The robustness of the Sarbanes Oxley effect on the U.S. capital market

We examine the incidence of new listings and delistings on U.S. stock exchanges and firms’ propensity to delist, as a function of general market conditions, firm fundamentals, and the costs of compliance with the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX). We find that both general market conditions and firm fundamentals explain the delisting incidence and firms’ delisting decisions; while SOX variables are positively associated with firms’ delisting likelihood only when general market conditions are not included in the analyses. Further analyses on the population partitioned into size quintiles suggest that the passage of SOX was not associated with an increase in the likelihood of delisting for any size quintile of firms and that the implementation of SOX section 404 is positively associated with the delisting likelihood for midsized and larger firms. Our empirical evidence is useful to regulators as they consider changes in the imposition and implementation of SOX section 404.     

Cross-listing and subsequent delisting in foreign markets

Employing a sample of stocks cross-listed and subsequently delisted from foreign markets, we examine the consequences of delisting to investors in terms of price, risk, and liquidity. We also provide a direct comparison between the firm's performance after a foreign cross-listing and after its subsequent delisting. We find a positive cross-listing and negative delisting effect on stock price, both of which dissipate in the long run. No significant changes in the market risk are found for either event. Foreign cross-listing and delisting are associated with increasing and decreasing long term trading volume respectively. Further analysis reveals that firms delist in response to low host market return and low firm trading volume in the host market. The changes in liquidity and market risk from delisting relate those from cross-listing. Finally, our results show that the bonding hypothesis fails to explain the listing premium and the delisting loss.     

Corporate social responsibility: An umbrella or a puddle on a rainy day? Evidence surrounding corporate financial misconduct

We examine the way a fraudulent firm's pre‐ and post‐misconduct corporate social responsibility engagement is associated with its stock performance to investigate the reputational role of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In the short term, firms with good CSR performance suffer smaller market penalties upon the revelation of financial wrongdoing, supporting the buffer effect, as opposed to the backfire effect, of a good social image. We also find that the misbehaving firms’ post‐misconduct CSR efforts are negatively associated with delisting probabilities, and positively with stock returns. These findings support the argument that increasing post‐crisis CSR engagement can be an effective remedy for a damaged reputation.     

EXCHANGE LISTINGS AND DELISTINGS: THE ROLE OF INSIDER INFORMATION AND INSIDER TRADING

We examine whether insiders systematically exploit their private information before exchange listings and delistings they are likely to know about before outsiders/investors. Analyzing a comprehensive sample of over-the-counter (OTC) firms, which listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or American Stock Exchange (AMEX) during 1977–93, we find evidence that insiders act on their private information of an impending exchange listing by purchasing or postponing the sale of stock on private account. For firms delisting from the NYSE or AMEX, we find that insiders of these firms sell stock on private account before delisting. Overall, the evidence indicates that insiders act on their private information before exchange listings and delistings.     

Cycles in the IPO market

We develop a model in which time-varying real investment opportunities lead to time-varying adverse selection in the market for IPOs. The model is consistent with several stylized facts known about the IPO market: economic expansions are associated with a dramatic increase in the number of firms going public, which is in turn positively correlated with underpricing. Adverse selection is procyclical in the sense that dispersion in unobservable quality across firms should be more pronounced during booms. Taking the premise that uncertainty is resolved (and thus private information revealed) over time, we test this hypothesis by looking at long-run abnormal returns and delisting rates. Consistent with the model, we find (a) greater cross-sectional return variance, and (b) higher incidence of delisting for hot-market IPOs.     

Anatomy of a regulatory race to the top: Changes in delisting rules at Korea's two stock exchanges, 1999–2002

One dimension of competition among stock exchanges is the quality of products they have to offer. In order to attract listings and trading volume, exchanges can affect the quality of their listed firms by altering their standards for firm disclosure and governance. We identify a competition with respect to delisting standards between Korea's two stock exchanges and show that it complies with the three components of a regulatory race to the top: external trigger, mobility among diverse regimes and meaningful changes that converge to similar rules. The race between the two Korean exchanges ended with stricter rules and better protected minority shareholders. The race also ended, however, with neither exchange gaining market share with respect to trading volume or new listings. Korea's experience, therefore, suggests a reason why these races are rare. In the absence of an external trigger, exchanges will be reluctant to enter a race if they think it will result in rule convergence and no winner.     

避免亏损与公开增发盈余管理的识别与估计:来自聚束设计的实证证据

基于2002-2017年中国A股上市公司披露的加权平均净资产收益率(ROE)数据,本文识别出上市公司在0%(避免亏损)和6%(公开增发股票)两个阈值处的盈余管理动机,并对盈余管理频率和幅度进行估计。首先,数据证实A股上市公司ROE分布图在阈值0%和6%处存在明显的左侧样本缺失、右侧样本聚集现象,表明公司确实为满足政策要求在阈值附近进行了盈余管理,将公司ROE从阈值左侧操纵至右侧。其次,本文用聚束设计方法估计出3.18%的上市公司为避免汇报亏损而进行盈余管理,占真实亏损公司的59.25%,进行盈余管理的公司将ROE平均提高了2.115个百分点。为了成功公开增发而进行盈余管理的上市公司比例虽然仅有0.28%,但占到了实际股票公开增发公司的58.13%,平均盈余管理幅度为0.524个百分点。最后,异质性分析表明:2016年以前上市公司为了避免亏损而进行盈余管理的动机一直很稳定,2002-2005年是为了满足公开增发条件而进行盈余管理最严重的年份;动机强烈的ST企业和杠杆率高的企业进行盈余管理的频率更高。     

What drives delistings of foreign firms from U.S. Exchanges?

We examine time dependency in the factors motivating delistings of foreign firms from major U.S. Exchanges over the period 1962–2006. For firms listing before Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), we find that governance has no significant effect on delisting but after SOX, it becomes one of the main forces driving delisting. For firms whose delisting decision is most likely attributable to SOX, we find they realize low benefits from listing – they originate from countries with strong home market governance, and from listing onward realize low trading volume, analyst coverage, and make little use of capital raising. Our results suggest that SOX has had a large influence on the benefits seek from a U.S. listing, leading firms from well governed countries and low capital raising needs to delist.     

避免亏损的盈余管理程度:上市公司与非上市公司的比较

本文以非上市公司盈余管理程度作为基准,运用参数估计的方法,对股票市场是否提高了公司盈余管理程度的问题进行研究。研究结论显示,1998年至2004年我国上市公司与非上市公司每年都存在避免亏损的盈余管理;在上市公司中,盈余管理公司比例为15.87%,它们提高ROA数据0.0122;在非上市公司中,盈余管理公司比例则只有5.49%,它们提高ROA数据0.0009。上市公司盈余管理频率大约为非上市公司的3倍,平均盈余管理幅度大约为非上市公司的13倍;两类公司盈余管理程度差异随着时间的推移而不断增大,因为非上市公司盈余管理程度在年度上的分布比较稳定,而上市公司盈余管理程度则随着时间的推移而不断增大。研究结论表明,股票市场提高了公司的盈余管理程度。     

Government assisted earnings management in China

As the socialist system in China embraces the market economy, it has created many conflicts of interests and collusion between firms and different layers of governments. The central government in China sets regulations to ensure the quality of firms listed in the capital market, while local governments engage in inter-jurisdictional competition for more capital, and their interests are aligned with listed firms through the stringent IPO quota system. This paper examines how local governments in China help listed firms in earnings management to circumvent the central government’s regulation. We find that local governments provide subsidies to help firms boost their earnings above the regulatory threshold of rights offering and delisting. Moreover, this collusion between government and listed firms in earnings management exists mainly in firms controlled by local governments.