Investor structure and the informational efficiency of commodity futures prices

This article investigates the impact of the trading positions of hedgers (i.e., producers, merchants, processors, or users of a commodity), speculators (i.e., commodity pool operators, trading advisors, or hedge funds), and swap dealers on the price formation process in the agricultural, metal, and energy futures markets. The hedgers' relative positions exert negative impacts on price efficiency in commodity futures markets. Hedgers are less likely to be information motivated, so their trading delays the price formation process. However, speculators' positions have positive impacts on price efficiency because speculators correct pricing errors. This study also offers evidence that the role of swap dealers, similar to speculators in futures markets, is to provide liquidity and cross-market arbitrage. These findings highlight the role of producers, hedge funds, and swap dealers in price formation processes in commodity futures—information that is beneficial to academics, practitioners, and regulators.     

Speculators,commodities and cross-market linkages

We use a unique, non-public dataset of trader positions in 17 U.S. commodity futures markets to provide novel evidence on those markets' financialization in the past decade. We then show that the correlation between the rates of return on investible commodity and equity indices rises amid greater participation by speculators generally, hedge funds especially, and hedge funds that hold positions in both equity and commodity futures markets in particular. We find no such relationship for commodity swap dealers, including index traders (CITs). The predictive power of hedge fund positions is weaker in periods of generalized financial market stress. Our results support the notion that who trades helps predict the joint distribution of commodity and equity returns. We find qualitatively similar but statistically weaker results using a proxy for hedge fund activity based on publicly available data.     

Derivative use,fund flows and investment manager performance

Prior literature which examines the use of derivatives by investment managers does not discern between different types of derivative trading strategies. This study is the first to examine and gather data on a particular type of derivative trading strategy undertaken by investment managers. We examine the extent to which equity fund managers use index futures to manage fund flows and the effect this has on their alpha and market timing measures of performance. Our results show that funds that do not use derivatives exhibit lower returns and negative market timing skills when they experience fund flow. The performance of funds that use derivatives, however, is independent of investor’s liquidity demands. In fact, the unconditional performance of the average user fund is statistically equivalent to the performance of the average non-user fund conditional on zero fund flow. Our results provide evidence that derivatives can be beneficial for mutual fund holders under certain conditions.     

The diversification effects of volatility-related assets

We examine whether investors can improve their investment opportunity sets through the addition of volatility-related assets into various groupings of benchmark portfolios. By first analyzing the weekly returns of three VIX-related assets over the period 1996-2008 and then applying mean-variance spanning tests, we find that adding VIX-related assets does lead to a statistically significant enlargement of the investment opportunity set for investors. Our empirical findings are robust and have two implications. First, there is scope for the further development of financial products relating to volatility indexes. Second, hedge fund managers can utilize VIX futures contracts or VIX-squared portfolios to enhance their equity portfolio performance, as measured by the Sharpe ratio.     

An empirical investigation of large trader market manipulation in derivatives markets

Using account-level transaction data in options and futures markets, we investigate the existence of market manipulation, which is the ability of large traders to trade strategically, impacting prices and making abnormal profits. First, large trader’s option positions have a quantity impact on the underlying asset’s price. Second, large traders generate significantly positive alphas from trading options and futures. Among the different investor types, proprietary dealers generate the largest positive alphas. Third, these abnormal returns are consistent with strategic trading and cross-market manipulation. The evidence supports market manipulation across the options and futures markets, but not within the futures market itself.     

VIX futures term structure and the expectations hypothesis

Tests of the expectations hypothesis reveal that the slope of the VIX futures term structure predicts the direction but not the magnitude of the evolution of the short-end of the curve, but predicts neither the direction nor the magnitude of short-term changes in the long-end of the curve. Relative value seeking spread trades, constructed to exploit such violations, deliver excess returns with annualized Sharpe ratios equal or greater than those of volatility-writing strategies deployed by VIX ETN's for a majority of the 32 spread trade combinations tested. I demonstrate that profits from beta-neutral variations of the spread trades, which are not compensation for taking on equity downside risk by design, are propagated by inflows of capital into VIX futures markets, after controlling for factors that measure changes in the availability of hedge fund capital, risk appetite, and momentum. At the heart of profits, and by extension the term structure anomalies, is a disproportionally elevated basis propagated by long VIX demand that enters the futures market through ETN channels.     

Portfolio pumping: An examination of investment manager quarter-end trading and impact on performance

Utilizing a database of daily institutional fund manager trades, we examine the contribution of strategic trading at quarter-end associated with potential ‘portfolio pumping’ or ‘ramping up’ of reported stock prices around quarter-ends. We provide the first direct evidence that active fund managers tend to purchase illiquid stocks on the last day of the quarter, in stocks in which they already hold overweight portfolio positions. Consistent with the way fund managers are evaluated, we found that the poor-performing managers display greater evidence of portfolio pumping. Both increased regulatory scrutiny and improvements to market microstructure design reduce the severity of stock price changes at quarter-ends.     

Identifying informed traders in futures markets

We use daily positions of futures market participants to identify informed traders. These data contain 8,921 unique traders. We identify between 94 and 230 traders as overnight informed and 91 as intraday informed with little overlap. Floor brokers/traders are over-represented in the overnight informed group. The intraday informed group is dominated by managed money traders/hedge funds and swap dealers, with commercial hedgers under-represented. We find that characteristics such as experience, position size, trading activity, and type of positions held offer significant predictive power for who is informed. An analysis of daily trader profits confirms that we select highly profitable traders.     

Changing investment styles: style creep and style gaming in the hedge fund industry

Notwithstanding their common features, hedge funds remain an extremely diverse asset class. Information on fund styles is important for numerous purposes, such as portfolio construction, performance attribution and risk management. With fund self‐declaration being prone to (strategic) misclassification, return‐based taxonomies grouping funds along similarities in realized returns provide a useful alternative. We provide a consistent classification system of homogeneous groups of hedge funds based on self‐organizing maps. Whereas some fund categories such as managed futures are largely consistent in their self‐declared strategies, others, especially so‐called ‘equity hedge’ funds, display no or very limited return similarities. Furthermore, we also find evidence of fund managers performing undisclosed changes of their trading style over time. Those funds that misclassified themselves once are particularly likely to change their trading style again. Although style self‐declaration can, therefore, be quite misleading, our results indicate that hedge funds do not misdeclare their style strategically to improve their relative performance. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does increased hedging lead to decreased price efficiency? The case of VIX ETPs and VIX futures

We examine the impact of the introduction of VIX exchange‐traded products (ETPs) on the information content and pricing efficiency of VIX futures. We document that trades in VIX futures have become less informative and that pricing errors exhibit more persistence after the introduction of VIX ETPs. In addition, we observe that the price process of the VIX futures has become noisier over time. These findings suggest that the introduction of the VIX ETPs had a prominent effect on the properties and dynamics of the VIX futures.     

Bounds for VIX futures given S&P 500 smiles

We derive sharp bounds for the prices of VIX futures using the full information of S&P 500 smiles. To that end, we formulate the model-free sub/superreplication of the VIX by trading in the S&P 500 and its vanilla options as well as the forward-starting log-contracts. A dual problem of minimizing/maximizing certain risk-neutral expectations is introduced and shown to yield the same value.The classical bounds for VIX futures given the smiles only use a calendar spread of log-contracts on the S&P 500. We analyze for which smiles the classical bounds are sharp and how they can be improved when they are not. In particular, we introduce a family of functionally generated portfolios which often improves the classical bounds while still being tractable; more precisely, they are determined by a single concave/convex function on the line. Numerical experiments on market data and SABR smiles show that the classical lower bound can be improved dramatically, whereas the upper bound is often close to optimal.     

Herding in the German Mutual Fund Industry

This paper analyses the trading activity of German mutual funds in the 1998–2002 period to investigate whether German mutual fund managers are engaged in herding behaviour. Another objective of the study is to determine the impact of this herd‐like trading on stock prices. Our results provide evidence of herding and positive feedback trading by German mutual fund managers. We show that a significant portion of herding detected in the German market is associated with spurious herding as a consequence of changes in benchmark index composition. Investigating the impact of mutual fund herding on stock prices, we find that herding seems to neither destabilise nor stabilise stock prices.     

Strategic trading behavior and price distortion in a manipulated market: anatomy of a squeeze

This paper investigates an attempted delivery squeeze in a bond futures contract traded in London. Using cash and futures trades of dealers and customers, we analyze their strategic trading behavior, price distortion, and learning in a market manipulation setting. We argue that marked differences in settlement failure penalties in the cash and futures markets create conditions that favor squeezes. We recommend that regulators require special flagging of forward term repurchase agreements on the key deliverables that span futures contract maturity dates, and that exchanges mark-to-market their contract specifications more frequently, or consider a cash-settled contract on a basket of bonds.     

股指期货创新中的投资者保护探讨

股指期货的推出,在交易机制和违规行为等方面,均对投资者产生了一定影响,因此股指期货创新中的投资者保护应成为其应有之义。本文认为股指期货在杠杆交易、双向交易和到期日制度方面会对投资者造成一定影响;另外在信息敏感性和跨市场联动性等方面也会对投资者造成影响。当前股指期货市场对投资者保护主要从投资者适当性,风险揭示和保护基金三方面着力,有待扩展和深化。本文在借鉴美国、日本、香港等成熟股指期货市场投资者保护立法及实践的基础上,提出了完善我国股指期货投资者保护的一些建议。     

Do long-short speculators destabilize commodity futures markets?

This paper contributes to the debate on the effects of the financialization of commodity futures markets by studying the conditional volatility of long–short commodity portfolios and their conditional correlations with traditional assets (stocks and bonds). Using several groups of trading strategies that hedge fund managers are known to implement, we show that long–short speculators do not cause changes in the volatilities of the portfolios they hold or changes in the conditional correlations between these portfolios and traditional assets. Thus calls for increased regulation of commodity money managers are, at this stage, premature. Additionally, long–short speculators can take comfort in knowing that their trades do not alter the risk and diversification properties of their portfolios.     

On short-term institutional trading skill,behavioral biases,and liquidity need

Are portfolio managers skilled or do they trade too much? Using a marked-to-market based “fair-value” method for measuring fund manager skill, we find that institutional managers can potentially earn +42 (+33) basis points benchmark-adjusted return before transaction costs after a holding period of four weeks on their buy (sell) trades. After transaction costs, the benchmark-adjusted return for the buy (sell) trades is +1 (-8) basis points. Pension fund managers outperform money managers. We are unable to detect evidence for overconfidence among pension fund managers over this short-horizon. In addition, we are unable to find evidence of disposition effect among mutual fund managers. Institutions tend to engage in short-term trades with holding period of four weeks (or less) despite only breaking-even or making economically insignificant (modest) benchmark-adjusted losses after round-trip transaction costs for liquidity, risk-management, or tax-minimization reasons. Among these, evidence for liquidity trading motive is the strongest.     

Do hedge funds trade on private information? Evidence from syndicated lending and short-selling

This paper investigates an important contemporary issue relating to the involvement of hedge funds in the syndicated loan market. In particular, we investigate the potential conflicts of interest that arise when hedge funds make syndicated loans and take short positions in the equity of borrowing firms. We find evidence consistent with the short-selling of the equity of the hedge fund borrowers prior to public announcements of both loan originations and loan amendments. We also find that hedge funds are more likely to lend to highly leveraged, lower credit quality firms, where access to private information is potentially the most valuable and where trading on such information could lead to enhanced profits. Overall, our results have important implications for the current debate regarding regulating the hedge fund industry.     

Mutual fund portfolio trading and investor flow

I estimate the extent to which mutual fund portfolio trading of securities is triggered by investor flows into and out of the funds, and find that this liquidity-induced portfolio trading activity is smaller than previously estimated by Edelen (1999). I obtain estimates from a much larger and broader sample of funds than Edelen’s (1999) sample. Portfolio managers of international funds trade a smaller fraction of investor flow than do those of domestic funds. Index funds invest a larger fraction. A funds’ usage of futures contracts does not have a statistically significant effect on how it trades in response to investor flows, but the unpredictability of investor flow weakly affects the trading response to flow.     

Tax Calendar Effects in the Municipal Bond Market: Tax‐Loss Selling and Cherry Picking by Investors and Market Timing by Fund Managers

Examining municipal bond returns, bond fund flows and buying activities by fund managers over the period 1990–2009, we find evidence of tax calendar‐related rational opportunistic trading patterns by fund investors and fund managers. Specifically, fund shareholders conduct tax‐loss selling in December and re‐invest in January. In April, June, and September, fund investors rationally cherry pick to sell their shares of short‐term bond funds instead of their shares of long‐term bond funds to raise cash to pay estimated taxes. Unlike fund shareholders, fund managers adopt a contrarian strategy of buying in December and selling in January.     

A tale of feedback trading by hedge funds

This paper studies the extent of feedback trading at the factor level by hedge fund managers. We show that fund managers continuously adjust their exposure to different risk factors conditional on the recent performance of these factors. The majority of managers apply a positive feedback strategy, whereas the remaining managers use a negative feedback strategy. In addition, we find some evidence for factor timing ability, although managers appear to be more backward looking than forward looking. We show that positive feedback trading can be beneficial to fund performance in our setup. If managers applied the positive feedback strategy more aggressively, however, they could benefit more from it. As such, the “smart switching benchmark” can be used to assess the risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds.