公司为研究样本,发现辖内上市公司处于财务困境状况对该地区未来的公司证券发行申请通过发审委审核比例存在显著影响,地方政府则会根据自身执行能力努力减少辖内上市公司处于财务困境。本文的研究对于中国转型期证券行政监管阶段性有效,特别是地方政府积极参与辖内上市公司财务困境风险化解给出了机理性解释并提供了经验证据。     

Residential Search and Mobility in a Housing Market Equilibrium Model

In this paper, we propose an equilibrium model for the housing market which provides an explanation for observed housing consumption of households over their lifetimes. The moving behavior of households is described as a stochastic dynamic process in which households moving decisions depend on information which is obtained over time. Households move when the offer exceeds an endogenously determined threshold. On the basis of the households moving behavior, the steady-state distribution of households over the housing stock is obtained. On the supply side of the market, landlords are looking for households to occupy their vacant dwellings. Their strategy is to set rents in a mixed strategy in order to profit from imperfect information. After formulating search behavior of households as well as the behavior of landlords, the market equilibrium is derived. We explore the sensitivity of the equilibrium to changes in the structural parameters.     

Some Policy Lessons from the Opening of the Korean Insurance Market

This article examines the recent dispute between the UnitedStates and the Republic of Korea over the opening of Korea'sinsurance market to U.S. companies. The article assesses theinterests and motivations of both countries that lay behindthe formal arguments presented during the negotiation process.It also analyzes whether the long-run interests of both developingand industrial countries would be well served by the approachto the opening of the market adopted in this case—sharingthe rent while continuing to regulate the insurance market.The analysis suggests that the opening of a developing country'sinsurance market (or the wider financial services market) wouldserve the long-run interests of both developing and industrialcountries only if it were accomplished in the context of overalldomestic liberalization of the finance industry. "Opening" ofthe market, if this means only the sharing of the rents thatwere generated by regulation of the market, is unlikely to bebeneficial to developing countries.     

Rent Control with Matching Economies: A Model of European Housing Market Regulation

Housing markets are thin, and consumer search for housing is costly, time consuming, and risky. Mismatches between tenants and dwellings are common in a laissez-faire market. There are scale economies in accumulating tenants and houses and then matching them up to improve welfare. In many European countries, some housing is rent controlled and rationed by public centralized matching. Waiting time, risk in rationing, and risk in matching are costs that arise from such regulation. We show that welfare improvements over laissez-faire occur if gains from centralized matching can offset the decrease in housing quality, the possible increase in waiting times, and the risks in rationing induced by rent controls. Under regulation, there is a welfare maximizing partition of the stock into free and controlled markets; and contrary to observed practice, it is often welfare improving to set controlled rents above (not below) laissez-faire, which increases the supply offered for centralized matching and the opportunity for a better match.     

对当前我国住房市场结构性问题的思考——基于北京市住房市场的实证分析

研究住宅市场供求关系的失衡以及特征、成因和根源,是解决住宅市场结构性问题的关键。解决住房市场绐构性问题,要调整好三个比例关系:保障类住房建设和商品房建设之间的比例关系;经济适用房建设与廉租房建设之间的比例关系;经济适用房建设和消费中"租"与"借"的比例关系。     

Rent control: The British experience and policy response

Rent Control in Britain began in the First World War and has lasted, on and off, most of this century. There has been almost no new building for private rent since 1939. The private rented sector is small (8%), marginalized, delapidated, and unattractive.The British Government is enacting new legislation to reform all areas of rented housing. Rents of new lettings will be freely agreed (i.e., at market levels) between landlord and tenant. But the tenant has security of tenure, subject to renegotiating a new rent. The absence of any important tax incentives or other subsidy was an obstacle to revival even with market rents. But the Business Expansion Scheme proposal in the March 1988 budget has created considerable interest among investors.Paper for conference on Rent Control: The International Experience, John Deutsch Institute Roundtable, Kingston, Ontario, 2 September 1987     

Modernizing Financial Regulation: The Relation Between Interbank Transactions and Supervisory Reform

Modernized financial firms are larger than traditional institutions, and they provide a broader range of services. Although the individual regulatory issues raised by modernization are not new, the pace and scope of these market changes may imply a qualitative change in the ability of governments to guarantee financial system stability. Private market discipline is more flexible, and the value of flexibility seems to have risen. In order to elicit private monitoring, however, governments must credibly eschew too-big-to-fail policies. Toward this end, national regulators should encourage ongoing efforts to implement secure interbank settlement systems.     

租购并举、货币政策与房地产市场波动

为补足房地产市场发展短板,有效解决房地产市场结构性失衡,我国提出加快建立租购并举的住房制度,健全住房租赁市场,满足居民居住需求。本文通过构建一般均衡模型,分析住房租赁市场发展对宏观经济的影响,并采用1998~2010年全国30个大中城市季度数据分析在房地产市场化改革前期房地产市场结构失衡对宏观经济的影响,采用2002~2019年全国月度数据分析实施租购并举住房制度后房地产市场结构改善情况下,宏观经济变化以及货币政策对房地产市场的调节效应。研究结果表明:第一,房地产市场化改革前期,住房以"居住"属性为主,"投资"属性相对较弱;第二,租购并举制度下房租房价之间"剪刀差"的缩小能够有效改善房地产市场失衡的状况;第三,货币政策对房地产市场具有显著影响,但不同的货币政策会产生截然相反的作用。     

中国一线城市房租形成机理和调控对策

房租是由房屋租赁市场的需求和供给两个方面决定的,而房屋租赁市场的需求和供给都受到房屋交易市场所形成的房价的影响。房价对房屋租赁市场需求的影响主要是由于房屋租赁市场和房屋交易市场的替代效应所导致,房价对房屋租赁市场供给的影响主要由房屋租售比和房价的上涨幅度决定。我国一线城市房价近十年的平均年上涨率为10%左右,这导致了我国一线城市的房屋租售比维持在极低的水平。随着房价的平稳,房租必然大幅上涨,故必须采取措施增加一线城市房屋租赁市场的供给,以供给量的大幅增加稳定房租。     

Efficiency in housing markets: Which home buyers know how to discount?

We test for efficiency in the Swedish co-op market by examining the negative relationship between the sales price and the present value of future monthly payments or ‘rents’. If the co-op housing market is efficient, the present value of co-op rental payments due to underlying debt obligations of the cooperative should be fully reflected in the sales price. However, a one hundred kronor increase in the present value of future rents only leads to an approximately 75 kronor reduction in the sales price. These inefficiencies are larger at the lower end of the housing market and in poorer, less educated regions and appear to reflect both liquidity constraints and the existence of more ‘sophisticated’ buyers in higher educated areas. Overall, our findings suggest that there is some systematic failure to properly discount the future stream of rent payments relative to the up front sales price.     

An economic assessment of rent controls: The Ontario experience

Rent controls have existed in Ontario since 1975. Although controls have undergone numerous changes, the basic approach has remained a modified cost-pass-through system with provision for the elimination of financial loss and for a return of new capital expenditures, and, prior to 1986, an exemption for new construction. This paper analyzes the economic consequences of the first twelve years of controls. The major effects have been to reduce rents on pre-1976 units but to increase rents on newly constructed post-1975 units, to reduce new construction, to accelerate deterioration and conversion of the existing rental stock, to generate a severe rental housing shortage, to create an environment for key money, to inefficiently and inequitably redistribute income, and to significantly exacerbate government budgetary deficits by reducing tax revenues and inducing increased government housing expenditures.     

Understanding Housing Market Volatility

The Campbell–Shiller present value formula implies a factor structure for the price–rent ratio of housing market. Using a dynamic factor model, we decompose the price–rent ratios of 23 major housing markets into a national factor and independent local factors, and we link these factors to the economic fundamentals of the housing markets. We find that a large fraction of housing market volatility is local and that the national factor has become more important than local factors in driving housing market volatility since 1999, consistent with the findings in Del Negro and Otrok (2007). The local volatilities mostly are due to time variations of idiosyncratic housing market risk premia, not local growth. At the aggregate level, the growth and interest rate factors jointly account for less than half of the total variation in the price–rent ratio. The rest is due to the aggregate housing market risk premium and a pricing error. We find evidence that the pricing error is related to money illusion, especially at the onset of the recent housing market bubble. The rapid rise in housing prices prior to the 2008 financial crisis was accompanied by both a large increase in the pricing error and a large decrease in the housing market risk premium.     

Aggregation of Local Housing Markets

This article explores the implications of spatial aggregation for parameter estimates in models of the housing sector. Using illustrative static and dynamic models and realistic assumptions about the true parameter values at the level of the local market, the article characterizes and quantifies the bias resulting from spatial aggregation and then uses the results to shed light on some previous findings from aggregate modeling of the housing sector.     

Deposit Insurance Reform in Japan: Better Late Than Never?

Introduced in 1971 as a response to the intensification in competition in the deposit-taking sector induced by the adoption of a program of liberalization and globalization, the deposit insurance system in Japan has since undergone a number of significant changes to accommodate developments in the local financial sector. The pace of such reform accelerated markedly in recent years to help stabilize the Japanese financial system in the face of systemic risk, be it due to the failure of the housing loan companies (the jusen) or other major institutions, such as Yamaichi Securities and the city bank Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. The evolution of local deposit insurance arrangements to cope with such events is explained here and an assessment of the policy responses is provided. The part played by deposit insurance in alleviating the pressures currently experienced by the Japanese banking sector also is addressed. Finally, the extent to which the Japanese authorities have learned from the U.S. experience with deposit insurance is examined.