美国财险公司衍生工具应用的价值和业绩效应

衍生金融工具价格并非标的金融资产价格的一元线性函数，因而使用衍生工具最终是否能够起到风险管理之目的虽倾向于正面但尚存争论。本文以美国财险上市公司为研究对象，研究衍生品使用对财险公司价值和业绩的直接效应。运用Panel data模型实证检验的结果表明，衍生工具运用之于财险公司价值及业绩影响性质不同。本文提出了中国衍生产品市场推出之后放开财脸企业的投资准入的建议。     

论衍生金融工具创新风险监管体系构建

随着衍生金融工具创新对国际、国内金融市场影响的加深,防范衍生金融工具创新风险具有重要意义。本文在分析衍生金融工具创新对金融与经济的双重影响的基础上,根据国际经济与金融的发展变化趋势,探讨如何构建有效的衍生金融工具创新风险监管体系。     

中国农业企业汇率风险应对行为的实证研究——基于企业竞争力视角

本文提出了一个涉外企业汇率风险应对行为的分析框架,并利用352家涉外农业企业调查数据与多元Logit模型,从企业竞争力视角实证检验中国农业企业汇率风险应对行为的影响因素。研究发现,企业竞争力对中国农业企业避险策略选择至关重要,且表征企业竞争力的诸多变量对汇率风险应对行为的影响各不相同:融资能力越强、在技术方面越有优势的农业企业越倾向于使用运营策略规避汇率风险,而国际化程度越高的农业企业越倾向于使用金融衍生工具管理汇率风险;同时,农业企业汇率风险应对行为存在较为明显的地区差异。在此基础上,本文提出中国涉外农业企业应对汇率风险、扩大出口的若干政策建议。     

儒家文化与股价崩盘风险

本文从非正式制度视角考察了儒家文化对公司股价崩盘风险的影响效应及作用机理。研究发现,公司受到儒家文化的影响程度越强,其股价崩盘风险越低。渠道分析表明,儒家文化主要通过抑制管理者自利动机、改善公司信息质量及降低管理者过度自信三条路径影响股价崩盘风险。进一步研究发现,儒家文化对股价崩盘风险的抑制作用在公司治理较弱和外部信息环境较差的情况下更加明显。这表明,儒家文化作为正式制度的一种隐性替代治理机制,对于防范股价崩盘风险、促进资本市场健康发展具有重要积极作用。本文不仅丰富了股价崩盘风险影响因素的研究,也深化了对儒家文化现代商业价值的理论认知。     

衍生金融工具会计信息披露问题的思考

衍生金融工具固有的高风险、突发性、复杂性的特点,使得衍生金融工具交易失败的案例数不胜数。而会计上的财务报告未能充分披露衍生金融工具的风险,很大程度上是投资者蒙受损失的一个重要原因,也造成了监管部门对衍生金融工具监管的困难。本文通过对衍生金融工具会计信息披露问题进行了分析,提出了相应的完善措施。     

我国衍生金融工具会计监督问题探讨

衍生金融工具是随着经济发展过程中的一种金融创新,它具有高风险、高收益的特征,在给衍生金融工具双方带来超额收益的同时,也蕴含着难以预料的风险.目前就世界范围来看,各国经济体多是把对衍生金融工具的监管集中于金融监管方面,对衍生金融工具的会计监管体系仍然处于缺位状态,衍生金融工具的会计监管准则仍处于构想和制定、完善过程中.本文在对衍生金融工具会计监管概念概述的基础上,对我国衍生金融工具会计监管中存在的问题进行了分析,最后有针对性的提出了加强衍生金融工具会计监管的对策,希望能对我国金融市场金融衍生工具的监管工作有所帮助.     

衍生金融工具会计信息披露问题的思考

衍生金融工具固有的高风险、突发性、复杂性的特点,使得衍生金融工具交易失败的案例数不胜数。而会计上的财务报告未能充分披露衍生金融工具的风险,很大程度上是投资者蒙受损失的一个重要原因,也造成了监管部门对衍生金融工具监管的困难。本文通过对衍生金融工具会计信息披露问题进行了分析,提出了相应的完善措施。     

商业银行衍生金融工具交易会计处理几个问题的探讨——兼谈我国金融工具会计准则

近年来国内商业银行衍生金融工具交易业务迅猛发展。衍生金融工具既能规避风险，叉能产生风险，是一把锋利的“双刃剑”。衍生金融工具的超前发展和监管滞后产生的矛盾，是衍生金融工具最大的风险来源，因此中国银监会2004年第1号令就是颁布《金融机构衍生产品交易业务管理暂行办法》，以加强对衍生金融工具市场监管。而作为监管基础的会计核算，如果对衍生金融工具不反映和不规范反映都将引致不可预期的严重后果，在国内发展衍生金融工具呼声高涨的大环境下，改革有关金融衍生品的会计核算制度也显得日益紧迫。     

上市公司衍生金融工具交易亏损原因及其风险防范

我国上市公司运用衍生金融工具业务现状不容乐观,出现了投机交易失败、套期保值交易不当等问题.上市公司衍生金融工具交易亏损原因是多方面的,如内部控制制度失效,违规操作造成重大损失；法人治理结构不完善,企业风险管控机制缺失；专业人才缺乏,国际投行欺诈；国内金融衍生产品市场发展滞后,有效监管不足等.上市公司要防范衍生金融工具交易风险,必须强化风险意识,正确运用金融衍生产品的功能；完善内部控制制度,防范衍生金融工具投资的各类风险；加快人才引进和培养,提高金融衍生产品从业人员投资能力.     

浅谈衍生金融工具对会计业务带来的风险

衍生金融是指基本金融工具(债券、股票)以外的金融工具。衍生金融工具在规避外汇风险和提高资金使用率方面提供了一条新的途径。衍生金融会计本身也会存在风险,如何规避衍生金融工具引发的风险,是目前会计研究的一项重要课题。     

Voluntary forward-looking statements driven by corporate governance and their value relevance

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on the level of voluntary disclosures of forward-looking statements in the narrative sections of annual reports. It also examines whether the forward-looking statements that are driven by governance are informative about future earnings. This analysis is drawn from a large-scale sample of UK FTSE All-Share companies for financial years ending within the period January 1996–December 2007. We find that corporate governance influences companies’ decisions to voluntarily disclose these statements. The main drivers are directors’ ownership, board size, board composition, and the duality of the CEO’s role. These results suggest that better corporate governance improves reporting practice. We further find that the forward-looking statements of well governed firms improve the stock market’s ability to anticipate future earnings. Our findings have important implications for policy makers and regulators because they confirm that the effectiveness of corporate governance in the practice of disclosure is a function of certain characteristics and that the voluntary forward-looking statements of well governed firms contain value relevant information for investors.     

The impact of divergence in voting and cash-flow rights on the use of bank debt

This paper examines the debt ownership structure of firms with corporate governance problems associated with the divergence in the controlling shareholders' voting and cash-flow rights. Previous studies suggest that debt can play an important role in mitigating corporate governance problems. However, not all debt can effectively manage the corporate governance problems associated with the financing of poorly governed firms. In this study, we find that firms with higher divergence in voting and cash-flow rights use significantly more bank debt financing. Moreover, the effect of the divergence in voting and cash-flow rights on the use of bank debt is greater in countries with weaker legal protection for investors. Overall, our findings suggest that bank debt has a comparative advantage in financing poorly governed firms.     

Currency hedging and corporate governance: A cross-country analysis

This paper examines the impact of the strength of governance on firms' use of currency derivatives. Using a sample of firms from 30 countries over the period 1990 to 1999, we find that strongly governed firms tend to use derivatives to hedge currency exposure and overcome costly external financing. On the other hand, weakly governed firms appear to use derivatives mostly for managerial reasons. These results are robust to alternative measures of corporate governance, various subsamples, the use of foreign denominated debt as an alternative strategy to hedge currency exposure, and a potential selection bias. Overall, the results serve as the first comprehensive evidence of the impact of firm- and country-level corporate governance on firms' use of derivatives.     

Corporate governance and dynamics capital structure: evidence from Vietnam

This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance and speed of adjustment (SOA) of capital structure for listed firms in Vietnam from 2000 to 2016. We first examine the literature on the influence of crucial corporate governance mechanisms, including gender diversity and managerial ownership, on SOA. Empirically, we then find that board size, board independence, gender diversity, and managerial ownership significantly increase SOA, but CEO duality significantly decreases it. We discuss some policy implications for firms and Vietnamese authorities.     

A TEST OF THE TWO-TIER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE: THE CASE OF JAPANESE KEIRETSU

We examine the effect of corporate governance structure on the relation between ownership structure and financial leverage among Japanese firms. Under normal conditions, we find no significant relation between ownership variables and financial leverage. When firms signal financial difficulties, however, keiretsu financial institution equity owners intervene to moderate the use of debt. This evidence reveals the existence of a keiretsu two-tier corporate governance system. In the first stage, the unique corporate cross-shareholding allows mutual monitoring under normal circumstances. In the second stage, when firms get into financial trouble, keiretsu financial institutions assume control by reducing debt levels. The results highlight differences between keiretsu and independent corporate governance structures.     

Corporate Governance,Political Connections,and Intra‐Industry Effects: Evidence from Corporate Scandals in China

This paper investigates intra‐industry spillover effects of corporate scandals in China. We demonstrate how a contagion effect spreads to peer firms depending upon the quality of corporate governance and their political connections. Good corporate governance in peer firms reduces the contagion effect of scandals. External governance has a stronger influence on reducing the contagion effect of both financial and non‐financial scandals, while ownership concentration and the quality of auditors play a more pronounced role in mitigating the contagion effect of financial scandals. State ownership helps to mitigate the negative influence of non‐financial scandals in individual‐owned firms, but not in state‐owned enterprises.     

The impact of anti-corruption measures and risk effects on equity incentives and financial misreporting in China

This study examines the effects of anti-corruption and equity incentive risk on financial misreporting in the context of China’s unique corporate ownership structure and governance regime. Using a sample comprising 2,708 cases of financial restatement over the 2007–2017 period. Our key findings suggest that managers’ shareholdings are significantly and positively associated with their firms’ financial misreporting, and certain equity risk factors dramatically alter Chinese corporate governance. Furthermore, managers’ motivation to misreport is significantly more pronounced in non–state owned enterprises (non-SOEs), suggesting that equity incentive risk effects mitigate the “absence of ownership” problem believed to affect SOEs. Managers in highly competitive industries and firms with low institutional ownership are found to be highly motivated to misreport performance.     

Corporate governance and firm value: Evidence from Chinese state-controlled listed firms

The association between corporate governance and firm value has been extensively studied in Chinese listed firms. Based on the characteristics of their ultimate shareholders, Chinese listed firms can be categorised as (1) central state-controlled, (2) local state-controlled or (3) non-state-controlled. Some scholars have described Chinese government policy as ‘zhuada fangxiao’, thus suggesting that the corporate governance mechanisms (CGMs) of central state-controlled listed firms (SCLFs) are better than those of local state-controlled listed firms. Therefore, this paper specifically examines the influence of CGMs on the value of central SCLFs and local SCLFs. Analysis of 2006 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2009 suggests that the aggregate ownership of other large shareholders and the remuneration of top executives exhibit different effects on firm value in central and local SCLFs. The results also provide evidence that there is no endogenous effect of firm value on the ownership of the largest shareholder in central and local SCLFs.     

Do minority acquisitions transfer better corporate governance practices? An analysis of UK's cross-border minority investments

This study examines the influence of minority shareholders on the transfer of corporate governance practices into companies in other countries where they invest. By analysing UK firms that acquired a minority ownership in foreign firms between 1993 and 2014, we find evidence of better corporate governance in the board structure of target foreign firms following UK firms taking a minority shareholding, the extent and nature of the changes varying depending on the quality of investor protection in the country the foreign target firm is located. Our findings contribute to the on-going debates on the spillover effect of better corporate governance practices via cross-border mergers and acquisitions as well as relationship between internal (board of directors) and external (country's quality of investor protection) corporate governance mechanisms.     

Ownership structure,corporate governance,and fraud: Evidence from China

Our study examines whether ownership structure and boardroom characteristics have an effect on corporate financial fraud in China. The data come from the enforcement actions of the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The results from univariate analyses, where we compare fraud and no-fraud firms, show that ownership and board characteristics are important in explaining fraud. However, using a bivariate probit model with partial observability we demonstrate that boardroom characteristics are important, while the type of owner is less relevant. In particular, the proportion of outside directors, the number of board meetings, and the tenure of the chairman are associated with the incidence of fraud. Our findings have implications for the design of appropriate corporate governance systems for listed firms. Moreover, our results provide information that can inform policy debates within the CSRC.