行业差异、利益相关者治理机制与治理指数分析

有鉴于利益相关者的相关问题已成为现行公司治理框架中不可或缺的一部分,本文设置五个利益相关者治理评价指标,考察中国上市公司利益相关者参与公司治理和利益相关者权益的保护状况,并得出利益相关者治理指数.对上市公司利益相关者治理指数进行的行业分析表明:不同行业的上市公司和样本总体在利益相关者治理机制及其所涉及的五个具体方面均存在重要差异,这说明行业差异可能对上市公司利益相关者治理机制和治理水平存在重要的影响.     

从高盛“欺诈门”看保险公司风险防范

本文就高盛"欺诈门"暴露出的金融机构治理机制缺陷进行了思考,通过利益相关者主义理论对保险公司治理结构进行了剖析,提出保险公司治理要实现利益相关者利益、加强制度建设、加强管理层监管、内控建设与外部监管并重等项措施。     

公司治理框架下企业激励机制和绩效考核关系分析

公司治理属于现代企业制度中最为重要的架构,而激励机制是现代公司治理的核心内容,业绩评价则是激励机制的基础和前提。公司治理也只有在科学有效的激励机制与具体的业绩评价操作下,才真正能够形成高效的制衡机制。股东利益至上模式公司治理的工作重心就是调整股东和经营者之间的关系,公司治理的目标就是实现股东财富的最大化;在共同治理的模式下,企业要充分发挥利益相关者的重要作用,真正实现利益相关者的价值最大化治理目标。公司治理模式的国际发展趋势是共同治理。要实现科学的公司共同治理,需要明确激励主体,并科学设定报酬契约,从而对利益进行有效协调。共同治理模式必然要求从更加广泛的角度去进行绩效考核,在评价指标体系中,既要求包括针对股东利益的企业财务业绩等各类经济指标,还应包括针对其它的利益相关者的经济社会责任指标等。     

上市保险公司资本结构偏好与优化:基于利益相关者理论的分析视角

基于利益相关者理论,本文分析了保险公司股东、保单持有人和保险行业监管机构等三个主要利益相关者对保险公司资本结构的偏好及其影响,在此基础上运用博弈论和股东收益率模型对利益相关者影响下的保险公司资本结构进行理论分析。研究结果表明:在利益相关者的影响作用下,保险公司采用较低的财务杠杆能更好地最大化各利益相关者的效用,优化公司资本结构。这一结论也得到了我国三家A股保险公司上市前后财务杠杆变化的经验数据支持。为此,本文提出降低保险公司财务杠杆、优化资本结构的政策建议。     

保险公司治理的特殊性研究——基于利益相关者理论

本文基于利益相关者理论分析了保险公司治理的特殊性,指出保单持有人、人力资本所有者、保险监管者是保险公司治理的特殊利益相关者。并对股份制保险公司、相互制保险公司、合作保险组织的治理结构和特点做了比较研究。最后是研究结论和政策建议。     

我国商业银行利益相关者治理

次贷危机的爆发让人们对商业银行股东至上的治理理念提出了质疑,商业银行经营的负外部性和危机的传染性要求其更加关注利益相关者的利益。本文在对商业银行利益相关者相关文献进行回顾的基础上,提出了界定利益相关者的三大属性,并采用问卷调查获取数据,利用SPSS统计软件,借鉴米切尔评分法,对我国商业银行利益相关者进行了界定和三维分类。在此基础上,将可进一步研究商业银行利益相关者参与公司治理的制度安排。     

保险公司承担社会责任与其经营业绩的相关性研究——基于人身险和财产险公司面板数据的证据

本文根据利益相关者理论,在之前相关研究的基础上,从股东、员工、客户和政府四个维度出发构建保险公司承担社会责任的评价体系,利用系统广义矩估计GMM方法,对我国54家保险公司2009—2017年的面板财务数据进行回归分析,研究人身险公司和财产险公司承担社会责任对于其自身的经营业绩会产生怎样的影响,进而提出建议。     

我国国有商业银行内部公司治理与外部监管理论研究——基于利益相关者理论

鉴于我国国有商业银行公司治理的特殊性,"利益相关者理论"应成为健全国有商业银行公司治理结构的指导思想与评价依据。在完善商业银行公司治理结构的过程中,应充分地考虑利益相关者的利益,构建健全有效的公司治理机制,实现银行效率与稳健运营的统一。     

财产险公司特征对经营绩效的影响——基于《保险公司经营评价指标体系》

2015年8月,中国保监会制定发布的《保险公司经营评价指标体系(试行)》为财产险公司法人设定了3类12个评价指标。本文研究财产险公司在这12个绩效指标上的“得分”(而非指标原始值)与公司基本情况、业务特点、财务状况和公司治理等方面的11个特征变量的关系。其中,对于风险保障、综合纳税、增加值和现金流的分析是已有相关文献中少见的。收集了2006～2016年的71家财产险公司的相关数据,根据12个绩效指标的性质及其记分规则,采用线性回归模型和二元离散选择模型,发现了一系列具体实证结论,并进行解释。     

我国国有商业银行内部公司治理与外部监管理论研究——基于利益相关者理论

鉴于我国国有商业银行公司治理的特殊性,“利益相关者理论”应成为健全国有商业银行公司治理结构的指导思想与评价依据.在完善商业银行公司治理结构的过程中,应充分地考虑利益相关者的利益,构建健全有效的公司治理机制,实现银行效率与稳健运营的统一.     

CalPERS基金运作机制及对我国企业年金的借鉴

本文研究了美国最大的公共养老基金——加利福尼亚州公共雇员养老基金（CalPERS）的运作机制，包括治理横式、参与公司治理以及投资组台构成等，分析了CalPERS的改革动向及其含义，提出了强化我国企业年金理事会职责，改革企业年金理事会成员构成、引入外部独立理事、积极参与公司治理、投资组合多样化等政策主张。     

公司治理对保险公司绩效影响的实证检验——以24家中资财产保险公司为例

近年来,金融机构的治理问题日益引起学者们的重视,成为公司治理领域研究的热点。综观已有的国内外文献,国外研究侧重于不同所有制保险公司的治理差异,且样本多来自英美发达国家;而国内保险公司治理研究刚刚起步,在研究变量、研究样本的选择上还存在一些不足。鉴于此,本文以24家中资财产保险公司为样本,实证检验了股权结构、董事会特征、高管激励机制、信息披露透明度等治理机制对保险公司绩效的影响。     

Do institutional shareholder services (ISS) corporate governance ratings reflect a company's operating performance?

Little is known about the relation between the actual governance rating received by a firm and the firm's performance. In this study, we examine the relation between the actual corporate governance rating received by a firm and the firm's performance during the years 2002–2004. We use the institutional shareholder services (ISS) corporate governance quotient (CGQ) rating of a firm's corporate governance structure and analyze this rating in relation to the firm's operating performance. We compare the institutional shareholder services’ CGQ rating to two measures of the firm's operating performance, return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Based upon our results, we do not find statistical evidence suggesting that the firms’ operating performance is related to the firms’ ISS corporate governance rating.     

公司绩效、公司治理与管理者报酬实证研究

本文以中国深、沪两市在2004年上市公司样本作为公司绩效、公司治理与管理者报酬研究对象,从公司绩效、股权结构的安排以及董事会治理三个方面,通过构建最小二乘模型进行多元线性回归,来研究公司内部治理机制对公司管理层报酬的影响。研究结果表明:公司绩效、国有股比例、董事会规模、两职兼任均对管理者报酬产生显著的影响。     

Financial constraints,board governance standards,and corporate cash holdings

This study examines whether financial constraints and board governance play substitution roles in lowering agency concerns in corporate cash holdings. Using four firm-specific characteristics of financial constraints and 28 forward-looking board governance standards, we find that board governance mitigates agency concerns in cash holdings more significantly for financially less-constrained firms. Consistently, financially less-constrained firms increase the level of board governance and adopt more board governance standards. A natural experiment with the 2007 financial crisis provides robustness to our findings. Our evidence suggests that financial constraints interrelate with the effectiveness of board governance on corporate cash holdings.     

我国中小银行风险控制能力的主成分分析——基于公司治理视角

文章以我国上市的11家中小银行为样本,根据其2013年半年度报告,基于公司治理视角,选取八个具有代表性的指标,利用SPSSl9．0对我国中小银行风险控制能力进行主成分分析。实证结果表明,基于选定的指标和数据,为提高风险控制能力,加强和完善我国中小银行公司治理各种机制的重要性依次递减为：外部治理中的资本充足率监管机制和信息披露机制、内部治理中的股东治理机制和董事会治理机制、内部治理中的股权制衡机制。由此提出加大外部监管力度,强化中小银行资本充足率监管机制;优化股权结构,完善中小银行董事会治理机制;重视引进并且稳定境外战略投资者等建议。     

The impact of corporate governance on auditor choice: Evidence from China

As the largest and fastest growing emerging market, China is becoming more and more important to investors throughout the world. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of firms’ auditor choice in China in respect of their corporate governance mechanism. Normally firms have to take a trade-off in their auditor choice decisions, i.e., to hire high-quality auditors to signal effective audit monitoring and good corporate governance to lower their capital raising costs, or to select low-quality auditors with less effective audit monitoring in order to reap private benefits derived from weak corporate governance and less-transparent disclosure (the opaqueness gains). We develop a logit regression model to test the impact of firms’ internal corporate governance mechanism on auditor choice decisions made by IPO firms getting listed during a bear market period of 2001–2004 in China. Three variables are used to proxy for firms’ internal corporate governance mechanism, i.e., the ownership concentration, the size of the supervisory board (SB), and the duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors (BoDs). We classify all auditors in China into large auditors (Top 10) and others (non-Top 10), assuming the large auditors can provide higher quality audit services. The empirical results show that firms with larger controlling shareholders, with smaller size of SB, or in which CEO and BoDs chairman are the same person, are less likely to hire a Top 10 (high-quality) auditor. This suggests that when benefits from lowering capital raising costs are trivial, firms with weaker internal corporate governance mechanism are inclined to choose a low-quality auditor so as to capture and sustain their opaqueness gains. On the other hand, with improvement of corporate governance, firms should be more likely to appoint high-quality auditors.     

The determinants of auditor switching from the perspective of corporate governance in China

This paper reports the association between firms' internal corporate governance mechanisms and their auditor switch decisions in the Chinese context. We identify two types of auditor switch, namely switching to a larger auditor and switching to a smaller auditor. Three variables are used to proxy for firms' internal corporate governance mechanism, including the ownership concentration (shareholding by the largest owner), the effectiveness of supervisory board (SB), and the duality of chairman of board of directors (CBoD) and CEO. We regressed the internal corporate governance variables over firms' audit switching types during a specific period of 2001-2004 when a bear market continued in China. The empirical results demonstrate that firms with larger controlling owners or in which CBoD and CEO are held by the same person are more likely to switch to a smaller auditor rather than to a larger one. However, the effect of the SB variable does not have a significant impact on auditor switching decisions. In general, the study findings suggest that firms with weak internal corporate governance mechanism tend to switch to smaller or more pliable auditors in order to sustain the opaqueness gains derived from weak corporate governance. On the other hand, with the improvement of corporate government, firms should be more likely to choose large (high-quality) auditors in making auditor switching decisions.     

The effect of corporate governance on firm’s credit ratings: further evidence using governance score in the United States

We investigate whether corporate governance affects firms’ credit ratings and whether improvement in corporate governance standards is associated with improvement in investment grade rating. We use the Gov‐score of Brown and Caylor (2006) , the Gomper’s G index and an entrenchment score of Bebchuk et al. (2009) to proxy for corporate governance. Using a sample of US firms, we find that firms characterized by stronger corporate governance have a significantly higher credit rating, and that this association is accentuated for smaller firms relative to larger firms. We find that an improvement in corporate governance is associated with improvement in bond rating.