Multi-stage product development with exploration,value-enhancing,preemptive and innovation options

We provide a real options framework for the analysis of product development that incorporates research and exploration actions, product attribute value-enhancing actions with uncertain outcome, as well as preemption and innovation options. We derive two-stage analytic formulas and propose a general multi-period solution using a numerical lattice approach. Our analysis reveals that exploration actions are more important when the project is out or at-the-money (near zero NPV) and less important for high project values. In a multi-stage setting, exploration actions are important even for in-the-money projects, when follow-on actions exist that can enhance the expected value of the project. With path-dependency, early actions are more valuable since they enhance the impact or reduce the cost of subsequent actions. Preemptive controls affecting rare event (jump) frequency and innovations that introduce positive jumps are more valuable for firms with higher frequency of competitive threats involving low volatility.     

Why is Convertible Debt Subordinated? An Investment‐Based Agency Theory

This paper offers an agency‐based explanation for the junior priority status of convertible bonds. Using a simple economic model, I show that when convertible and straight debt have equal priority, shareholders can prefer value‐decreasing projects, which results in wealth transfers from bondholders to shareholders; and I prove that this problem is solved when convertible debt is subordinated. Empirical evidence supports the theory. I find that firms with greater potential for investment‐based agency conflicts are more likely to issue subordinated convertible debt, and firms with senior convertible debt are more likely to deviate from the optimal investment policy.     

Investment Irreversibility,Cash Flow Risk,and Value‐Growth Stock Return Effects

We simulate results from a simple real options model to provide insight into the value‐growth stock return anomaly. In our model, firms possess either single (“value” firm) or multiple (“growth” firm) investment opportunities. Our model predicts that growth firms: (1) invest sooner, (2) exhibit greater continuity in capital expenditure over time, (3) have lower book‐to‐market ratios, and (4) generate lower rates of return than value firms.     

Does familiarity with business segments affect CEOs' divestment decisions?

We examine the impact of familiarity with business segments on CEOs' divestment decisions. We find CEOs are less likely to divest assets from familiar than from non-familiar segments. We attribute this effect to CEOs' comparative information advantage with respect to familiar segments. Consistent with this information advantage, we document that the familiarity effect is particularly strong in R&D intensive industries. We further find the familiarity effect to be most pronounced for longer-tenured CEOs who have built up sufficient political power over the course of several years in office to enable implementation of their preferred divestment choices. We also document the value effects of divestments and show that familiarity affects returns on divestment announcements.     

Making real options really work

As a way to value growth opportunities, real options have had a difficult time catching on with managers. Many CFOs believe the method ensures the overvaluation of risky projects. This concern is legitimate, but abandoning real options as a valuation model isn't the solution. Companies that rely solely on discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis underestimate the value of their projects and may fail to invest enough in uncertain but highly promising opportunities. CFOs need not--and should not--choose one approach over the other. Far from being a replacement for DCF analysis, real options are an essential complement, and a project's total value should encompass both. DCF captures a base estimate of value; real options take into account the potential for big gains. This is not to say that there aren't problems with real options. As currently applied, they focus almost exclusively on the risks associated with revenues, ignoring the risks associated with a project's costs. It's also true that option valuations almost always ignore assets that an initial investment in a subsequently abandoned project will often leave the company. In this article, the authors present a simple formula for combining DCF and option valuations that addresses these two problems. Using an integrated approach, managers will, in the long run, select better projects than their more timid competitors while keeping risk under control. Thus, they will outperform their rivals in both the product and the capital markets.     

Collateralizing liquidity

I develop a dynamic model of optimal funding to understand why financial assets are used as collateral instead of being sold to raise funds. Firms need funds to invest in risky projects with nonobservable returns. Since holding these assets allows firms to raise these funds, investing firms value the asset more than noninvesting ones. When assets are less than perfectly liquid and investment opportunities are persistent, collateralized debt minimizes asset transfers from investing to noninvesting firms and thus is optimal. Frictions in asset markets lead to an illiquidity discount and a collateral premium, which increase with the asset’s illiquidity.     

The Subjective Valuation of Indexed Stock Options and Their Incentive Effects

We analyze the potential role of indexed stock options in future pay‐for‐performance executive compensation contracts. We present a unified framework for index‐linked stock options, discuss their incentive effects, argue that indexation schemes based on the capital‐asset pricing model (CAPM) are the most suitable for executive compensation, and derive a subjective pricing model for the class of CAPM‐based indexed stock options. Contrary to earlier work, executives would not be motivated to take on investment projects with high idiosyncratic risk once their lack of wealth diversification and degree of risk aversion are factored into the analysis.     

CEO investment of deferred compensation plans and firm performance

We study how US chief executive officers (CEOs) invest their deferred compensation plans depending on the firm's profitability. By looking at the correlation between the CEO's return on these plans and the firm's stock return, we show that deferred compensation is to a large extent invested in the company equity in good times and divested from it in bad times. The divestment from company equity in bad times arguably reflects CEOs' incentive to abandon the firm and to invest in alternative instruments to preserve the value of their deferred compensation plans. This result suggests that the incentive alignment effects of deferred compensation crucially depend on the firm's health status.     

Family Control and Financing Decisions

This study uses a comprehensive European dataset to investigate the role of family control in corporate financing decisions during the period 1998–2008. We find that family firms have a preference for debt financing, a non‐control‐diluting security, and are more reluctant than non‐family firms to raise capital through equity offerings. We also find that credit markets are prone to provide long‐term debt to family firms, indicating that they view their investment decisions as less risky. In fact, our empirical results demonstrate that family firms invest less than non‐family firms in high‐risk, research and development (R&D) projects, but not in low‐risk, fixed‐asset capital expenditure (CAPEX) projects, suggesting that fear of control loss in family firms deters risk‐taking. Overall, our findings reveal that the external financing (and investment) decisions of family firms are in greater (lesser) conflict with the interests of minority shareholders (bondholders).     

High-speed rail transport valuation

In this paper, the optimal timing for investing in high-speed rail projects under uncertainty in relation to the utility provided to railway users was investigated. To accomplish this, a continuous time real options analysis framework using a stochastic demand model was developed to determine the optimal time to invest. Uncertainty upon investment expenditures was also added in an extended framework. The value of the option to defer and the investment opportunity value were also assessed.     

Friends or foes? Target selection decisions of sovereign wealth funds and their consequences

This paper examines investment strategies of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), their effect on target firm valuation, and how both of these are related to SWF transparency. We find that SWFs prefer large and poorly performing firms facing financial difficulties. Their investments have a positive effect on target firms' stock prices around the announcement date but no substantial effect on firm performance and governance in the long run. We also find that transparent SWFs are more likely to invest in financially constrained firms and have a greater impact on target firm value than opaque SWFs. Overall, SWFs are similar to passive institutional investors in their preference for target characteristics and in their effect on target performance, and SWF transparency influences SWFs' investment activities and their impact on target firm value.     

The Impact of Ambiguity on Managerial Investment and Cash Holdings

Standard finance theory suggests that managers invest in projects that, in expectation, produce returns that justify the use of capital. An underlying assumption is that managers have the information necessary to understand the distributional properties of the pay‐offs underlying the decision. This paper examines firm investment behavior when managers are likely to find it more challenging to develop expectations of pay‐offs, namely during periods of increased macroeconomic ambiguity. In particular, we examine how macroeconomic ambiguity – proxied by the variance premium (Drechsler, 2010 ) and the dispersion in forecasts of corporate profits from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (Anderson et al., 2009 ) – impacts managerial capital investment and cash holdings. Consistent with ambiguity theory, we find that macroeconomic ambiguity is negatively associated with capital investment and positively associated with cash holdings. These results are robust to alternative explanations related to risk, investor sentiment and economic conditions. Moreover, consistent with recent theoretical real options literature, we find that ambiguity reduces the value of investment opportunities, while risk increases the value of such opportunities. Overall, these findings provide initial empirical evidence on the economic distinction between ambiguity and risk with respect to managerial investment and cash holdings.     

The effects of external financing costs on investment timing and sizing decisions

We develop a dynamic model in which a firm exercises an option to expand production on either a small or large scale with cash reserves and costly external funds. An intermediate level of cash reserves, which is insufficient for the large-scale investment but sufficient for the small-scale investment, provides an incentive for the firm to invest early in the small-scale project. These results fill the gap between two types of results: (i) empirical findings of a U-shaped relation between the investment volume and internal funds and (ii) empirical predictions of a U-shaped relation between the investment timing and internal funds. In addition, our results have real-world implications for investment in alternative projects.     

CONVERTIBLE DEBT AND RISK‐SHIFTING INCENTIVES

I argue that convertible debt, in contrast to its perceived role, can produce shareholders’ risk‐shifting incentives. When a firm's capital structure includes convertible debt, every investment decision affects not only the distribution of the asset value but also the likelihood that the debt will be converted and thereby the distribution of the firm's leverage. This suggests that managers can engage in risk‐increasing projects if a higher asset risk generates a more favorable distribution of leverage. Empirical evidence using 30 years of data supports my argument.     

Product markets and corporate investment: Theory and evidence

Investment patterns often associated with agency and information problems can emerge as rational responses to product-market rivalry. We illustrate this result when industry players make simultaneous or sequential investment decisions in the face of two negative externalities. One externality arises when all competing firms invest, thus eroding the gains to investment accruing to any one firm. Another externality arises when some firms do not invest and lose out to rivals who do invest. The value of investment therefore depends on the investment’s intrinsic merits and the actions of all competitors. Our analysis can rationalize investment patterns that might appear suboptimal when such externalities are ignored. For instance, our simultaneous model can justify investment levels that might otherwise be interpreted as under- or over-investment. Our sequential model shows that value-maximizing firms might optimally herd in their investment decisions. We present evidence supporting key aspects of both the simultaneous and sequential models.     

Financing constraints, cash-flow risk, and corporate investment

Using an analytically tractable two-period model of a financially constrained firm, we derive an investment threshold that is U-shaped in cash holdings. We show analytically the relevant trade-offs leading to the U-shape: the firm balances financing costs for present and future investment, respectively. Our main argument is that financing costs today are more important than the risk of future financing costs. The empirically testable implications are that low-cash firms facing financing costs today are more reluctant to invest if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. On the other hand, cash-rich firms facing no financing costs today invest in less favorable projects (i.e., forgo their real option to wait) if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. The magnitude of these effects is amplified by the degree of market frictions that the firms are facing.     

Realizing the Potential of Real Options: Does Theory Meet Practice?

The idea of viewing corporate investment opportunities as “real options” has been around for over 25 years. Real options concepts and techniques now routinely appear in academic research in finance and economics, and have begun to influence scholarly work in virtually every business discipline, including strategy, organizations, management science, operations management, information systems, accounting, and marketing. Real options concepts have also made considerable headway in practice. Corporate managers are more likely to recognize options in their strategic planning process, and have become more proactive in designing flexibility into projects and contracts, frequently using real options vocabulary in their discussions. Thanks in part to the spread of real options thinking, today's strategic planners are more likely than their predecessors to recognize the “option” value of actions like the following: ? dividing up large projects into a number of stages; ? investing in the acquisition or production of information; ? introducing “modularity” in manufacturing and design; ? developing competing prototypes for new products; and ? investing in overseas markets. But if real options has clearly succeeded as a way of thinking, the application of real options valuation methods has been limited to companies in relatively few industries and has thus failed to live up to expectations created in the mid‐ to late‐1990s. Increased corporate acceptance and implementations of real options valuation techniques will require several changes coming together. On the theory side, we need more realistic models that better reflect differences between financial and real options, simple heuristic methods that can be more easily implemented (but that have been carefully benchmarked against more precise models), and better guidance on implementation issues such as the estimation of discount rates for the “optionless” underlying projects. On the practitioner side, we need user‐friendly real options software, more senior‐level buy‐in, more deliberate diffusion of real options knowledge throughout organizations, better alignment of managerial incentives with long‐term shareholder value, and better‐designed contracts to correct the misalignment of incentives across the value chain. If these challenges can be met, there will continue to be a steady if gradual diffusion of real options analysis throughout organizations over the next few decades, with real options eventually becoming not only a standard part of corporate strategic planning, but also the primary valuation tool for assessing the expected shareholder effect of large capital investment projects.     

Options trading activity and firm valuation

Options may have an effect on firm value because they help complete markets and stimulate informed trades. However, these benefits are likely to manifest themselves in active, rather than inactive, options markets. Supporting this observation, we find that firms with more options trading have higher values of Tobin's q, after accounting for other determinants of value. Corporate investment in firms with greater options trading is more sensitive to stock prices. Options trading affects firm valuation more strongly in stocks with greater information asymmetry. These results indicate that options trading is positively associated with firm values as well as information production.     

Public private partnerships: Incentives, risk transfer and real options

Private financing of large-scale infrastructure projects through public private partnerships (PPPs) has grown in recent decades. Together with changes in conventional construction procedures, there have been changes in the project financing model. The use of PPPs raises questions as to the role of the private sector in infrastructure provision and the conditions governing the long-term contractual relationships between the private and public sectors. In some early examples of PPPs, the government guaranteed a minimum profitability over the cash flows using a set of contractual terms which transferred some of the risk of the project from the private provider back to the government. Using a large toll road project, the Melbourne CityLink Project, as a case study we show how the imposed conditions can be treated as real options, how these options affect the incentive to invest and how the public sector may be transferring considerable value to the private sector through government guarantees.     

A Duration Model For Defaultable Bonds

I extend recent theoretical work on duration and derive an improved model for the risk‐adjusted duration of corporate bonds. My ex‐ante risk‐adjusted duration is the sum of the bond's Fisher‐Weil duration and the duration of the potential expected delay in recovery caused by the default option. My main conclusion is that failing to adjust duration for default is costly for high‐yield bonds, especially those with a shorter time to maturity. For investment‐grade bonds, this cost is trivial for all maturities.