上市开放式基金运作机理探讨

上市开放式基金(LOFs)与交易所交易基金(ETFs)的出现打破了长期以来所形成的"封闭式基金"与"开放式基金"的二元结构.但作为一种基金创新形式,LOF的推出也面临一些新的挑战.本文从上市开放式基金的运作机理出发,对上市开放式基金的市场"均衡"问题、套利机制问题、信息披露问题以及适合的基金类型进行了探讨,认为免佣基金、指数基金将是上市开放式基金的发展方向.     

公募REITs信息披露责任配置制度研究

中国证监会发布基础设施领域不动产信托基金相关的通知和指引标志着公募REITs试点阶段的开始.公募REITs制度特别强调信息披露,并在发行期和存续期都规定了较为详细的信息披露要求.但是现有公募REITs信息披露制度并未规定相关主体之间的信息披露协同和衔接,不同主体之间的信息披露责任划分也不明确.我国公募REITs复杂的交易结构、双重委托代理困境而产生的信息不对称及利益冲突,需要我国公募REITs进一步明确不同主体信息披露责任配置.公募REITs信息披露制度,应当以信息生成和传递过程中不同主体产生的法律关系为分析基础,具体化项目管理人及其主要负责人信息披露责任、加强基金托管人的监督职能,在公募REITs年度报告责任主体中应当包含专项计划管理人等其他管理人.     

企业创新行为信息披露的经济后果研究——来自创业板的经验证据

随着封闭式创新向开放式创新过渡,信息悖论已经被打破,但创新行为信息披露对开放式创新影响研究缺失。本文以我国创业板2012年至2014年上市公司为对象,首次检验了创新行为信息披露的经济后果,研究发现,在提升企业价值方面,创新行为自愿性信息披露水平贡献度普遍大于强制性信息披露水平,在资本市场上投资者认同方面,结论相反,在提升外部融资能力与降低代理成本方面,创新行为信息披露水平没有通过显著性检验。研究结果表明我国创新行为信息披露有效性有待提高,基于累积创新链与降低创新隐性成本需要,应加强创新行为的中间信息披露制度建设,基于创新行为的行业特征,应加强以投资者需求为导向的分行业信息披露制度建设。     

海外企业社会责任披露制度及借鉴

与传统信息披露制度要求公司披露财务方面的信息不同，社会责任信息披露要求公司从经济、环境和社会业绩三个方面揭示公司政策和经营活动对社会的影响。联合国以及经合组织在其制定的有关跨国公司的行为准则中均要求企业披露其社会责任方面的信息。美国、欧盟等也有关于企业社会责任信息披露方面的专门立法。我国在企业社会责任信息披露方面尚处于摸索阶段，需借鉴国外的经验以完善我国的企业社会责任信息披露制度。     

美国寿险产品信息披露制度及其对中国的启示

本文首先介绍了美国寿险产品信息披露制度,并通过制度对比,分析了我国新型人身保险产品信息披露制度中存在的问题,最后从扩展信息披露功能、建立原则、加强管理、提升效率四个方面提出了完善我国寿险产品信息披露制度的建议。     

我国商业银行信息披露研究综述

银行业作为特殊行业,其信息披露问题一直以来受到理论和实务界的广泛关注。近些年,国内外学者对商业银行信息披露的必要性、成本效益以及是否需要强化监管等方面进行了大量的研究。本文在对2001年-2014年学术界关于我国商业银行信息披露方面的文献进行全面回顾的基础上,从披露制度、披露现状及问题、披露的影响因素、特殊信息披露等几个方面简要评述目前研究的特点和存在的不足之处,并提出未来的研究方向。     

激励相容信息披露制度设计——一个理论框架与现实分析

信息披露是投资者了解上市公司、证券监管机构监管上市公司的主要途径,信息披露制度是各国证券法律制度的重要内容.针对当前我国证券市场中上市公司虚假信息披露案件频发,本着保护中小投资者利益为目的,本文从激励相容信息披露制度设计的理论模型角度出发,分析了影响信息披露质量的各种变量,并以各个变量为基础得出模型对我国证券市场信息监管实践的启示,从而指出要完善我国证券市场信息披露监管制度,必须从立法、加大惩罚力度等各方面加强监管.     

XBRL、代理成本与绩效水平——基于中国开放式基金市场的证据

从2010年开始,中国证监会强制要求所有基金公司采用XBRL在唯一指定的官方网站上披露年报等信息,同时提供在线XBRL阅读器以方便投资者查阅相关信息。基于此,本文考察XBRL的采用对于开放式基金代理成本及其相关经济后果的影响,研究发现,强制采用XBRL,降低了开放式基金的代理成本,同时提升了开放式基金的绩效水平。研究表明这一新的披露方式,减少了投资者的信息搜索成本以及投资者与基金经理之间的信息不对称,从而促进了投资者作为委托人对于代理人行为的有效监督。     

我国上市公司社会责任信息披露制度实证研究

我国上市公司社会责任信息披露制度在推动上市公司披露社会责任信息方面发挥了积极的作用,但是在规则体系、制度内容、监管体制与机制等方面还存在着一定的问题,有待于改进和完善.当前,应将上市公司社会责任信息披露纳入法律规制的范围,健全上市公司社会责任信息披露制度的内容,加强上市公司社会责任信息披露的监管.     

从基金暂停申购看投资者权益保护

开放式基金制度设计的初衷是赋予投资者自由申购赎回的权利,只有在特定情况下才能暂停申购以维护持有人权益。本文深入研究了我国开放式基金暂停申购的各种情况、背后的原因以及对投资者权益的影响,认为基金管理人在暂停申购决策过程中具有较大的自主空间,可能利用暂停申购,实现自身利益最大化而损害持有人利益。为规范基金暂停申购,维护投资者权益,本文建议应加强对基金管理人的监管和约束,细化基金暂停申购的具体规则,完善暂停申购信息披露制度,改进对长期暂停申购基金的评价方法等。     

论我国开放式证券投资基金的发展

发展证券投资基金对于规范证券市场具有重要意义，但封闭式证券投资基金在运作过程中也出现了许多问题。目前我国开放式证券投资基金即将推出，本文从对封闭工基金存在问题进行探讨的角度出发，分析了开放式证券投资基金的优势，提出了正确认识我国开放式基金在发行规模、投资风险、投资理念、市场运作等方面的局限性，并就完善基金立法、建立规范的金融监管体系、制定正确的开放式基金发展步骤、加强理论研究和基金人才培养以及完善证券市场创造基金发展的良好环境等方面提出了基本构想。     

Mutual fund herding and audit pricing

This study investigates how investor trading behavior affects audit pricing by examining mutual fund herding in specific. When mutual fund managers herd due to information cascade, mimicking incentive, or agency problem, it causes information friction and weakens their monitoring effectiveness. Heightened governance risk is associated with higher audit risk and thus higher audit pricing. In our empirical tests, we find that herding weakens mutual funds’ information advantage and monitoring effectiveness, ultimately resulting in higher audit fees. To mitigate the endogeneity concern, we employ the natural experiment of the 2004 SEC regulation change on mutual fund disclosure frequency to capture exogenous change in herding intensity. Our findings are robust using propensity score matching method and alternative measures. Consistent with our conjecture, we document that firms facing stronger mutual fund herding are associated with deteriorated corporate disclosure quality.     

Managerial skill and closed-end fund discounts

Empirical evidence from the UK market is examined in the light of recent theories about closed-end fund discounts. Market pricing of skill, relative to the fees charged for it, accounts for a significant portion of discount variation, but cannot explain the rarity of index funds or why they trade at a discount, since fees tend to be lower than on open-end funds. Index funds have lower discount volatility, consistent with the skill hypothesis. The results imply that managerial skill, relative to the fees charged, does not wholly account for the tendency of closed-end funds to trade at a discount.     

Daily mutual fund flows and redemption policies

We examine how redemption policies affect daily fund flows in open-end mutual funds. Since short-term trading of fund shares, as manifested in daily fund flows, can have an adverse impact on returns to the fund’s shareholders, mutual funds might find it desirable to discourage short-term trading through the use of redemption fees. However, if daily fund flows are due to fund shareholders’ legitimate liquidity demands, the redemption fee would have little effect on daily fund flows and possibly adversely affect fund shareholders by imposing a liquidity cost on them. We find that the likelihood of a fund charging a redemption fee is largely a function of its overall fee structure. We also use a sample of funds that imposed redemption fees to examine whether the distribution of daily fund flows changes after the initiation of the redemption fee. We find that the redemption fee is an effective tool in controlling the volatility of fund flows.     

中国社会保障战略储备基金管理中存在的问题及对策分析

全国社会保障基金是中国社会保障战略储备基金,其安全性以及保值增值状况对中国社会保障的发展具有重要战略意义。我国社保基金不断发展壮大,同时,实行直接投资和间接投资相结合的管理模式,保证了较好的安全性和较高的收益率。但是,仍然存在着资金来源不稳定、保值增值能力不足以及信息披露机制不完善等问题,因此,应完善基金来源规划、壮大基金规模,增强基金保值增值、抗风险能力,并完善信息披露机制。     

A Liquidity-Based Theory of Closed-End Funds

This paper develops a rational, liquidity-based model of closed-endfunds (CEFs) that provides an economic motivation for the existenceof this organizational form: They offer a means for investorsto buy illiquid securities, without facing the potential costsassociated with direct trading and without the externalitiesimposed by an open-end fund structure. Our theory predicts thepatterns observed in CEF initial public offerings (IPOs) andthe observed behavior of the CEF discount, which results froma trade-off between the liquidity benefits of investing in theCEF and the fees charged by the fund's managers. In particular,the model explains why IPOs occur in waves in certain sectorsat a time, why funds are issued at a premium to net asset value(NAV), and why they later usually trade at a discount. We alsoconduct an empirical investigation, which, overall, providesmore support for a liquidity-based model than for an alternativesentiment-based explanation.     

我国基金公司内部封闭式基金对开放式基金的补贴研究

由于封闭式基金与开放式基金的差异,基金公司倾向于补贴开放式基金而侵害封闭式基金的利益。经验证据表明,我国基金公司确实存在封闭式基金对开放式基金的补贴行为。论文进而构建了一个封闭式基金对开放式基金补贴模型,指出投资者偏好、市场预期的开放式基金销售量、激励机制、基金公司自身的管理能力是影响补贴行为的重要因素,并讨论了如何进行防范。     

Public Disclosure of Audit Fees and Bargaining Power between the Client and Auditor: Evidence from China

Before the public disclosure of audit fees was mandated, it was unlikely for an audit client to have accurate information about how much other companies were charged by their auditors. Public fee disclosure decreases the cost of auditees' access to audit fee information for the auditor's portfolio of clients and is thus likely to increase the relative bargaining power of auditees over auditors when they negotiate audit fees. Using both proprietary and public audit fee data before and after public fee disclosure was mandated in China, we provide evidence consistent with the preceding conjecture. We find that public fee disclosure reinforces the magnitude of audit fee decreases for overcharged clients and weakens auditors' ability to raise audit fees for undercharged clients. These findings suggest the existence of unintended consequences of public fee disclosure regulation, the original rationale of which was a concern about audit pricing practices that could undermine auditor independence.     

全球基础设施投资基金研究：投资者偏好和委托代理问题

基于2005年1月至2019年6月间公开发售的2246支来自全球的基建基金数据,本文研究基建基金投资者偏好和委托代理问题。研究结果表明:投资者偏好客户忠诚度较高、投资于国际市场、团队管理型的基建基金;在基建基金公司层面,投资者存在跟风投资行为,且随着信息不透明度和收益不确定性加剧;投资者与基金管理人存在委托代理问题,体现为基金费率与预期业绩不匹配。该现象源于基金管理人利用投资者较高的预期收益设置费率,可以由基金特征因素和年份效应解释,尤其是投资于国际市场、收益分配或非团队管理等特征。本文结论对创新基础设施融资模式、稳定资金来源和微观审慎监管具有重要借鉴意义。     

Regulation And The Rise In Asset-Based Mutual Fund Management Fees

In this article I explain why asset‐based fees are common for mutual fund management companies and why the average fee has increased recently. I argue that Securities and Exchange Commission fee regulations make alternative fee types illegal or unattractive. Management companies can maintain higher fees because regulations and brand‐name capital partly insulate them from competition and because investors cannot easily distinguish between performance‐oriented and marketing‐oriented fund companies. Index funds and unit investment trusts may offer competition to mutual funds in the future because they are designed to minimize management fees.