股权质押下的控股股东增持:“价值信号”还是“行为信号”？

在股权质押的背景下,理性的控股股东会利用投资者的有限理性,通过增持向市场发送行为信号来提振股价,以缓解控制权转移风险。研究发现:股权质押下控股股东更有可能增持;短期内增持公告产生了正向的市场反应,其程度在非质押组和质押组间无显著差异;而长期来看,增持后质押组的长期股价以及经营绩效表现弱于其对照组,而非质押组则好于其对照组,说明股权质押下的增持并不是价值信号,而是行为信号。进一步研究发现,质押对增持的正向效应在高平仓压力组、低公司质量组、监管环境较宽松的欠发达地区更显著。拓展性检验表明,在考虑减持影响后,股权质押下控股股东更倾向于通过二级市场买卖和竞价交易实施净增持,并且管理层与其他大股东也会在一定程度上迎合控股股东的增持行为。最后本文排除了传统增持动机假说对上述结论的替代性解释。     

股权质押、盈余管理与审计师风险应对

基于2007—2018年我国A股1109家上市公司的数据,研究大股东股权质押、真实盈余管理与审计师风险应对之间的关系,探究真实盈余管理程度是否增强了大股东股权质押与审计师风险应对的正向关系。研究发现:大股东股权质押正向影响了审计费用和审计意见;真实盈余管理程度加剧了大股东股权质押后的负面效果,进而加强了大股东股权质押与审计费用间的正向关系,但对审计意见的影响不显著;进一步的研究发现:上期的审计费用反向助长了当期的股权质押率;存在大股东股权质押的上市公司,审计师出具非标准审计意见的概率会随审计费用的提高而加大。该结论扩展了审计师风险应对的研究范围及影响大股东股权质押的其他因素,对提高审计师风险应对及完善大股东股权质押政策具有一定的参考价值。     

券商的股权质押业务与其分析师荐股评级的乐观偏差

券商为上市公司大股东提供的股权质押融资服务是否会影响其分析师荐股评级的乐观偏差呢?本文基于我国A股上市公司2008-2016年间的数据对此问题展开了研究,结果发现,相较于非质权人券商分析师,质权人券商分析师对出质人公司的荐股评级更加乐观;且这一关系在规模较小的券商中更为明显。本文进一步研究还发现,质权人券商分析师的荐股评级乐观倾向主要存在于大股东股权质押期间,而在相关股权质押发生前和股权质押解除后,没有证据表明质权人券商分析师与非质权人券商分析师的荐股评级存在显著差异。本文的研究结果表明,券商作为上市公司大股东股权质押的质权人会带来利益冲突,并在一定程度上会有损于其所隶属分析师的独立性。     

大股东股权质押与上市公司资本运作

资本运作一方面可以提高股价,另一方面可以让公司股票停牌,那么是否会成为大股东度过质押风险的方式呢？基于此,本文以2007—2018年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,考察了大股东股权质押对上市公司资本运作的影响及其作用机制。研究发现:(1)大股东股权质押比例越高,上市公司进行资本运作的可能性越大; 这一关系在质押股权面临的平仓风险越高和非国有控股的上市公司中更为显著。(2)机制检验发现,随着质押比例的提高,上市公司进行资本运作后的停牌时间越长;从股价提升的效果来看,资本运作在短期内能提高股价,缓解质押风险,但从长期来看效果并不显著。(3)上市公司进行资本运作的方式主要为股权转让、资产收购和资产剥离;其中,大股东主要利用资产收购和资产剥离增加停牌时间,利用股权转让助推股价。在控制了潜在的内生性问题影响以及各种稳健性检验下,上述结论仍然成立。     

控股股东股权质押、高送转与股价崩盘风险

本文以2009-2018年沪深A股上市公司为样本,探讨控股股东股权质押对高送转、公司股价崩盘风险的影响。实证分析发现:控股股东进行股权质押后,会显著增加上市公司未来的股价崩盘风险;随着质押比例的升高,股价崩盘风险也增大。同时,股权质押后,上市公司会更倾向于推行高送转,持续正向增加股价崩盘风险。进一步研究发现,在民营企业以及控股股东持股比例较低的上市公司中,控股股东股权质押对股价崩盘风险的正向作用更强。     

大股东股权质押同伴效应的异质性研究北大核心CSSCI

文章以2009-2019年1043家A股上市公司的数据验证行业、地区同伴效应对大股东股权质押的影响。研究发现:行业与地区同伴效应将正向影响大股东的股权质押行为,地区同伴的影响更大;融资约束与国有产权性质均会削弱股权质押的同伴效应,市场竞争则加剧了股权质押的同伴效应;另外,股权质押的同伴效应会损害上市公司的企业价值,加深大股东的掏空程度。     

我国上市公司大股东增持的发展特征与市场意义研究

上市公司大股东增持是指上市公司大股东从股票二级市场上自主购进本公司股票,增加持股份额的行为,是一种我国股票市场上较为常见的股权管理方式.回顾我国上市公司大股东增持的发展历程,对我国上市公司大股东增持的发展特征和市场意义进行归纳总结,将对我国股票市场的发展和稳定产生积极影响     

控股股东股权质押、社会责任与上市公司财务风险

为探究控股股东股权质押对上市公司财务风险的影响机理,本文选取2012—2020年我国A股上市公司作为研究样本,运用固定效应模型实证检验控股股东股权质押对上市公司财务风险的影响、不同产权性质下控股股东股权质押对上市公司财务风险的影响差异,以及企业社会责任在二者关系中的调节效应。研究结果表明：控股股东股权质押会增加上市公司的财务风险;相对于国有上市公司而言,非国有上市公司控股股东股权质押对财务风险的正向影响会更加强烈;控股股东股权质押对上市公司财务风险的影响效应在社会责任表现较差的企业中更为明显。本研究为上市公司防范财务风险,为政府与监管机构监督股权质押行为提供了新的视角和理论依据。     

股权质押、员工持股计划与大股东自利行为

现阶段,作为激发员工积极性及实现效率提升的员工持股计划出现了大量的"倒挂"现象.本文以我国2013-2017年全部A股上市公司为研究样本,研究探析倒挂现象背后的大股东行为逻辑和利益链条.研究发现员工持股计划的信号作用很可能成为大股东进行自利的工具.具体表现为:股权质押情况越多,则大股东自利动机越大,员工持股计划实施的次数越多、范围越大.其次,在股权质押企业中,员工持股计划能够短期拉升股价,并且当股权质押面临平仓风险时,员工持股计划的动机越大.第三,股权质押会增加股票来源于定向转让员工持股计划的实施,继而达到大股东减持的目的,同时大股东会把通过减持获得的资金用于赎回质押股票.上述结论对员工持股计划"倒挂"的现象给出了一种解释,在存在股权质押的企业中,员工持股计划的实施可能是大股东自利的工具,即为了实现大股东利益最大化.     

股灾后大股东增持行为对股票价格的影响

我国股权分置改革开始后,上市公司大股东"增持"现象日益增多,对二级市场标的股票价格带来了正向影响。本文以沪深300成份股作为样本,通过事件研究法和多元回归方法研究大股东增持行为对市场的影响及影响因素的研究,证明了大股东增持会给市场带来超额收益,并且在增持比例越高情况下,竞争力越小的行业中,超额收益越显著。     

媒体公关、投资者情绪与证券发行定价

本文研究了拟上市公司通过专门针对媒体的公关活动影响其证券发行定价的内在机制。结果发现:公司可以通过投入媒体公关费用来增加媒体对于该公司的新闻报道量,这些报道在性质上属于正面的广告宣传,而正面新闻能够显著提高投资者对该公司的关注程度和乐观情绪;乐观情绪越强,则参与证券发行的投资者人数越多,需求量越大,进而导致证券发行价格的上调幅度越大。但是在长期内,当证券交易价格逐渐回归于实际价值时,发行前关注度越高的证券,其长期回报率越低。本文的研究意味着新闻媒体在证券发行中的宣传推介功能与其公司外部治理人的身份存在冲突。     

Share pledges,tone of earnings communication conferences,and market reaction: evidence from China

We investigate how share pledging affects firms’ disclosures and influences investors in Chinese stock market. The tone of firm disclosures when there are shares pledged by controlling shareholders is more positive than that of firms without them. Considering tone inflation motivation and ability simultaneously, we find share pledge risk has an inverted U‐shaped relation with tone. Investors react positively to tone in short‐run windows, and firms with controlling shareholders’ pledges have higher stock returns for earnings communication conferences. We identify an inverted U‐shaped link between margin distance of controlling shareholders and stock returns for earnings communication conferences.     

企业创新效率研究——来自股权质押的影响

本文结合我国实施创新驱动发展战略及股权质押频繁的现实背景,利用2006—2015年A股上市公司的数据,探讨控股股东的股权质押行为是否以及如何对企业的创新效率产生影响。研究表明,控股股东的股权质押行为会显著降低企业的创新效率。进一步地研究发现:(1)当第二类代理问题越严重,或质押风险越大时,控股股东股权质押行为抑制企业创新效率的作用越明显,表明控股股东股权质押伴随的掏空效应及短视效应,是导致二者负向关系的重要原因;(2)掏空效应和短视效应在影响控股股东股权质押与企业创新效率的关系上存在显著的替代效应;(3)研发投入强度下降时,控股股东股权质押对企业创新效率产生的负面效应更强。本文的研究不仅丰富了企业创新效率影响因素及控股股东股权质押经济后果的相关文献,对于规范控股股东股权质押行为,提高企业创新能力,实现创新驱动发展战略,也具有重要的启示意义。     

股权质押与公司估值:理论与实证

本文基于2000—2020年我国A股上市公司数据,探讨了控股股东股权质押对上市公司代理问题及其估值的非线性影响。研究发现,控股股东股权质押比例较低(高)时将会缓解(加剧)上市公司的代理问题,从而使其估值上升(下降)。进一步分析显示,随着控股股东股权质押比例的提高,上市公司的财务约束和财务困境水平先降后升,呈U形变化;与此同时,控股股东高股权质押比例降低了上市公司增量现金的边际价值,增加了其审计费用和违规频次。从企业异质性来看,国企子样本中上述关系大多不显著。本文研究对进一步理解股权质押的内在运行机制和经济后果有一定参考意义。     

Do controlling shareholders collude with their related large shareholders? Evidence of equity pledges and shareholding increases from China

The key for controlling shareholders to prevent the risk of equity pledge is to increase the stock price, and the large shareholders' shareholding increases have the effect of increasing the stock price. Using the data of Chinese A-share firms from 2007 to 2019, this paper examines the relationship between the controlling shareholders' equity pledges and their related large shareholders' shareholding increases. We find that when the controlling shareholders pledge equity, their related large shareholders are more likely to increase their shareholdings. By analyzing the necessity, ability and motivation of related large shareholders to provide help, we find that shareholding increases of related large shareholders are behaviors of helping controlling shareholders to mitigate the risk of equity pledge. Based on the analysis of external acquisition threats, stability heterogeneity of control rights and exogenous impact of Vanke Equity Competition, it is shown that the controlling shareholders pledging equity promote their related large shareholders to increase their shareholdings for the purpose of preventing the risk of control transfer. In further analysis, we find that the shareholding increases of related large shareholders have the practical effect of improving the stock price and preventing pledge risks. This paper proves that the controlling shareholders pledging equity collude with their related large shareholders, which is reflected in the fact that the shareholding increases of the related large shareholders have become a means for controlling shareholders to prevent the risk of equity pledge.     

One way out of the share pledging quagmire: Evidence from mergers and acquisitions

Share pledging by controlling shareholders is accompanied with a risk of control transfer when stock price decline triggers a margin call. This situation motivates controlling shareholders and firms to initiate value-enhancing activities to manage the pledging quagmire. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with pledging controlling shareholders are more likely to implement mergers and acquisitions (M&As) than other firms. Their M&As also perform better, regardless of whether using short- or long-term stock returns or operating income as the performance measure. Furthermore, the positive effect of share pledging on M&As is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, firms with individual controlling shareholders (especially families), firms with better governance, and firms with higher financial capabilities. Additional analyses on deal types also show that firms with pledging controlling shareholders are more likely to engage in diversified, non-affiliated, and cash-financed acquisitions. These results consistently suggest that M&As may effectively eliminate firms' pledging risks and that share pledging mitigates shareholders' conflict of interest regarding M&A decisions.     

Controlling shareholder share pledging and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from China

We propose and test the incentive view—that the margin call pressure and ownership-control discrepancy associated with insider share pledging increase investors’ perceived risk, and thus also the cost of equity capital, in an emerging market. Using a controlling shareholder share pledging sample for Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with share pledging have a cost of equity capital that is 23.7 basis points higher than firms without share pledging. Further, share pledging increases the cost of equity capital through the information risks and agency conflicts channels. Cross-sectional analyses show that share pledging has a stronger effect on the cost of equity capital in non-state-owned enterprises, firms without monitoring of multiple large shareholders, firms with controlling shareholders assuming the position of chairperson, and firms with a weak institutional environment. In addition, using the global financial crisis and the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) as quasi-natural experiments, we disentangle the potential confounding effect of firm fundamentals and show that share pledging is positively associated with the cost of equity capital. Overall, the results are consistent with our incentive view that share pledging increases the cost of equity capital in an emerging market.     

Financing constraints and share pledges: Evidence from the share pledge reform in China

Financing constraints are important to triggering controlling shareholders' share pledges. However, the related literature faces two major challenges: the endogeneity problem and the lack of direct evidence of why and how individual share pledges can ease corporate financing constraints. Based on China's Share Pledge Reform (SPR) in Q4 2012 and the phenomenon that private firms face discrimination when obtaining bank loans, this paper studies the impact of financing constraints on share pledging behavior and its mechanisms by building a difference-in-differences (DID) model. The SPR makes it more convenient for shareholders to raise money through share pledges, and shareholders of private firms facing stronger financing constraints are more vulnerable to this reform than are state-owned enterprises (SOEs). After the SPR, the probability of share pledging by controlling shareholders of private firms is approximately 23.04% higher than that of controlling shareholders of SOEs, and the pledge ratio is approximately 16.53% higher. Further tests reveal that, after the SPR, controlling shareholders of private firms are more inclined than those of SOEs to provide loans to the company to alleviate its financing constraints. Heterogeneity tests further corroborate the finding that this effect is more significant in private firms that are smaller and do not have shareholders of banking and institutional firms among their top ten shareholders.     

Is pledge risk matched between pledgees and pledgers in China’s share pledge market?

Based on a sample of share pledging by the controlling shareholders of A-share listed firms, we investigate whether pledge risk is matched between pledgees and pledgers in China’s share pledge market. The results show that, compared with broker pledgees, commercial bank pledgees accept pledged stocks with lower market risk and the corresponding listed firms are at lower risk, have higher levels of information transparency and are more likely to be state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We also find that commercial bank pledgees do not ease the risk requirement of pledged stocks for pledgers of SOEs. Further, we document that commercial bank pledgees face lower margin call risks than broker pledgees. After securities companies were authorized to compete in the share pledge market in 2013, the pledge risk faced by commercial bank pledgees further reduced. Our results support that China’s share pledge financing market generally achieves an efficient equilibrium in terms of pledge risk matching between pledgees and pledgers. We recommend that the macro control of share pledge risk be focused on broker pledgees.